Regionalism, populism and federalism in Argentina, 1916-1930. by Rodriguez, Celso.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1974
Regionalism, populism and federalism in Argentina,
1916-1930.
Celso. Rodriguez
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rodriguez, Celso., "Regionalism, populism and federalism in Argentina, 1916-1930." (1974). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 1336.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1336

REGIONALISM, POPULISM AND FEDERALISM
IN ARGENTINA, 1916-1930
A Dissertation Presented
By
Celso Rodriguez
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May ^9'^^
History
Celso Rodriguez 1974
All Rights Reserved
iii
REGIONALISM, POPULISM AND FEDERALISM
IN ARGENTINA, 1916-1930
A Dissertation
By
Celso Rodriguez
Approved as to style and content by:
Robert A. Potash, Chairman of Committee
Lewis U. Hanke, Member
ane M. Loy, Member
Howard J. V/iWda, Member
Robert H. McNeal, Department Head
May 1974
ABSTRACT
Regionalism, Populism and Federalism in
Argentina, 1916-1930 (May 1974)
Celso Rodriguez, B.A., S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo
M.A., S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo
Directed "by: Dr. Robert A. Potash
The enactment of the Saenz Pena Electoral Law of
1912 and the election four years later of Hipolito
Yrigoyen, the Radical Party presidential candidate,
constituted notable achievements in the long struggle for
political refo3rm in Argentina. The Radical Party success,
however, represented only a partial victory for the reform
movement. Yrigoyen' s election in 1916 did not give his
followers simultaneous control of the provincial
governments as was to be the case with Peron' s triumph
thirty years later. Accordingly, the politics of the
Yrigoyen administrations revolved in great part around
intra-provincial power struggles and the relations between
the national administration and provincial authorities.
Much of what has been published about the Radical
Party and its dominance of Argentina from 1916 to 1930 has
been written from the viewpoint of national politics. The
present study directs attention to the provincial arena
where the conflict between traditional and reform elements
1
2and between rival factions of the latter was a continuing
theme despite Radical dominance of the Casa Rosada,
In particular this study focuses on the two western
provinces of Mendoza and San Juan and on the transformation
of the Radical movement there from 1918 to 1930. As in no
other Argentine provinces during that period, Radicalism
in these two states displayed distinctive popular
characteristics. These were evidenced both in the personal
style of their undisputahle leaders—Jose Nestor Lencinas
and his son Carlos Washington, in Mendoza, and the brothers
Pederico and Aldo Cantoni, in San Juan—and in the principles
of social justice on which they based their political action.
These leaders generated two movements known as
Lencinism and Bloquism which produced a tremendous regional
impact. Their social accomplishments surpassed the moderate
approach of the Radical Party at the national level, and
because of their populist principles and procedures, they
distinguished Mendoza and San Juan from the rest of the
country during these years. This study analyzes the
populist characteristics, the authoritarian political style,
and the emotional strength which these two movements
forged within the patria chica from the time they assumed
power until 1930. This work also evaluates the degree to
which the expectations they raised were fulfilled, as
well
as their role as defenders of the federalist
principles.
3Since the policies of these regional leaders had great
impact beyond the geographical boundaries of llendoza
and San Juan, their relevance in the larger scene is
also analyzed. There they became involved in an almost
permanent conflict with the national authorities and
their political adversaries in Buenos Aires.
Because Lencinism and Bloquism were popular provincial
movements which offered an alternative to the traditional
rule of a local oligarchy, their reforms were a harbinger
of the changes which took place throughout Argentina in
the 1940* s and 1950' s. While Peronism was not consciously
modeled after Lencinism or Bloquism, it shared the same
fundamental characteristics of authoritarian political
behavior and a strong preoccupation with the welfare of
the masses. This study, therefore, while focusing on the
regional politics of an earlier era, provides a basis for
appraising the domestic roots of Peronism.
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VINTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Saenz Pena Electoral Law of
1912 and the election four years later of Hipolito Yrigoyen,
the Radical Party presidential candidate, constituted
notable achievements in the long struggle for political
reform in Argentina. The Radical Party success, however,
represented only a partial victory for the reform movement.
Yrigoyen' s election in 1916 did not give his followers
simultaneous control of the provincial governments as was
to be the case with Peron's triumph thirty years later.
Accordingly, the politics of the Yrigoyen administration
revolved in great part around intra-provincial power
struggles and the relations between the national
administration and provincial authorities.
Much of what has been published about the Radical
Party and its dominance of Argentina from 1916 to 1930 has
been written from the viewpoint of national politics. It
is the purpose of this study to direct attention to the
provincial arena where the conflict between traditional
and reform elements, and between rival factions of the
latter was a continuing theme despite Radical dominance of
the Casa Rosada.
In particular this study will focus on the two
western provinces of Mendoza and San Juan and on the
transformation of the Radical movement there from 1918 to
vi
1930. As in no other Argentine province during that
period, Radicalism in these two states displayed
distinctive popular characteristics. These were evidenced
both in the personal style of their undisputable leaders
—Jose Nestor Lencinas and his son Carlos Washington, in
Mendoza; and the brothers Federico and Aldo Cantoni, in
San Juan—and in the principles of social justice on which
they based their political action.
These leaders generated two movements known as
Lencinism and Bloquism which produced a tremendous regional
impact. Their social accomplishments surpassed the moderate
approach of the Radical Party at the national level, and
because of their populist principles and procedures, they
distinguished Mendoza and San Juan from the rest of the
country during these years. This study, which attempts
neither a history of Lencinism and Bloquism nor a biography
of their caudillos, will focus on the populist
characteristics, the authoritarian political style, and the
emotional strength which these two principal movements
forged within the patria chica, from the time they took
power until 1930. This work will also evaluate to what
degree the expectations they raised were fulfilled.
As their impact beyond their geographical
boundaries
was also significant, the role of Lencinism
and Bloquism
in the larger national scene will also
be considered.
vii
There they became involved in an almost permanent conflict
with the national authorities and their political
adversaries in Buenos Aires. Finally, in an overall view,
the relevance of these movements will be analyzed in
conjunction with the issue of federalism and with their
historical significance as regional precursors of Peronism.
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CHAPTER I
GENERAL FEATURES OF MENDOZA AND SAN JUAN
BEFORE THE RISE OF THE RADICAL PARTY
Physical Framework
The provinces of Mendoza and San Juan constitute, together
with San Luis, a region known as Cuyo, located in western
Argentina, in the central part of the country on a north-south
axiSf Mendoza has always been the most important of the three
provinces, followed by San Juan and then San Luis.^
The area of the province of Mendoza is 58,239 sq. mi.,
similar to the size of the state of Michigan. From the physical
and economic viewpoint it can be divided into four main regions:
the mountains, the eastern plains, the fluvial oases and an
area called Payunia.
The region of the mountains, part of the cordillera of the
Andes, covers the western side from north to south. Because of
its natural characteristics, it has a very sparse population
and it is potentially rich in mineral resources.
On the eastern side of the province, from the border with
San Juan in the north to that of La Pampa, in the south, is
the region of the plains, which borders on the west with the
fluvial oases. This semi-desert plains area has very little
^The general information for this topic was taken from
Erancisco de Aparicio and Horacio A. Difrieri, La A££en|2Ji|.
Suma de geografia (9 vols., Buenos Aires, 1963), Vols. 1,
ii,
fv^VII and VIII; and Miguel Marzo and Osvaldo Inchauspe,
Geograffa de Mendoza (2 vols., Mendoza, 1967).
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2rainfall and very few human clusters of importance because of
the scarcity of water. Housing reflects the poverty of the
whole environment, and land communications are poorly
developed. Land tracts are not as much divided as they are in
the fluvial oases, but even the largest extensions cannot be
compared with the latifundia of Buenos Aires province, because
of their inferior agronomic value.
The most important region of Mendoza is the fluvial oases.
Here as in San Juan, water has been the fundamental factor for
the attraction and settlement of people. There is no cultivation
in either province which does not depend on artificial irrigation.
Because of it, men established roots on the borders of the
rivers and the whole life of the two states is conditioned by
the availability and improvement of hydrographical resources.
This absolute dependence on artificially distributed water has
created exemplary working habits in the people of the region.
While in the Humid Pampa the fields are watered by generous
rainfalls, the agricultural life on the west depends entirely
upon human labor, which has to provide the irrigation that
nature denies. In this region land ownership is greatly divided,
a pattern which began developing late in the nineteenth century.
Because of this Mendoza deserves to be called the country of
the small landowner.
There are two important oases, one in the north, formed
by the Mendoza and Tunuyan rivers; and the other in the south,
formed by the Diamante and Atuel rivers. In the northern oasis
the Mendoza river is the most useful for the province and its
3area of influence embraces the largest population. Together
with the Tunuyan, it forms an oasis where most of the
economic, cultural and administrative activities of the
province take place, and the largest number of intensively
cultivated crops exists.^ The southern oasis has the same
characteristics although in lesser scope, and its main
urban center is the city of San Rafael.
Payunia is the remaining region of Mendoza, and is
located south of the oasis formed by the Diamante and Atuel
rivers. It is a semi-desert area sparsely populated; its
main center is Malargue and this region still must be
considered as a promise for the future. It differs
ecologically from the rest of the province because it
represents a penetration of Patagonia into Southern Cuyo,
with its volcanic geological structure and saline and
gypseous soil. Rainfall in the province is always
insufficient, especially in wintertime. Hail and frost are
constant threats to the crops and there are no departments
free from these severe natural calamities.^
The province of San Juan has an area of 33 f 257 sq. mi.,
comparable in size to the State of Maine. It is more
^The capital city, Mendoza, is located in the
proximity of the Mendoza river, at 2,467 feet above sea level.
^The provinces of Mendoza and San Juan are
politically divided into districts called departamentos .
They are the equivalent of counties in the United States.
The Cordillera influences air currents moving from
the west. This gives rise to a phenomenon of the region,
the famous Zonda, which blows periodically in San Juan and
Mendoza.
4mountainous and arid than Mendoza but shares with it most of
its physical characteristics. San Juan can be divided into
three regions. One is the western part, which covers one
third of its territory. It contains the high mountains of
the Cordillera, the parallel ranges of the pre-cordillera
and between them, the productive but not very populated
valleys of Rodeo, Iglesia, Calingasta and Barreal.
The central region is under the influence of two
fluvial oases. The one in the north centers around Jachal and
is irrigated by the river of the same name. Its trade with
Chile was important for many years, but toward the end of the
nineteenth century the area suffered from lack of adequate
development and communications. In comparison to other
sections of the province, Jachal remained in a state of near
stagnation. In the south is located the most important
economic, social and administrative center of the province.
Here is San Juan's capital, also called San Juan, and the
departments surrounding it are intensively cultivated. This
entire area belongs to the oasis formed by the San Juan river,
the most important and the only one which can be compared in
significance with the four principal rivers of Mendoza.
Eastern San Juan, the third region of the province, is
an area less mountainous than the others. While its northern
section enjoys a sub-tropical climate and is artificially
irrigated, the southern part is arid and mostly uninhabited.
San Juan has a mild climate during winter, but summer is
very hot and dry, and the low humidity allows for permanent
5clear skies and a radiant sua; its annual rainfall averages less
than four inches, quite insufficient and only half of what
Mendoza gets. This type of climate, providing enough water is
available through artificial irrigation, is ideal for the
development of viticulture.
The physical characteristics of Mendoza and San Juan
described above existed during the early decades of this
century. But irrigation development and land cultivation were
much less significant than at present. The only important
areas in Mendoza centered then in the northern oasis; the
southern one, focusing on San Rafael was insignificant, but
began a rapid development during the 1920' s. In San Juan the
center of activities was in the areas around the capital and
Jachal. By 1917 land communications in both provinces consisted
only of dirty roads or mere cart paths, and the means of
4transportation depended entirely on the use of animals.
What influence did the particular geography of these
provinces exert on their inhabitants? What kind of habits and
customs were shaped when instead of huge extensions of land
the campesino had to concentrate on a few acres and was forced
to irrigate them artificially? In colonial times the Spaniards
settled on the edges of the rivers and slowly evolved from a
society of farmers to viticulture. Over the centuries this
transformation has created an industrious community. Hence,
^The population of Mendoza in 1914 was 277,500; in 1972
it reached one million. San Juan had a population of 119,200
in 1914, and 388,000 in 1970.
6the man working the land in Cuyo could not be compared with
the gaucho who was typical of the Humid Pampa.
As life in these provinces flourished in the oases, the
geographic and economic conditions developed an environment
conducive to social cooperation. The average campesino was
not an expert horseman as was the gaucho; he preferred the
mule to the horse because the former was easier to handle in
the rugged geography of the mountains and was a very valuable
aid dioring harvest time, when thousands of mules were used
to pull the carts filled with grapes. The paisano of Mendoza
and San Juan, the native as well as the immigrant, was rooted
to the land he worked; moreover, he tended to be a family man
5living in an established community. The aridity of the land
posed a challenge that could only be overcome with hard work.
In Mendoza and San Juan this challenge was accepted.
A civilizing factor of prime significance for both
provinces was the building of the railroad lines through the
desert. Upon the completion of this communication with the
east, Cuyo experienced a thrust for progress. In 1875 the
railroad reached Mercedes, in San Luis province, and in 1885
the Perrocarril Andino began its services between San Juan and
Mendoza and Buenos Aires.
^
^Jorge I. Segura, Danzas folkl5ricas ^ tradici onales
de Mendoza . Panorama de cuatro siglos (Mendoza, 1971),
unpublished.
^Until 1910 San Juan was connected by railroad only to
Mendoza, making the northern province greatly dependent on
the southern neighbor. The opening that year of the San Juan-
7Almost at the same time the conquest of the desert took
place under the command of General Roca. In 1879 the campaign
headed by Lt. Col. Napoleon Uriburu freed all southern Mendoza
of Indians for the first time.
Economic development to 1916
The economy of Mendoza and San Juan was, and still is,
basically founded upon the wine industry. Especially since the
1880' s, it has been their most important source of public and
private wealth. The agricultural-industrial backbone of the
entire grape-wine economic complex was constituted by the
vinateros , the owners and keepers of the vineyards, and by
the bodegueros , the owners of the wine-making establishments.
The vinateros were the largest group, ranging from the
small proprietor who worked a limited number of acres, to the
large landowner whose vineyards represented a substantial
7
capital investment and who had them worked by contratistas .
Most of the vinateros cultivated the land to sell their
production because they did not own a bodega . The average
bodeguero did not own a vineyard; he made wine from grapes
which he bought from the vinateros. An important variation
was the combination of the two mentioned groups, that is, the
Serrezuela line, in the northwest of Cordoba, provided San Juan
with a new means of communication and trade, especially with
northern Argentina, so the province became less dependent on
the traditional hegemony of Mendoza.
"^They are named so because of the contract they sign
when arranging the working rules with the landowner.
8vinatero with bodega, or the reciprocal, the bodeguero who
processed the grapes from his own vineyards and those he
bought from other vinateros.
As the final decision regarding the seasonal price for
the grapes depended on the bodeguero, the vinatero was always
subordinated to the fluctuations of the market. His bargaining
position vis-a-vis the bodeguero was very limited because
once the grapes reach the proper stage of maturity they have
to be gathered within a short time. Any delay deteriorates the
Q
product and forces the vinatero to dispose hastily of it.
As the industry became more developed, its importance
to the economic vitality of the province increased. Fiscal
receipts depended to a very large extent on the wine industry,
forcing the provincial governments, in reality, to become a
subordinate partner of the bodegueros and vinateros.
The protection of the wine interests, like that of sugar
in northern Argentina, was an essential factor in the
consolidation of the industry. But in spite of the tariff
barrier, it experienced serious crises as a result of
fluctuations in consumption, adverse climatic conditions,
credit abuses, and the adulteration of wines, all of which
handicapped its development and impaired its reputation. The
shifts in prices quoted for wine at the bodega suggest the
^Another important factor which denoted the supremacy
of the bodeguero was that he paid in four quarterly
installments for the grapes he bought at harvest time; but
starting each July he was able to sell the regular wine from
the harvest. Therefore, he could advantageously finance most
of his operations while taking the whole year to pay off
the vinatero.
magnitude of the problem:
Year Year Price Year Price
1900 5 cents 1910 17 cents 1914 10 cents1901 6 1911 17 1q;1^5 g1902 8 1912 20 I9i6 7
1903 12 1913 16 1917 10
Source: Provincia de Mendoza, Sumario estadiatico. 1936(Mendoza, 1937), p. 17Ti
The steps taken to remedy the crises affecting Mendoza and
San Juan at the beginning of the century, and again from 1914
to 1918, took into consideration the interests of the large
landowners and the wine-makers, usually referred to as
industrialists. Control of the executive and legislative
branches of the provincial governments was in the hands of
people directly or indirectly linked with those interests.
They used their power to enact legislation whose main objective
was to defend the patrimony of the bodegueros and vinateros by
revaluating the product. To accomplish this, in 1914, a large
number of acres with vineyards were uprooted and more than
7,242,000 gallons of wine, valued at 2,193,000 pesos were
Q
thrown away.
As the measures taken proved ineffective, in December
I9I6, Law No. 703 was enacted, rekindling the hopes for a
solution to the problems of the depressed industry. The law
encouraged the creation of cooperatives, but only one was
formed, the so-called Cooperativa Vitivinl cola. The policy of
^Leopoldo Suarez, La industria vitivinicola (Mendoza,
1922), p. 28. The legislation enacted authorized the building
of regional bodegas to allow the legion of vifiateros to make
wine from their own production, but not a single regional
bodega was built.
10
elimination of grapes continued with such intensity that
those destroyed during 1916-1917 were valued at 3,753,000
pesos and in the season 1917-1918 amounted to 7,648,000
pesos,^^
The figures given above are indirect evidence that
another victim of these crises was the man whose work
depended on the prosperity of the vineyards and the bodegas.
In 1908, for example, a gatherer earned ten cents for each
basket of grapes. Thus, a man working with help from others
could earn from 8 to 9 pesos per day. In 1916, his wages were
less than half that amount because of the much smaller harvest,
which sunk the worker in a deep misery. The destruction of the
grapes, which were never gathered but destroyed at the vine
itself, left thousands of workers idle and countless families
impoverished. No legislation was enacted to solve this problem.
As water was the vital element for the economic development
of Mendoza and San Juan, its distribution was a matter of
paramount importance. To secure a satisfactory apportionment
of water for all the vinateros, a system of local juntas was
set up for the administration of its distribution. Moreover, to
avoid undesirable manipulations of any nature the juntas were
granted financial autonomy in order to meet their ordinary
expenses.
On paper, the legislation concerning all the irrigational
^^Ibid . The tremendous magnitude of this figure appears
more viviHly when it is compared with the total fiscal receipts
for the province during 1915, which amounted to 7,547,000 pesos.
11
matters was entirely non-political and technically-oriented.
In reality, however, the handling of the distribution of
water became on several occasions an electoral tool,
popularly known as the torniquete del agua, the water
tourniquet. It meant a precious reward for the supporters of
the influential groups and an arbitrary punishment imposed
upon the political adversaries.^^
Provincial Currency
The issue of provincial money was a problem that
affected Mendoza and San Juan, as well as other provinces.
Part of the financial support for public works, and especially
for irrigation purposes, was obtained by issuing provincial
scripts, or letras de tesoreria . The first issue was made in
1892 in order to finance the building of a dam and intakes in
the Mendoza river. Although other public works were funded
through the years by the same means, financial difficulties
and lack of scruples in the enforcement of the laws transformed
the letras into ordinary income for the provincial treasury.
As the letras were issued in small values they soon
circulated as regular currency within the provincial boundary.
The national government took the position that the circulation
of the letras as currency violated Article 108 of the national
constitution which placed the right to issue currency
exclusively in the hands of the federal authorities.
^^Another facet of the favoritisms which the necessity
of water made possible were the concessions granted to irrigate
thousands of acres in isolated areas. These concessions paved
the way for land speculation and abusive enrichment.
12
In defense of the provincial policy, the commercial
and industrial interests of Mendoza, grouped in the Bolsa
Vitivinicola y Comercial, informed Governor Emilio Civit in
1908 about their great financial requirements for carrying
on agricultural works, and the need to fulfill their credit
obligations. They asked Civit, in the name "of the superior
ideal of preserving and protecting the public and private
well-being," to continue the issuance of letras, as he was
authorized to do by the provincial legislation. Responding
favorably to this statement, the governor affirmed in January
1909, that it was the duty of the province to participate
with its financial resources and its credit to promote the
12
activities of its commerce and industry.
Although rebuffed by a presidential order demanding the
immediate withdrawal of the letras, Civit stated weeks later
in a note to the Ministry of Hacienda, that the letras were a
very valuable auxiliary element to the national currency. The
governor's position was that the amount of currency circulating
in Mendoza was insufficient to cover the needs of its commerce
and industry. He affirmed that the public circulated the letras
without any impediment; that they were not subject to any
discount or depreciation; that the province received the letras
for tax payment purposes, and that the business community in
general was accepting them because of their certain and easy
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Las letras de tesoreria ante
la constitucion ^ leyes de la nacion (Mendoza, 1909) , pp. 25-28
13
convertibility. Furthermore, with respect to the legal aspect
of the problem, he stated that
the fact that the letras are issued also in small
values, but not inferior to one peso, does not
affect at all their legal standing, because it
is not denied that it is an indisputable right
of the provinces to issue bonds backed by their
own credit. 13
Despite this defense of the use of letras, the customary
lack of responsibility on the part of the provincial
governments resulted in many cases of non-compliance with the
very conditions imposed by the provincial laws authorizing
14.their issuance.
The Work in the Vineyards and the Impact of Immigration
The initial economic pattern of scattered small properties
worked by their owners with the help of relatives was
substantially transformed through the years with the emergence
of a system in which thousands of families took care of the
15
vines on lands owned by others. Most of the work in the
vineyards was done, and still is done, by the contratistas.
But the term contratista, in fact, does not involve one person
^^Ibid.
, p. 58.
^^As an example, on January 1st, 1912, there were
circulating in Mendoza 820,274 pesos in letras, which ought
to have been withdrawn two years before. Mario Arenas, Estudio
historico ^ critico sob re las finanzas de la provincia de
Mendoza en 1912 (Buenos Aires, 1913), p. 61.
"^^The growing number of acres of vineyards are an
indication of the expansion which took place in the fluvial
oases. In Mendoza there were 16,000 in 1890; 112,000 in 1910,
and 149,000 in 1916. In San Juan they increased from 20,000
in 1890 to 65,000 in 1915. This growth also led to a large
expansion in the number of bodegas.
14
but many, that is, the head of the family and by extension,
his whole family.
This agricultural system brought a permanent change in
the paternalistic relationship which had prevailed for many
decades between the patrones and their workers. With the
arrival of the immigrants in large number and the new systems
of agricultural-industrial exploitation, the traditional
pattern gradually vanished. European immigrants were a major
factor contributing to the progress and modernization of
Mendoza, although in much smaller scale to that of San Juan.
Until the 1880' s most of the economic activity centered
on the extensive alfalfares where cattle graze before being
exported to Chile. This declined as most of the immigrants
were attracted to work in the vineyards, for which very
favorable climatic conditions existed. The flow of immigrants
into Mendoza became significant by the middle 1880 's and
remained strong until the beginning of World War I, as the
following table indicates:^^
Year Number Year Number Year Number
1900 1,183 1906 7,372 1912 15,914
1901 4,160 1907 9,107 1913 16,138
1902 1,521 1908 12,068 1914 4,063
1903 757 1909 9,618 1915 739
1904 1,255 1910 14,095 1916 646
1905 11953 1911 11,767 1917 439
Source: Mendoza, Sumario estadistico , 1936 , p. 25.
^^Within a few years Mendoza and San Juan were placed
out of competition in the nation's livestock market. This
situation not only evolved from the changes they experienced
in their traditional agricultural activities, but also because
of the fast-growing development of the Humid Pampa and the
improved means of transportation in the littoral.
15
European techniques began replacing the rudimentary
exploitation of the vines in Mendoza and San Juan, and after
1885 the agrarian and industrial transformation became more
evident with the end of the primitive transportation of wine
by carts to Cordoba, Tucuman and the littoral. The immigrant
farmer began working the lands on a small scale, simply with
the help of his family and some salaried peons. As the lands
became more divided the family constituted an important part
of the rural labor force. At the same time, the foreign-born
merchants, who were generally called turcos, dotted all
areas of Mendoza with their personal and laborious trading
style.
The national censuses indicate the extraordinary
influence of immigration in Mendoza, as well as the lesser
significance it had in the development of San Juan:
Mendoza
Census Natives io
«
Poreign-born 9^ Total
1869 59,269 99.1 6,144 .9 65,413
1895 100,231 86.3 15,911 13.7 116.142
1914 189,181 68.2 88,354 31,8 277,535
San Juan
1869 58,007 96.2 2,312 3.8 60,319
1895 78,929 93.7 5,322 6.3 84,251
1914 102,830 86.3 16,422 13.7 119,252
16
The figures for the 1869 census require additional
clarification, because at that time the number of
Europeans was insignificant:
Mendoza San Juan
Chileans 5,774 2,059
Prom bordering countries 29 18
Other nations 341 235
6,144 2,312
The foreign-born community, especially those from Italy,
made the largest contribution to the agrarian and industrial
prosperity of Mendoza and San Juan. In the former province,
in 1910, 60 per cent of the people working in the vineyards
were Italians, 30 per cent French, and the remaining 10 per
cent from other nationalities. Many of them were acquainted
with the wine culture in their native lands, and all brought
with them their skills in commerce and industry and their
hard-working habits. Through a constant process of
capitalization, many of the immigrants set up the vigorous
foundation of the grape industry, which in less than fifty
years would radically change that region in the Argentine
west.^'^ Especially in Mendoza, many immigrants acquired land
^"^Benito Marianetti, El racimo ^ su aventura. La
cuestion vitivinicola (Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 19. Apart
from the large foreign contribution, Mendoza attracted
migrants from other provinces. According to the censuses of
1895 and 1914, people from San Juan and San Luis, in that
order, were the largest domestic groups migrating to Mendoza,
Zulma L. Recchini de Lattes and Alfredo E. Lattes, Mig;racione3
en la Argentina . Estudio de las migraciones internas e
i^ternacionales basado en datos censales , 1869-1960 ( Buenos
Aires, 1969), PP. 47-48, 291.
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to expand their operations or to become owners instead of
mere contratistas. It was a slow but uninterrupted
process, which in less than a century placed the ownership
of most of the land in the hands of the immigrants or their
18descendents.
This impressive shif in Mendozan land ownership from
the Creole to non-creole sectors was made possible after the
arrival of the railroad, which facilitated the transformation
of pasture lands into valuable vineyards. This process was
less evident in San Juan, where the native Creole upper class
continued to own a larger proportion of land than its
counterpart in Mendoza. In 1914, the natives owing real estate
1
8
The transfer of land from the native upper class to
European immigrants is revealed in a recent study of land
registers showing owners of irrigated lands in selected
areas in the fluvial oases. The study compares land
ownership in the latter part of the nineteenth century with
the situation as of I960. Although this latter date is
beyond the period of the present work, the information
submitted below indicates the transformation that was taking
place in the ownership of land:
Area Influenced Pirst Ownership I960 Register
by the River Register
Creole Non- Creole Non-
Creole Creole
Mendoza 100 0 18 82
Tunuyan 86 14 5 95
Diamante 32 68 1 99
Atuel 17 83 3 97
Luis Campoy, Grupos culturales criollo ^ no-criollo .
Disponibilidad para el cambio ^ niveles de movilizacion ^
desarrollo (Mendoza, 1971), pp. 45-62. Unpublished. Mr.
Campoy was in 1972 the chairman of the Institute of
Sociology at the National University of Cuyo, in Mendoza.
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in this province were 67.9 per cent, while in San Juan they
were 87.4 per cent."^^
To acquire small parcels of land was relatively easy,
if money or credit was available, because an acre of vines
with irrigation rights brought a very high price, making it
profitable for owners to sell off such parcels. The large
majority of the immigrants, however, were not so fortunate as
to become captains of industry or big landowners. Most of
them and their families had to work all their lives on lands
which were not theirs.
Social Structure
The social configuration of Mendoza and San Juan in the
early decades of the century presented the classical pyramidal
composition. The upper class consisted of the traditional,
19Tercer censo nacional
, 1917, IV, 44-49.
The following figures give the approximate value of
a hectare of land—equivalent to two acres and a half—around
1910, in a few selected departments of Mendoza:
Department
Guaymallen
Junln
Rivadavia
San Rafael
Vineyards Alfalfares Uncultivated Land
With Without
4,000
2,500
3,000/5,000
2,500/3,000
$
900/1,000
1,200
400/1,000
400/600
Water
$
200/500
300/500
200
150/400
Water
$
not given
not given
5/10
2/10
Provincia de Mendoza, Su vida , su trabajo , su progreso, n.p.
n.d. It was a special publication in homage to Governor Emilio
Civlt, c. 1910.
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Creole elements, whose family roots could be traced to colonial
times or the era of the wars for independence. ?/ith their
economic strength derived from land ownership, they monopolized
the political control in both provinces. Even when they began
to sell off their lands to immigrants, they were still able
to retain their upper class status within the society. They
continued to constitute an elite which supplanted prestige
based on landowning with that derived from the historical luster
of the family name, control of the higher bureaucratic positions
and professional credentials. In this way the social glamour
and the political power which had been exclusive assets of the
native upper class, persisted into the twentieth century.
Abelardo Arias, the noted novelist who was born in San
Rafael, Mendoza, has portrayed the arrogance and frustrations
experienced by the native creole upper class, when it had to
21face the painful reality of seeing the gringo gradually
taking possession of its lands. Arias' fiction projects a
vivid picture of the contempt felt by the traditional groups
toward the immigrants. These Creoles were extremely proud that
the lands taken from the Indians never had had other owners
but those bearing the traditional blood; they even hated to
put a wire fence around the fields because it was a thing of
22gringos.
^^The name "gringo" in Argentina is given to an
Italian immigrant.
^^Abelardo Arias, Alamos talados (Buenos Aires, 1942).
All the symbolism connoted in these attitudes and the Creole
disdain for working in the vineyards is also evidenced in the
words Arias assigns to a creole: "Los criollos no somos
muy
20
The middle class consisted of creole elements engaged
in professional activities and small-scale commercial
occupations; small landowners and contratistas, mostly
immigrants; and the foreign-born merchants who practically
dominated their field in Mendoza.
During the times of large immigration, the average
foreign-born did not mix socially with the natives; and so,
for example, one Italian married another Italian. Non-creole
merchants and industrialists who prospered in their
business, however, married women from the creole upper
class. The lower segments were mostly composed of Creoles.
In general, they displayed less ambition and less
willingness to accept the discipline of continuous labor
than the average immigrant worker.
Social Conditions
The living conditions of the popular sectors early in
the century revealed a situation of general poverty, which
was reflected in the nature of their occupations as well
as in their habits of life.
In his report to Joaquin V. Gonzalez, then Minister of
the Interior, Juan Bialet Masse affirmed that the popular
segments in Mendoza were as far apart from the leading class
as they were during colonial times; that the leaders of the
guapos pa' estos menesteres, eso di' andar cortando
racimitos son cosas para los gringos y las mujeres. Ahora,
lidiar con los toros, jinetear potros, trenzar tientos de
cuero crude, marcar animales, eso son cosas di' hombre."
Ibid ., p. 157.
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society only took an interest in the people to use it as a
"political masquerade," but that they never showed concern
for their social betterment.
Bialet Masse considered alarming the debasement of the
working class, vitiated by drunkenness, gambling and
lewdness, which was partially mirrored in the large number of
illegitimate births and arrests of drunken people. Especially
on Sundays many stayed until midnight in taverns, which
explained the large absenteeism of workers on Mondays. He also
compared certain social attitudes among the lower classes,
stating that
To save money is a principle which does not penetrate
the mind of the native worker, and so, while the
Italian and the European in general work hard and
enjoy soon a relative well-being, and many of them
even rise socially and economically, the creole
stands still amidst the poverty surrounding him.
On the social question, Bialet Masse observed that the
policy of employers was merely "to pay the smallest wage
possible and to make the laborer work as much as he can." The
wage of a temporary worker, a bracero , was 1,30 pesos per day,
without meals, which was very low. Among the municipal workers,
carters of sanitation crews earned 1,50 per day and garbage
burners 1,40. Servant girls, a very important occupational
source for the creole lower class, earned from 12 to 20 pesos
^"^In 1910, for every 1,000 born alive in Mendoza, 263
were out of wedlock. In San Juan the figure was 440. Alejandro
E. Bunge, Una nueva Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1940), p. 168.
24.per month. ^
Recollecting conditions in his native city, Raul Aguirre
Molina asserted that by the turn of the century housing for
the poor in Mendoza lacked the essential sanitary facilities;
that their earnings were very low and that they did not
receive any assistance from the government in case of need.
When these serious grievances became more noticeable, remarked
Aguirre Molina, the lower classes began their protest, and
eventually rebelled by adhering to Lencinism, and less than
two decades later, to Peronism.^^
No legislation aimed specifically to benefit the workers
had been enacted in Mendoza. The only piece of social
legislation was Law No. 371, of October 1906, which declared
Sunday a holiday, but it was effective only in a few urban
areas. No other law of this nature was enacted until 1918. The
constitution of Mendoza, as reformed in 1910 and later in 1916,
specifically authorized the legislature to pass laws regulating
the work of women and children and the sanitary conditions in
industrial establishments. But no legislation was enacted on the
26basis of this new authority.
^^Juan Bialet Masse, El estado de las clases obreras
argentinas a comienzos de siglo (Cordoba, 1969) f pp. 555-583.
The original appeared in 1904. The 1969 edition was published
by the National University of Cordoba.
^^Raul Aguirre Molina, Mendoza del 900 (Buenos Aires,
1966), pp. 14-15.
^^In July 1916, the Radical minority introduced in the
provincial' legislature two bills establishing a maximum of
eight hours for the working day and the so-called "English
Saturday," meaning that normal work would cease at noontime
on Saturdays. But these bills did not get legislative
approval.
La Prensa, July 24, 1916.
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IQ the more primitive scene of San Juan, by 1900 society
was considered to be simply the traditional group of leading
families of the oligarchy, who through the years had disputed
among themselves the attainment of political power. The rest
of the people, the small merchants, the artisans, the workers,
the servants and the poor peones
, although they were part of
the community performed a permanently passive role. Many
people in the lower groups were called the rabble, the chinos ;
being mostly illiterates, they were totally subordinated to
the will of the patrones.^'^
Living conditions for the lower classes were similar to
those mentioned for Mendoza, that is, very poor housing, low
income and few prospects for any tangible material improvement.
Bialet Masse 's report stated that there was in San Juan a
general depression, with the cost of living so high that in
proportion wine was cheap, which explained the drinking habit
of the people. Most distressing, however, were the general
working conditions, which demanded excessive hours of labor
for an insignificant wage, to the extent that for some workers
alcoholism became an escape from the daily misery. A policeman
earned 40 pesos per month, but as he was paid in letras, his
net salary was only 35,40, and 40 per cent of the police force
was illiterate. It was customary for women of the lower class
to give away their children, which was evident in the large
^"^Salvador A. Doncel, "San Juan desde el punto de vista
social," Censo agricola . Estadisticas e informaciones de la
provincia de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1934), 116.
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number of chinitaa working as servants for a salary of 8 to
12 pesos per month.
Popular Education and Civic Culture
According to the 1914 national census, the illiteracy
rate among children of school age was 38.1 per cent in
Mendoza and 29.8 per cent in San Juan. Equally unsatisfactory
was the school attendance record: in Mendoza 49.4 per cent
of all the children of school age did not attend classes, and
in San Juan it was 45.3 per cent.^^
The participation of the family in the rural chores
affected the non-attendance or the late attendance of children
in school, especially during harvest time. In other
circumstances, the negligence of their parents because of
their low cultural understanding, plus the indifference of the
State, contributed to the number of school drop-outs and the
illiteracy rate. The traditional poverty of many schools in
the countryside explained why in most cases a child was
considered literate who did not attend school for more than
two or three years.
The level of civic culture in both provinces was low.
The main source of information on public affairs for the
ordinary individual was the partisan political rally. Only
the literate could read newspapers and they were limited, with
^^Bialet Masse, El estado de las clases , pp. 585-615.
^^Tercer censo nacional, III» 584-591.
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the exception of Los Andes in Mendoza, to a few modest sheets.
This explains to a large degree the historical justification of
the rule by the few. When the freedom of suffrage was made
effective by the Saenz Pena Law, however, the role of the
political caudillos became paramount in the process of guiding
the masses into political action.
The voter registration lists, or padrones , of Mendoza and
San Juan emphasize the significance of the number of illiterate
citizens, as shown in these examples:
1904 1916
^ io
Mendoza 42.3 42.5
San Juan 49.7 45.6
Source: Rodolfo Rivarola, La crisis politica argentina .
Or£ genes
,
causas , soluciones (Buenos Aires, 1931),
p. 28.
What kind of political process and electoral contests could
be held when almost half of the electorate was illiterate? Were
there any means by which the masses could comprehend the issues
of the day if almost half of them could not read and write? The
relationships between the ballot box, the rate of illiteracy,
and the social conditions of the popular sectors were extremely
significant during the period under consideration in this work.
In a society with its majority confined to the lower
echelon, limited in its possibilities for economic improvement,
poorly and deficiently housed, scarcely protected to avoid
illness, without official aid to check the abuses of employers
or the misfortunes of life, with a high rate of illiteracy.
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and without the material and intellectual means to overcome
the unpretentious cultural circle in which they lived, it
was not necessary for this majority to understand ideological
theories about class conflicts.
Within the submissiveness which characterized them, they
were class-oriented simply by nature, by emotion, by sentiment.
Amidst the material limitations surrounding them, they could
realize that there were some groups in the society who lived
much better, and who enjoyed the privileges that power yielded
to them. This contrast developed in the popular sectors a
psychology of resentment.
Before the Saenz PeKa Law was enacted, there was no
possibility for the masses to effectively reflect in the polls
their distrust of the ruling class. The electoral system did
not offer guarantees to the electorate to express freely its
political choice. This shameful reality was voiced in Congress
by Indalecio Gomez, the Minister of the Interior,
The civic spirit is dead; our democracy is non-
existent; people do not vote. In spite of the fact
that constitutional powers exist, that there are
governments in the provinces and in the nation,
that there are congress and legislatures filled
with the most distinguished men, the people feel
a deception about congress. . .why? because it was
not chosen through honest elections but by a
system corrupted and disfigured. 30
After the enactment of the electoral reform—especially
in Mendoza, where the principles of the federal law were
incorporated into the provincial constitution in 1916— the
^^Congreso Nacional, Camara de Diputados, Diario de
esiones (hereafter referred as Diputados ) , 1911, HI, 14b
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conservatives found it more difficult to generate wide
electoral support from the popular groups, nor could their
leaders communicate persuasively with them. On the other
hand, the popular sectors gained political strength when
they became conscious of the value of their vote, freely
cast. By 1917, they were ready to channel their sympathy
to the party and the candidates who opposed the views of
the traditional landowner-industrialists political power.
The Political Scene. Mendoza:
Prom Oligarchic to Contested Politics
The governments of Mendoza after 1862 followed the
liberal traditions of the times, with their leadership in the
hands of a few, cultured, propertied men, who constituted the
^1
oligarchy of that province. Although many of its members
were related by economic interests or family connections, they
did not constitute a cohesive group. Personal interests put
distance among many of them, and eventually the divergences
within the ruling groups paved the way for political
antagonisms which survived for many decades.
^ The economic power they represented is stressed by
the fact that in the 1870' s one per cent of all proprietors
54 out of a total of 5 , 203—possessed 26 per cent of the
lands under cultivation. Jose Luis Masini Calderon, Mendoza
hace cien anos (Buenos Aires, 1967), p. 46.
Standard reference works on the political developments
in both provinces are: Jorge M. Scalvini, Historia de Mendoza
(Mendoza, 1965); Carmen Penaloza de Varese and Hector D. Anas,
Historia de San Juan (Mendoza, 1966); and Edraundo Correas,
"Historia"de~Mind3ii, " and Juan Romulo Fernandez, "San Juan
1862-1930," in Historia de las provincias los pueblos. Vol.
IV of Historia ar^entina contemporanea (Buenos Aires, iyo^
,
pp. 469-502 and 503-544, respectively.
The basic split among Mendozan conservatives was
between the followers of Emilio Civit, who was enrolled in
the Roquismo
, and those of Benito Villanueva, who enjoyed
high political and economic influence in Buenos Aires. Both
clashed pertinaciously. In spite of the animosities that
pulled these groups apart, all their members were
participants in the oligarchical trenza
,
manipulated by the
Villanueva and Civit circles, which for many years were the
Capulets and Montagues of the Mendozan elite. Basically,
until 1917, their intra-oligarchical frictions were
evidenced in the bitterness with which they fought for the
high national and provincial positions.
Besides these dominant groups, another future major
contender in the provincial political arena was Jose Nestor
Lencinas. He was born in 1859 in the village of San Carlos,
sixty miles south of the capital. After graduating from the
University of Cordoba in 1880, this young lawyer began his
professional career in Mendoza and became actively involved
in the political disputes of the day.
^^Roquismo was a political current led by General
Julio Argentine Roca, representative of the liberal forces
which in the 1880" s shaped the so-called Argentine
oligarchy, politically and socially elitist but
economically progressive.
^^Trenza is a term commonly used in the political
iar^ron denoting the weaving process of a braid,
with the
Station o?^rregular ^iealings, suspicious acc^^^^
and labyrinthine intrigue, in which politicians
oiten
indulged.
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His first biographer stated that Lencinas became known
in time as the defender of "any gaucho who was harassed by
the judges," and asserted that he obtained the release from
jail of more than 4,000 under prosecution, without charging
them any fee.^^ At a place and time when a professional
degree was a certain indication of social status, Lencinas'
crusade as the "lawyer of the poor" became a very important
factor adding to his personal prestige.
The revolution of July I89O, in Buenos Aires, attracted
little attention in Mendoza, but did provide the opportunity
to create a provincial arm of the Civic Union. Its initial
group was composed of individuals who until then had
sympathized with different political sectors, including
some who had had affinity with Roquismo and Juarismo,^^ as
well as others who had opposed both groups. With such
diverse origins, factions began to take shape within the
Civic Union; on one side were those who were more
accommodating to the traditional political groups, and on
the other side—led by Lencinas—were those more critical
of the policy of agreements within the elite.
At the opening of this century the Radical faction with
the closest ideological ties to the conservative wing
"' Julio Nieto Riesco, Lencinas , I (Buenos Aires,
1926), p. 39. There is no explanation of how Nieto Riesco
arrived at this high figure.
Name given to the groups supporting the personalist
rule of Miguel Juarez Celman, another prominent member of
the Argentine oligarchy in the 1880' s.
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commanded by Civit, founded the Partidos Unidoa, which became
the political front that controlled provincial affairs with
an iron hand, from 1901 to 1910. Political decisions continued
subject to the agreements reached among the leading members
of these groups. The legislature was the stage from which
they exerted their influence; for the deputies constituted
half of the electors of the Electoral College who selected
the governors, and they also took part in the appointment of
national Senators.
Reflecting on the political reality of those days, a
keen Mendozan writer considered shameful the "criminal
indifference of the governments toward anything which is not
immediately quotable in hectares of vineyards or in cattle
reproducers." He deplored the fact that there was no other
alternative but to rely on the efficacy of an elite which
was able to impose its image upon the malleable sentiment of
the masses. "No man rises here," he added, "because he gains
the ballots of his constituents by virtue of a program and an
ideal of which he has to render account to the people. "-^^
A reaction took place among some conservatives after
Rufino Ortega was elected governor in 1910, by the choice of
Civit, the outgoing governor. Ortega not only broke his
political ties with the Civitists, but formed a new political
force, the Partido Popular, in order to open an alternative
^^Julio Leonidas Aguirre, Cocina criolla ^ salsa india
(Mendoza, 1902), p. 12, 281.
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to the authoritarianism of those controlling the province
since 1901. This rejection of the men and procedures which
characterized an era in Mendozan politics, therefore,
brought other groups to power from 1910 to 1917. They were
also part of the elite, hut dissatisfied with the heavy-
hand with which Civit and his political associates ruled.
The election for governor held in December 1913,
brought a healthy change in the political situation. Besides
the two conservative segments, the Partido Popular and the
Concentracion Civica, the Radicals participated for the first
time in a gubernatorial election. "^"^ Although there was more
electoral freedom than in the past, irregular procedures
still prevailed in this encounter. But the success of
Francisco S. ilvarez, the Partido Popular candidate, indicated
that within the traditional conservative groups there was room
to attempt some kind of political reform.-^
During his term, however, Alvarez had to meet one of the
most serious crises in the history of the wine industry, the
eventual solution to which was to pour wine into trenches and
^ In the three-cornered contest, Benito Villanueva'
s
candidate garnered the largest number of votes: Partido
Popular, candidate: Francisco S. Alvarez, 11,597 votes;
Concentracion Civica, supported by Emilio Civit, 8,644; and
Union Civica Radical, candidate: Jose Nestor Lencinas, 6,733.
La Prensa , December 15 i 1913.
^^The National Deputy Lucio Funes asserted that Mendoza
was joining those provinces that were in favor of institutional
renovation and political integrity. And in a direct reference
to Civitism, he added that his province "was no longer a fief,
no longer the island of an obscure personage who until
yesterday ruled omnipotently." Diputados , 1914, I, 371.
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destroy grapes in the vineyards in order to revaluate the
products. A grave social problem confronted the province,
with such massive poverty and unemployment that the
government had to set up, in the public square, the so-called
ollas populares—
-poT:ular kitchens—to feed the poor people.
But since the men who governed Mendoza from 1910 to
1917 reacted only mildly against the traditional ruling
pattern, the Radicals, by 1917, were in good position to use
the most important weapons they had in their hands: the
guarantees of a secret ballot and the strength of their
growing number of supporters. Their resounding success in the
presidential election of April 1, 1916, in which they polled
14,900 votes against 10,500 of the conservatives, greatly
enhanced their possibilities to capture control of the
provincial affairs.
Fully aware of the seriousness of this challenge in the
election for the governorship scheduled at the end of 1917,
the antagonistic groups of Civit and Villanueva were forced
to forego their traditional enmity. They decided to confront
together the common enemy, in order to defend their paramount
political leadership in the province. Thus, during this
second stage of the primacy of the oligarchy, from 1910 to
1917, a confrontation began to take shape not between the
hostile groups of the same social and economic class, but
between occasionally united liberals and the Radicals. The
^^For this Alvarez was given the unpopular nickname of
Pancho Hambre.
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growing ascendancy of the latter, at the national as well as
the provincial level, gradually changed the political
atmosphere by challenging the hegemonic rule of the oligarchy,
and promising to regenerate the virtue of the ballot box.
Until 1917, as has been mentioned, political power in
Mendoza rested mostly in the hands of Villanueva and Civit. As
leaders of the oligarchy, what kind of men were they? About
Villanueva it has been stated that "he was a master at carrying
on unethical electoral schemes. He bought all he could using
any means available: money, influence, promises, and pandering
to the human ambitions and vanities. "^^ His ideas and actions were
the epitome of what the term Regimen came to symbolize. ^"^
But Emilio Civit left his name more indissolubly linked
with the regional history of the period. A few references
about him as a public servant will reveal the controversial
historical judgments he stirs up. A penetrating observer of
the recent Mendozan past acknowledged that Civit had been "a
representative of the first magnitude of our enlightened
despotism and the rising progressive bourgeoisie," and a
contemporary of Don Emilio stated that "he knew how to handle
to perfection the political puppets, and he had at his finger
tips the weakness and frailities of his friends and
Carlos Ibarguren, La historia que he vivido (Buenos
Aires, 1955), p. 135.
^^Regimen is the term applied by the anti-conservatives
to the governments which ruled until the ascent to power of
the Radical Party.
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42enemies." While Edmundo Correas has considered Civit not
just a statesman, but a great statesman, Ricardo Rojas
expressed the view that although he modernized the city and
urbanized the countryside, "his heart was more that of a
municipal councilman than of a statesman. "^^
More recently, one of his critics praised his qualities
as a performer and admitted that this "born organizer" had
sometimes the dexterity of a visionary. But he insisted that
Civit lacked the heartiness of the caudillo who knows how to
reach his people; he was not touched by ethical considerations
or scruples of conscience, and in order to get what he
desired, he "accepted as valid all the trickeries and ruses
44in which he was an expert."
Nevertheless, Edmundo Correas, examining the oligarchical
regime in Mendoza, in which figures like Civit flourished, has
stated in explanation that
it could not have been otherwise in a society with
neither a democratic nor a republican experience;
accustomed to be ruled by fear; lacking education;
plagued by prejudices inherited in colonial times;
divided in a rigid social strata, and so limited
by the number and the quality of its leaders that
only a small group was relatively prepared to
' govern the rest and take care of the administration
of the common interests. 45
^^Benito Marianetti, Problemas de Cuyo (Mendoza, 1948),
p. 188; and Lucio Funes, Anecdotas mendocinas (Mendoza, 1936),
p. 137.
^^Correas, "Historia de Mendoza," pp. 490-491; and
Ricardo Rojas, Las provincias . Vol. XVII of Obras (Buenos
Aires, 1927), p. 225.
^^Dardo Olguin, Dos politicos ^ dos polfticas (Mendoza,
1956), pp. 9-39.
^^Correas, "Historia de Mendoza," pp. 493-494.
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As acknowledged by this interpretation, the series of
progressive rulers could only have governed in a very
stratified society, although it was precisely with the family
governments that the distortion of the republican and
representative system began. Since the candidates were
selected by the governors, the popular verdict did not
represent the conscious will of the electorate, and as
explained by a contemporary politician, the people "was
excluded by evil means from the ballot box, or was led to it
as a docile flock. "^^
The existence of a backward society justified the fact
that the control of public affairs was in the hands of an
aristocratic minority, protected by claims of ancestry and
wealth. However, when the common man began to wave a new
and popular political flag, he judged quite differently the
role of those who had held power for almost sixty years. The
Radicals admitted that some members of the elite had
rendered valuable services by promoting the industrial
progress of the province. But they considered that by
monopolizing the high public positions, the elite had built
up a regime whose major concern was to serve the interests
of those within its own circle.
By 1917 the new voice of the popular sectors was
beginning to be heard more every day through the growing
^^Jose E. Aguilar, Mendoza en los aftos 1900 a 1916
(Mendoza, 1957), p. 41.
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number of street meetings carried out by the Radicals and
the Socialists. There, the common man was told that while he
was isolated from the mainstream of progress, the official
machinery had been the vehicle to enrich the traditional
landowners and many industrialists with money and social
prestige. Three decades later, the history of Mendoza and
San Juan, as well as that of the nation, would prove that the
masses would prefer rulers with fewer virtues, perhaps, than
those who enjoyed the higher public positions until 1916, but
with a greater responsiveness to the political needs of the
lower segments.
An idea of how the popular sectors judged the Mendozan
past was given by a Radical newspaper which in 1917 analyzed
the "fifty years of the Regimen in Mendoza," voicing in this
way its partisan views:
these are the men, genuine representative of the
old regime, who ruled Mendoza by the design of the
Villanuevas and Civits during the time when the bayonet
was the only law and a great electoral tool of the
Roquism. . .
.
...the people of Mendoza must search into their
memories and try not to forget the innumerable dubious
dealings in which these oligarchs have participated,
taking advantage of their official positions. . .and
disposing of the legislators at their own will. During
thirty years Ellas Villanueva had the monopoly of
the slaughterhouse; then came Civit's streetcar
company; the central market owned by Civit and
Villanueva, as well as their gaslight company; the
concern for paving the streets in which almost
everybody had his share; the Provincial Bank where
eight million pesos were withdrawn by fourteen
members of this oligarchical family, and up to now
not even the interest on this huge amount has been
paid 47
^'^La Palabra (Mendoza), September 14, 1917.
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The high honor of family traditions, of cultural
ancestry, and economic supremacy, were distinctive values
of the conservatives who in Mendoza had to face first
political discord within their own ranks, and later the
challenge of a Radicalism rising vigorously. On the other
hand, the values of the common man were forged almost
entirely by the material conditions in which he lived and
by his lack of faith in a system in which he felt himself
an alien.
The Political Scene. San Juan:
A More Endurable Oligarchy
Political life in San Juan resembled that of Mendoza in
the closeness of its oligarchical structure. But the economic
and social conditions in the land of Sarmiento were much more
modest and primitive than in wealthier Mendoza.
The provincial governments since the 1860*3 "were all a
true image of the politica criolla, " as demonstrated in their
domestic practices as well as in their passive solidarity with
the different governments at Buenos Aires. The Radical
revolutions of 1890, 1893 and 1905 did not have any echo in
the provincial domain; the spirit and strength displayed in
other parts of the country by the romantic Radical movement
went little noticed in San Juan, and offered no challenge to
4-8
the solid power of the conservative Concentracion Civica.
^^Jose P. Barreiro, La provincia de San Juan. Su
transformacion politica social (San Juan, 1928), pp. 18-20.
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The political disputes of this group made up of
"patricians, the traditional elements and the bodegueros , "^^
were in essence personal feuds, and the rivalries among them
did not improve either the civic qualities of the ruling
oligarchy or the political education of the common man.
The Radicals constituted an association of men with
heterogeneous political backgrounds, and their lack of doctrinal
coherence fostered personal discords that widened in time. While
the movement was gaining strength in other areas of the country,
in San Juan it became assimilated to the prevalent mediocrity
of the political scene. Thus, instead of becoming a new force,
it was simply an addition to the old provincial structure, "with
all the vices of the past reflected in the new movement. "^^
Their participation in the April 1916 presidential election
proved unsuccessful for they were defeated by the Civic
Concentration by 9,170 to 7,572 votes. Another setback for the
Radicals was the 1917 election for governor in which the
conservatives were able to keep their political preeminence by
electing Amador Izasa by 8,658 votes against 7,595 of the
51Radicals.
Then, early in 1918, when they had to select their
candidates for national deputies, the frictions which had
^^Varese and Arias, Historia de San Juan, p. 428.
^^Barreiro, La provincia de San Juan , p. 20.
^^Varese and Arias, Historia de San Juan , p. 429; La
Prensa, January 12, 1917.
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plagued the Radicals reached a climax. A few young members
decided to challenge the leadership of the party by forming
the Intransigent Radical faction, under the command of an
energetic young physician named Federico Gantoni. For the
first time the Radicals of San Juan were promising a truly
political alternative to the permanent succession of
conservative rulers.
The economic, social and political conditions in Mendoza
and San Juan were paving the way for the accession of new
leaders and new policies, which were already taking shape by
1916. By then, Mendoza was on the threshold of experiencing a
reaction against a political way of life and a transformation
of the traditional social framework. San Juan would follow,
years later, in the same steps of the Mendozan populism.
The time had arrived for Mendoza to test the reality of
the promises and the values of the new popular force, the
Radicals, against a Regimen symbolized by the provincial
oligarchy. The next chapter will analyze the repercussion of
the "political regeneration" carried out by the national
government on the Mendozan situation, and the kind of
leadership which emerged in that province under the banner of
the Radical Party.
40
CHAPTER II
HIPOLITO YRIGOYEN, JOSE NESTOR LENCINAS,
^
AND THE QUEST POR POLITICAL REGENERATION IN MENDOZA
Yrigoyen and the Radical Party. The "causa."
The Radical Party had long regarded effective suffrage
as the instrument that could terminate fraudulent government
at the provincial as well as national level. With the enactment
of the Saenz Pena Law in 1912, a new chapter opened in Argentina's
political history; traditional ruling groups now had to face
the electoral challenge of those who had been seeking for
decades to test their strength in honestly conducted polls. To
Yrigoyen and his closest followers, however, the confrontation
between Radicals and entrenched groups was not simply a political
contest between "outs" and "ins"; rather, it was a crusade in
which they represented forces of good, the "Causa," arrayed
against an evil oligarchy, the "Regimen."
Yrigoyen, the supreme leader of the Causa, carried on his
mission and that of his party in favor of political reform,
with a religious devotion. He was convinced, beyond any doubt,
of his own capacity to carry out a profound civic transformation.
Likewise, he believed that the Radical movement, under his
aegis, was the only channel through which Argentine political
customs could be changed and improved.
Throughout his public statements, Yrigoyen unequivocally
displayed the messianic sense he attached to his political role
and that of his party. As an illustration, in his original
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refusal to become a presideatial candidate, in March 1916,
he evinced the intensity of his political faith and his
self-confidence. He asserted that his creed was to vindicate
the honor of his country, adding, in his characteristically
obscure and enigmatic language
I am convinced that I would govern exemplarily,
but a government is only a tangible reality,
while in my apostolate it is the single thought,
a spirituality which will last through the times,
closing a cycle of infinite projections.!
In like manner, in his first administrative message to
Congress, in June 1917, Yrigoyen reiterated the basic
principles of his political thought: to restore the legitimacy
of the representatives of the people. Not to accomplish this
would destroy the highest hopes, because instead of opening
an era of "historical remembrances and everlasting examples,"
the Radicals would become a victim of the malady they were
2trying to correct.
But in the uphill road to achieve this objective, the
electoral success of the Radicals at the national level in
1916, was only half a victory. They did not muster a majority
in Congress and most of the provincial governments were still
"'Hipolito Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno . Vol. I, Part II
(Buenos Aires, 1953), ?• 414. This reads in Spanish as
follows: "Tengo la conviccion de que haria un gobierno ejemplar,
pero un gobierno no es nada mas que una realidad ^ tangible,
mientras que en mi apostolado es un pensamiento unico, una
espiritualidad que perdurara a traves de los tiempos,
cerrando un ciclo de proyecciones infinitas."
^Ibid. , Vol. II, pp. 87-88.
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in the hands of the Regimen.^ Yrigoyen, however, interpreted
his own election to he a mandate from the people he
referred to it as a plebiscite—to purify those provincial
governments he considered unrepresentative. If any came to
power by an irregular process, the national government had
the right and the duty to remove them and to arrange for the
proper election of a new one.
This was the basis of the regeneration—Yrigoyen'
s
political program of civic restoration—carried out from
Buenos Aires through numerous federal interventions. Its
fundamental aim, at least in theory, was to replace minority
provincial governments by others more genuinely representative.
The Constitution and Federal Intervention
The constitutional norms which regulate the relationship
between the federal authorities and the provinces in Argentina,
have placed in the hands of the latter the administration of
their own affairs, on the condition that their constitutions
must conform to the basic principles adopted by the national
constitution. As stated by its Article 5i
Each province shall adopt for itself a constitution
under the republican, representative system, in
accordance with the principles, declarations, and
guarantees of the national constitution, ensuring
its administration of justice, municipal government,
and elementary education. Under these conditions,
the Federal Government guarantees to each province
the enjoyment and exercise of its institutions.
^n Congress, the Chamber of Deputies was formed by
45 Radicals and 70 members from other parties; the Speaker
was a conservative. The Senate was made up of 25 conservatives,
4 Radicals and 1 Socialist. Eleven provinces out of 14 were
ruled by the Regimen.
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The national authorities, nevertheless, have the right
to intervene in the provinces if an anomaly takes place,
seriously impairing the stability of their established
governments. Article 6 of the national constitution states
that
The Federal Government may intervene in the
territory of a province in order to guarantee the
republican form of government or to repeal foreigninvasions, and at the request of its constituted
authorities, to support or reestablish them,
should they have been deposed by sedition or
invasion from another province.
Constitutional theories, however, have not always been
matched by constitutional practices. A considerable gap
exists between the written clauses of the topic of
intervention or their interpretations by the students of
constitutional law, and the political abuses committed many
times by the national governments and lawmakers, under the
guise of resorting to a constitutional right. The interventions
were political measures aimed at redressing an assumed
constitutional violation. But on many occasions they were
undertaken merely to obtain political gains, or to serve the
interests of a specific group in an intra-party confrontation.
The difficulty of establishing limits to the use of the
intervention power lay basically in the ambiguity of the
national constitution itself. Under the assumption that the
republican system of government was seriously threatened or
annulled, the national government needed only to appeal to
Article 6 of the constitution to become the arbiter of any
provincial conflict. But what specific situations constituted
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a threat to the republican system of government? The
interpretation of that constitutional norm has been,
throughout the years, as wide and vague as demanded by the
political circumstances and the diverse interests involved.
Especially in the twentieth century, mere partisan rivalries
often placed the provincial branches of government on a
collision course, creating an impasse whose solution
ultimately rested upon the political convenience of the
central authority. Most often, the opposition parties in the
provinces sought intervention to displace a political
adversary from power. Besides, the lack of faith in the fair
enforcement of the provincial legal norms moved individuals
as well as a large variety of pressure groups to demand
intervention from the national authorities.^
Soon after taking office, Yrigoyen began to implement
his promises to regenerate politically the provincial
governments which, in his opinion, did not legitimately
represent the people. The thought that constituted the
avowed cornerstone of his regeneration policy was expressed
to Marcelino Ugarte, the conservative governor of the Buenos
Aires province early in 1917: "The provincial rights to self-
government
—
autonomias—belong to the people and are for the
5
people, and not for the governments." Upon this principle
^From 1862 until October 1916, there were 58 federal
interventions in the provinces, 27 ordered by decree and
31 enacted by Congress.
^Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno , Vol. II, Part I, p. 131
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Yrigoyen set in motion partisan machinery to eliminate the
local political oligarchies.
The "Gausa" and the "Regimen" in Mendoza
Jose Nestor Lencinas was Yrigoyen' s right hand in
Mendoza. A fellow partyman from early times, he had known
Leandro N. Alera and had assimilated his mystic partisan
fervor. Under the national leadership of Yrigoyen, he led
the uprising in Mendoza in the ill-fated revolution of 1905,
and after 1906 he was the chairman of the provincial committee
of the Radical Party. According to Manuel Galvez, Lencinas was
the most important of the Radical caudillos after Yrigoyen.^
The personality of the Mendozan leader resembled that of
the president in his strong partisan feelings and in his
^Manuel Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen . El h ombre
del misterio (Buenos Aires, 1939), p. 357.
In April 1916, Lencinas was elected National Deputy.
He obtained 14,958 votes against 10,524 for the conservative
Lucio Funes, and 1,072 for the Socialist Ramon Morey. This
circumstance put him closer to the most important political
center of the nation and helped him to plan the political
action in his province for the immediate future, with the
whole support of Yrigoyen. His first biographer stated
that as National Deputy he introduced several important
bills (Nieto Riesco, Lencinas
,
I, p. 175). Many years later,
Dardo Olguin repeated the same statement ( Lencinas , p. 249).
In fact, Lencinas played an insignificant role as National
Deputy, he did not take part in any committee, scarcely
attended half of the meetings during the two years of his
mandate, and took part in only one debate, affecting the
political situation of his province. He only introduced
one bill, concerning national guidelines for the wine
industry, but it was never reported out of committee.
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almost religious belief that the Radical movement was
destined to shape a new political era. Lencinas, just like
the old leader from Balvanera, had a sense of predestination
in the mission he was determined to accomplish. Besides their
resoluteness in their quest for justice and political decency
they also shared an unwillingness to compromise their
7
viewpoints.
Letters which each of them wrote to Pedro C. Molina, the
party leader from Cordoba, reveal the close similarity of
their thoughts on the missionary role of the Radical Party,
Yrigoyen, in the first letter of his famous polemic with
Molina, said in September 1909 that
never before has a popular movement occupied the
scene with greater qualities, more generosity or
more intense sacrifices. It will be a historical
institution of never ending radiations, ever so
resplandent because its action is eminently
national, carried out with the utmost selfishness
and inspired by the most generous purposes and
the noblest sentiments.
8
Similar fervor was conveyed in the words of Lencinas to
Molina, in 1908,
...I search for freedom and justice, and there I
stand and nobody will move me, even if hell
freezes over. And because these ideals are those of
the party, its life is for me so sacred and symbolic
that I love it so much; and before it men are
insignificant, and are dignified when they serve it
with their action or their thoughts.
9
'^Lencinas was very influenced by theosophic thoughts.
He believed profoundly that every person had a marked destiny
^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y; gobierno . Vol. I, Part I, p. 126.
^Homenaje de La Nueva Provincia (Bahia Blanca, 1928),
p. 83. Special issue"of the newspaper La Nueva
Provincia, on
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the city of Bahia Blanca,
Argentina.
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Mendoza had been ruled since 1914 by the Popular Party,
a conservative group which disclaimed its association with
the Regimen by opposing the Civitists. Nevertheless, in
anticipation of the election for governor scheduled for January
1918, the Mendozan Radicals acted to prevent it from being
held under the control of what they considered a fraudulent
administration. In May 1917 they appealed to Buenos Aires for
federal intervention,^^ accusing the provincial government of
interfering in the electoral process, and complaining of the
abject subordination of both the legislature and the judiciary
to the will of Governor Francisco S, Alvarez. Their petition
bitterly criticized the role of the police in harassing the
Radicals throughout the province. It also denounced, among
many other things, the decay in public education, the
considerable arrears in teachers' salaries, and the misuse of
public funds for the benefit of those within the governor's
circle.
A few days later Yrigoyen appointed Diego Saavedra
National Commissioner, to investigate the Radical accusations
in Mendoza. ^"^ Several weeks later, Saavedra delivered his
report to the President. In summary, his conclusions were:
(1) that the republican system of government was being
properly observed in Mendoza; the three branches were
^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno . Vol. II, Part I, pp. 322-
327.
^^The decree was dated May 10, 1917. It can be assumed
that the President had high confidence in his commissioner. A
few days before, Saavedra had ended his mission as Federal
Commissioner in Entre Rios. There, the provincial conflict was
resolved in favor of the Radicals with the election of the two
National Senators from that party.
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functioning according to the constitution and the laws;
(2) that the government had not been engaging in electoral
fraud, as demonstrated by the fact that the two most
important elections of 1916 were won by the opposition;
(3) that the participation of public employees in partisan
activities was proven only in isolated cases; (4) that the
charges against the administrative functioning of the
government were groundless; and (5) that the accusations
made to the President, although sincerely felt, ought to
be considered the result of obfuscation derived from political
passions and the Radicals' belief in the lack of fair play
12by the government.
What had been organized as a stepping stone for federal
intervention backfired, contrary to the President's and
Lencinas' expectations. Yrigoyen forbade disclosure of
Saavedra's findings, but this provided the conservatives with
heavy political ammunition. In July, the Chamber of Deputies
inquired about Saavedra's mission, without success. But the
inquiry touched off a heated debate between Lencinas and
Rafael M. Aguirre, another National Deputy from Mendoza, and
chairman of its Popular Party. Aguirre stated that the
Saavedra submitted his report to the President
early in July 1917, but it was not published until the end
of November, when it was made available unofficially (La
Prensa, November 27 and 28, 1917). On December 14, the
Chamber of Deputies approved a petition requesting from the
President the release of the findings. Eventually it was
made available by the government and published in Diputados ,
1917, VII, 177-192.
49
government had opened all the records, so Saavedra had been
able to investigate them properly. Lencinas, on the other
hand, accused the commissioner of having been too lenient
and of lacking the required political acuteness to realize
what was being done in the comites of the populares
. and to
notice the repressive behavior of the police. Aguirre
rejected these charges, and without revealing his source,
he added that he knew that the coming provincial election
would take place under federal intervention. He also lashed
out against the Radicals in Mendoza, with the exception of
Lencinas, whom he considered the only authentic Radical.
Aguirre, a non-Radical, thus gave expression to the view
that Lencinas in Mendoza symbolized the values and principles
for which Yrigoyen stood at the national level. "^^
Oligarchy versus Populism. The 1918 Election
After Yrigoyen' s victory in Mendoza in the 1916 presidential
election, it became apparent to the provincial conservative
groups that the 1918 election for governor would turn into a
fiasco unless they could consolidate their strength. Besides,
they were aware that a federal intervention was in the making.
^A comite is the headquarters of a political party in
a ward, where political activities are performed at the rank
and file level.
•^^Diputados
, 1917, II, 508-517. Manuel Galvez stated a
similar viewpoint about the unique position of the President
within his party. "Hipolito Yrigoyen is one thing, and the
Radicals, another. He is a moralist by temperament .. .he has
ambitions for moral perfection; but many of his supporters,
especially those not disciplined in ascetism, have only
ambition for power and public favors." Vida de Hipolito
Yrigoyen
, p. 276.
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This Radical threat was considered so serious that
Civit and Villanueva decided to forget their embittered
political rivalry, over a quarter of a century old. At the
end of October 1917, the two conservative factions cemented
a new political alliance in a convention presided over by
Benito Villanueva which named Erailio Civit the candidate
for governor of the newly formed Conservative Party. It was
a rewarding moment for Civit, because he was able to gain
the support of politicians who until then had been his
permanent political foes. This conservative "family compact,"
however, was not painless. Governor Alvarez became openly
opposed to Civit, deepening the division of loyalties plaguing
the anti-Radical camp.
In the Radical sector, the undisputable leadership of
Lencinas spared them the painful, labyrinthic maneuvers of the
conservatives. Lencinas' arrival from Buenos Aires to organize
the campaign clearly demonstrated his popularity. A large
number of humble people gave him an enthusiastic welcome,
replete with bands and banners, showing that in his patria
chica Lencinas was also a candidate for political canonization.
As a candidate Lencinas possessed traits of physique and
personality that appealed to the average man. Lencinas was tall,
with the appearance of a distinguished and aristocratic man.
His dark brown hair was touched with gray at the temples,
contrasting with his neatly-trimmed silver-gray handle bar
moustache and goatee. His face was oval with a high forehead.
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high prominent cheek-bones and a straight nose. His dark brown
eyes were wide and deeply-set giving him a soulful, trusting,
sympathetic, yet somehow melancholy expression. As Benito
Marianetti recalls him, Lencinas had an imposing figure,
resembling an apostle, radiating warmth and respect. He kept
himself at a certain distance from those he addressed,
allowing his personality to symbolize authority and hierarchy.
In his slowly delivered political speeches he was wont to
assail the upper classes while extolling the values and
rights of the workingmen. His words were filled with energy
and reassurance, his discourse was that of a true believer.
He was called by some a gaucho, although despite a rural
upbringing in his native San Carlos, he neither dressed nor
lived as a gaucho. But calling him gaucho was a recognition
15
of his personal courage and generous sentiments. For his
supporters the word "gaucho" signified the most noble
quality, and was pronounced by them with the greatest
affection. Calling him "el gaucho Lencinas," meant that he
was like them, that he was one of them. To his opponents,
however, this expression, in its political sense, was
associated with the lower sectors, the vulgar populace, a
kind of Radical canaille .
On November 24, 1917, only a few weeks before the
^^Benito Marianetti, En la verde lejanla del recuerdo
(Buenos Aires, 1967), pp. 161^1^^.
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election, Yrigoyen finally intervened by decree in the
executive branch of Mendoza's government, appointing a loyal
Radical, Eufrasio Loza, as commissioner.^^ The reasons given
in the decree indicated that the President, despite the
Saavedra report, extended full credit to the charges made by
the Radicals in their May petition.
Governor Alvarez protested at once to Yrigoyen, reminding
him of the conclusions of Saavedra' s investigation. Why had
not the President taken into consideration the unbiased
opinion of a commissioner whom he himself had appointed, asked
Alvarez, instead of accepting at face value the impassioned
17
voices from the comites? Yrigoyen simply ignored this plea,
leaving in Loza' s hands the implementation of his policy of
political regeneration.
The popular welcome given by the Radicals to Loza when he
arrived at Mendoza, left no doubts that he was considered an
18
ally and not an impartial arbiter. The following day,
El Regimen , the official spokesman for the conservatives,
spitefully branded those who greeted Loza so warmly as
descamisados . La Palabra, a Radical newspaper replied stating
that "these shirtless are the real people, angrily protesting
'•^Loza was the first Radical governor of Cordoba
(1916-1917).
^'^La Prensa , November 27, 1917.
^^No member of the government was at the railroad
station to greet Loza. The official feelings toward the
intervention were also evidenced when the changeover took
place: Governor Alvarez was absent, and the Police
Commissioner transferred the power to Loza.
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against the Regimen and an epoch. "^^
Behind the Radicals' fervor was nurtured the feeling
that the intervention would enhance the possibilities of
their victory at the polls. This expectation was reflected
in a fiery bulletin issued by the Radical Provincial
Committee, warning those who labeled the Radicals as an
ignorant rabble, that they soon would have to submit
themselves to the verdict of the people; that
The pseudo conservative aristocracy, farcical and
ridiculous, which has built up its fame and fortune
protected by corrupted governments, has been
lowered from its muddy pedestal, has lost the
government, the arbitrary use of power and its
chances to abuse the public purse, and now reveals
to the people the real skeleton of its moral and
civic structure. 20
As was expected, Loza began at once the replacement
of personnel, intervening in the municipality of the capital,
a juicy provider of jobs, and suspending the members of the
Irrigation Board without following the constitutional
formalities. These actions deepened the antagonisms between
Radicals and conservatives, and confirmed the suspicions of
of the anti-Radicals about the partisan nature of the
4 ^ 21intervention.
^^El Regimen , November 29, 1917; and La Palabra ,
November 30, 1917. This journalistic exchange reveals an
early use of the term that Peron's adversaries applied to
his followers almost three decades later.
20La Palabra, November 26, 1917.
^^Loza filled many vacancies with people he brought
from Cordoba, whose number was estimated at 300. This fact
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Early in December the Radical convention chose Lencinas
as their candidate for governor, and Delfln Alvarez to share
the ticket with him. The candidate for deputy-governor had a
reputation of being a humble, hard-working man, who had
served the party with loyalty.
This was perhaps the sweetest political hour for Lencinas.
The possibility of molding a society on the basis of the
equality and justice he had dreamed of now seemed opening
before him. It was a time when the political horizon was
still free from the chagrin of the days ahead. Lencinas
represented hope for a sector of the people who enthusiastically
followed and trusted him; it was as if all his promises were
already fulfilled. What was the quality of this leader and what
force moved that people? In the eyes of the Radicals
The name Lencinas means a whole life devoted to
sacrifices and civic pride. He represents thirty
years of intense laboring and constant, bold-daring
struggle. He symbolizes the best and most sincere
ideals of the people who have slept in the public
square and in the street, who had been hungry and
castigated by the police, the rude armed branch
of the oligarchy .... 22
provoked this caustic reaction, among many others, from his
opponents:
Son los Lozistas, son cordobeses^
que a un Nestor tienen por capitan
son rojos, negros, son radichetas,
son la langosta que hace gambetas
y al presupuesto se tragaran.
Son los Lozistas, son cordobeses,
que a un Nestor tienen por capitan.
La Tarde, January 8, 1918
•
La Palabra, September 3, 1917.
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These were the Radical voices of Mendoza, portraying an
image of Lencinas almost bigger than life, at a moment when
the party was on the threshold of taking power. They echoed,
almost with religious fervor and in spite of their vagueness,
the simple aspirations of the humble people.
Lencinas' supporters extolled the virtues of their
leader as a blameless idol. Carlos M. Puebla, one of his
closest political friends, and professional partner, asserted
that Lencinas' daily contacts with the impoverished masses
made him an apostle; that in his humanitarian concern for the
social betterment of the people, he asked for no other
compensation than moral reward. In the nation, added Puebla,
no man after Alem had been devoted to this task with greater
perseverance than Lencinas. The untiring efforts of the
Mendozan caudillo at spreading the Radical creed, through
many years of travelling all around the province, gained for
him the solid and emotional adherence of the lower sectors.
In general, both urban proletariat and the rural workers
supported Lencinas, although a small number followed the
ably-led Socialist Party. The conservatives' strength focused
in the industrial and business groups, and most of the
professional and propertied class.
In so far as the development of the wine industry,
however, the differences between the Radicals and conservatives
were more rhetorical than substantial. In Mendoza the influence
^^bid.
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of the grape and wine industry transcended class and party
lines. And as the general welfare depended fundamentally
on those interests, they were in a special way, everybody's
patrimony.
This was illustrated in the response of both
conservatives and Radicals to a problem which arose a few
months before the election, a time when politicians ordinarily
seek to emphasize their differences. Yrigoyen's budget for
1918 called for an increased tax on wine. As could be expected,
Mendozan conservatives raised their voices in protest. But
lencinas also complained. In a petition to the President
opposing the tax increase, he praised the industrial progress
of the province which, he noted, was achieved through the hard
work of its people and the confidence of those who invested in
its future. He pointed out the example of the irrigation works
and the fact that the large number of landowners was a
safeguard against the evils of latifundia. Being neither a
vlnatero nor a bodeguero, Lencinas defended the wealth of the
province as something that should be preserved and improved,
for the benefit of all.^^
There was in Lencinas' crusade a deep compassion for the
poor and the exploited. But he never advocated the
collectivization of lands and bodegas. In a Socialist fashion,
he proposed setting up cooperatives to solve the problems of
the more dependent economic groups, especially the viHateros.
His purpose was to achieve social Justice for all the workers.
^^Ibid.
,
September 8, 1917.
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under the prevailing economic framework, by means of a
reasonable income and decent living and working conditions.
The intense electoral campaign provided the major
confrontation between the Regimen and the Causa in Mendoza.
Its tone was rough and partisan vehemency contributed to
hardening the opposing positions. Even items of dress lent
themselves to partisan use. Illustrative of this was the
popularization of the expression chusma de alpargata— the
rabble of alpargata
—
given to the Lencinists
. The
alpargata was the traditional footwear of the poor, especially
in rural areas. It was made of canvas and a rope sole. The
alpargata was an important social indicator, no person of the
middle or upper class wore it. The association of the alpargata
with lower class status was absolute. Hence, the derogatory
sense with which it was used against Lencinas' followers— the
rabble. That expression gained extraordinary currency and
became, in fact, an unofficial denomination of the Lencinists.
In the bitter exchanges between partisan newspapers,
La Palabra in turn assailed the conservatives as the chusma
with frock coat, a privileged caste which had monopolized power
as a birthright. The Civitists rejoined pointing out that when
they were referring to the chusma, they did not include the
"real" worker, but that
^^The coinage of this term was attributed to the
conservative leader Julio Cesar Raffo de la Reta, when he was
addressing a campaign rally. But there is no certainty over the
authorship of this expression.
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The shirtless, the stinkers, are the arrogant and
roughshods of the suburb who for a handful of money
refuge, on the otherhand, for that kind of men.... when we see thatfigure of the suburb, with his hat tipped to one
side, high heels, long hair, spitting through the
eyetooth and using the most coarse language, it
should be known that our reprobations are against
that kind of men. 25
These harsh adjectives were symbols of the conflict
between the upper groups and the popular sectors. As stated
by the political scientist Murray Edelraan, political symbols
"bring out in concentrated form those particular meanings and
emotions which the members of a group create and reinforce in
27
each other." The political symbols of Lencinism fittingly
served its popular consolidation. Among its propaganda devices
were a small alpargata used as a lapel badge; thousands of
Lencinas's pictures, massively distributed throughout the
province; as well as white alpargatas with blue ribbons, and
gourds—mates—with a heart engraved on it bearing the face of
the "gaucho Lencinas." These propaganda materials, small and
unimportant by themselves, served to provide the Lencinists
with visible symbols of their political identification.
The educational limitations of a large part of the
electorate did not allow it to comprehend the rationale of
some of the issues in dispute. It seems likely, however,
that the Mendozan masses read their own meaning into the
26El Regimen , December 1, 1917.
^"^Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics
(Urbana, 111., 1967), p. IT7
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election, and responded to symbols that simplified the
contest. In line with their populist orientation, the
Lencinists propagandized appealing political cliches, so in
a simple and uncritical way, their followers could grant
full faith and credit to the opinions of their leaders. In
consequence, any negative remark, vaguely stated against
the conservatives, served the propaganda purposes of the
Lencinists more effectively than any other concrete
reference they could have made about their adversaries. Very
often they referred to the conservatives as "the thieves and
bribers of Mendoza," without providing an additional
explanation for these accusations.
This kind of political language did not convey a meaning
by itself, but it was a part of the desires and interests of
the people for whom it had been written or spoken. Furthermore,
its purposes not only were to chastise the local adversary,
but to project the love-and-hate political views at the
national level as well, placing Lencinas in the local scene as
the political surrogate of Yrigoyen. Regardless of their
credibility, the Lencinists invectives against their opponents
were absorbed by the masses through a constant repetition in
rallies and in the partisan press. By exploiting the simple and
deceptive technique of "good guys versus bad guys" the^
Lencinists effectively convinced their large homespun
constituency that they could never expect anything positive
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from the ^ansos, the geese. ^8 Moreover, the aggressiveness
of the political language attests to the complete freedom of
expression, and for the press which existed throughout
Argentina,
During the campaign the Radicals displayed a new political
technique, aimed at reaching out directly to the masses. It
consisted of the provision of social services, free of charge.
In the capital and all the departments, doctors and lawyers
made themselves available, and in some places advice was given
on agricultural and industrial matters. Hardly any other grass
roots-oriented, partisan measure, could have been more effective
in gaining the sympathy and adherence of the "chusma de
alpargata."
But in the structure of the political parties the comite
was still playing the most important role in the communication
process between the politicians and their followers. It was the
main center of activity during the political campaigns and
especially on election days, because it was customary for the
average voter to go to the comite first to pick up the ballot,
and then to the voting place. The traditional low reputation
of the comite resulted from being the visible symbol of the
highly questionable electoral practices of all political
parties, with the exception of the Socialists. Especially for
the Lencinists, the comite represented an effective center of
socialization. For many workers and peasants it assumed the
^^A popular, derogatory term applied to the conservatives
in the province of Mendoza.
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role of a boliche—the suburban bar, which in fact was th(
traditional social club of the poor—where at election times
the game of tab a and drinking of wine became a popular
pastime.
The coraite was also a center of social protection for
its members; a place where they could talk with the "doctor"
—the leader of the comite or the local area—and other
influential people; and where the rewards for political
patronage were usually dispensed. It also served as a
stepping-stone for the local leaders to build up their
electoral backing. Thus, because of their important electoral
role, the voices from the comites were often heard in
connection with the handling of public matters or provision
of jobs.
Because it engaged in politics at grass roots level, the
comite was an open door institution. To become a member did
not demand any personal or professional requirement, as was
necessary to belong to a social club or a trade union. Jorge
Calle explained it succinctly: "a national flag and four
chairs are enough to 'institutionalize' any room at any
provincial town."^^ This is why the comite earned high
political and social relevance as an institutional
phenomenon of an era. There the humble people found a familiar
^^Jorge Calle, Los iluminados (Buenos Aires, 1922), p.
159. Calle, a son of the founder of Los Andes , was co-director
of that newspaper when Lencinas was governor of Mendoza.
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setting for their unpretentious relationships, even as the
landowners and the bodegueros found theirs at the Jockey
Club
.
But the role of the comite was bitterly criticized
for not improving either civically or socially the personal
quality of its members or the prestige of the party. This
kind of criticism was made more acrimoniously by the middle
and upper classes, although the conservatives also
depended politically on the comites to reach their
followers. A contemporary Kendozan asserted that the comites
were "the gathering place of the lower class. "-^^ If one
disregards any pejorative intention in this remark, it was a
correct one because the upper segments socialized in
exceedingly more refined settings. The Jockey Club, the Club
de Gimnasia y Esgrima, and the Circulo Italiano, were the
institutions where the more aristocratic and wealthy members
of the provincial elite socialized, and where gambling and
drinking were also a regular pastime.
Although at quite different levels, the Lencinist comite
and the Jockey Club fulfilled an important social and political
function. The fact that one was considered a place of
populacheras customs, while the other was reputed the most
distinguished institution of the province, reflected the
socio-economic extremes of the times, as was evident in many
•^^Luis Reyna Almandos, La demagogia radical ^ la
tirania, 1916-1919 (Buenos Aires, 1920), p. 101.
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other activities.
During the final weeks of the campaign, a succession
of small, irritating episodes increasingly alienated the
opposing groups. Isolated incidents paved the way for the
hardening of positions, and the electoral rhetoric was
replete with phrases and words of class conflict. On many
occasions the anti-Radical press referred to the Lencinist
propaganda as Maximalista and to Lencinas as the Soviet of
Mendoza. By the final days of the campaign there was
hardly an event or attitude that did not carry out with it
partisan overtones.
An example of the aggressive rivalry between the
conservative and populist sectors, was the decision of the
Federal Commissioner to celebrate New Year's Eve with a
social gathering. For the traditional groups it meant that
their social setting would be open to the personal
representative of Yrigoyen and his cohorts, which by
extension, meant the friends of Lencinas and his hated
chusma. How dare the interventor mingle the Mendozan society
with elements so alien to the provincial elite? It was
true that the popular sectors already had invaded the
traditional San Martin's Avenue, but it was unacceptable for
^"'"In the capital, for example, some confiterias were
symbols of the social, economic and political divisions of
the society. The "Colon" and "La Cosechera," were
strongholds of the conservatives; "Los 20 Billares" and
"El Barquinazo," were places traditionally Lencinists.
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the cultivated people to have the Radicals share their
refined social environment. The sharp-tongued protest of
the conservative newspaper indicated their indignation
No, the mob which has invaded Kendoza will not06 accepted beyond the vecinity of the
government house, the municipalities and thepolice precints in the countryside. They will
not enter the homes and the elegant rooms to
scare the people with their howls of montonera
and the suburb. 32
These words exemplified the social values of a
segment of the society. Through them can be sensed the
basic issue between the forces clashing in the election of
the Summer of 1918. The cultured group was proud of the
traditions their families represented. In spite of their
internal differences, all of them were branches of the same
trunk, upon which the provincial grandeur was built. The
men had handled public business as a family monopoly,
preoccupied with their own progress, their lands and their
production. Likewise, the women of the elitist group were all
considered dignified representatives of those distinguished
women who contributed financially to San Martin's military
campaign. At the opposite end of the social spectrum was the
chusma, populachera and suburban, without tradition, dignity
or history.
The partisan newspapers and the street rallies served
mostly to further the resentment toward political adversaries.
El Regimen usually pictured the Lencinists as a drunk mob. Its
^^El Regimen, December 28, 1917.
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typical reference to a Radical rally was to call it a parade
of clowns,
...totally drunk shouting their outrageous cries,
striking upon kerosene cans the rhythm of
candomberos
, while at the same time throwing
stones at the walls and the electricity poles.
With similar acrimony, Yrigoyen was called "a second
class, coarse politician, backstage manipulator, exalted by
the barbarian drive of his party followers.
. .
. "^^ The
Lencinists, using the same aggressive language, referred to
Civit as the old and crooked politician.
A manifesto of the Conservative Party labeled as
fallacies the populist promises of the Radicals. It
denounced as deceitful their campaigning for higher salaries
for the workers and the peasants, and contended that the -
Radicals flattered the humble people solely to gain their
vote; that the simple solutions which they demagogically
proposed were only deluding the workers and public opinion.
The manifesto added that salaries could not be raised
capriciously by a ruler, nor public works become a reality
^^Ibid. , December 6, 1917.
^^Ibid. , December 22, 1917.
^^la Palabra, December 27, 1917. Many times the
campaign resembled a huge political payada—a popular,
literary duel between two guitar players— , acute and cutting.
At a Radical rally in San Carlos, it was said in praise of
Lencinas that he was a gaucho whose silver spurs, with
sonorous wheels, were like the song of the land; while Civit,
on the other hand, was like an untamed horse to whom Lencinas,
as a good gaucho, would give the spurs and tame him. This
oratory received the conservatives' reply a few days later:
when the Creole has blood in his veins nobody can tame him, much
less a "gaucho de feria con botas de carton y lazo
de piola.
El Regimen, January 16, 1918.
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oust because a decree was issued; and that the cost of
consumer goods could not be decreased by a mere administrative
order. Schools, highways, trade, and the fruits of the land,
stated the conservatives, were not the work of charlatans but
of superior men, educated and experienced.^^
Both sides eyed the election as if it were a decision
destined to shape the provincial future for many years to come.
Manuel Ceretti, a conservative leader, said at a rally that
the voters would have to decide between the Conservative Party,
that is, "the intellect, the cultured elements," or the Radical
Party, "the incompetence, the abuse and the impudence. "^'^
A series of partisan complaints and rebukes stepped up
the political tension, and personal incidents received a
significance out of all proportion. Thus, a large number of
telegrams was sent to Yrigoyen and the Minister of the Interior,
denouncing attacks against Conservative rallies and comites.
Radical followers were often pictured as the incarnation of
JQ
those who accompanied Pacundo Quiroga and El Chacho.
The most serious incident of the boisterous pre-election
weeks occurred in the capital, after a conservative rally.
Partisan effervescence and excessive police zeal resulted in a
tumult, in which the Police Commissioner, Comandante Espeleta,
^^El Regimen , December 18, 1917.
37-Ibid.
•^ Toward the end of the campaign, at the request of
the conservatives, the President ordered Loza not to provide
identification certificates from the military authorities,
allowing citizens who did not have a libreta, to vote.
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had a physical encounter with the Civits,^^ The Radicals,
nevertheless, were not to be blamed for creating an
arbitrary, abusive security force. The police rules had
be4n set up by the governments of the Regimen to maintain
th^r authority; because of the intervention, the political
positions were now reversed, and the conservatives became
vi(5tim3 of the abusive system they had created.
The episode gave rise to the exchange of a number of
telegrams between Buenos Aires and Mendoza. It was one more
evimt in which deep class animosities flared as election
da- approached. A large group of women in the upper social
st;'atum telegraphed the President denouncing the police
bnitality and the assaults against their carriages, from
wh:.ch, they said, all they were doing was showing their
patriotism by throwing flowers at the national flag. Another
group of women, who called themselves Radicals, also
expressed their views to Yrigoyen, rebuffing the statement
of the rival feminine group. Yrigoyen replied to the pro-
conservative damas
,
taking the edge off their criticism by
interpreting their reaction as an expression of their
sensitive feelings. These had been also the feelings of the
people who opposed the Regimen, added Yrigoyen, with the
no- able difference "that the reason for your agitation does
no< have any foundation in this era of full guarantees,
-^^Such was the agitation provoked by this incident
that Espeleta resigned. At the same time, a group of members
of the Jockey Club, of Mendoza, demanded his expulsion from
that institution.
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while the evils that disturbed Argentina during long years
caused a real distress. "^^
The election which was held on Sunday, January 20, 1918,
was free from serious disturbance. This was the first direct
election of a governor since the adoption of the constitutional
reform of 1916 Lencinas won by a margin larger than
expected by the Radicals; he carried the capital and all the
departments, except one.'^^
The triumph of Lencinas over Civit was as significant
—within the provincial scope—as Yrigoyen's national success
had been in April 1916. In their post-electoral analysis, the
conservatives declared that the major cause for their defeat
was the feeble nature of the coalition between Civitists and
Populares. In its appraisal, the conservative newspaper La
Tarde criticized the unwillingness of the cultivated groups
to get actively involved in a political campaign, while the
Lencinists carried on uninterrupted electoral agitation. The
La Nacion
,
January 13 » 1918; la Palabra, January 13,
1918; and la Frensa
,
January 17, 1918. The term damas and
mu.jeres were, and still are, symbols of the social status of
women. Those in the upper class are generally referred as
damas.
41The only problem arose after the election, when the
Conservative Party requested that the ballot boxes be deposited
in the Banco de la Nacion, an indication that they trusted the
national government more than that of the intervention. Loza
did not heed this petition, and the conservatives, in turn,
complained to the President. Yrigoyen at once censured Loza
for not satisfying the wishes of the Civitists, no matter how
unfounded their claim could have been.
^^La Prensa, January 6, 1922. Lencinas polled 18,300
votes against 12,695 for Civit.
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conservative elements, "lovers of the causerie of the club,"
mistakenly believed that by campaigning for a few weeks they
could offset the Radical propaganda, vigorously waged for
many months/^ The conservative candidate, moreover, was
somewhat outmoded in an election with such heavy populist
overtones and where almost half of the electorate was
illiterate. Civit was neither a caudillo nor a ruler with
demagogic inclinations, affirmed a historian admirer of Don
Emilio; the people respected Civit but did not understand
him/^
Before the election Benito Villanueva had declared that
all the conservatives had forgotten their hatreds and were
now patriotically united to avoid the takeover of Mendoza by
the Radicals. On the same occasion, Civit had asserted that
in spite of having been Villanueva' s foe for three decades,
the time had come for them to shake hands and prevent the
45province falling into one man's rule. In spite of their
"brave words, the election returns brought Civit and Villanueva
to realize how short-lived was the unity they had forged, and
in March Civit resigned as chairman of the Conservative Party.
^^La Tarde, February 6, 1918.
^^Edmundo Correas, "Discurso del Presidente de la Junta
de Estudios Historicos, el 22 de mayo de 1966," Revista de la
Junta de Estudios Historicos de Mendoza, VI, Segunda Epoca
(Mendoza, 1970) , 631.
^^la Prensa, January 8, 1918.
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The conservative coalition, thus, did not survive
electoral defeat. And indeed, not until the 1930'3, under
another leadership and different circumstances, was it
possible to repair their political apparatus. But no
matter how effective the conservative coalition might
have been, their system in 1918 was unable to withstand
the Radical tide. For to a majority of the people of
Mendoza at least at this crucial time, the Radical Party
was the party of hope and the repository of their
4-6
confidence.
The electorate ratified its position when the
election for National Deputies was held early in March
1918. The Radicals obtained 17,850 votes against 4,582
for the Conservatives and 2,033 for the Socialists.
Popular support for the government was demonstrated again
in the election held on May 12, 1918, to elect a National
Deputy replacing Lencinas. The Radical candidate,
Francisco Rubilar, running unopposed, obtained 18,856
votes against 3,989 blanks. Only 40 per cent of the
registered voters cast their ballots. These figures
reflect the decline of the conservatives after the
January election.
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CHAPTER III
THE FIRST RADICAL GOVERmiENT OP KENDOZA
The accession of Lencinas to the governorship of Mendoza
represented, in terms of personalities, a sharp break with
the past. But to what extent did the entry of Mendozan
Radicalism to power mark a departure from the policies and
practices of the Regimen? In what ways did Governor Lencinas
live up to the expectations of those who voted for him?
This chapter will examine Lencinas' performance in office
by focusing on three distinct facets: his role as a pioneer
provincial ruler committed to enacting a program of social
legislation; his treatment of constitutional limitations,
especially in such fields as municipal and water administration,
fiscal matters and public education; and thirdly, his relations
with other branches of government and the controversies these
gave rise to. Por at stake in the conduct of his administration
was not only Lencinas' personal power and prestige but that of
the provincial Radical Party and even the political autonomy
of the province.
The Promises are Fulfilled
Prom the day of his inauguration, on March 6, 1918, it
was clear that Lencinas' administration represented a departure
from the practices of the past. On that day he inaugurated a
policy of maintaining close contact with the masses: the
government house opened its doors to the people, and a popular
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banquet was jubilantly held at a public park.^ There was a
proud feeling among the Lencinists—as the Radicals came
to be known—because for the first time the poor were
being honored by a provincial ruler. La Montana characterized
thus the special joy of the lower classes:
That is why people rejoices with such hearty
enthusiasm for all that represents a triumph ofthe people, of the humble; without ... aristocratic
exclusions and without demeaning it because it
comes from the lower sectors.
2
lencinas' appeals to the emotions and class feelings
of the humble people were denounced as demagoguery by
conservative elements. The opposition was especially
critical of the government for spending 5,000 pesos in
the inaugural celebration. The Lencinists retorted, in
turn, recalling the thousands spent in champagne by
the conservatives in their exclusive gatherings, while
The governor appointed Carlos M. Puebla as Minister
of Government, Eduardo Teisaire as Minister of Industries
and Public Works, and Dardo Corvalan Kendilaharzu as Minister
of Hacienda. Teisaire played an extremely important role in
Lencinas' government. He had been secretary of Emilio Givit
until the end of 1915 f and had been associated with the
conservatives for 17 years. Recently, he had supported
Lencinas enthusiastically, including assisting in the
financial needs of the campaign. A skilled journalist,
Teisaire founded Los Debates , in Mendoza, in 1890, and had
been a correspondent for Los Andes , of Mendoza, and La Prensa ,
of Buenos Aires. Immediately after Lencinas took office,
Teisaire established La Montana , a mouthpiece of the
provincial government during 1918 and 1919. As another
example of his untiring energies, Teisaire put out a Buenos
Aires edition of La Montana , in 1919. It was the only case
in Argentina where a provincial paper was simultaneously
published in the Federal Capital.
^La Montana, April 6, 1918.
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the people
-were in their miserable huts, forgotten, as
old trash.
Another indication of the new political winds
sweeping Mendoza was Lencinas' decree proclaiming May 1,
the traditional day of the working class, as a provincial
holiday. Besides, on several occasions the government
organized popular festivals, collecting funds to buy
clothing and blankets for the poor. In the departments,
there was sporadic official distribution of food and
clothing, followed by popular dancing sponsored by the
local authorities. In these as in other instances, Lencinas
was showing his concern for the underdog. He was not the
only leader fostering these sentiments, but he was the
first in Mendoza to demonstrate such interest from the
highest position. This earned for Lencinas the unabated
loyalty of the common man, in spite of the fact that the
governor' s accomplishments were often short of what he had
promised,
A novel, populist measure of the governor was his
proposal for the building of a monument to the worker.^ No
precedent for such an action existed either at the national
or at the provincial level. The proposal identified "the
workers" with "the people," and sought to give public
^Ibid.
^A four-man committee, including a labor union leader,
was to be in charge of the project. The estimated cost of the
monument was 10,000 pesos, which were to be raised through
public contributions.
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recognition to those social segments that had been neglected
in the past. "We have to mold in the bronze," declared La
Montana, "the character, the pride, the courage, the
nobility of the worker, which is the nobility, the courage,
the pride, and the character of the people."^
Perhaps no other phrase illustrated the symbolic
meaning of the proposed monument than the title of an
editorial in La Montana : "La dignificacion del pueblo."
Comparing Lencinas' attitude with that of previous governments,
the editorial argued that the inclusion of a worker in official
committees uplifted the labor groups from the low, fixed status
to which they had been relegated. If the provincial aristocracy
considered the worker worthy only of being manipulated at the
elections or serving in the army, Lencinas was placing him in
the respectable position he deserved in the society.^ Thus, it
would seem reasonable to expect, from a government so given to
expressing its worker sympathies, that once announced, the
proposed monument would have become a reality. This was not the
7
case. Nevertheless, the proposal had given an opportunity to
sharpen the oratory of class conflict and to reaffirm the
government's social theories.
^La Montana
,
May 3, 1918.
^Ibid
. ,
May 4, 1918.
"^The Chairman of the Federacion Obrera refused to serve
on the committee, alleging that the working class needed other
kind of measures, that would benefit it more directly. A
public bid for the monument was announced in July 1918, and as
of early 1919 nothing was yet decided. The whole project,
finally, passed into oblivion.
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Lencinas' accomplishments in the sphere of social
legislation were the real foundation of his political and
personal prestige. In July 19I8, at the initiative of the
Executive, the first Pension Act for public employees was
enacted (Law No. 717).^ Eight months were to lapse before
the employees started their financial participation and
it was not until October 1919 that the first retirement
benefit was paid, but the law significantly marked the
initiation of a welfare system for the public servants of
the province.
The principal achievement of the government in its
endeavor for the social betterment of the lower sectors
was the law establishing a maximum 8-hour working day and
a minimum wage. The principle underlying this law had been
included in Article 45 of the 1916 constitution, but no
legislation had been enacted to enforce it. The workers
continued to be subject to the will of the patrones who,
unrestrained by any legislation, arbitrarily determined
working schedules and paid small salaries. Conservative
Governor Francisco Alvarez had himself taken the initiative
to obtain labor legislation but without success.^
Los Andes, November 23, 1918, published an extensive
article based on mathematical analysis, to demonstrate that
the financial arrangement of this bill was entirely inadequate
for it to be self-supporting.
q /
In September 1916, Alvarez proposed to create a
General Department of Labor, but its functions should be
only to verify the enforcement of the national law on
Workmen's Compensation and the provincial law on Sunday
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Alvarez' proposal rested in the legislature until
Lencinas, with the able support of Radical legislator
Manuel A. Zuloaga, revived it and improved it significantly.
In September 1918 the Senate approved the first part of the
amended measure. Knovm as Law No. 731, it created an agency
empowered to verify compliance with labor legislation and
to gather pertinent statistical information. The second
part, embodied in Law No. 732, established an 8-hour maximum
working day for both public and private employees and
workers; it also provided for a minimum wage of 2,50 pesos a
day for state personnel, and 2 pesos for non-public workers;
with time and a half for overtime. This law became effective
on November 1, 1918, making Mendoza the first Argentine
province to enact wages and hours legislation."^^
holiday. It should also advise the government about the type
of legislation required to implement Article 45 of the
constitution. But no action was taken, by the legislature.
Almost a year later, in August 1917, Alvarez introduced
another bill, more comprehensive than the previous one, in
which the 8-hour clause was included for state personnel. In
case of overtime, the payment would be raised 35 per cent.
But the project stated that the length of the working day in
non-public establishments was to be determined by the patron.
^^One of the most difficult problems was to set up the
way the 8-hour rule could be applied to rural workers. It was
agreed that they should work an average of 8 hours a day over
the whole year. The arrangement established a peak of 11
hours a day during harvest time, and a maximum of 5 hours at
the time when the work was less demanding. The 50-cent
difference was justified by the fact that many private workers,
especially in rural areas, received some extra benefits. The
so-called English Saturday became effective in Mendoza in
April 1919. In Buenos Aires it began in September 1918.
The sources for the information provided on this topic
were the numerical files of provincial legislation, in the
Archives of the Legislature of the Province of Mendoza.
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Naturally enough provincial employers attacked the new
laws as wasteful and unnecessary. Through the columns of La
Opinion, their unofficial spokesman, they argued that when
outdoor work was done without physical effort, as happened
during a good part of the year in rural areas, there was no
need to authorize the peons to loaf at the expense of the
patron. It was also contended that workers who earned 30 to
40 pesos per month were satisfied with their income and
never complained or questioned the number of hours they
worked. But now, because of the law, argued La Opinion
,
"these peons whose wages were sufficient for their regular
needs if they did not use them to get drunk," began insolently
demanding the minimum wage. Los Andes also shared the view
that there was no real benefit for the worker, because the
increased salary and the reduced hours would be offset by a
higher cost of living and higher taxes. In essence, asserted
Los Andes , it was token social justice by the government,
with electoral strings attached. "^"^
Per the workers, however, the benefits of the minimum
wage law were beyond dispute. The wage of a bodega worker,
for example, increased 150 per cent, from 80 cents daily to
12
2 pesos.
^^La Opinion , February 10, 14, 19, and 28, 1919;
Los Andes , March 18, and May 21, 1919.
^^Manuel A. Zuloaga, Salario minimo . Inf orme presentado
al Poder Enecutivo Provincial (Mendoza, 1927), p. 113-
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Faulty Practices Nullify Avowed Principles
The vigorous thrust of the Lencinists in the field of
social legislation was not matched by comparable zeal when it
came to upholding constitutional clauses on matters concerning
the reinstatement of municipal autonomy; returning the
administration of water to its own users; the proper funding
of the school system, and the handling of fiscal affairs.
One of the electoral commitments of the Radicals had been
to return the municipalities to constitutional rule. But in
his inaugural address, in June 1918, Lencinas argued for a
delay in holding elections, pointing to the need for a new law
granting universal male suffrage. The governor purposely
ignored the legislation in force, because it only granted the
right to vote in municipal elections to the proprietors or
those paying a business franchise tax. In September Lencinas
submitted to the legislature a bill regulating all aspects of
the municipal structure, including the electoral franchise
reform. Allowing the masses to participate in the local
election was a step forward in the democratization of political
life. The fact that Lencinas had received his strongest
support from the propertyless sector and that the proposal
would pave the way for an increased control of the
municipalities by the Radicals, was not an unimportant
consideration.^^
^"^The Socialist Federation of Mendoza— the Socialist
Party—had made the same proposal to the legislature in
September 1917, to no avail.
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Whatever the merits of the bill, the failure of the
legislature to take action meant that, as at the end of
1918, Lencinas still maintained under intervention
thirteen out of Mendoza' s seventeen municipalities. This
in spite of the fact that Article 207 of the provincial
constitution stated that once a municipality was intervened,
a new election should be called within 30 days. When in
February 1919 a federal commissioner arrived at Mendoza,
the municipal reform project was still awaiting to be
included in the legislative agenda.
Lencinas' arbitrary decision not to respect the
municipal legislation in force, and the legislature failure
to set up new rules, benefited the Radicals because the
municipalities intervened by the governor were under his
absolute control. If elections were held, the Radicals would
risk losing the control of some departments and in all of
them the opposition would acquire a voice in the municipal
councils.
Governor Lencinas treatment of the laws concerning the
election of irrigation authorities was similar to his
handling of municipal elections. The provincial constitution
stated explicitly that on the first Sunday of each November,
elections should take place to choose the local authorities
in charge of administering the distribution of water. However,
during the first days of his governorship, in March 1918,
Lencinas appointed ex-officio new authorities in all the
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province. He explained his action by the need to curtail
the abuses committed by previous administrations. When the
time arrived, in accordance with the constitutional
mandate, to hold the elections, November 1918, he issued a
decree suspending them. This time the Justification for
his decision was the lack of legislation regulating all
matters concerning irrigation, as the constitution required.
The opposition protested; they agreed that such a law was
not enacted, but declared that the enforcement of the 1916
constitution did not suspend or revoke any previous
legislation. Law No. 322, of 1905, they contended, was still
in force and should have been applied to hold the November
elections. The government's violation appeared even more
flagrant in view of Article 18? of the provincial
constitution which stated explicitly that under no
circumstances should laws regarding irrigation deprive the
interested parties of their right to elect the authorities
and to administer their own budget.
In the area of elementary education, the first Radical
government in Mendoza gave lip service more than real support
to the school system. Lencinas appointed Enrique Julio as
14
Director of the Provincial School Board. This was an
autonomous agency which, under provisions of the provincial
charter, was entitled to receive 20 per cent of the general
revenues and, in addition, the receipts from the inheritance
^^Julio was an active party-member who lived in Bahia
Blanca, where in 1898 he had founded the newspaper La Nueva
Provincia.
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tax. But Julio faced a permanent acute financial deficit
because, as in so many aspects of national and provincial
life, the gap between law and practice was substantial. The
authorities were always behind in transferring funds from
general revenues, and failed completely to turn over the
inheritance tax funds. Given the fact that the inheritance
tax had gone into effect in 1910 and that numerous estates
had been probated since then, it is obvious that important
sums were being denied to the school system. The School
Board, thereupon, paid the teachers with considerable delay.
This endemic Argentine malady was present in Mendoza many
years before Lencinas became governor and, unfortunately,
15
continued many years after him.
In his first message to the legislature, Lencinas
outlined his firm intention to improve public education
throughout the province by opening new schools and
libraries. The governor also expressed his determination
to normalize the payment of teachers' salaries and to increase
the number of those certified. In accord with these principles,
when a conference on illiteracy took place in late June 1918
in Buenos Aires between Yrigoyen and the National Board of
^The weak political power of the teachers as such,
explains to a large extent this chronic and corrupt practice,
so much generalized, both in time and space.
•^^The governor noted that out of 67,000 children of
school age, only 44,000 were registered in schools. To
provide a basic education for those 23,000 not attending class
at all, Lencinas estimated that 200 new schools were needed.
Mensaje de S.E. el Sefior Gobernador de la Provincia Dr. Jose
Nestor Lencinas (Mendoza, 1918), p. 27.
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EducatioQ. Lencinas identified himself with the aims of the
conference. In a telegram to the President he expressed his
desire to take steps to ameliorate the alarming illiteracy
problem in his province. Therefore, he proposed to Yrigoyen
an accord between Mendoza and the Federal Government, whereby
the latter would take over the financial burden of 50
provincial schools and the province would move to set up 100
new schools in rural areas by March 1919.
The Minister of Justice and Public Education replied to
Lencinas rejecting such a proposal. Nevertheless, he promised
that if the governor would indicate the location of the
proposed 100 rural schools, the National Board of Education
would start installing them immediately. Lencinas set aside
the minister's offer, and kept insisting on his original
scheme. His efforts attracted the attention of Congress.
Deputies Carlos Gallegos Moyano and Anibal Cabrera, both
Radicals from Mendoza, reassured their colleagues that from
1919 on, the provincial executive would strengthen the
finances of the School Board, which would make it possible
to expand the number of schools. Nevertheless, Luis Agote, a
conservative Deputy from Buenos Aires, wondered how Mendoza
would set up a large number of new schools within a few
17
months if it could not maintain those already established.
Two months later Lencinas was able to persuade the
national government to accept his offer. In consequence, the
^'^
Diputados , 1918, III, 194-201.
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Mendozan School Board alleviated its own financial problems
by transferring 50 provincial schools to the nation. Lencinas,
however, as Agote predicted, did not fulfill his part of the
agreement. As shown by the following table, the number of
schools did not increase; there was simply a transfer of
responsibilities.
Number of Schools in Mendoza
1917 1918 1919
Provincial 208 154 156
Private 26 25 22
National 43 93 93
Annexed to National 3 3 3
Total: 280 275 274
Source: Consejo Nacional de Educacion, Educacion comun
en la capital
,
provincias ^ territorios
nacionales (Buenos Aires, 1921), p. 262.
The fact is that the School Board by mid-1918 already
was indebted to the amount of $ 2,698,000, equal to approximately
one third of the provincial budget. With such an enormous
deficit, how could Lencinas and Julio have made their offer to
the Federal Government? It seems that not even the largest
amount of wishful thinking would have made this deal possible.
Lencinas' failure to carry out his promises in the sphere
of primary education was accompanied by a dismal observance by
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Direccion General de Escuelas,
Gesti5n econ5mica ^ financiera . La obra del Sr . Enrique Julio
al frente del gobierno escolar (Mendoza, 1920), p. 46.
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deficit, how could Lencinas and Julio have made their offer to
the Federal Government? It seems that not even the largest
amount of wishful thinking would have made this deal possible.
Lencinas' failure to carry out his promises in the sphere
of primary education was accompanied by a dismal observance by
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Direccion General de Escuelas,
Gestion econ6mica ^ financiera . La obra del Sr . Enrique Julio
al frente del gobierno escolar (Mendoza, 1920), p. 46.
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his administration of constitutional procedures governing
fiscal management. Government officials found it more
expedient to bypass legal requirements than to accept the
norms of fiscal responsibility.
The pressing financial needs led the government to
follow the methods they had repudiated in the past. The
last budget approved by the legislature was in 1916. The
following year, the same budget was extended by decree, with
additions voted in cabinet agreements. These supplementary
modifications were made in violation of the constitution,
which empowered the legislature alone to approve fiscal
expenses and revenues. But this procedure had been used
for so many years that time had "institutionalized" the
malpractice.
The 1918 budget—again the same as that of 1915—was
also extended by decree. That of 1919, which should have
been submitted in August 1918, was promised by the executive
but never sent to the legislature.
The problem of the letras continued to be handled in an
irregular way. Exactly as happened under the Regimen, the
first Radical government found in the issuance of letras a
valuable financial resource. By a decree of November 1918,
Lencinas authorized the issuance of four million pesos in
letras, using as a legal basis three laws enacted during
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Civit's second term.-^^
The opposition raised serious objections to this decree.
They claimed that it rested on laws which had been enacted
under different circumstances and for different needs; that
the letras were issued in small values—a practice already
followed under the Regimen—so they could circulate as
currency; and of course, that legislative approval was
lacking. The national government demanded an explanation, but
once Lencinas expounded the financial difficulties of the
province, it took no steps to force a reversal.
The issuance of letras, nonetheless, was a denial of the
electoral promises made by the Radicals when they were in
opposition and coined the slogan "No mas letras de tesoreria."
With an ironical bent, Los Andes remarked that Lencinas'
20decree appeared to be handwritten by Civit,
1 Q
^These laws were:
Law No. Year Amount Original Purposes of the Law
389 1907 2,000,000 Irrigation works.
437 1908 1,000,000 Agricultural promotion.
438 1908 1,000,000 Industrial promotion.
An example of the arbitrary procedures used by the
Mendozan governments to obtain more revenue was given by Law
No. 437. It authorized the issuance of "Internal Debt Bonds,"
not the letras, that were in fact emitted.
^^Los Andes, November 15, 1918. But Lencinas was not
the only Radical governor from the cadre of early reformers
who put aside a principle in exchange for a pragmatic^
solution. Juan Bautista Bascary in Tucuman, and Joaquin
Castellanos in Salta, also resorted to this kind of financial
relief.
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In spite of the fact that the letras specified on their
face that they were legally acceptable for the payment of
provincial taxes, the government ordered that the property
tax be paid half in letras and half in national currency.
When the feared depreciation of these values began to take
place, the letras were exchanged at a 7 per cent discount.
The Several Roads to Federal Intervention
After so many years spent in relentless opposition to
the Regimen, it was not to be expected that Lencinas would
"bring a spirit of compromise into the governor's office.
Utterly convinced that he was supporting the right causes,
Lencinas displayed remarkable tenacity in any political
struggle he undertook. But in five instances it appears that
he exceeded the reasonable limits, and found himself in
conflict with Yrigoyen, the very man he politically admired.
These major cases involved the intervention of the Compania
Vitivinicola de Mendoza; the rejection of four provincial
deputies from the opposition; the deportation of journalists;
the enactment of dietas , or salaries for the legislators, and
the role therein of Deputy Governor Delfin Alvarez; and
Lencinas' decision to suspend the members of the Judicial
Power.
In 1916 Law No. 703 was enacted with the hope of putting
an end to the serious crisis in the viti-vini culture industry.
Its purposes were to bring prices and production to reasonable
levels. The mechanism to accomplish this was to be the creation
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of cooperatives. But this remedy proved to be only slightly
effective, for only one cooperative was formed, the Compania
Vitivinicola, and the centralization it created appeared to
"be more harmful than beneficial. As the bodegueros wished
to turn the market entirely free again, they had already
asked Interventor Loza to repeal Law No. 703.
Three weeks after his inauguration, and having heard
the opinions and suggestions of both sides, Lencinas took
over the management of the Compania in order to liquidate it.
The decree he issued charged that it did not fulfill the aims
for which it was created, and accused the members of the
board of financial and technical irregularities. However, the
lawyers of the Comparlia, Mario Arenas and Meliton Arroyo,
conspicuous members of the Conservative Party, appealed to the
provincial Supreme Court alleging that the decree was simply
a despoilment of their patrimony, and in April the court
21
ruled the decree unconstitutional.
This decision of the provincial Supreme Court touched off
The industrial interests of Mendoza had also challenged
the constitutionality of the financial rules set up in Law 703.
The taxes were levied not only on the members of the Corapa'Hia
Vitivinicola but on all trading wine. In November 1918, the
National Supreme Court declared that financial levy
unconstitutional, under the assumption that it curtailed the
principle of freedom of commerce. The large vitlateros and
bodegueros rejoiced at this decision. The Supreme Court, by
striking at the financial support of the Compania Vitivinicola,
in fact, killed it. It was a step toward returning to a system
of free trade, the one preferred by the largest industrial
interests. As they stated in their petition to the Supreme
Court, the ills of the industry were due to the abusive
governmental intervention, which through artificial means
pretended to destroy the law of supply and demand.
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a violent campaign against its members by the pro-government
press, especially La Montana
. Lencinas, moreover, appealed
the decision to the National Supreme Court, but it declined
to hear the case. The governor, so convinced of the
righteousness of his position, ignored the opinion of the
court, and denied the assistance of the police to return
the CompaSia to its former authorities. Supported by the
law but without the means to make it effective, the Compafiia
Vitivinicola found itself at a dead end, and requested from
President Yrigoyen a federal intervention.
The second provincial dispute to reach the doorstep of
the national authorities began with the election held on
April 28, 1918, to renew part of the provincial Chamber of
Deputies. The Radicals won the eight seats for the majority
while the conservatives obtained the four vacancies for the
22
minority. The opposition, however, successfully obstructed
the chamber's scheduled meetings, by not attending them. With
this maneuver they prevented the incorporation of the newly
elected deputies, which would give the Radicals the control of
the chamber. Frustrated after six attempts to hold a session,
the Radicals met without a quorum; they first accepted the
credentials of their eight new deputies, and then asked the
conservatives to participate and swear in their four new
members. The conservatives declined, stating that the chamber
^^The four conservatives were Mario Arenas, Jose V.
Auriol, Agustin de la Reta and Fernando Lavoisier.
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had been illegally constituted. The Radicals interpreted
this refusal as an implicit resignation of their seats and,
accordingly, accepted them. The acceptance of resignations
that the conservatives did not even submit, prompted the
four legislators to request the National Congress to authorize
the federal intervention of the province.
The discussion of this issue in Buenos Aires stimulated
almost the same partisan feelings it had produced on the
local scene. In the Senate, the conservative Joaquin V.
Gonzalez scorned the "guilty intentions of the majority," for
its resort to the tactic of the "tacit" resignation. Senator
Civit criticized the attitude of the Lencinists and assailed
Yrigoyen's policy of intervention by referring especifically
to the cases of several other provinces intervened by the
Federal Government. The Senate approved a motion to intervene
in Mendoza, but in the Chamber of Deputies the Radicals
mustered the necessary support to set it aside. This action
gave Lencinas some temporary leverage, but weakened his
image in Buenos Aires.
During these years Argentine journalism exhibited virtues
and defects which greatly influenced the political mind of
the common man. Pree from any censorship, both the Radicals
^^Congreso Nacional, Camara de Senadores, Diario de
sesiones
,
1918, III, 509-531 (Hereafter referred as Senaaores )
Senator Joaquin V. Gonzalez, from La Rioja, had been a member
of the cabinet under President Roca. He was a leading
authority in Constitutional Law and a literary man. Through
his inspiration, in 1905, was created the National University
of La Plata.
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and their opposition found in the written word their most
important partisan instrument. However, criticism of political
foes was often made without inhibitions, and many times
degenerated into abusive, almost vituperative language.
The combative hostility against the government shown by
the conservative paper La Tarde, official organ of the Popular
Party, and its scornful treatment of the private life of the
governor's family, moved Lencinas to order the deportation to
San Luis of its two directors. Other journalists suffered the
same fate and for similar reasons. This arbitrary treatment
of newsmen, despite the excesses comitted by them, provoked an
immediate reaction from the anti-Radical press, nationally as
well as in Mendoza.^^
The rough treatment accorded to a correspondent from the
widely read Buenos Aires newspaper Critica, in December 1918,
created even more hard feelings. The porteno daily had been
strongly anti-Lencinist , and it was not surprising that the
arrival in Mendoza of Cesar Orozco, its special correspondent,
would be met with suspicion. What was perhaps not expected was
his arrest by the police. Even after his release by Judge
An indication of the strong official feelings was
revealed when street demonstrators supporting the government
and enjoying police benevolence, after breaking windows of
La Tarde, paraded in front of the government house, receiving
the solid support of the governor and the police commissioner.
These incidents intensified inter-party friction and
precipitated very unfavorable comments in Buenos Aires. There,
the Circulo de la Prensa complained to Yrigoyen; Benito
Villanueva pleaded for the deported newsmen to the President,
and there were frequent critical comments from La Naci5n and
La Prensa.
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Jorge Vera Vallejo in response to a habeas corpus proceeding,
he was rearrested. This time he was held for a short time and
allowed to leave through the backdoor of the police building,
only to be met by a group of thugs who beat him up.
The episode had other aspects which revealed the
arbitrariness of the Mendozan governor. Police Commissioner
Quellet, who had obeyed the judicial order to release Orozco
was replaced by Roberto J. Rincci, the Mayor of Maipu, an
energetic party-member, far more experienced in the arbitrary
handling of political adversaries. More significant yet,
Judge Vera Vallejo, who issued that order, was himself ousted
from office. The complaints against the governor grew louder,
and the deportation of newsmen became another hot issue in
the already strained relations between Mendoza and Buenos
Aires.
But further troubles for the government were already
brewing, troubles which eventually would disrupt the unity of
Mendoza' s Radicalism. In the 1916 provincial legislative
period the Radicals had successfully opposed a bill to
establish a salary for lawmakers. In August 1918, however,
the Radicals sponsored a bill assigning a stipend to the
legislators. This represented an annual budget increase of
264,000 pesos. Lencinas was absent from the province at that
time for health reasons, and Delfin Alvarez, serving as
acting governor, opposed the proposal alleging the precarious
situation of the provincial treasury. He notified the
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legislators that if the bill were approved he would veto it,
and this he did on September 16, over the opposition of two
cabinet ministers, Puebla and Teisaire.^^ The crisis summoned
I'encinas back to Mendoza, where at once he expressed his
confidence in the two ministers and asked for Alvarez
resignation. Thus, another major conflict began to take
shape.
Alvarez found himself attacked by most of his fellow
party-members and the Lencinist newspapers. In his defense,
he declared that Lencinas, before leaving the province, had
given him full freedom of action, and that the governor was
supporting Puebla and Teisaire out of friendship rather than
26
out of concern for the issue involved.
The dietas issue brought to the surface serious personal
splits within the official party. The basic animosities lay
between Alvarez, now considered a traitor by the Lencinists,
and Teisaire, who counted on the complete support of the
^In opposition to Alvarez, Ministers ,Puebla and
Teisaire resigned. The legislature rejected Alvarez' veto on
a technicality and the dietas became effective, retroactive
to September 1, 1918.
^^Los Andes, September 20, 1918, suggested that Alvarez'
error was"^ believe that it was th^ proper time to expel the
false apostles from the temple. La Epoca , September 22, 191o,
protecting Lencinas' imag^, approached the conflict as a
dispute solely affecting Alvarez and the legislature. Dardo
Olguin, in his biography of Lencinas, contends that the
discrepancy over the die^tas was only a smokescreen for the
political ambitions of Alvarez; that he counted upon the poor
health of the governor, or upon the possibility that Lencinas
woSld fill the seat of Emilio Civit in the Senate, when
Civit
ended his term in 1919, Lencinas, p. 297. Jose Hipolito
Lencinas, a son of the governor, coincides somewhat
with
Olguin, believing that Alvarez was so simple-minded that the
power went to his head. Personal interview, Kendoza,
June 26,
1972.
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governor. Like a contagious patient, Alvarez was isolated
by his former political friends. He remained absent from
the Senate for a month in order to cool off the tensions,
but when he returned to preside over the meetings, no
quorum was obtained.
The Radical split deepened when Alvarez was expelled
from the party. In a stormy session of the provincial
committee, held on September 29, Lencinas' wishes were
overwhelmingly supported and Alvarez was ousted. But a
group of Radicals sided with him and formed a new political
organization, the Intransigent Radical Party.
^'^
A few weeks later Alvarez sought protection in the
house of a prominent bodeguero, accusing the police of
harassing him. In Buenos Aires, meanwhile, Puebla attempted
to gain the support of the Federal Government for the ouster
of Alvarez from the government, which the deputy governor
refused to leave. But Yrigoyen declined to intervene in the
provincial conflict. As a result, the Lencinists had to find
their own solution to the stalemate. To this end, in the
session of October 17, provincial Radical Senators sponsored
a bill suspending Alvarez as deputy governor and ordering
that he be examined psychiatrically . They contended that the
^'^Among those defecting from the Lencinists were
Anibal Cabrera, a National Deputy; Bautista Gargantini and
Jesus Romero. Soon thereafter they too were expelled from
the Radical Party. Most of the dissenters declared their
total adherence to President Yrigoyen. This marked the
formal opening in Mendoza of the breach that years later
divided the Radicals in Personalists and anti-Personalists.
fact of "vetoing the dietas and denouncing imaginary
harassments,
" indicated that his mental abilities were
impaired. The Senate found the project plausible and
28
approved it.
The public reaction was immediate, '^ile Los Andes
termed this action "the most impudent and unscrupulous"
in the history of the legislature, La Prensa deplored the
fact that a party with popular roots could acquiesce in
using such flimsy procedures. ^ In December more fuel was
added to the fire. The provincial Supreme Court, by a
unanimous vote, ruled unconstitutional the October
decision of the Senate suspending the deputy governor.
Adding to the poignant intra-party strife afflicting
the Radicals was the relative punctuality with which the
legislator' s salaries were paid, except to those who
deserted the party. This raised the protests of the
opposition. They contrasted this prompt payment with the
delays in paying the salaries of modest public employees,
the financial plight of the hospitals, and the perennial
tardiness with the teachers' salaries.
When early in December Alvarez sent a third public
message to Yrigoyen, reiterating his request for personal
guarantees, Lencinas rebuffed the suspended deputy governor
at once. He informed the President that his government made
1918.
^^Legislatura de Mendoza, Senadores , 1918, 274-289.
29los Andes, October 18, 1918; La Prensa, October 19
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no distinction between the most important and the most
modest man, and that as far as Alvarez was concerned, he
should he cast into oblivion, because of his ill-services
to the party. Each for his own reason, both Lencinas
and Alvarez sought Yrigoyen's assistance to bail them out
of the stalemate.
The opposition to the Mendozan government became more
incensed. But the attacks against Minister Teisaire were
more venomous than those against the governor. Among the
things that antagonized the opponents and even many Radicals
against the minister, was his heavy hand in several
grandiose projects he conceived. The most important had been
the railroad line from Algarrobal to Mendoza, for which
several million pesos were approved by a cabinet agreement,
without legislative consent. Unfortunately for lencinas,
Teisaire' s schemes created increasing animosities against
the minister, including a severe criticism for his nepotistic
inclinations. Many Radicals complained that Teisaire abused
his high favor with Lencinas; that only the minister's
friends could communicate with the governor, while the rest
were not welcomed at the government house. The split within
the Radical Party widened, to the extent that the two main
groups had in common only their loyal acceptance of Lencinas'
^^La Epoca , December 4, 1918. Yrigoyen did not
participate directly in the controversy, but the possibility
of a federal intervention cast a large shadow.
leadership. The opposition press in Mendoza, ' banteringly
,
referred to Teisaire as the "Prime Minister."
Thus, in an unforeseen chain reaction, what had begun
in August as a purely local controversy, became by the end
of 1918 a major threat to the institutional stability of
Mendoza and to the unity of the Radical Party.
While this conflict was exclusively a dispute within
the Radical family, another clash, this time between the
government and the Judicial Power confronted Lencinas and
conservatives again. Immediately after taking office, the
Radicals began questioning on ethical grounds the
appointments made in the past to the Judiciary. As happened
at the national level, the Radical government of Mendoza
controlled the Executive, but the judicial branch continued
mostly in the hands of appointees named during the Regimen,
appointees generally opposed to the Radical creed. The
governor, however, had a very significant advantage over
the President, because the provincial constitution
established a special body, the Judiciary Review Board, to
decide on matters pertaining to the conduct of the judges,
except those from the Supreme Court.
The first legislative assault on the Judiciary was a
request for a general investigation, introduced by Deputy
^•^This board, the Jurado de En juiciamiento, was
formed by the five members of the Supreme Court, five
senators and five deputies. The governor only needed a
legislative majority to get the ten votes required, and
legally dismiss any judge blocking official decisions. The
ten legislators were Lencinists, none from the opposition.
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Carlos Washington lencinas, son of the governor. At this
time he did not make specific charges against any
magistrate, but in September the campaign to tarnish the
Judiciary focused on two Supreme Court judges, Arturo Punes
and Gregorio Vargas. Deputies approved their impeachment,
but the Senate, where the Lencinists were still a minority,
rejected the charges.
The coup de grace against the Judiciary was given by a
decree of December 18, which declared all its members
subject to new appointment. Lencinas proceeded to replace
three judges from the Supreme Court, four from other lower
courts, and declared vacant the judgeship of Jorge Vera
Vallejo. The stated reason for this daring overhaul was the
lack of legislation regulating the Judicial Power, as called
for in the 1916 provincial constitution. The same
justification that was previously given by the government
for not holding elections for municipal and water authorities
was offered here.
The fact that no law was enacted as required by the
provincial charter, however, need not have prevented the
Judiciary from continuing to function according to the legal
rules set up before 1916. Lencinas' action was considered by
the opposition as an unconstitutional, dictatorial move, one
motivated by revenge against the court's decisions in the
cases of the CompaRia Vitivinlcola and the suspension of the
deputy governor. Reacting against the maneuver of the
Executive, several ex-members of the courts petitioned to
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Buenos Aires for a federal intervention.^^
This new confrontation added to the burdens besetting
the governor, and deepened the hostility between those
defending and attacking the government. A public letter
from the Radical Senator from Entre Rios, Leopoldo Melo,
to two former members of the provincial Supreme Court,
added more heat to the controversy. He condemned the
excesses of "those ruling that province, calling themselves
Radicals." The ex-judges replied to Melo that a word of
solidarity from an authority of such moral and intellectual
caliber constituted a gravestone for the Mendozan
government . -^-^
Lencinas could not ignore being criticized from Buenos
Aires by such an influential member of the already divided
Radical Party. He sent a very extensive telegram to the
Senator, which clearly reflected the populist position of
the governor,
[Melo' s pretensions^ won't be able to overcome my
convictions and integrity, which I have shaped
through a lifetime of deprivations, sufferings
and afflictions, which you neither know nor
understand; because you have been only a Radical
at the happy times, the times of triumph, when
all the v\^ork was done and was easier to become a
hero [^Radical de la mesa servida y de la gloria
barata]] ....
...I am telling you, clear and loud, with all the
fervor of my convictions and my sense of justice:
•^^A feeling of uncertainty surrounded the judicial
circles. It was feared that all the legal decisions
sanctioned after December 18, could eventually be questioned
in view of the apparent unconstitutionality of Lencinas'
decree.
'La Prensa, December 22, 1918.
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you will never be President of the ArgentineNation I repeat it and reaffirm it, you willnever be President. ^4 ' ^ " '^-'-^-^
Melo replied to lencinas in an indirect way, in a
communication to the Intransigent Radicals of Kendoza.
Referring to the governor's telegram, Melo boasted of his
seniority in the party and his numerous contributions, of
all kinds, he said, at the service of the "causa." He
reaffirmed that the Mendozan leader "did not have the soul
of a Radical," and concluded that Lencinas' actions in the
government not only were a contradiction of what the party
always stood for, but reflected the image of the worst
specimen of the Regimen.
Apart from the personal antipathies which increased
with this biting controversy, the whole issue revealed the
emergence of two tendencies within the Radical Party at the
national level. One, legalistic, was closer to the more
powerful, traditional segments. The other, more personalist
and popularly inclined, used words and actions which revived
some of the symbolic characteristics of nineteenth century
caudillismo in the handling of public affairs.
Buenos Aires Becomes the Arbiter for the Second Time
The subordination of the Judiciary was not the only reason
that moved the opposition to demand a federal intervention. But
^^Los Andes, December 24 i 1918.
^^Ibid. , December 27, 1918.
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it was the last straw, the event that tipped the scales
against the highly controversial governor. The National
Senate had approved in September an intervention in Mendoza
in view of the arbitrary elimination of four provincial
deputies, but the bill had died in the Chamber of Deputies.
By December, pressure demanding intervention had mounted
considerably.
The opposition in Mendoza believed that lencinas had
trampled on the constitution. His uncompromising decisions
and lopsided interpretations of the nature and scope of his
rule, they claimed, made impossible a political acconmiodation
without the assistance of the national government. The
Lencinists, on the other side, also needed federal help to
retrieve a situation which had grown more entangled and
adverse for them. Since neither political sector was prepared
to reverse its position, there was no room left for an
acceptable solution within the province.
Yrigoyen himself was reluctant to intervene. He had, it
will be recalled, sent Loza in November 1917, to accomplish
the institutional regeneration of Mendoza. Now, a year later,
the necessity of sending a new intervention was embarrassing
for it was an indication of the disarray affecting what once
promised to be a showcase province for the Causa.
To save it or to damn it, there was hardly any other
solution available but to intervene in the province. Yrigoyen
discussed this matter with his cabinet and decided to send the
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intervention. However, there was disagreement as to the
scope: should the reorganization of the provincial
authorities affect just the legislature or should it also
include the Judiciary? The cabinet discussed this matter
obstinately. The Minister of the Interior, Rosendo Gomez,
and the Minister of Justice and Public Education, Jose
Santos Salinas, enthusiastically defended Lencinas' position
in favor of intervening at both the legislature and
judicial branches. The rest insisted on reorganizing only
the legislature.
Congress was scheduled to convene on December 26, to
start a special period. Two days before, to avoid having to
request congressional approval, Yrigoyen issued a decree
intervening in Mendoza and appointing Elpidio Gonzalez as
interventor. The decree did not specify the branches of the
government subject to the federal reorganization. Its
purpose was vaguely stated: to restore the "functional
normalcy" in the province. Yrigoyen' s interpretation of the
Mendozan situation was spelled out more clearly by La Epoca
,
his semi-official spokesman. The National Executive did not
question the legitimacy of Lencinas' rule as a democratically
elected governor of his province. But it was essential that
any government should function within the constitutional
boundaries. Lencinas had exceeded his legal powers, claimed
La Epoca , and therefore he had subverted the republican
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'System of government
.
Congressional opposition criticized the decree
intervening Mendoza on several grounds: for having been
issued only 48 hours before Congress was schedule to
convene, for its ambiguity regarding the branches sub jet
to intervention, and because the interventor appointed was
not a guarantee of impartiality, since Carlos Washington
Lencinas and other Radical leaders from Mendoza had
campaigned actively in behalf of Elpidio Gonzalez in a
recent election in the province of Cordoba.
As it turned out, Gonzalez never served as interventor.
Tomas de Veyga, head of the Bank of the Province of Buenos
37Aires was appointed to replace Gonzalez when Yrigoyen
decided to name him Buenos Aires Police Chief early in 1919.
The definition of the intervention's scope was made by
Yrigoyen only after exploring the issue with Lencinas.
Horacio Oyhanarte, Yrigoyen' s troubleshooter in Mendoza,
visited that province twice during December. He asked
Lencinas to decide on three alternatives, in order to
negotiate the task of the intervention. They were: to resign
as governor, to allow the admission of the four legislators
of the opposition, or to intervene only in the legislature.
In a letter to the President, dated January 1, 1919, Lencinas
^^La Epoca , December 26, 1918.
^"^De Veyga had been a federal judge, professor at the
Law School and National Deputy of the Radical Party.
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discarded the idea of his resignation. If he were to do it,
he told Yrigoyen, he would scrap thirty years of struggle
against the oligarchy of Civit and Villanueva. Furthermore,
he assured the President that he would win the elections
again, against all the other parties combined, and that
hie political success would also enhance the stature of the
national government. The governor did not consent to the
incorporation of the four conservative deputies-elect,
because he feared that together with the Radical dissidents,
they could cripple his projects in the legislature. He did
consent to the intervention in the legislature, although he
also would have preferred the inclusion of the Judiciary
.
lencinas greeted this intervention without the fanfare
and high hopes with which he had welcomed Interventor Loza
fourteen months before.-"^ In his decree transferring the
Executive Power to de Veyga, on February 17, 1919, Lencinas
reasserted his unyielding belief in the rectitude of his
rule. He stated with indomitable confidence, that he would
prove to the nation that without any help from other powers,
he would be supported by the will of the people, in free
elections, as an unqualified popular ratification of his
"^^A copy of Lencinas' letter was made available by
his youngest son, Horacio Antulio Lencinas, in Mendoza.
^^The train in which de Veyga traveled arrived at
Mendoza early in the morning. Minister Puebla was at the
station to greet the commissioner. But since de Veyga was
still in bed, Puebla ordered a police officer to give de
Veyga the official welcome and left the station. Los Andes ,
February 18, 1919.
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performance as governor.
In his 300 days in office, Lencinas had been able to
consolidate his popularity with the comrnon man. The Lencinist
used every opportunity to enhance the figure of their
leader But the massive support from the electorate could
not shield him from the frustrations of troublesome,
unresolved problems, many of them created by his own
arbitrariness. The province turned momentarily to the Federal
Commissioner. His decisions were anxiously awaited by all
segments, each one in search of lasting solutions, but also
seeking to avenge its grievances.
For Lencinas, it looked like November 1917 again, but
the clouds had already replaced the glory of the morning sun.
Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio del
Interior , 1918-1919 (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 139.
^^In December 1917, at the height of the political
campaign, the Radical Party had condemned the participation
of public employees, as such, in politics. But a year later
it reversed its position, and the rules were changed to
authorize public servants to support the government.
Accordingly, on January 20, 1919, there was a public
celebration of the anniversary of the election held a year
before. All government offices were emptied, while the
personnel attended the party's festivities at the Odeon
Theatre, in Mendoza.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SECOND STAGE OF THE POPULIST EXPERIMENT
A New Federal Interlude
Interventor de Veyga delt with the Mendozan crisis by
adhering strictly to constitutional rules and applying
them with complete personal independence. In a few days he
settled the two most pressing issues: first, he ruled that
Alvarez should be reinstated as deputy governor, and
second, he ordered that the judges arbitrarily suspended
by Lencinas should also be reinstated. With these two
decisions de Veyga seemingly accomplished the most important
part of his mission, but in fact, this marked only the
beginning of his problems. Unobjectionable from the legal
viewpoint, these decisions left the political impasse as
entangled as before, and in addition provoked the immediate
ill-will of the Lencinists.
Given the rift between the two Radical factions, what
kind of rapprochement would have been possible between
Lencinas and Alvarez? And after the drastic, authoritarian
measure taken against members of the Judiciary, what type
of workable relationship would be possible now between that
power and the executive? De Veyga had been sent to Mendoza
restore legal order and harmony between the branches of the
provincial government, but paradoxically, his decisions
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hardened even more the antagonistic positions of the Lencinists
and their opponents, and led to a political dead end.
Fearful that the return of the governor would toughen his
attitude toward the opposition, several groups petitioned
Buenos Aires for the continuance in office of the commissioner.
The Partido Autonomista asserted that the only possible
"functional regularity" was to break up the Lencinist
apparatus before holding any election.^ The Intransigent
Radicals, the Socialists, and the Progressive Democrats
requested that the executive power be also intervened, so a new
election for governor could be held and thus, effectively stop
Lencinas' arbitrariness. The Centre de Bodegueros, in the name
of the well-being of the province and especially of its
industry and commerce, pleaded that de Veyga remain in power
for the longest time possible.-^ Voicing the same view, Los
Andes appealed to the patriotism of the commissioner, observing
with foreboding that if Lencinas had earlier dared to accuse
some of his old Radical friends of being insane and traitors,
his return to office would revive the autocracy of the "Praile
Aldao."^ This newspaper, however, in a display of commitment to
Hps Andes , March 10, 1919.
^La Prensa , March 8, 9, and 10, 1919.
^Los Andes, March 8, 1919.
^Ibid. , March 13, 1919. This newspaper referred to the
caudillo Felix Aldao, fervid supporter of Juan Manuel de Rosas,
who ruled Mendoza despotically during part of the decades of
1830 and 1840.
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principle amidst stormy partisanship, believed that the proper
step was to let the people decide freely about Lencinas. If hi
party would win again, said Los Andes
, it would mean that he
represented the aspirations of the people.^
Delfin Alvarez pressured Lencinas with the proposal that
he would resign if the governor would do the same. But his
gesture was in vain; to the Lencinists their old caudillo
embodied the movement itself and his political stature was
beyond any compromise. Meanwhile, the Radicals did not remain
idle. Lencinas and Teisaire, openly at odds with the intervent
traveled throughout the province recruiting adherents to
petition Yrigoyen for de Veyga's immediate replacement.
Lencinas believed that de Veyga's purpose was to damage him
politically, although he thought that his prestige was above
any maneuver attempted at the national level against him and
his government.
Their confrontation led Lencinas and de Veyga to discuss
the stalemate of Kendozan affairs with the President, but not
in the presence of each other. According to Delfor del Valle,
an Yrigoyenist Senator for the Federal Capital and a close
political friend of the President, Yrigoyen censured Lencinas
personally for the mishandling of his government and the
stained image it attached to the reform efforts of the party.
Such was the deadlock between the governor and de Veyga,
explained del Valle, that on March 27, in an effort to
^Los Andes, March 13, 1919.
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maintain institutional order in Mendoza, Yrigoyen forced
Lencinas to resign. The President himself dictated the words
to Lencinas, who "touched and with tears in his eyes," wrote
I place in your hands my irrevocable resignation
as Governor of the Province of Kendoza, thus theFederal Government would have in their hands allthe necessary elements to resolve in a sovereign
and democratic manner what to do with the powers
of this province.
o
Del Valle said that Yrigoyen never considered this note
an official document, and that Lencinas remained on friendly
terms with the President. Beyond the anecdotal value of this
episode, what is clear is that the solution to the Mendozan
dilemma rested in the hands of the President again, as it had
in the times of the Regimen,
The Minister of the Interior, Rosendo Gomez, vainly tried
to effect a reconciliation between de Veyga and Lencinas.
Gomez told the interventor that Lencinas was an old friend and
political colleague, highly respected in the party. De Veyga
replied that he did not view their relationship at that level,
"because he had gone to Mendoza as a Judge of an institutional
7
conflict and not as a fellow party member.
Senadores
, 1929, I, 537-539. A photocopy of Lencinas*
letter appears on p. 539. Dardo Olguin, although citing his
source as Del Valle' s words in Congress that day, September
25, 1929 ( Lencinas , pp. 439-440), quoted his speech
fragmentarily, excluding from a long paragraph the Senator's
account of how Yrigoyen dictated Lencinas' resignation to
him. Instead, Olguin states that Lencinas left the
presidential office and wrote his note in a small adjacent
room.
'^Los Andes, April 4, 1919.
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In spite of the long friendship between Yrigoyen and
Lencinas, it can be inferred that at this Juncture, the
President, displeased with the troubled government of the
Mendozan caudillo, favored the position of the commissioner.®
The calculated presidential inertia, however, deepened the
pessimism of those who wanted the interventor to return to
Mendoza. They were afraid that Yrigoyen' s decision would
take personal interests into consideration above those of
the institutions involved.
At this point, de Veyga resigned on April 5 alleging
that the Lencinists were openly questioning his impartiality.^
Minister Gomez and the Governor of Mendoza urged the President
to accept the resignation, but Yrigoyen rejected it contending
that the mission of institutional justice that should be
carried out in Mendoza could not be stalled by any personal
reservation. Nevertheless, de Veyga insisted, and Yrigoyen then
Conservative National Deputy Manuel Lainez affirmed in
his newspaper El Diario , of Buenos Aires, that two or three
governors like Lencinas would be enough to bring back to
Argentina the barbarism of several decades ago, April 5, 1919.
The Intransigent Radicals told de Veyga that they viewed
"with horror" the possibility that Lencinas would return to
office. La Prensa
,
April 10, 1919.
^Senator Benito Villanueva, defending de Veyga'
s
position, affirmed that when he had decided to issue a decree
reinstating the four conservative provincial deputies
rejected by the Lencinists in 1918, he was recalled to
Buenos Aires, and never returned to Mendoza. Senadores , 1920,
I, 669.
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accepted his decision. "^^
The President appointed Perfecto Araya the new head of
the federal mission. He had been a Radical legislator for
Santa Pe from 1914 to 1918, and was now a member of the
Consejo Supremo de Guerra y Marina. The instructions given
to Araya were more explicit than those issued to de Veyga:
he was to call for elections to renew the entire legislature,
and then reinstate the governor. Accordingly, early in May
1919 f the second interventor dissolved the legislative branch
and set the election date for June 22."^^ The partisan
alignment of the future legislature was especially important
because it had to elect a National Senator to replace Emilio
Civit, whose term ended in April 1919.
The refusal of the Federal Government to order a new
election for the governorship led the discontented opposition
to renew their demands. Among them, the Intransigent Radicals
petitioned Araya to replace all the high ranking personnel of
the administration, including the police, in order to insure
impartiality. They reaffirmed that they would prefer to be
governed by an interventor until the end of Lencinas* term,
A virulent anti-Yrigoyenist newspaper said that when
de Veyga' s mission in Mendoza was over, he had told some
friends: "I am poor, the only fortune I will leave to my sons
is the integrity of my name. If I would have returned to
Mendoza, I would have lost it." La Pronda , November 9, 1919.
De Veyga had died in Buenos Aires the day before.
^^The provincial conservative deputies that had been
elected in previous elections, protested in vain against
Araya' s decision, alleging that their credentials had been
approved at the appropriate time, and that their terms only
could be revoked by the procedure determined by the provincial
constitution.
Ill
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rather than see him reinstated in office.
Using the justification that his government was a
temporary one, and limited by specific instructions, Arayj
denied police assistance in order to enforce returning the
Compania Vitivinicola to its original authorities, as had
been ordered by the provincial Supreme Court. The attorneys
of the CompaRia, invoking Article 45 of the national
constitution, solicited the impeachment of the President for
failing to take the necessary steps for the enforcement of
the Supreme Court decision. Without delay Yrigoyen disapproved
Araya's handling of the case and ordered him to comply with the
legal resolution. The commissioner obeyed reluctantly. But the
provincial bureaucratic machinery, mostly in Lencinists' hands,
was averse to seeing the Compaflia defeat one of Lencinas
dearest accomplishments, and at once began clogging the
administrative paperwork of the CompaRia to water down the
presidential order as much as possible. The bodegueros
requested that the President end these irritating measures,
but Yrigoyen let them know that the solution to these
annoyances was a matter to be handled exclusively by the
province. Therefore, the situation remained unchanged during
Araya's brief interlude.
As election time drew closer, the polarization of the
diverse political sectors into Lencinism and anti-Lencinism
heightened. Conservatives, Socialists, and Radical
Intransigents emphasized their common cause against the
government and minimized the traditional differences
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separating them.^^ The Lencinists also carried on intensive
political activity, they supported workers on strike, and
especially the contratistas against owners of the vineyards.
In the last days of the campaign, as reported daily by
the newspapers, opposition voices increasingly complained
against the partisan attitude of the intervention, specifically
its indifference to the violence waged in the streets by the
Lencinists before the eyes of a passive police; the
organization of gangs to intimidate the opposition; the
threats against some industrialists, and the hardships
encountered by opposition groups trying to carry out their
propaganda because of the aggressiveness of the followers of
the governor. "^^
Given an electoral climate that did not offer any hope
for the opposition, the Autonomists finally decided to abstain
from the election, alleging a total lack of guarantees. This
12The solidarity among the anti-Lencinist groups was
evident at a rally held in the capital in Kay 1919. In the
so-called Alameda there was a meeting of the Intransigent
Radicals at 4:00 P.M. Half an hour later a conservative rally
took place in another location of the Alameda. When they were
over, people from the two rallies marched together to the house
of Delfin Alvarez to show him their support. Los Andes , May 29,
1919.
^^The Socialist National Deputy Augusto Bunge, who took
part in the campaign with his colleague Federico Pinedo,
depicted the Lencinists as the dregs of society. Bunge stated
that while a Socialist rally was in progress in Lujan, a
suburb of Mendoza,
. . .desfilaron tres veces en torno de la plaza una
serie de carros llenos de pobres diablos, del mas
lastimoso aspecto, muchos de los cuales se
tambaleaban en forma alarmante a cada oscilacion
del carro, y que con voces vacilantes gritaban
"Viva el gaucho Lencinas "
"
Los Andes, June 16, 1919.
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decision climaxed the gradual weakening of the conservatives
since their defeat of January 19I8, and it was taken in
spite of the fact that they still had some very capable and
indeed courageous leaders, such as those agitated times
demanded.
The Lencinists won the election of June 22 by a generous
margin. They took the capital and every one of the departments,
and as a result they gained the majority in both chambers of
the legislature, for the first time in the Senate. The
Intransigent Radicals won the seats for the minority. "^^
Lencinas in Power Again. The Social Sphere
After five months under two federal commissioners, lencinas
was back in the saddle of the province by the will of a large
majority, just as he had predicted. In an interview with Los
Andes
,
a few days before taking office, Lencinas declared his
intention to pursue a government of moderation. He acknowledged
that at difficult times during his early government he had to
apply harsh measures in order "to protect the authority of the
ruler and the image of the party." But now, he said, the time
15had come for tolerance, not violence.^
The governor's opening message to the legislature on July 26,
The election returns showed 15,097 votes for the Radical
Party against 6,459 for the Intransigent Radicals. Ibid . , July
17» 1919. This Mendozan newspaper reacted resignedly to this
electoral evidence: "The people have decided, and this is the
government they want. So, let it be." July 14, 1919. La Nacion,
July 21, 1919, less enthusiastic about the virtues of the
principle of the majority rule, asserted that what had been chosen
was Lencinas' legislature, not Mendoza's one.
^^Los Andes, July I8, 1919.
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1919, the day he reassumed office, was brief and almost
exclusively political. Lencinas regretted that the unity
and discipline of the Radical Party in older times had been
replaced by divisions, both in Mendoza and the rest of the
country. Locally, he condemned those who owed their
positions to the party but were now sabotaging it—a direct
reference to Alvarez—and he especially criticized de Veyga
for having reversed his decision on the Judicial Power.
There was no social or economic reference of any kind with
respect to the state of the province. The exception was a
general outline for a new legal structure to deal with
important aspects of industrial relations, including the
creation of labor courts.
The labor legislation that Lencinas planned to propose
put emphasis on conciliation and the significant role of
the State in resolving social conflicts. He would propose
the organization of unions of workers as well of employers,
with the purpose being to create among them a harmonious
relationship. Likewise, he favored legislation establishing
conciliatory procedures and final compulsory arbitration,
as a healthy solution for major conflicts between labor and
management. The governor planned to submit legislation to
prevent the formation of latifundia in order to protect the
rural worker and the small landowner, and other measures to
regulate rural rents. To look after the proper enforcement
of these laws Lencinas proposed the creation of a new type
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of court, created especially to deal with labor disputes.
In his message the governor recognized the difficulties
in the way of implementing these initiatives. But having
established the 8-hour day and the minimum wage in advance
of the rest of the nation, his faith in his high purposes
was reassured. The governor's outline reflected his basic
thoughts on the role which the government should play in
ensuring social justice for the working man. He perceived
the function of the State as that of a supreme arbiter
balancing the interests in conflict.
Even though Lencinas now enjoyed a confortable majority
in both houses of the legislature, these innovative ideas
were never transformed into specific proposals for legislative
action. The governor needed an essentially united party and
a well disciplined body of legislators. He did not have
either of them during the second part of his government, for
the bitter intra-party split found in the legislative
chambers another forum where the rivalries intensified.
Similar principles to those set forth by Lencinas in
1919 were to become, many years later, the standard labor
rules of modern nations. But Lencinas had in mind a
paternalistic structure, functioning to a large extent
through the personal leadership of an enlighted individual,
and not the highly bureaucratic, impersonal organization
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Kensaje del Gobernador Dr . J ose
Nestor Lencinas a la Honorable Legislatura (Mendoza, 1919).
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characteristic of modern states.
Besieged by the serious problems he had to face since
coming back to office, lencinas- advanced scheme of labor
legislation remained just a blueprint for the future. But
his towering accomplishments—the 8-hour day and the
minimum wage-already gained for him a secure and privileged
place among the early social reformers of Argentina,
regardless of his actions and attitudes in other spheres of
government.
Lencinas was genuinely cognizant of the necessities
and aspirations of the humble people. As an individual and
as a public servant he promoted their spiritual and material
well-being. His firm convictions and the leadership he
enjoyed for many years in his province before he reached the
governorship, instilled in him a devoted concern for the
elevation of the masses. "^"^
In the party Jargon he was called an apostle, like
Yrigoyen, and he displayed a paternalistic disposition
toward the large number of economically less fortunate
people, like a shepherd who must take care of his flock.
This paternalism was born of his conviction that he really
17 To Lencinas is attributed the statement that "the
mountains are ascended in alpargatas," connoting that the
heights are only reachable by the humble people. Gabriel
del Mazo, El Radi calismo . Ensayo sobre su his toria ^
doctrina, Vol. I (Buenos Aires, 1957) , p. 169; and Arturo
Jauretche, El medio pelo en la sociedad argentina (Buenos
Aires, 1967T7 p. 172.
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understood and interpreted the yearnings of the lower
classes. Lencinas voiced this thought in a manifesto which
well may be the consummate populist expression of his
government;
...we do not belong to these governments whichlive in an ivory tower, where the voice of thepoor never reaches; but we authentically belongto the people. Therefore, we feel that the
majesty of our rule is enhanced when we speakdirectly to the common man. Ours is a government
which rejoices with the happiness of the masses,because we share their sorrows, because we are
the people themselves. 18
On practical grounds, however, Lencinas' actions to
improve the daily living conditions of the poor were not
as revolutionary as his social legislation. The conditions
of poverty affecting large sectors of the rural and urban
population were not significantly altered during the
Lencinas administration.
Housing was a major indicator of the social decay
afflicting the lower class; in the capital there were a
good number of conventillos which only had two bathrooms
to serve almost two hundred persons. Many houses were in
fact wretched places without a toilet. In areas beyond the
wooden pavement, the general conditions resembled an
Ottoman city, with the not uncommon sight in the streets
of a number of invalids and needy people, many of them
1 o
Union Civica Radical, El Comite Departamental de
San Carlos ofrece a sus correli gi onari os la recopilaci 5n
de algunos documentos politicos de actualidad (Mendoza,
1919), p. 11.
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mendicant children. This was to a large extent a direct
responsibility of the municipal authorities. But beyond
what specifically concerned the municipal governments,
the province did not take any radical measures to alleviate
the distressing pauperism in which the lower classes lived.
The Lencinist press, nonetheless, often accused the well-
to-do sectors of profiting from this situation. La Montarla
upbraided Benito Villanueva for being one of the most
prominent among the legion of conservatives owing
20
conventillos.
At this time the Radicals, while championing political
equality, did not envision that the role of the State
might be extended to include serving as a relief agency for
the most needy, and reducing social and economic disparities
by changing the fiscal structure and realigning the
priorities of the province. The upper class segments
•^"The beggar is an institution in this city,"
expressed Los Andes , December 7, 1919 » in one of its many
editorials denouncing the shameful living conditions of the
poor. Water contamination was very common because of the
large number of cesspools; and the constant dust in the
streets and garbage left on the sidewalks attested to the
unhealthy climate in the popular barrios of Mendoza.
Furthermore, Lencinas was criticized for sponsoring a
monument to the worker while endemic ills, like goiter,
continued to be an insurmountable problem throughout the
province,
^^An illustration of the social and economic abyss
dividing the provincial society was given by two notices
published on the same page in Los Andes , on November 3i
1918. While one reiterated a complaint about the
considerable number of conventillos without a single toilet,
the other, a few lines down, announced that that afternoon
a "five o'clock tea" would take place in the Jockey Club,
with a selected musical program as entertainment.
119
financed and administered a few charitable associations,
which performed an extremely useful service to the
community, especially for the most impoverished. It was a
self-imposed moral obligation, inspired by humanitarian
principles, but it was carried out within the elitist
framework of the traditional society of Mendoza.^^
The provincial budget, while a good source of
employment for the lower segments, did not provide strong
direct assistance for the poor. Moreover, the fiscal
structure was not engineered to create a social
revolution, but oriented to serve the needs of the
bureaucracy-ridden provincial apparatus. The most important
social service was hospital assistance, free of charge to
the people, but always inadequate. Outside the capital
there were only two hospitals in all the province, both
located within forty miles of the capital.
21An example of the aristocratic-minded approach
which characterized the upper segments was given by Josefina
Civit de Ortega, daughter of Emilio Civit, when she referred
to a kindergarten created in Mendoza in 1908 by Law No. 474,
during her father's second term as governor. Mrs. Ortega
stated that it was a model in its class, the best in Argentina
and perhaps in South America—a viewpoint also expressed by
Theodore Roosevelt, she added, when he visited Mendoza. V/hat
filled Mrs. Ortega with pride was that a jury at the Ghent
Exhibition, in Belgium, awarded the first prize to the
kindergarten for its architectural merits. Thus, while the
conservative government of Mendoza had created an institution
whose highest pride was having aroused the European curiosity
for its architectural values, many dwellings of the poor
II (Mendoza, 1970), 622.
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Old Longings and New Controversies.
The Political Scene
Lencinas' hopes to further the enactment of progressive
social legislation were rendered fruitless by the resurgence
of old political problems and the appearance of new ones.
Pour of these problems became major political issues in the
province: the impeachment of Deputy Governor Alvarez; the
teachers' strike and its aftermath; the election of Teisaire
as National Senator by the legislature; and the appointment
by the National Chamber of Deputies of a committee to
investigate the enforcement of individual rights in Mendoza.
These issues renewed the wrangle between Lencinists and
anti-Lencinists, and brought the already strained
relationship between Lencinas and Yrigoyen to its lowest ebb.
The issue of ousting the deputy governor was first on
the agenda of the reinstated government. The Lencinists were
determined that the number two authority in the province
should be a man of their confidence. Having failed to persuade
Alvarez to resign and, later, to get rid of him by charges of
insanity, the new Lencinist majority in the legislature was
finally able to carry out Lencinas' resolution to eject from
office his undesirable deputy governor.
On July 30, only four days after Lencinas reassumed
power, a petition was introduced to the legislature
requesting Alvarez' impeachment, charging him with having
121
improperly fulfilled his official duties. The intense
political rivalry aroused by this maneuver was clearly
indicated by the political weight of Alvarez' defenders:
National Senator Leopoldo Melo and National Deputies Juan
Luis Ferrarotti, Miguel Laurencena, Carlos A. Becu and Anibal
Cabrera, all Radicals.
The legislature observed the constitutional formalities
step by step—although the defense was pressed by arbitrarily
set time limitations—and on September 13, the Senate removed
Alvarez as deputy governor, finding him guilty of having
illegally replaced the secretary of the chamber. As the
Lencinists had a large majority in that body, this ruse
proved to be a good justification.^^
The adverse publicity created by this political
manipulation of the Lencinists occurred when labor agitation
was riding a high crest in Mendoza. At a time when organized
resistance by workingmen against social and economic
inequalities was very often branded as the work of
Maximalists— the term given to the Marxists
—
, Lencinas'
approach to labor conflicts was markedly paternalistic. This
became more evident in the latter half of 1919 » a period of
social and political confrontations. A qualified observer of
Mendozan life said of this attitude of Lencinas that
,
Meanwhile, feeling his safety endangered in Mendoza,
Alvarez moved to Buenos Aires. There, one more time, he
demanded of the President a federal intervention in his
province. Ricardo Baez, an old-time Radical who was the
acting chairman of the Senate, formally became the number two
man in the province.
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nn? j^s^^gialista conceptions couldot tolerate the fact that a few "gringos" were
mf^'^'l^Z^ ^o^^ga or printing shop workersagainst hira. He was the only one who could resolvethese problems and he did not admit anyintermediaries. 23
During the de Veyga and Araya interventions, the
propertied sectors resented the open Lencinist support
given to strikers who demanded, among other things, the
enforcement of the 8-hour day and the minimum wage. But it
was the teachers' strike which provoked the major social
and political reverberation during Lencinas' rule. It began
in April 1919 when a small number of teachers founded an
association aimed at correcting deficiencies in the school
system. The organizers of this group were leftist in outlook;
but regardless of their political orientation, their
complaint about inefficiencies was a legitimate one.^^
^^arianetti, En la verde le jania del recuerdo, p. 166,
24
This group—bound by secrecy, like a lodge—was
seeking to end the delay in the payment of teachers' salaries
and the rents of the school buildings; to press for the
regular! zati on of the federal subsidy; to replace the
existing anarchy of methods and programs; and to erase
political favoritisms. The existence of these inefficiencies
was later confirmed by Eduardo Luzuriaga, acting Director of
the School Board during Araya' s intervention, in May 1919.
Luzuriaga stated that in order to collect their salaries, the
teachers had to discount them at a provincial financial
institution. As regards the accounting records of the Board,
Luzuriaga reported that the last entries recorded were from
1917. La Prensa, July 20, 1919. Among the leaders of Idea
were Florencia Fossatti, a highly regarded Kendozan educator,
and Angelica Mendoza, who in those years helped to establish
the Communist Party in Mendoza. Years later she left the
party, received a doctorate at Columbia University, and in
the late 1950' s taught at the National University of Cuyo.
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These teachers divulged their purposes in a publication
called Idea. Enrique Julio, the Director of the Provincial
School Board, a very capable man but, according to the
Mendozan historian Jorge A. Segura, an intolerant and
authoritarian one, ^ interpreted the creation of the
association as a revolt against the school authorities, and
a source of indiscipline among the provincial teachers.
Therefore, he suspended the teachers who organized it. This
marked the beginning of a long conflict: the provincial
teachers decided to strike and requested Lencinas to replace
Julio.
The significance of this confrontation went far beyond
a simple labor dispute. The fact that the teachers clashed
with the government immediately politicized the conflict.
The opposition, unexpectedly, had found an ally. This
situation, however, posed a contradiction: while the
organizers of the strike were ideologically on the left, the
traditional anti-Lencinists were conservatives. Another
incongruity of this alliance was that in order to reinforce
their bargaining position, the teachers sought the support
of the Federacion Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA), but this
anarchist-led trade union central was anathema to the
industrialists, businessmen, and the well-to-do in general,
who sympathized with the strike mainly because it embarrassed
the government.
^^Jorge I. Segura, Historia de Mendoza, p. 769.
Unpublished.
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Lencinas believed that, above any other consideration,
his authority was at stake. Accordingly, he adopted an
inflexible position which propelled the conflict, contrary
to his intention, beyond the bounds of the province and
created still another fissure in his relationship with
President Yrigoyen. Lencinas would not accept any solution
based on displacing those whom he regarded as his trusted
political associates. No one in his home had imposed any
policies on him, he said, and the same policy should be
applied in the government.
When de Veyga was appointed interventor, early in
1919 » he reinstated the teachers who had been expelled;
and since he was appointing his own assistants, he removed
Julio from the School Board. This situation continued under
Interventor Araya. But when Lencinas came back to office,
in July 1919, he reappointed Julio as Director of the
School Board.
To compensate for the loss of school classes created
by the strike, the teachers taught pupils at their own
houses. This situation induced the opposition to urge a
federal intervention, since the provincial government
could not guarantee primary education, as required in
Article 5 of the national constitution. There were
^^Los Andes, July 25, 1919. One of the tactics of
the Lencinists was to promote the creation of a new trade
union for teachers, to counteract Maestros Unidos, which
was the established organization, and which had declared
the strike. Thus, the so-called Union Mendocina de
Maestros was born, grouping those backing Lencinas.
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stoppages of mercantile activities in support of teachers
—a general strike lasted eight days—and the police
reacted against the strikers with vigorous repression. The
opposition blamed lencinas for the climate of social
disorder than ensued, alleging that his stubbornness in
supporting Julio had caused the teachers' strike, truly
exotic for Mendoza, it was asserted, ^'^ and a damaging
paralysis of general activities.
The response of the Lencinists was a bill, introduced
in the legislature by Senator Manuel Molina, prohibiting
all provincial personnel from becoming members of any trade
union. This proposal was based on the alleged need to
protect the highest interests of the community against the
despicable intentions of the Maximalists. But the bill
never reached the floor of the Senate.
La Nacion accused the government of Mendoza of
following a two-faced policy in regard to the rights of
the workers. As far as the major sources of wealth were
concerned—the vines, the bodegas, commerce in general
—
the government thought that trade-unionism was an inevitable
phenomenon and a positive tool to achieve social progress,
even if the unions resorted to violence. But the government,
on the other hand, under siege by the teachers, considered
the strike as politically-motivated and as an unacceptable
^'^Los Andes, August 13, 1919.
^^Ibid.
,
August 23, 1919.
126
anarchical threat.
Early in August the government partly eased public
tension by ordering an investigation into the accounting
office of the School Board, to verify the presumed
irregularities that Luzuriaga had denounced, and Julio then
stepped down temporarily. When the administrative
investigation ended at the beginning of September,
declaring Julio free from any wrongdoing, he was reinstated
by the governor. This in turn touched off a new strike and
a further deterioration of the authority invested in the
School Board. Police repression intensified and many
teachers were fired. -^"^
The atmosphere of the provincial capital continued to
"be disturbed: the FORA arranged a one-day general strike
for the last day of September; the encounters between
policemen and strikers and the claims of police mistreatment
continued unabated. The government dealt harshly with the
labor segments that sided with the strikers, alleging that
their only interest was to upset the social order. -^"^
^^La Nacion, August 24, 1919.
^^La Epoca
,
September 9, 1919, reported that the
Mendozan government had denied charges that the teachers
could not meet freely. It also defended the procedures of
the police as being directed only against those engaging in
subversive activities and as being designed to guarantee
the rights of the teachers who wished to work.
^Hate in September 1919, England experienced its
greatest labor conflict, involving 500,000 railway workers.
Lloyd George's government faced the strike sternly, and
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The importance of the strike and the widespread
commotion it provoked were echoed in Buenos Aires. University
students in the Federal Capital organized a number of
rallies in support of the teachers and there was a proposal
to the Federacion Universitaria Argentina to declare a
national student strike if Yrigoyen failed to intervene in
32Mendoza. Any effort of the President to reconcile the
parties needed the acquiescence of Lencinas. The latter had
promised to discuss the problem with Yrigoyen, but remained
in Mendoza, preoccupied with the school conflict and the
heated Radical dispute over the election of a National
Senator. To add to Lencinas' difficulties, National Deputy
Bunge informed Yrigoyen that the deportation of many workers
from Mendoza "savagely forsaken in the desert by the police,"
had been proved beyond any doubt. -^-^ To neutralize the adverse
effects of these incidents, the Radical legislators of
Mendoza declared that public opinion in Buenos Aires was
used all means at hand to maintain public order, believing
that the workers were used by extremists for sinister
purposes. In Mendoza, Lencinas had followed the same pattern
toward the strikes besetting his province, and he felt
reassured by Lloyd George's actions. In a press interview,
Minister Puebla remarked that "public opinion will judge
whether a government which deals with its labor problems
by applying the same policy as the most advanced nation in
the world can be labelled barbaric." La Naci5n , November 2,
1919.
•^^La Prensa , October 8, 1919.
^^La Fronda, October 10, 1919.
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being misled by the biased information of La Nacion and
La Prensa
,
and that the people of the province were
enjoing their rights as they never did before. -^^
By October 1919, six months after the teachers had
made the first challenge to the school administration, the
conflict had spread widely into other provincial activities
and even became a preoccupation of the national government.
For those at one end of the political spectrum this
complicated episode was simply a subversion engineered by
undesirable Reds. For those at the other end, the only
possible remedy was a federal intervention in the three
branches of government.
With the passage of time, the original issues of the
strike became enmeshed with the political positions of the
people involved in it. This was exemplified at a rally held
in Mendoza on October 16 in support of the strikers. Among
the guests were Julio V. Gonzalez and Gabriel del Mazo, for
the Federacion Universitaria Argentina and Luis H.
Sommariva, president of the Federacion Universitaria de La
^^los Andes , October 11, 1919. In open dissidence
from the thoughts of the legislative majority, Luis Maria
Calle, co-director of this newspaper, denounced the abuses
of the government, not to the provincial or national
authorities, but to La Frensa , which he regarded as the
only barrier in Argentina against the growing
authoritarianism of the Radical governments. Calle
asserted that, in his presence and that of Deputy Bunge,
a speaker at a Radical rally had advised the police to
set fire to the printing shop of Los Andes , and to
"enlazar los conservadores. " La Prensa , October 13, 1919.
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Plata. When Gonzalez was addressing the people, he was
heckled by someone in the orowd, to whom he replied:
salf "-vw""" P^^P^^ " ^hi^ audience hasid
, Viva el gauoho lencinas!" We are not
persfn "'wr/°'''? "'^'^^"^ dea?h o? anyo .... We do not repudiate the gauoho becauseof his condition, we love the gaucho who lives in
children nviL'° '''' ffectifn of°hrs°wifFan"n ia , liv ng a simple and honest life. But we
^tSlhrSom'o! ^^i^^^^-h^ -omes from 'the'citierwith the police saber to attack our institutionsto curtail our freedom at, u i^uxion ,
Purther assailing Lencinism, Gonzalez echoed Juan
Bautista Alberdi, stating that it was necessary to be alert
in order to prevent universal suffrage from being
transformed into universal ignorance. Otherwise, he said,
the minority will rule where the majority is imbecile.
In spite of the local storms and the pressures from
Buenos Aires, Lencinas remained intractable. He thought it
was his legitimate privilege as a ruler to select his
subordinates. He maintained this inflexible position until,
finally, the conflict lost its steam. The support of the
workers in behalf of the teachers weakened in a few weeks
because of the financial attrition inflicted upon the
35This politically-inspired participation of leaders
from university students organizations, anticipated the
similar collision which took place mostly in Buenos Aires,
in 1945.
•^^Los Andes , October 17, 1919. To quell the agitation,
the Radical legislators proposed that Lencinas name Julio
mayor of the capital and appoint to the School Board an
educator from outside the province, as Yrigoyen had
suggested to the governor. But Lencinas was able to convince
the legislators to put aside this proposal.
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working man. Moreover, the unwavering police repression
against many labor leaders diminished their strength and
muted their protest. New teachers replaced those who were
ousted, and by the end of November the school year
closed, placing a peaceful lid on the once boisterous
provincial dispute. The sectors disaffected with the
governor did not forget the incidents and the arbitrary
treatment they had to put up with. But the period of
convulsion ended, its energies exhausted by the wear and
tear of a conflict enlarged out of proportion by interests
other than those originally sponsored by the Idea group.
Sustained by a strongly personalist and profoundly
ethical perception of politics, Lencinas fully repaid the
political loyalty of his supporters with unreserved
solidarity. "I am indebted to my friends and their
aspirations," he said in his 1918 Inaugural Message, "and
it will be a cowardice to abandon them at the sweet hour of
triumph."-^ The loyalty of Lencinas to Julio was exemplary,
though by defending Julio's position the governor was
protecting above all, what he considered a privilege of his
function and position as a ruler. He did not close the door
to discussion of the teachers' grievances, but he kept an
unyielding position when he thought that being forced to
discard an important collaborator meant to question his
authori ty
.
37,Mensaje de S.E. el Senor Gobernador , June 1918, p. 5
131
Perhaps the mountain of criticisms and problems
generated by this conflict, in Mendoza and elsewhere, could
have been avoided if Lencinas had been more receptive to
those claims of the teachers that related to well-knovm
deficiencies. The government did not take effective steps
to alleviate the financial straits of the School Board, and
thus continued to ignore the provisions of the constitution
on this matter. In fact, even without reference to the
impassioned accusations of the opposition, it is clear that
the government did not live up to its own promising
statements on popular education. Julio himself stated that
politics had downgraded the social function of the teachers
and that the financial branch of the government did not
work in earnest for the betterment of the school system. -^^
To the preoccupations of the government in getting
Delfin Alvarez out of the official family, and the
complications of the teachers' strike, was added another
hot political issue: the election of a National Senator to
replace Civit, Minister Puebla was one of the candidates,
but Yrigoyen was adamantly against the idea that high
ranking officials be appointed to the National Senate, as
had been customary under the Regimen. With Puebla out of
the contest, and with Lencinas' support, Teisaire's friends
mustered the necessary strength to nominate him, although
^^Julio, Gestion economica ^ financiera , p. 23.
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his candidacy was vehemently opposed by some party leaders.
The two government factions in the legislature, pro
and anti-Teisaire, collided in a debate that revealed the
intrigues of the badly divided Radicals. Especially sour
for the majority were the words of Senator Emilio Quellet,
who had been Police Commissioner in Mendoza in 1918, under
Lencinas. He expressed his profound disenchantment with
the governor for favoring Teisaire's "camarilla nefasta,"
and he censured Teisaire for his policies of hate and
disrepute for the old-timers of the party.
In spite of the hardy opposition, the majority of the
Lencinists decided to adhere to party discipline, and
early in November Teisaire was elected National Senator.
This was a rare case, in which the successor of a
conservative Senator would be his former secretary and
fellow-partisan of years ago, who now was enrolled in the
leading anti-conservative party. It was up to the National
Senate to approve his credentials, but already his election
Quellet accused him of concocting from La Montana
the ambitions of National Deputy Francisco Rubilar for the
governorship of the province, with the sole intent of
planting doubts in Lencinas' mind about the loyalty of
Rubilar. In his long and heated speech, Quellet echoed the
charges of Machiavellianism which had been made before
against Teisaire, for his self-interest in the manipulation
of provincial affairs through personal influence and
subterfuge, without the knowledge of the governor. Provincia
de Mendoza, Senadores, 1919, II, 5-19. Another legal
barrier raised against Teisaire's election was that he had
filed for bankruptcy, and the case was still pending in the
provincial courts. This disqualified him from becoming a
National Senator.
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by the provincial legislature had shattered what remained
of party unity.
The opposition to lencinas realized that in spite of
the cool relationship between the governor and the
President, Yrigoyen would avoid taking any decisive action
contrary to Lencinas' interests. Therefore, they turned to
the National Congress. The Radicals who disliked the
Mendozan government, which they considered wicked and
irresponsible, took up the issue of Lencinas rule in the
Chamber of Deputies. In November 1919, Deputies Victor
Molina, Jose P. Tamborini and Carlos F. Melo, among others,
proposed to set up an investigating committee to examine
how constitutional rights were enforced in Mendoza. As the
Yrigoyenists deputies did not object to the proposal, it
41
was easily approved.
This measure satisfied conservatives and Socialists
because they could gain a foot in the provincial structui-e
In August 1920 the National Senate rejected
Teisaire's credentials by an uncontested decision of the
conservatives and Socialists. The Radical Senators did not
attend the session. Senadores
,
I, 673-675.
^•^Diputados
, 1919, VI, 383-412. Julio Cesar Raffo
de la Reta, a conservative Deputy from Mendoza pronounced
the most critical words against Lencinas: "That province
is under a tyranny," he stated, which ought to be destroyed
"por razones de cultura y humanidad.
"
^The committee was
formed by Miguel Araoz (Tucuman), Jose A. Gonzalez (Santa
Fe)
,
and Valentin Vergara (Buenos Aires), Radical
Yrigoyenists; the conservative Manuel Bermudez ( Corrientes)
,
and the Socialist Enrique Dickmann (Federal Capital).
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without any interference from the national Executive. The
Radicals, in spite of the fact that in theory they
accepted the investigation of a government of their own
party, were themselves becoming somewhat disillusioned
with Lencinas' rule and, in any event, they were
safeguarded by holding the majority of the committee.
On previous occasions Lencinas had publicly
demonstrated his combative spirit. He exhibited it again
when confronted with the chamber decision. To general
astonishment, on November 23 he issued a decree denying
any right to that committee to conduct any investigation.
After stating constitutional objections, he made a
political attack against the National Chamber of Deputies,
which was illustrative of Lencinas' character and
convictions and, at the same time, would have greatly
satisfied Yrigoyen. If a branch of Congress had the legal
power to investigate Mendoza or any other province,
asserted Lencinas, then the province should have the same
power to investigate how the representatives of the people
were fulfilling their obligations. It should have the
right to inquire into the causes that made them transgress
the constitutional mandate—by their indulgence in sterile
political debates—while a large number of bills on
importat matters concerning the welfare of the nation were
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condemned to the files.
Following up this step, Lencinas six days later sent
a copy of his decree of November 23 to all the governors
and interventors in other provinces, and invited them to
express their political solidarity with his position. With
this action he seemed to be moving onto the national
political stage as the champion of provincial autonomy.
This unprecedented move by Lencinas indicates how firm
and strong-willed he was concerning the issue of federalism.
On the other hand, it demonstrates that Lencinas failed to
realize that each province would view its own relationship
vis-a-vis the Federal Government according to its own
particular interests and circumstances.
Contrary to Lencinas' hopes, only a handful of
governors and interventors replied, while some merely
acknowledged receiving Lencinas' note. The replies did not
support the position of the governor. They discerned that
the problem v/as simply a dispute between Mendoza and a
chamber of National Congress, whose solution was not under
the jurisdiction of the other provinces. Among those who
replied to Lencinas, the governors of Cordoba and Entre
Rfos added that the chamber had the right to make the
43inquiry, though without arrogating executive functions.
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Boletin Oficial , December 24,
1919, pp. 5184-5185.
^^La Prensa, December 4, 1919.
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The governor of Corrientes stated that those who ruled
with an open door should not make any objection to a
congressional committee seeking information/^
Apart from this new clash between lencinas and his
opponents, his blatant decree refusing to acknowledge the
validity of the congressional committee raised a
constitutional question. Did the chambers of Congress have
the right to order an investigation of sovereign provinces?
This issue was discussed in the leading newspapers. Senator
Joaquin V. Gonzalez affirmed that when the executive powers
—the federal and the provincial—linked their interests
and joined together politically, then it was proper to
resort to a congressional investigation.^^
Dissenting from this view, Juan A. Gonzalez Calderon,
another authority on Constitutional Law, stated that neither
the Executive Power nor Congress was legally empowered to
conduct that inquiry. La Prensa supported this interpretation.
Though disapproving of the tone of Lencinas' decree, that
paper maintained that the provincial governments were not
constitutionally responsible to any chamber of Congress.
La Nacion carped at Lencinas' dual criteria for not having
vindicated the principles of federalism when Yrigoyen had
^^Ibid.
^^La Prensa, December 2, 1919.
^^La Nacion, December 5, 1919.
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appointed Diego Saavedra in 1917 to study the situation in
Mendoza, ruled then by an anti-Radical government.
Branding this a double-edge-knife policy, L_a Nacion
contended that Lencinas- sole interest was to sanction any
procedure against non-Radical governments, and disavow as
illegitimate any measure taken against Radical rulers
The stern decree of the governor provoked the paralysis
of the still-born committee. In fact, after Lencinas'
reaction, what possibilities had they of carrying out their
mission? It is reasonable to believe that even if Lencinas
had not been so fiercely opposed to that committee, the
institutional situation in Mendoza would not have changed
at all, as was demonstrated in 1917 during Saavedra*
s
mission.
Those still wishing to see the end of Lencinism had
only the possibility that Congress might approve a federal
intervention. But this was quite unlikely, since neither
the Yrigoyenist legislators nor the President was inclined
to behead the Mendozan caudillo politically,
Los Andes, the most important anti-Lencinist bastion
in Mendoza, stated its opposition to a new intervention. It
did not justify its position in the name of federalism or
out of respect for a government democratically elected.
Los Andes declared that the arbitrary and intolerant policy
^'^La Prensa, December 14, 1919; and La Nacion,
November 29, 1919.
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of Lencinism was steadily eroding the Radical Party. It
was necessary only to let them rule for a time to witness
the party's irretrievable collapse. A federal intervention,
it said, would stop the otherwise inevitable process of
party decomposition and it would reaffirm the predominance
of Lencinism,
Constitutional Duties, Fiscal Responsibility
and Industrial policy. An Uneven Performance
The political developments described above were only
part of the picture of the populist government of Lencinas.
His performance of constitutional duties with regard to the
municipal system and the local irrigation authorities, as
well as his handling of public finances, was almost as
unsatisfactory as during his first year in office. His
policy toward all aspects of the wine industry, however,
was an enlightened one, and resulted in the enactment of
highly promising legislation, aimed at curbing the
domineering position of the large bodegueros, while
protecting the interests of the considerable number of
small vinateros.
During the second part of his term, municipal autonomy
continued to be a dead letter in spite of specific
constitutional clauses and the fact that for five months
the province was in the hands of two federal commissioners.
48Los Andes, December 6, 1919.
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By December 1919, eleven departments out of seventeen were
still under the direct control of the governor.
Only with regard to the election of water authorities
did Lencinas reverse in 1919 his position of 1918. As no
law was yet enacted on general rules for the administration
of water, Lencinas called for elections in November 1919
under the system established by Law 322, of 1905. Now,
ironically, the governor followed the legal procedure which
the opposition recommended be observed a year before, and
which Lencinas then rejected by suspending the elections.
The inefficiency of fiscal administration increased
after Lencinas reassumed office. In his opening message of
July 1919 not a single word was said about the state of
Mendoza' s economy. From then on, the financial reports were
not made public and some of the new expenditures continued
to be authorized by cabinet agreements, ignoring the
AQ
required legislative approval.
In November 1919, the 1920 budget was submitted by the
Executive. Total expenses were estimated at 12,163,000
pesos, significantly higher than the 9,913,000 spent in
1918. This increase was due to a general rise in v/ages and
salaries and the expansion of the police force. To meet
these expenses several taxes were to be raised, especially
^^To find a solution to the permanent financial
deficit, a special tax on wine— two cents per liter—became
effective on October 1919, with the revenue specifically
allocated to pay salaries and other debts from previous
years.
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on wine, properties and licenses. This provoked a strong
campaign against the government proposal by the whole
business and industrial sectors. As the legislature did not
take any action, lencinas issued a decree, once again,
enforcing the 1920 figures of the I916 budget.
In the financial sphere, the Achilles' heel of the
government was the Provincial Bank, which lencinas had
promised to transform into a mixed institution, modeled
after the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires. But the
bank remained in provincial hands and, as in the past, it
served as a tool for political favoritism. The letras
continued to be undervalued, adding a burden to most wage-
earners, because only federal and railway personnel
received their wages in "nacionales. "^^
The wine industry benefited from this situation. As
most of its sales were made outside the province, almost
all its receipts were in pesos, while it paid wages and
local expenses with letras. But the industry was concerned
with its economic outlook. Every sector, for its own
reason, was dissatisfied with the policy of prices and
production, and although all of them referred to the
^ Its director, Francisco Muniz, had to resign under
charges of corruption and inefficiency leveled against him
by a group of Lencinist legislators.
^^The thirst for pesos was evident in signs in the
windows of the stores: "Se necesitan nacionales"; and the
banks set up separate accounts for their customers, one in
pesos, another in letras.
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"crisis" of the industry, the phrase meant quite a different
thing to each one. The core of the viti-vini culture problem
was to determine whether the industry should be regulated,
and if so, by whom. The government favored a mild
intervention, intended basically to defend the interests of
the small vinateros. The larger producers and bodegueros, on
the other hand, had in the past preferred their own kind of
regulation, as had been embodied in the Corapaflia Vitivini cola,
created in 1916 by Law No. 703 when the industry was in a
serious crisis. But as prospects improved in 1919, they
reversed their position and vigorously advocated a policy of
total reliance on the principle of supply and demand.
More than any other factor, the climatic condition in
1919 helped to bring an end to the crisis which had been
affecting the industry since 1914. Hail and rain were
responsible for damage to a large number of vineyards. This
meant a heavy loss for some vinateros, but at the same time it
significantly raised the prices for grapes and wine. The large
surpluses of wine, which for four years had kept prices at a
very low level, were greatly diminished in a short time. Sales
of wine in markets outside the province rose from 340 million
litter in 1918 to 413 million in 1919.^^ With the promise of
an industrial bonanza in sight, the bodegueros insisted on
^ Provincia de Mendoza, Estadisticas de la Provincia de
Mendoza, 1930/ 31 (Mendoza, 1932), p. 169. The Banco de la
Nacion reported the rise in prices and shipments, concluding
that the improved situation had cast aside any fears of
overproduction. F.emoria del Banco de la Nacion Argentina
(Buenos Aires, 1920), pp. 3-4.
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their preference for a free market.
Upon his return to office, Lencinas tried to avoid the
previous unfortunate experience when some of the production
was destroyed. He sought legislation to shield the
vifiateros from the losses produced by natural calamities
and from the greediness of the bodegueros. In this endeavor,
Lencinas profited from the assistance of his new Minister
of Industries, Leopoldo Suarez, who had first-hand knowledge
of all facets of the industry.
In September the government proposed that the
legislature set up compulsory insurance for the vinateros
against hail and other natural disasters; determine a
minimum price for grapes, and sponsor the construction of
regional bodegas—or use existing ones—to facilitate the
vinateros without bodega to process their own production.
The bodegueros disapproved of the creation of regional
bodegas, which, of course, was contrary to their interests.
They contended that the capacity of the bodegas greatly
surpassed the demand of the national consumption of wine.
What they asked, appealing to the obvious, was the reason
to build new bodegas when those already established
exceeded the needs.
This viewpoint of the bodegueros was technically
acceptable; but the intention of the government did not focus
^\inister Puebla was the only original member remaining
in Lencinas' cabinet after reassuming office in July 1919.
Suarez had been Superintendent of Irrigation during the
first part of Lencinas' government.
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on the capacity of the hodegas available, but aimed
essentially at the protection of the vinateros from being
forced to sell their production at a very low price. The
principles outlined by the Executive were enacted in
November 1919. This legislation represented a positive
step in normalizing the relationship between the highly
conflictive industrial interests. It provided a shelter for
the small producers, without suffocating the large industrial
groups. If these laws were properly enforced, the added
taxation they imposed would be worthwhile, and all segments
related to the wine industry would prosper.
The End of the First Populist Experiment
The response of the Lencinists to growing criticism by
the press was to exclude it from official sources of
information, as happened with Los Andes
, La Prensa , and La
Nacion. ^ This attitude indicated how Lencinas' well
developed sense of self-righteousness became more acute as
54 nLaw No. 758 authorized the building of new bodegas,
the purchase of existing ones, and the setting up of
cooperatives, as well as other complementary measures, to
be financed by an additional tax on grapes and wine. Law No.
759 instituted compulsory insurance covering hail and other
of nature's risks, to be financed by a tax on the official
price of the grapes. The minimum price for grapes was later
determined at 8 pesos per 100 kilos, the same price
requested by the vinateros.
^^Artificial conflicts were also created between the
newspapers and the people selling them, with the purpose of
paralyzing their distribution. On several occasions the
windows of Los Andes were the targets of politically-
motivated vandals.
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problems grew more troublesome for him. This was noticeable
in the answers he gave to a correspondent from La Nacion in
November 1919, a time at which he was pressed by i
threatening his survival as governor of Mendoza. In
"David versus Goliath" fashion, he complained that he had b
a victim of the big press—meaning La Prensa and La Nacion—
of Congress, and even of some members of Yrigoyen's cabinet;
all were trying to tarnish his government. He said that the
accusations of his use of political repression against his
opponents were all lies spread by the misinformed
correspondents of the large newspapers. Questioned about the
certainty of the rumors about a new intervention in Mendoza,
he exclaimed: "You will see me dead before that'."—adding
his confidence that the President would not consent to the
intervention. "I trust him, I am his friend, I have known
him for thirty years," said Lencinas, "but if Don Hipolito
trips my horse, it will be different.
. .
.
"^^
The succession of conflicts crippled Lencinas' dreams
for a progressive government. His own party was badly split
56Interview with Ernesto Escobar Bavio, correspondent
of La Nacion, sent especially from Buenos Aires. La Nacion
,
November 14, 1919. Yrigoyen tipped Lencinas' horse. A
traditional but unimportant ceremony provided him with an
official occasion to show his disapproval of Lencinas. It is
customary in Argentina for the President to be the godfather
—by proxy—of any seventh male child born in a family. As
there was such a case in Mendoza in January 1920, Yrigoyen
named the National Deputy Erancisco Rubilar as his
representative, instead of appointing Lencinas, as he had
done before. El Intransigente , January 10, 1920.
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into three factions, one entirely loyal to the governor,
another under the leadership of Ricardo Baez, the President
of the Senate, and the third under the guidance of National
Deputy Francisco Rubilar, firmly loyal to Yrigoyen. The
Lencinists were especially concerned that in view of the
failing health of the governor, there should be a
possibility for Baez to fill in Lencinas- position. Baez
Bided with the anti-Teisaire group, and this attitude
seriously strained his relationship with Lencinas.
To prevent further political erosion, the group most
closely supporting the governor, which controlled the party,
ordered its reorganization. The committee in charge of the
arrangements was headed by Carlos Washington Lencinas, and
it immediately revoked the terms of all provincial party
authorities. The Rubilarista faction, closer to Yrigoyen
than to the governor, ignored the reorganization. This
situation made more significant than ever the fundamental
question whether the Radicals and Lencinists were becoming
two separate political entities.
The excellent relationship of earlier times between
Yrigoyen and Lencinas had been steadily declining.
Disturbed by the wandering course of the Kendozan
government, Yrigoyen asked the governor to see him in
Buenos Aires, but Lencinas sent instead his Minister
Puebla. The minister returned to Kendoza carrying a strong
complaint from the President because of the arbitrary
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manner in which Lencinaa ruled the province. Yrigoyen had
told Puebla that the situation of Mendoza was uncertain,
and it had to be settled. 57 The governor, always zealous of
his political independence, interpreted the presidential
admonition as an intrusion into provincial affairs.
Consequently, on January 3, 1920, he sent a long letter to
Yrigoyen, in terms clearly inferring the end of a long
political friendship. To the presidential threat "to settle"
his government, Lencinas replied that he was afraid of no
one, including Yrigoyen. He reminded the President that he
has been his loyal friend but warned him not to take any
"Machiavellian action" against the government of Mendoza.
In thus defying the President, Lencinas may have had a
presentment that his poor health would prevent any actual
clash. At any rate, less than three weeks later the
impetuous governor, long a victim of uremia, was dead.^^
57Yrigoyen' s opinions were referred in Lencinas'
reply to the President. See footnote No. 58.
-"^Senadores, 1929, I, 369-370. The nine-year old
letter was read in the National Senate by Carlos V/ashington
Lencinas. On that occasion the Yrigoyenist Senator Delfor
del Valle recalled that Yrigoyen had told Puebla that he
would not allow Lencinas to remain as governor one single
day if the charges of corruption, and the beatings and
deportation of political adversaries, were as bad as was
feared. In order "to defend the austere and puritan
reputation of Dr. Jose Nestor Lencinas," Carlos Washington
replied to del Valle that Yrigoyen had never been a
sincere friend of his father. Ibid . , 538, 542.
^^When on January l8 his illness became critical,
Yrigoyen sent three doctors from Buenos Aires, but the
governor died on the 20th while they were en route to
Mendoza. Lencinas' term would have expired on March 6, 1921.
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The burial of the controversial governor was an imposing
demonstration of the popular affection he enjoyed. The
eulogies were filled with understandable panegyrics, as
demanded by the occasion. But half a century later, some of
those concepts have retained their historical substance. The
provincial Senator Ricardo M. Encina, for example, said that
with lencinas had disappeared the last popular caudillo, who
represented at the same time the strong personalism of the
pre-constitutional era and the university education
characteristic of a modern statesman. The Senator equated
Lencinas' acumen with the instinctive feelings of Facundo,
of knowing how to read men's hearts. Los Andes
, softened
its criticism of Lencinas' errors by blaming the circle
around him, and enhanced what it considered his major virtue:
his unalterable love for the lower classes, to whose well-
being he had devoted his life.^^
The eulogies and criticisms with which the national
press reacted had in common an almost unanimous recognition
of the fact that Lencinas had been a ruler loved and revered
by the popular sectors. La Razon , an evening Buenos Aires
newspaper, declared that for his correligionarios he had been
a father, a protector, and a friend; and that Lencinas had
governed more with his heart than with his brain. "His
^^Los Andes, January 22, 1920.
^•^Ibid.
,
January 21, 1920.
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ascent to power," it added, "more than an evolution,
symbolized a revolution. "^^
But La Pronda, the arch-anti Yrigoyenist Buenos Aires
daily founded in 1919, stated that Lencinas had governed
above the constitution and the law and that his professed
affection for the people was nothing but the exploitation
"of the bad popular instincts, in a class war, and
permanently flattering the lowest passions of the people,"
in what La Fronda called "an outrageous excess of
caciquism."^^ Critica said that Lencinas' death should be
regretted as that of any human being, but it shouldn't be
lamented because he had been such a dismal ruler. If
Lencinas would have been a bit more talented, asserted
Critica
,
this aggressive Don Quixote of the interior
—
"tierra adentro"—would have been a great governor. But
he failed because of his disdain for legal norms, his
despotic selfishness, his queer mixture of culture and
barbarism and his scorn for other people's rights.
With more sober words and more moderate discernment.
La Naci on viewed Lencinas as a ruler with authentically
distinctive characteristics, who displayed a careless
frankness, sometimes indelicate, other times naive and
^^La Razon
,
January 20, 1920, 5th edition.
^^La Fronda
,
January 21, 1920.
^^Critica
,
January 21, 1920. Further appraising
Lencinas' personality, this newspaper said that he was a
"gaucho levantado en montonera electoral contra el
poblado, del que adulo a lo peor de su pueblo, en
perjuicio de las elites mas calificadas. "
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picturesque, typical of the so-called men of the interior.
La Nacion credited hirn for the sincerity of his purposes and
his good intentions, but pointed out his lack of proper
judgment in selecting his collaborators.
Reflecting the chilled relationship which existed
between the President and Lencinas, La E^oca stated that the
historical appraisal of the Mendozan caudillo and his
government should not be made by his contemporaries. But La
E£Oca admitted that the old Cuyano leader had been,
politically speaking, a product of the people, because of
the grass roots qualities of his personality and the faith
with which the masses went hand in hand with him.^^
Perhaps nothing reveals better the extent to which
Lencinas was a controversial figure in his times, than the
attitude taken by the National Chamber of Deputies, of which
he had been a member, the day following his death. When
Manuel Caceres, Radical Deputy from Santiago del Estero,
proposed the customary homage of standing up in memory of
Lencinas, the conservative Matias Sanchez Sorondo expressed
his disapproval and requested that the decision of the
chamber be manifested individually. To accept this homage,
Sanchez Sorondo said, would be to disown his past criticisms
and repudiation of Lencinas' rule. The Yrigoyenist Vergara
^^La Nacion
,
January 21, 1920.
^^La Epoca
,
January 22, 1920.
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insisted that the proposal was simply to pay respect to
Lencinas as a former member of the body, irrespective of
any Judgment on his virtues and defects as a ruler of his
province. Deputy Luis Agote reasserted the conservative
opinion. He rejected paying homage to Lencinas because,
in his words, "there are tombs which only deserve silence."
The motion was turned down by 31 votes of the conservatives
and Socialists, to 29 of the Radicals. ^'^
This was the only instance to that date in which a
chamber of Congress refused to pay the traditional respect
to one of his ex-members, when he died. But even if the
motion had been approved, the fact that it was debated
violated one of the time-honored parliamentary norms.
The death of the populist leader prevented a final
showdown with Yrigoyen and ended a government which for the
first time had confronted the provincial oligarchy head on.
Lencinas was revered by his supporters as a virtuous man,
and denounced by his adversaries as a despot and a
^^Diputados
, 1919, VII, 215-220 (January, 1920).
Lencinas had been involved already in a similar
incident, although not as serious as that mentioned above.
A few days after the election held in Mendoza in January
1918, in which he was elected governor, Lencinas asked the
National Chamber of Deputies to allow him to be absent for
five sessions, alleging health reasons. As the request was
denied by the majority of his peers, the chamber voted
again for the second and third time, with identical
results. There was no precedent for this extreme
discourtesy, since these requests were traditionally
approved regardless of the motives invoked. Diputados , 1917,
VIII, 435 (January, 1918).
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demagogue. He had been blessed and cursed with an intensity
which during the period of the Radical national governments,
was only surpassed by the admiration and hatred for Hipolito
Yrigoyen at the national level, and for Federico Cantoni in
the province of San Juan.
A general appraisal of Lencinas' performance— the
objective of the next chapter—will measure the historical
relevance of his leadership and the impact of the movement
he had begotten.
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CHAPTER V
LENCINAS AND LENCINISM. AN APPRAISAL
Lencinas, and Yrigoyen through his own political
weight, were the pillars of Mendozan Radicalism. The
significance of their political philosophy and the
circumstances they had to face in the government, are of
utmost importance in understanding why they were the epitome
of the Radical movement, and in discerning the causes that
led to their estrangement.
Yrigoyen and Lencinas ascribed to themselves the high
moral qualities demanded of true leaders. They became the
political guides of the popular sectors, which led to their
indisputable leadership in their spheres of influence.
Likewise, their followers placed them on such a high level
of civic integrity, that they were not only considered the
leading heads of the party, but the "apostles" of the movement.
Both attained their high public positions after many years
of proclaiming from the opposition the shibboleths of
"reparation," and rigidly defending its principles in the
government.
The Mendozan scholar Andres Roig has stated that Yrigoyen
provided the Radical movement with an ideology which made a
dogma of the need for all citizens to participate in public
affairs, through free suffrage. This awoke the faith of the
people in themselves, assigning to the concept "people" a
dimension unknown until then. Yrigoyen laid down the basis of
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what Roig calls a solidarista neoliberalism, which intended
to replace the exclusionist liberalism of the oligarchy.
^
Lencinas shared the political creed of Yrigoyen and embraced
the tenets of social liberalism, seeking to achieve a more
equitable distribution of wealth within the capitalistic
framework of provincial society.
Both Radical leaders demanded the same devotion and
loyalty from their collaborators which they felt for the
Causa. But this created a predicament which added a heavy
burden to their governments. In 1917 the Socialist leader
Juan B. Justo warned Yrigoyen about the obstacles ahead on
this matter. He said that he believed in the virtues and
honesty of the President, but he alone could not govern
Argentina, and, unavoidably, he would be surrounded by men
not as honest as he was. The historical experience of the
governments of Yrigoyen and lencinas substantiated Justo'
s
views. Both were accompanied by several mediocre
collaborators and, in the case of the governor, by some
individuals of questionable honesty.
Both men had to share the virulence of the opposition,
which did not offer them any truce, and which many times
intruded into their private lives. This served, nonetheless,
to consolidate the ties between them and their followers;
and in spite of the difficulties and frustrations they
"^Andres Roig, Los krausistas argentinos (Puebla,
Mexico, 1969), 173, 2357
^Diputados, 1917, I, 338.
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encountered in office, they maintained their political and
personal prestige. Lencinas often travelled throughout the
province, and his close relationship with his constituents
laid the foundation for a loyalty which in time became his
best political support. Yrigoyen, on the contrary, was
more aloof than Lencinas—a fact which makes more
remarkable the dimension of Yrigoyen' s leadership.^
Yrigoyen and Lencinas were introvert personalities.
Perhaps the years they spent as active conspirators
impressed upon their characters a sense of reserve and
confidentiality. Yrigoyen had a calm temperament, less
impassioned than that of the Mendozan leader. But both
maintained an uncompromising stand on what they regarded as
the basic principles of the party. Yrigoyen' s statements on
this matter could have been signed by Lencinas without
hesitation, and vice versa.
The different attitudes taken by Yrigoyen and Lencinas
in government were imposed, to a large degree, by their
dissimilar levels and the circumstances in which they
performed. One author claims that Yrigoyen relinquished his
ideals for political reform from the moment he became
President, for in spite of having "all the power in his
In the words of one of his opponents, Yrigoyen was
the exceptional case "del tribune mudo, del apostol sin
doctrina, de la elocuencia sin palabras." Julio A. Costa,
El presidente . Hombres y partido (Buenos Aires, 1913), p.
105.
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hands," he allowed the Regimen to survive/ This
interpretation-shared by other authors-does not resist
historical scrutiny. Yrigoyen did not have all the power in
his hands; in fact, not even the full control of his own
Radical Party. He might have erred in his tactical political
approach to the Regimen, but he was hampered by a society
loath to accept political reform, especially when it was
being implemented by unorthodox constitutional means.
Lencinas could control the province with a heavy hand and
abuse legal norms if he chose, not only because he enjoyed
wide support within the province, but also because of the
benevolence of the national executive. Yrigoyen, on the
other hand, did not have the protection of a higher
authority as a recourse to solve his problems, but instead
saw his actions continuously blocked by powerful legal and
political barriers.
These men were friends who respected each other.
However, they had to break up their friendship when both
persisted in their intransigent viewpoints, zealous in
matters they thought belonged to their own jurisdiction.
As they were leaders with a profound sense of authority,
they reached a point beyond which they were unable to
conciliate their positions. Of the two leaders, perhaps
Lencinas should have been more flexible, in view of the
implications his policies had for the federal government.
^Olguin, Lencinas, pp. 307-309.
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But the Mendozan caudillo preferred to sever his friendship
with Yrigoyen rather than compromise on issues in a way he
regarded as unacceptable
.
By placing themselves on a level above ordinary rulers
and attributing to their leadership the highest moral value,
Yrigoyen and Lencinas somewhat removed themselves from the
social reality in which they had to experience their ideals.
It was neither possible to transform overnight the political
customs of the people, nor to eliminate in a short time the
imbalances and privileges which over the decades helped to
create—from the social and economic viewpoint—two very
dissimilar societies within the province.
The two Radical leaders viewed the role of the party as
one of exceptional nature, destined to regenerate Argentine
political life; and saw themselves as the ones chosen to
carry out this high purpose. This stern disposition of mind
might explain why the Lencinists felt that their most bitter
opponents were pathological, as reflected, for example, in
their attitude toward Delfin Alvarez: only a man out of his
senses could have opposed their good government.
If according to their own evaluation only the Radicals
embodied all the civic virtues, then by extension, they were
the only men of principle and the only ones who deserved to
govern. Those who left the party, because of disagreement
with the government, or dissented from the Lencinist rule,
were considered traitors. This was precisely, Lencinas'
reaction when Interventor de Veyga was trying, in Buenos
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Aires, to gain presidential backing for his decisions.
Lenoinas believed that the real interest of de Veyga was to
harm him, by opening a crack in his old friendship with the
President. In lencinas- eyes this action was tantamount to
treason.
In another situation, but one in which Lencinas took a
similarly inflexible stand, he expressed his disbelief when
some tramway operators who were on strike had been
harassing the policemen placed in all vehicles to insure
normal service. Lencinas considered the behavior of the
workers as being directed against him, and he found it
incomprehensible. He could not believe, he said, that the
workers could attack a police force who respected them.
Instead, they were creating difficulties for a government
"well known for his emotional solidarity with the people."
Lencinas concluded that those confronting the government
were only provokers, alien to the real interests of the
5
workingmen.
Lencinas felt a strong self-confidence in his
political power. He said of the conservatives that he alone
could have won the elections against them all.^ This
expression of paternalistic superiority reveals Lencinas'
self-assurance of being the leader of the majority of the
people of Mendoza. The governor portrayed himself in the
^Union Civica Radical, El Comite Departamental , p. 13-
^La Nacion, November 14, 1919.
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provincial arena as the representative of good against evil.
"I have fought for thirty years against the group who
possessed this province," he said, "and I'll always defeat
theml" He professed the highest faith in his aims and
defended his actions obstinately. This is why he left no
room for compromising in the serious conflicts in which he
was involved. The only political alternative in the
province was to be with him or against him. But to rout him
out, he said, was impossible, even by killing him, as he
told a porteno correspondent: "If I am protected, I do not
known by whom, but someone protects me, a mysterious forcel"'^
Lencinas was convinced that his political decisions were
rational and totally justified. Therefore, he reacted
harshly against his critics, especially when they questioned
his intentions. When he refuted the accusations of police
harassment of former Deputy Governor Alvarez, Lencinas wrote
to Yrigoyen as if, instead of being a ruler at the service of
the law, he were the patron of the province: "...I would be
severe in punishing those who in this way attempt to cast
shadows over the good faith and correctness of my
government. "^
Few Radical leaders of his time commanded such
admiration from their followers as did Lencinas. For his
longings in favor of social justice, he was compared with
'^
Ibid .
Q
La Prensa, December 5, 1918.
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the Uruguayan statesman Jose Batlle y Ordonez.^ Lencinas
himself felt elated when he compared some of hia
accomplishments and decisions with those of the statesmen
from countries more advanced than Argentina.
Lencinism proclaimed itself to be a movement
authentically representative of the people. Accordinc to
this viewpoint, the term "people" embraced a strong
political and social connotation: the underdogs, the chusma
de alpargata, the descamisados, that is, the lower classes,
in opposition to the oligarchs, the landowners, the
bodegueros and the social elite. As the people had been
exploited by an unjust political and economic system,
Lencinism—more than national Radicalism— considered itself
the liberating movement which through free suffrage and
social action would eliminate the inequities of provincial
society. Moreover, within the political context, the
expression "people" conveyed the particular notion that it
was unpolluted by the greediness of the superior classes,
"People" then, represented a pure and noble human
segment, which even erring was not at fault, because the
humble sectors could make mistakes out of ignorance, but
^Sometimes the tribute of praise approached hyperbolic
symbolism, as when it was said of him that: "Parece una
resurreccion del heroe de Cervantes, pero esta vez salido
de las paginas de la fabula para repetir en la vida real las
aventuras quijotescas en defensa de los desvalidos, de los
humildes, de los que lloran sus infortunios en el tugurio
sin pan ni calor, y sus desesperanzas en las tinieblas de su
noche moral." H omenaje de la Muni cipuli dad de la Capital al
Doctor Jose Nestor Lencinas (Mendoza, 192«), p. 6 From a
decree naming a street in the provincial capital after
Lencinas
.
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not through bad faith. This provided the term "people" with
an aura of infallibility. If any action could be justified
in the name of the people, it received its legitimacy
regardless of the intrinsic merits of the issue itself.
Just because they had been traditionally exploited by the
upper groups, "people" meant virtue; and the exploiters
became not mere adversaries, but anti-people. To be one of
them was a negative condition, and thus in the mind of the
popular segments the issues lost their normal complexities,
and were transformed into simpler situations in which the
alternative was to be for or against the people. -'^
The relevance of that term derived from the political
transformation provoked by the Saenz Pena Law in Argentine
civic life. But in Mendoza, under Lencinas, its social
connotation was enhanced, because moving beyond Yrigoyen's
goals, the Mendozan caudillo attempted a social
transformation in which the symbolic values of the terra
"people" surpassed the restrictive meaning of Radical
regeneration.
A Mendozan sociologist asserted that the liaison
between a leader and the masses is based on a personal
relationship, since the popular sectors are involved in
primary interactions, where the functional takes a
'^The folkloric fervor for this interpretation of
the word "people" has increased in Argentina through the
years. In this topic, for example, Olguin refers to the
election held in Mendoza on June 22, 1919, as a coalition
of conservatives and Radical Intransigents "que se
volvieron a coaligar en la lucha contra el pueblo
[iencinismj ." Lencinas , p. 494.
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secondary importance. This process develops the most
favorable conditions for the ascent of a caudillo, because
besides the intrinsic qualities required to become one,
there exists a large social group in need of a leader.
For Lencinas' followers his ascent to power represented the
achievement of their political freedom. "The day has
finally arrived, "-stated "One of alpargata," in La Montana
,
celebrating the Radical electoral success of January 1918—
for those "without an illustrious name but with noble
feelings, serving unselfishly the needs of the people. "^^
"'•^Luis Carapoy contends that the Creole group in
Argentina has permanently created the ascendancy of new
popular leaders. Once the masses identified with the caudillo,
they remained most loyal to him, even after the caudillos
die, as was the case of Lencinas; or after they escaped, ashappened with Rosas and Juan D. Peron. "Grupo cultural
criollo bajo," Investigaciones en Sociologia (Mendoza) , IV
(January-June, 1965), 49-51.
12La Montana, April 20, 1918. "Uno de alpargata" was
the pen name of Juan Draghi Lucero, then a young and fervent
Lencinist, who years later became a distinguished local
historian. In the Archive Historico de la Frovincia de
Mendoza are preserved many letters written to Jose Nestor
Lencinas by humble people who, the best they could,
requested a favor from the governor, to solve a personal
problem or a petty political dispute. The tone of these
letters indicates that Lencinas commanded the highest
respect and confidence as an arbiter, and that loyalty to
the party was also a matter of fundamental importance. The
following excerpts are typical examples: "Teniendo en
cuenta que nosotro como rradicales emos trabajado mucho para
obtener el escito de su triunfo, decearia saber si su
escelencia podria hacer algo para que un senor que me deve
una cuenta hace cuatro anos me pagara, por que yo soy pobre
y con nuebe ijos...." (May 10, 1918); "...por haber sido uno
de los que se sacrificaron luchando por la noble causa del
Partido Radical." (November 4, 1918); "...decirme cuando
podre ablar a S.E. aunque tenga que hirme de a pies de esta
no me importa." (November 20, 1918). Another man was asking
for a free railroad ticket to San Juan, if not, he asked
Lencinas "...me preste el dinero necesario, que vo en
pudien^o le hare la devolucion." (November, 1918). Carpeta
25-1. Epoca independiente.
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At the same time, the political ascent of the common
man and the agitation of the social question intensified
the polarization of Mendoza's societal groups. On the one
hand was the oligarchy; on the other, the sectors with
lesser income, the "people." The Lencinist literature
voiced the resentment of the lower classes. La Montana
assailed the "senores del regimen" that ignoring "Juan
Pueblo" had been contented with just luring the people with
wine on election day.^^ On the opposite side, the
propertied elements expressed their indignation at the
socio-political changes experienced in the society through
Lencinas' actions in favor of the workingmen. Before the
Radicals came to power. La Opinion lamented, the policy of
the rulers was to gain the favor of the patron, of the
owners, of those who "handled" workers and, therefore, had
the ballots in their hands. Now, it said, the situation was
;just the opposite, because the workers were taught to hate
the patron and were incited to be undisciplined, and even
to declare strikes."'"^
Those supporting Lencinas believed that the decisions
he took on important issues were indicative of his strong
character and will power. But those who judged him from the
opposition denied him these qualities and asserted that he
was simply arrogant; that Lencinas' firmness was not such.
^^La Montana
,
April 19, 1918.
^^La Opinion , March 11, 1919.
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but mere stubbornness denoting an "alarming disturbance of
his moral equilibrium. "^5 The fact was that his political
and personal preeminence was such that as stated in a
contemporary comment, "Lencinas is the whole party: he
speaks in its name, and he handles its business at the
same time that he does that of the province, absorbing all
the functions.""'"^
The Radical leader was closely identified with the
common man, upon whom he exerted an extraordinary
influence. Because of Lencinas' sympathetic concern for
the lower class, the conservatives reflected upon him the
same negative image they had of those popular segments,
largely illiterate and socially inferior. On the same
wavelength of criticism, an interested observer remarked
that Lencinas "impressed one as a barbarian, capable of
17any violent action," and another stigmatized him as
"the caudillo of the illiterate masses. ""'^
One of the criticisms most often leveled against
Lencinas was his strong reliance on the forces of the
15La Prensa, December 8, 1918.
^^Ibid.
,
April 19, 1919. Upon Lencinas fell the
accusations of being a "Soviet raendocino," a Maximalist;
and his policies were compared with those applied in
Russia, aimed at destroying the capitalist regime. But
neither Lencinas' ideas nor actions Justified these
charges.
^"^Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen
, p. 416.
Mariano G. Bosch, Historia del Partido Radical
(Buenos Aires, 1931), p. 192.
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comite. Cruz Vera, the President of the Partido Autono.ista,
and a partisan viewer, said that the rank and file of the
administration was made of "elements of the comite,
incompetent, unethical and most of them illiterate.
Regardless of the possible overtones of Lencinophobia in
this statement, the fact was that the Radicals engaged in
widespread political patronage which accentuated the
traditional shortcomings of the provincial bureaucracy:
administrative disorder, slowness, and dependence on some
kind of influence.
Those more fiercely opposed to the Lencinists claimed
that the masses had been made fanatical by propaganda, so
they would irrationally follow their idol. For them,
Lencinism was just a mass of misguided men, "ragged, drunk,
starving, and with their feet scarcely covered by humble
20alpargatas," or Just "illiterates and drunks. "^-^
Lencinas' more mordacious contemporary critics placed a
significant weight on the more aggressive and disruptive
elements of the lower class, which massively supported
Lencinism, and often compared them with the chusma that
applauded Rosas in the 1840' s.^^
^^La Nacion
, October 27, 1919.
^^La Tarde, September 24, 1919.
^"Ibid.
,
July 28, 1919.
22Sharing the conservative viewpoint, the Anarchists
of Mendoza also joined the anti-Lencinist choir, and
e3
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The Radicals constantly and intensively disseminated
their own propaganda. Thousands of lencinas- pictures covered
the walls of the buildings of the capital, and even the
municipal vehicles; and in the most distant ranches, or mean
dwellings, of the province, the peasants exhibited with prid
the picture of the "gaucho Lencinas," also popularly known
among his supporters as "el viejito de la buena suerte." Thi
was sincere popular veneration, but doubtless, it had been
• amply stimulated by a vigorous and persuasive propaganda by
the Lencinists.
A team of journalists from La Voz del Interior
, a well-
known newspaper of the city of Cordoba, which was sympathetic
toward the Radicals, was sent to Mendoza at the end of 1919
to analyze the provincial situation. They reported that the
Lencinists were very active, with their rallies well-attended
and preceded by intensive propaganda. They also confirmed the
diligent participation of provincial employees in the
activities of the Radical Party. In their long report, the
newsmen of Cordoba emphasized the unequivocal popularity of
Lencinas, but they felt that the propaganda of the party was
excessively personalist. They observed that because such
referred to the Radical government as one of "caudillaje,
matoneria y barbarie." Pensamiento Nuevo (Mendoza), January
1, 1920. A by-weekly publication of the Anarchists of
Mendoza. The Lencinist leaders were also criticized for
merely paying lip service to their rejection of
"oligarchical" way of living. V/hile they flattered the poor,
they were dressed by the best tailors of Buenos Aires; and
while they shouted ";viva la alpargatal" their footwear was
made of patent leather or other refined foreign materials.
El Intransigente
, December 30, 1919.
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propaganda centered wholly around Lencinas, it was contrary
to the impersonal spirit upon which Radicalism was founded,
and a threat to the progress and cohesion of the party. ^3
In spite of the popular support for Lencinism,
personal ambitions and internal disputes impaired its
possibilities of governing efficiently. It had to endure
the displacement of important assistants of the governor,
such as Francisco Muniz, as manager of the Provincial Bank,
and Emilio Quellet, as Police Commissioner; the acerbity of
old timers like Ricardo Baez and Francisco Rubilar, and
their old political friends, against Teisaire; and the
desertion from the party of men like Jesus Romero and
Antenor Pereyra, who had accompanied Lencinas during the
1905 revolution and the ensuing exile in Chile.
It is generally contended that the responsibility for
Lencinas' mistakes belongs, to a large extent, to his inner
circle of collaborators, in which Teisaire appears to have
been the devil himself. In fact, his negative influence
eventually cast a long shadow on the prestige of the
governor. However, the general acceptance of this
interpretation begs the question. Taking into consideration
his personal qualities and commanding authority, how could
Lencinas have been so dominated by a few politicians of
Los Andes , December 28, 1919. The newsmen from
Cordoba cited as examples the incessant proclamation of
Lencinas as the supreme and only leader of Kendozan
Radicalism; the plethora of worship for the trilogy "Alem,
Yrigoyen, lencinas"; and the exaggerated repetition of
the popular expression, "jViva el gaucho Lencinasi"
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lesser stature? Did Lencinas know exactly what was going on
in his government? Did he know how to appraise men as well
as the majority contended? Whatever the answer might be,
it would hardly favor Lencinas' image in this matter.
Instead, it would cast a doubt over the generalized
interpretation that he controlled the government with a
strong hand but, at the same time, was unaware that the
people around him, and especially Teisaire, were the real
masters of the show, running it from backstage.
Political principles and practices under Lencinism
followed divergent lines on many occasions. The Radicals
engaged in political favoritism of the same nature that
they had criticized before in the governments of the
oligarchy. A decree of July 1918, for example, forbade
public employees to recommend any person for a provincial
job, under the penalty of losing their own jobs after the
second violation. Regardless of its good intentions, this
decree was contrary to the kind of favoritism inherent in
the human condition, and essential at that time to the
building of the electoral clientele. The fact was that
the Radicals—as well as the conservatives when they were
in power—implemented very generously the policy of
political patronage.
The Lencinists justified many of their actions, like
not holding elections for municipal and water authorities,
by their belief that their stand was coherent with the
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principles of Radical political regeneration and in
observance of the provincial constitution. Did Lencinas
apply a double standard on these occasions? In reality, the
Lencinists made twisted interpretations of the constitutional
rules in order to fit their political purposes. But when the
conservatives were in power and distorted the laws, the
Radicals had claimed that it had been done to perpetuate
the oligarchical power of a minority. Prom the practical
viewpoint, and setting aside their avowed intentions, the
Lencinist conduct produced the same negative effect as the
conservative policy of older times. To manipulate elections
for municipal and water authorities in order to impose
specific candidates, or not to hold them to avoid the risk
of losing power, were both procedures which did not honor
the rulers who indulged them.
The Lencinists proudly waved the flag of their
concern for the underprivileged, and the enactment of
legislation which brought social Justice for the forgotten
majority. But in spite of the tremendous strides their
actions represented—labeled "conquests sans-culotte style"
by an unsympathetic newspaper—they senselessly delayed the
payment of teachers' and other public servants' wages.
^Los Andes
,
September 13, 1919. The magnitude of
the financial plight affecting them is given by the growing
number of salaries discounted at the Banco de Prestaraos y
Ahorros, a provincial public institution:
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Ironically, when the Radicals requested federal intervention
from Yrigoyen in May 1917, one of their complaints was that
the Mendozan government kept the teachers' salaries in
arrears,
The Judicial Power fell victim under Lencinism of the
legal institution called Judiciary Review Board—created for
self-serving purposes by the conservatives when they were in
power. Thus, as it was under the Regimen, party adherence
continued to be an essential requisite for an appointment to
the Judiciary.
In like manner, a significant gap existed between the
promises for better elementary education and the limitations
and conflicts which plagued the system. The provincial
schools decreased both in number and quality; and when the
teachers raised their protest on well-founded grievances,
they were labeled subversives by the government, and their
movement harshly dealt with by the police.
It was precisely the police v/ho played a major role in
sustaining the sometimes sever policies of the Executive,
The Lencinas administration did not improve the traditional
Wages and Salaries 1917 1918
Number S Number $
Public personnel 1,606 237,300 1,872 261,300
Teachers 158 20,300 1,669 191,300
Ibid .
,
July 9, 1919. Thus, in order to get cash, the teachers
and other employees paid interest for a loan, or advance, of
the salary they have already earned, but which was paid by
the province with a promisory note.
^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno , Vol. II., Part I, p.
326.
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behavior of this institution. The police had been in the
past a political arm of the government, and continued to be
so under the Radicals. The people were aware of their
arbitrary means; and they especially feared them in the
rural areas, reflecting in this way the apprehensions of
the humble people about the symbols of authority.
The deportation of newsmen and workers and the
authoritarian handling of labor conflicts reaffirmed the
undisguised political role of the police. It was more
evident during the electoral campaigns, when the heavy hand
of the uniformed authority set the climate by intimidating
the opponents, or remaining passively at the sidelines when
Lencinist groups provoked the people rallying for their
adversaries.
The government justified the police behavior as a
necessity to counteract the excesses in which all political
groups were engaged. "Savage behavior is not a monopoly of
ruthless policemen," asserted Jose E. Aguilar, a high-
ranking official in Lencinas' government, "but it is also
found in the uncontrolled multitudes," subscribing to the
theory that strong governments were not a creation of fate
2'6
A report of a political delegate of the Department
Santa Rosa to Interventor Loza, after the January 1918
election, pointed out this characteristic of the rural
inhabitants, "humble people that, facing the specter of
hunger, accept the job they are given, aware of the
sacrifices ahead, because they curse the patron who is
unjust and arbitrary, and believe that most of the time the
authority is an accomplice of the abuses committed against
^hem." Archive Historico de Mendoza, Carpeta No. 25 H,
Epoca Independiente,
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but a consequence of the characteristics of the people. ^7
Certainly, in dissonance with the customary provincial
tranquillity, it was common for an adult male to carry a
weapon. The gun was not only a source of personal protection,
but for the most aggressive individuals it was also a symbol
of political machismo. Regardless of the extent to which the
police behavior was Justifiable, its apparatus served the
purposes of the Lencinists, as in previous governments it
had served the interests of the Regimen. In this regard,
Lencinism proved to be no different from the conservatives.
Early in the century, a student of Argentine society
asserted that the creole anarchy and its symbol, caudillismo
,
were coherent characteristics of the Argentine historical
28
complexion. Almost fifteen years later, Los Andes analyzed
the social reality of Mendoza and Argentina and shared
Ayarragaray' s viewpoint. This newspaper believed that the
transition between electoral methods so different as those
applied before and after 1912, had been too abrupt to be
properly grasped by the citizen at the bottom of the social
structure. The common man was unable to appraise the real
impact of the Saenz Pena Law and the suddenly acquired
significance of his ballot. The law had moved on paper
farther and faster than the political customs. The masses
^"^La Nacion , November 20, 1919.
^^Lucas Ayarragaray, La anarquia argentina (Buenos
Aires, 1905)
, p. 135.
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were then free from frauds and violence when casting their
votes, but within them there still subsisted the wicked,
unreformed political attitudes of the past.^^
On the positive side, lencinas initiated a process of
socio-economic changes which paved the way for evolution
toward a more just society. But those changes did not alter
or destroy the traditional framework of the provincial
economy. One of Lencinas' biographers contends that
Lencinism sapped the foundations of political privilege
and deeply modified the social and economic structure of
Mendoza. The revolutionary spirit of that movement, he
said, led them to cut up root and branch of the oligarchy,
at all its sources of power. This Interpretations appears
to be inspired more by populist fervor than by the Kendozan
reality. Lencinas did bring a new class consciousness to
the lower segments, and enacted social benefits which would
had been unattainable under an oligarchical government. The
Lencinists romanticized the idea of an equalitarian society,
and when they gained political power, materialized their
aspirations by implementing novel social legislation without
disturbing the economic structure of the propertied class.
At no time did they advocate outright collectivization or
expropriation of private property. Lencinism was a political
29Los Andes, April 21, 1919
^^Ig-ain, Lencinas, pp. 307-309.
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and social revaluation of the lower classes, in line with
its liberal-solidarista philosophy, but it did not attempt
to find a sustitute for the capitalistic basis of the
society,
Lencinas- policy in regard to the wine industry was
firmly oriented to curtail the too-powerful interests of
the large bodegueros. The governor was committed to the
principle that it was a fundamental duty of the government
to regulate the basic source of provincial wealth, in
order to ensure its normal development by avoiding the
chaos of the price structure, the maladies of overproduction,
and to correct the disproportionate power of the large
industrialists. Kis intervention in the Cooperativa Vitivi-
nicola in March 1918, as well as the legislation enacted in
November 1919, attest to the seriousness and determination
with which Lencinas was resolved to block the unchallenged
influence of the industrial sector in provincial affairs.
Traditionally, the large bodegueros had been politically
associated with the conservatives, and their liaison became
more cohesive when they confronted a Radical government.
Lencinas deserves full credit for the political courage and
the forthright determination with which he pursued the
defense of important sectors who had always been at the
mercy of the bodegueros.
This struggle has been condensed in a populist
expression, "alpargatas versus casks
—
bordalesas , " which
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conveys a strong political message of good versus evil.^l
But from a broader viewpoint, in which all the interests
involved were part of a complex economic problem which
could not be solved by simply relying on a "black versus
white" interpretation, Lencinas' policy proved to be
beneficial for the whole industry. The bodegueros had to
pay better salaries, provide better working conditions,
and compensate the vinateros with a fair price. In
contrast with the free rein the bodegueros enjoyed before
Lencinas, the new rules imposed upon them specific
obligations. However, they were not crippled in their
activities, and the major problems affecting the industry
were not caused by the government' s decisions
. Time has
proven Lencinas* right in his belief that the government
should establish a minimum price for grapes before harvest
begins. Today, with a wine industry far more orderly than
that of 1919, the government continues determining each
year the minimum price for the product.
Summing up this evaluation, it can be stated that
from the political viewpoint, time has granted historical
credence to the evaluation made by Los Andes the day after
Lencinas' death. It affirmed that his crusade for political
regeneration, waged relentlessly during long years in the
opposition, surpassed whatever he accomplished in the
government. From the social viewpoint, on the contrary,
^•^Ibid .
, p. 310.
32Los Andes, January 21, 1920.
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it was in his first year In office that Lencinas achieved
a landmark by becoming the pioneer social legislator of his
time. But beyond the benefits derived from the laws, it was
even more important to have given the masses dignity and
self-confidence. With leaders like Lencinas they began their
long way toward the accomplishment of their most significant
"silent victory—in the expression of Sergio Bagu^^—
, the
self-recognition of their status in the society. A hard-
fought social recognition which was not fully achieved in
Mendoza, or anywhere else in Argentina, until the 1940' s.
Neither savior nor tyrant, Lencinas fought for the
principles of political reform more as a caudillo than a
statesman; and he gave hope to the traditionally forgotten
sectors of Mendozan society. A study of his performance as
leader and reformer will necessarily show the peaks and
valleys of his successes and failures. But in spite of his
numerous shortcomings, Lencinas emerges with a historically
enhanced image. The political, social, and economic goals of
Mendozan Radicalism assumed a very distinctive orientation
in Lencinas' hands. His strongly personalized rule affected
provincial political life from its roots on up; his social
innovations opened a new era of expectations for the common
man; and his economic aspirations favored a social liberalism
which proved easier to outline on paper than to implement
in action.
^^Sergio Bagu, La sociedad de masas en su historia
(Cordoba, 1961), p. 70.
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CHAPTER VI
THE SECOND LERCINIST EXPERIENCE.
ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHASES
The death of the Mendozan caudillo ended a cycle of
populist government, but its impact upon the masses paved
the way for the continuation of Lencinism well into the
1920' s. This political force found a new leader in the late
caudillo' s son, Carlos Washington, who on assuming command
of the party placed it under the spiritual guidance of his
father. Under the young Lencinas, the movement known as
Lencinism would gain a stature of its own as a regional
force, while simultaneously becoming a branch of the anti-
Personalist faction of the Radical Party.
Carlos Washington's historical significance rests in
the depth of his popularity as provincial caudillo, and in
the role he played in the agitated national politics during
Yrigoyen's short-lived second presidential term. This
chapter and the next will focus on the relevance of Carlos
Washington Lencinas as a provincial populist leader, and
his endeavors and accomplishments as such.
The death of Jose Nestor Lencinas v/as succeeded by a
tremendous scramble for power within the divided Radical
movement, Ricardo Baez, the acting chairman of the Senate
and a former protege of the old Lencinas, succeeded to the
governorship inasmuch as the post of deputy governor was
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vacant. Baez was an old Radi nan o «^±Q K a c l, a companion of Lencinas
since the early days when Radicalism was founded in
Mendoza, but he had been somewhat at odds with the fc
governor because of the recent party disputes.
Although Baez was not endowed with statesmanlike
qualities, he was known for his forthright honesty. He
reshuffled the administration and reported about alleged
anomalies which had taken place during Lencinas'
government. Moreover, he stated that the provincial
personnel was overstaffed and plagued with incompetents.^
Baez' actions led to an open confrontation with the
Radicals loyal to Jose Nestor Lencinas who now were
entrusting the leadership of the party to Carlos
pWashington.
The provincial constitution prescribed that a new
election for governor should be called within thirty
days, and accordingly, Baez announced the date of April 4,
1920. But it soon became apparent that Baez wished to
Provincia de Kendoza, Memoria administrativa de
los cuatro meses del gobierno del Sr . Ricardo Baez
Ilendoza, 1920)
, pp. lb, 26.
2
On March 7, 1920, during Baez' rule, the election
for National Deputies took place. This contest was held
at a time when the faction-ridden Radicals were entangled
trying to assert their supremacy within the party. The
electoral returns were: UCR ( pro-Yrigoyenist , candidates:
Francisco Rubilar and Emilio Quellet) 12,833 votes; UCR
(lencinist, candidate: Carlos V/ashington Lencinas) 7,319;
Socialists 2,791; Conservatives 2,554. Rubilar, Quellet
and Lencinas were elected. La Prensa, March 13 i 1920.
remain as governor beyond the time limit deten^ined by the
constitution. He began an intensive propaganda campaign,
praising his own leadership and seeking support from the
business and industrial sectors. Alleging the need to
maintain social order, Baez postponed the election until
July 4. This action touched off a constitutional conflict
that would end only when the central government again
placed Mendoza under its authority.
Baez had rightfully assumed office, since he was
president of the Senate at Lencinas' death. But his term
as Senator would end on May 31, 1920, which meant that
after that day he would automatically cease as governor.
The postponement of the election until July revealed that
Baez intended to continue in office beyond May 31.
Sensing the approaching storm, Baez closed the legislature
on May 18, and requested federal intervention as the only
means to hold a new clean eletoral contest.
The president of the provincial Supreme Court,
however, announced in a message to the Ministry of the
Interior, that as of midnight of May 31 he would assume
charge of the government, in accordance with the
constitution; and that he would then request the
appointment of a federal commissioner. But Baez stated
that he would refuse to deliver the government to the
Supreme Court. In Buenos Aires, national deputies from
Mendoza also asked for intervention from the Federal
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Government. Thus, although everyone petitioned according
to his own convenience, all the sectors demanded that
Buenos Aires decide how to settle Mendoza- s political
quandary. In fact, the provincial constitution provided
the means to restore political life to normalcy, but
local, personal rivalries demonstrated one more time
that federalism, the cherished symbol of provincial
autonomy, was not such a vital principle for the men of
the interior. Judging these self-seeking requests for
the arbitration of Buenos Aires, La Prensa observed
that they indicated "a degeneration of democratic life
and an atrophy of civic virtues."-^
Buenos Aires was again master of the Kendozan
situation when Congress enacted in August 1920 the
intervention law. It stated that the federal commissioner
should comply with the constitution and laws of Mendoza.
This provision was important because, according to the
provincial charter, elections for governor should be held
on the first Sunday of January 1921.
Yrigoyen appointed Eudoro Vargas Gomez, a Radical
leader from the province of Corrientes, to serve as
commissioner. His rule had two salient characteristics:
he carried out intensive negotiations trying to unite the
Radical factions, and he seriously neglected the
•^Ibid., June 13, 1920.
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administrative business of the province. The difficult and
thorny negotiations held in Mendoza and Buenos Aires to
forge Radical unity are indicated by the length of the
intervention. Whereas Commissioner loza, who had arrived
in Mendoza in November 1917, stayed in power less than
four months; and de Veyga and Araya interventions lasted
a bit more than seven months, Vargas Gomez ruled Mendoza
until early February 1922, that is, for seventeen months.
The achievement of Radical unification was
especially important not only to ensure the preeminence
of the party in the province, but also to strenghten it
for the coming presidential election. As the chances of
the Radicals getting the governorship were excellent,
the struggle over the candidacies became a major
stumbling block in solidifying the party. The repeated
failures to achieve the desired unity forced the
commissioner twice to postpone the elections. Los Andes
summed up the intra-partisan fight by asserting that
"there is not a single Radical who looks at the situation
with the same viewpoint."^
As the elections approached, a self-labeled
"unionist" sector proclaimed Rufino Ortega, a loyal
supporter of Yrigoyen, its candidate for governor. At the
A
los Andes, Tlay 19, 1921. As an indication of the
prevailing intolerance. National Deputy Emilio Quellet
was assassinated over political differences.
same time, another Radical coavention chose Carlos
Washingtoa Lencinas as its candidate. The Lencinists
tried to enhance their position by appealing to the
popularized expression "El muerto manda," symbolizing that
Jose Nestor lencinas was guiding them and commanding that
the future of the movement be placed in his son's hands.
Since Lencinas was the candidate who could muster the
largest electoral support, Ortega- s candidacy was
withdrawn. Lencinas was already a household name with a
considerable following. But Carlos Washington's popularity
was not only an inherited one. He had personal qualities
for leading the Radicals, now officially transformed into
the Union Civica Radical Lencinista.
Carlos Washington had been learning politics as a
companion to his father ever since his return to Hendoza
in 1913, as a brand new lawyer graduated from the
University of Buenos Aires. Born in Department Rivadavia
on November 13, 1888, he was one of the youngest political
fig-ures of the province, especially when compared with the
leading politicians of the times. However, he had already
acquired substantial political experience by serving in
responsible positions within the party, and as provincial
deputy from 1917 to 1920. He had also been part of the
bureaucratic machine during his father's governorship,
serving as attorney for the Provincial Bank and the School
Board, and as a member of the Irrigation Council. In 1920
he had been elected National Deputy, in the first electoral
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contest held after his father's death.
^
To assure success in the forthcoming election, the
lencinists sought to balance the popular image of Carlos
Washington with a candidate for deputy governor agreeable
to the moderate sectors. Because of the arbitrariness of
Jose Nestor Lencinas when he was in office, the reputation
of Lencinism had been stained in the eyes of the non-
Lenoinist electorate. Hence, it was important for Carlos
Washington to appeal to the different sectors and
especially to dispel the charges of "Bolsheviks" applied
to them by the conservatives. He was able to recruit the
support of Bautista Gargantini, Jr., son of one of the
largest bodegueros of Llendoza. In this way the ticket
presented a facade more palatable to those less
responsive toward Lencinism.^
The lencinist program as approved by the party
convention expressed moderate goals, with emphasis on
5As a National Deputy, Carlos V/ashington'
s
performance was as inconspicuous as that of his father.
He introduced only two pieces of legislation, one of them
a bill that his father had unsuccessfully sponsored in
1916 for a national wine industry statute.
^Lencinas and Gargantini received the acquiescence
of Buenos Aires, but in Llendoza the other Radical sectors
were reluctant to endorse them openly. Gargantini had
Joined the Radicals, but later he sided with the
dissidents who formed the Intransigent Radi cal ^Party in
1918, when Jose Nestor lencinas purged Delfin Alvarez
from the deputy governorship. Jose Hipolito Lencinas
recalls that Carlos Washington exhorted Gargantini:
"acompaneme por una corazonada." Personal interview,
Mendoza, June 22, 1972.
social services aad the efficiency of the bureaucracy. The
principal points of the program referred to granting a
pension for the aged, the spread of health services
throughout the province, improvement of the financial
system by transforming the Provincial Bank into a semi-
private one, self-government for the municipalities,
reasonable prices for grapes and wine, irrigation works,
modernization of the school system, and normalization of
the financial conditions of the school teachers.'^
The conservatives, adopting a new party name,
Partido Liberal, to replace that of Partido Autonomista,
selected Mario Arenas and Jose V. Auriol as their
candidates in October 1921. A party statement
characterized the differences between the Liberals and
the Lencinists in class terms. In the Liberal Party, it
said, were to be found the majority of the provincial
leaders, the most capable, the most traditional, and
those with the highest interests to protect. In contrast,
the statement viewed the Lencinists as men who in order
to get votes "flatter the people, teach hatred for the
patr5n, and abusing their j^the people'
sj ignorance,
misguide them to believe that they had the right to take
Q
property without paying for it,"
'^La Prensa
,
July 31, 1921.
o
Los Andes, November 10, 1921.
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Since the conservatives had limited hopes for success,
they used the Mendozan electoral confrontation chiefly as a
platform from which to attack Yrigoyen. At the party
convention in Mendoza, Matias Sanchez Sorondo sounded this
note when he exclaimed: "...for the salvation of our
fatherland, the least I can say is: Delenda Yrigoyenl Let
us destroy Yrigoyen and his Radical government'.
The election held on Sunday, December 18, 1921
confirmed the overwhelming popularity of Lencinas, despite
the opposition of other Radical factions and the lukewarm
attitude of the national leadership. Carlos Washington
thus entered the governorship with a broad base of support,
a support he did not hesitate to associate with his father.
"Voting for me," he said, "my followers not only have
thought of the 'gauchito' [[little gaucho^
, as they call
me, but of my father who made so many sacrifices for the
Radical cause. "^'"
On February 4, 1922, Carlos Washington assumed the
governorship of Mendoza. Only 33 years old, he received
^Ibid., October 17, 1921.
^^The UCR Lencinista won in the capital and in every
department by a wide margin. The total electoral returns
were: UCR Lencinist 13,207 votes; Liberal Party 6,085;
UCR ( Tabanerista, another Radical faction) 5,083; and
Socialist Party 1,905. La Prensa , December 28, 1921.
^^La Prensa, January 6, 1922. As soon as he was
elected, Carlos Washington sent a congratulatory telegram
to Yrigoyen, telling the President that the election
returns had confirmed "your prestige as interpreter of the
dearest aspirations of the people." Ibid . , December 19,
1921.
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that day expressions of the same warmth and solidarity
from the common people that had been given his father four
years before. The crowd broke the police lines and erupted
into the government house, as if to symbolize the fact
that the people were again in power.
Lencinas' political success was rooted in the
popularity he enjoyed among the masses. In fact, many
contemporary observers believe that he had greater appeal
among the humble than his father. His personal qualities,
especially his frank and open manner, contributed to their
devotion. But lencinas was a practical politician who
worked hard to win their support. Taking advantage of the
swift development of the automobile, he travelled
tirelessly throughout the province, carefully organizing
his political tours to reach every possible corner. He
disciplined his mind as well as his body to the hard
scheduled he imposed upon himself. When he needed to
recoup his energies he used to sleep for half an hour at
12His mother, Pidela Peackok de Lencinas, placed
the sash upon him. That day was also a cherished one for
the Radicals, because it marked another anniversary of
the 1905 Revolution. Thus, in a telegram to Yrigoyen,
Lencinas complimented him for that landmark "in the
history of the glorious party which embodies in you the
highest aspirations of the people." La Epoca
,
February 7,
1922. Lencinas appointed as his collaborators many who
had also served under his father. Among them, Carlos I.I.
Puebla returned to the Ministry of Government; Leopoldo
Suarez was entrusted with the Ministry of Industry and
Public Works; and Jorge Cespedes became Minister of
Hacienda. But in May Cespedes was elected National
Senator by the legislature, and was replaced by Clodomiro
Soto.
any place, and then he was up again with new vigor.
While the conservatives opened their comites only at
election ti.es, asserted a Mendozan writer, Carlos Washington
was in contact with the gaucha^je all year round.l3 His sharp
memory was also of great assistance in his communications
With the people. He could trace the members of a family as if
it were his ov^; hence, the proverbially large number of
godchildren he had all over the province. Benito Marianetti
recalls the fact that many children born in Mendoza used to
bear the names Jose Nestor or Carlos Washington.
Lencinas was a good-looking man, of average height; he
had the appearance of an excited, lively man, with a long
broad face with wide deep-set eyes and full lips, and with
hair combed straight back off his high forehead. Although
he sometimes dressed in gaucho apparel, he had the pose of
a typical urban caudillo. The fact that he was a fairly
young governor contributed to build up his remarkable
political following. Moreover, the memory of his father was
very vivid and helped to capitalize the appeal evoked by
his name, especially in the rural areas. His vitality also
denoted new blood in handling the business of the State.
His father died at almost 61 years of age; Carlos Washington
became governor at half that age. While Jose Nestor Lencinas
"^^Interview with Carlos Alberto Arroyo, Buenos Aires,
May 13, 1972. Mr. Arroyo is a member of one of the so-called
traditional families of Mendoza.
14Marianetti, Las luchas sociales en Mendoza, p. 63.
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had been a respected, poised figure, in the patriarchal
style of late nineteenth century, Carlos Washington
represented modernity, both in his physical appearance and
his proverbial dynamism. His brother Rafael Nestor
recalled Carlos Washington's expression that "I'll be the
governor of Mendoza because I do not take a siesta,"
implying his drive to communicate with people as much as
ISpossible,
A Mendozan historian who in the 1930' s played a
prominent political role in conservative politics,
recognizes Carlos Washington's interest in public works,
but laments that as a leader— "el mas popular de todos"
he wasted his enormous prestige by attracting and catering
to the masses "in his own way, without attempting either
to educate or to improve their ideas and sentiments.""'"^
Likewise, Adolf o Vicchi credits the younger Lencinas for
his extraordinary ability to establish a warm rapport with
the people all over the province. ^'^
Carlos Washington's political action was based upon a
personalist influence, getting directly involved with the
people, enjoying being with them, sharing the good moments
IS ,
Personal interview with Rafael Nestor Lencinas,
Mendoza, June 29, 1972.
Edmundo Correas, "Historia de Mendoza," IV, pp.
500-501.
^'^Luis Alberto Romero, interview with Adolfo Vicchi,
former Governor of Mendoza (1941-1943), Buenos Aires,
August 5, 1971. Columbia University, Oral History Program.
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and helping them in the bad ones. His personality enabled
him to attract the goodwill and affection of the popular
sectors. If their veneration for Carlos V/ashington was like
a religious experience, it was because those who had very
few material things to protect found in him a protector of
greater values, their dignity, a sense of equality as
human beings, and a friend who never closed the door to a
man in distress. His father had plowed the same field,
18„
o ^
Carlos Alberto Arroyo, who won the 1972 LiterarvAward of the Fondo Nacional de las Artes (a FederalGovernment council for the endowment of the arts), has
?Sev a^pf^n^.n^'^'i"
foousing on the Loncinist experience,ih y re: Odio entre hermanos (Buenos Aires, 1957)-Politicos enloouecidos (Buenos Aires, 1959); El interventorfederal Buenos Aires, I960); and La furia deTos vencid^(Buenos Aires, 1961). In El intervent^FTid¥fa.T7~T. n. i pH-
129, he presents an image of Carlos Washington Lencinas
which m his own view (personal interview, Kay 9, 1972)reflects the true sentiments between Lencinas and the *
common people:
Los criollos veneraban al caudillo: su fotografia
veiase junto a la imagen del santo de la devocion femenina,
sujeto en la quincha, homenajeado con un ramillete de
humildes flores silvestres
. . . . Toda esa masa profesaba unafe y la unia un sentimiento. . . . Estaban dominados por un
fanatismo semejante al de los creyentes de una religion.
Veian en el caudillo a un nuevo redentor, pero de carne yhueso, a su alcance, al que oian...el gobernaria para ellos;
el quitaria a los ricos y daria a los pobres. Y se codeaba,
y comia y chupaba con sus iguales los paisanos. No los
rehuia, no los miraba con soberbia. Vivia para ellos, se
sacrificaba por ellos...
- A mi no me van a comprar por mas que me engatusen. Yo soy
criollo,
;
yo soy gaucho como ustedesl . . .
.
- Los ricos dicen que yo los persigo, que los quiero
empobrecer.
i
Si , es ciertol Es para que ustedes tengan un
poco mas y ellos un poco menos....
- ...ellos son todos parientes y van al mismo club social.
Son oligarcas y ricos. ; No son como nosotrosl Nosotros
somos iguales a ustedes....
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tut Carlos Washington did not have to rely upon Jose
Nestor's memory to enjoy the fondness of the workers and
the campesinos."^^
The political style of Carlos Washington made it
possible for him to build up his personal image. A
sympathetic newspaper stated that a visit to the government
house provided a valuable psychological dissection of the
way he dealt with all kind of visitors. The waiting rooms
were always crowded, especially with lower class people. He
was the ultimate arbiter even in matters which should have
been resolved at lower levels, because the people were only
satisfied with his words.
Luring the rule of Jose Nestor Lencinas only Carlos
V/ashington of his several sons, had been a part of the inner
circle of government. But when Carlos Washington became
governor, his brothers Jose Hipolito and Rafael Nestor
entered the political arena and played significant roles.
19Personal interview with Benito Marianetti. Kendoza,
June 21, 1972. Marianetti noted that Yrigoyen, in contrast
with Lencinas, was essentially reserved and aloof, having
almost no communication with the masses.
'^^La Palabra, May 16, 1923.
21Jose Hipolito was born in I.lendoza in 1892, and
graduated as a lawyer from the Law School at the University
of Buenos Aires. He served for a brief period as secretary
to his father when Jose Nestor Lencinas assumed the
governorship in 1918. Jose Hipolito had a strong voice in
party and government affairs. Early in the 1920' s he was
appointed prosecutor, and later named attorney for the
Provincial Bank. In 1923 he was elected National Deputy and
appointed legal adviser of the Promotional Committee in
charge of the activities of the former Cooperativa Vitivini-
cola.
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The diversity of the personalities, values, and charact
of the three brothers was highly influential in molding
public opinion about their actions and motivations. Carlo
Washington enjoyed an immense popularity, almost unrelated
to his successes and failures in office. His authority was
never questioned and his decisions seldom challenged. Jos^
Hipolito acted from the beginning as a shrewd politician,
expeditious in resolving problems in a pragmatic and
utilitarian way, respected because of his power, but not
22loved. Rafael Nestor was in many respects like Carlos
Washington, a warm, open-minded person, but he lacked the
maturity of a leader and the self-discipline required to
serve efficiently in the party and the government. Of the
three brothers, only Carlos Washington had the charisma of
Jose Nestor Lencinas, and his ascendancy overshadowed the
political significance of his brothers.
Rafael Nestor was born in 1896 and died in August
1972. V/hen Carlos Washington assumed office he also became
an influential figure, was elected provincial deputy and
in 1924 was chosen Speaker of the provincial Chamber of
Deputies, and appointed representative of the legislature
to the Caja Obrera de Pension a la Vejez e Invalidez. In
1928 he graduated from the Kedical School at the
University of Buenos Aires, although he never practiced
medicine. There is a fourth son of Jose Nestor Lencinas,
Horacio Antulio, born in Mendoza in 1917» a lawyer, and
a daughter, Maria Irene.
^^Through the initiative of Jose Hipolito Lencinas
the Circulo de Armas, a socio-political institution was
created in 1923. It performed for the Lencinists the role
that the Jockey Club performed for the conservatives.
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Carlos Washington was an affable man, instilled with
the personalistic inclination typical of the leading
caudillos from the interior. He was well adjusted to perform
under any circumstances, be it a meeting with the president
of the republic or a criollo
,
dinner with humble supporters
in a rancho far away in the countryside. He was an intuitive
leader, not a thinker, whose university background enabled
him to add stature to his populist movement. However, as a
Mendozan writer has pointed out, he was not a doctrinaire
and did not proclaim his educational status to the masses.
On the contrary, he preferred to be considered another
"criollo gaucho" like them.^^ As a politician, he embodied
the typical "dotor" of political life; he devoted all his
energies to the party, for in the party were his friends,
his interests, his problems, everything in his life.
Every time Carlos Washington arrived from Buenos Aires,
it was a happy, colorful occasion for his legion of
partisans to demonstrate their affection for him. The
capital was prepared for the event in advance. Bands,
petards, flags, pictures of both Lencinas, carts filled
with people coming from the departments filling the streets
24
with a gaudy spirit of holiday.
2 ^Dardo Olguin, "...y en el medio de mi pecho, Carlos
V/ashington lencinas," Todo es Historia (April, 1969), 33.
^^On one occasion, in August 1923, Carlos Washington
was taken from the train, lifted in the arms of his
supporters and carried into the streets of Mendoza. Like a
civic procession, they usually paraded from the Pacific
Railway Station to the Circulo de Armas. Los Andes, August
13, 1923.
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During the long months of intra-Radical political
maneuverings and on the arduous campaign trail, Carlos
Washington's abilities to prevail as the indisputable party
leader and upon the electorate's choice, were proven beyond
doubt. But how did the "gauchito" perform as a governor?
What reforms resulted from his political, social and
economic actions?
The Populist Performance.
Political and Constitutional Affairs
The main characteristic of Lencinist politics was its
personalism and in this regard Carlos Washington continued
his father's approach, although with a tone less moralizing
and less stern than that of the late leader. Carlos
Washington served as the political umbrella of his
movement protecting and promoting its candidates.
Verticality, discipline and loyalty to the party and its
leadership were basic features of lencinism. Members were
warned, as on the occasion of the 1923 congressional
elections, that:
25 The propaganda of the party had a strong
personalist accent. For example, it was customary to name
the comites after prominent men in the party. This was
especially so with the Lencinists, who profusely displayed
the iconography and revered anniversaries of the movement.
Besides the numerous comites simply named Jose Nestor
Lencinas or Carlos Washington Lencinas, there were other
baptized as "Gran Gaucho Lencinas," "Nuestro Gran Jefe
Lencinas," "Gaucho Lencinas," "Ocho horas," "4 de
febrero," "Pension a la Vejez," "Defensa Obrera Gaucho
Lencinas," and many others with similar exaltations.
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^''S^''^^"!'
^^"^ sustitutes even only one of ourcandidates, is a traitor to the party! The
arair'^h.""^"' ^"'S whole list, or nott all. This is party discipline. 26
Carlos Washington was inclined to reward his political
friends by welcoming them onto the official payroll. As he
frankly put it in his June 1922 inaugural message to the
legislature, "I have sought to provide the friends who
shared with me the hours of sacrifice with the public
rewards, according to strict partisan merits "^'^ While
at the highest level he sought the collaboration of those
who had performed under his father, in the lower echelons
he promoted, or at least tolerated, the active interference
of the petty bosses of the coraites to carry on some of the
business of the government. On many occasions this attitude
led to the public exposure of despicable parochial
interests, creating situations which impaired the adequate
functioning of the provincial government.
The so-called "politica de comite," which granted
higher relevance to party affiliation than to any other
qualification, was responsible for placing very mediocre
El latigo (Mendoza) , March 2, 1923. The author
recalls how many years later the same electoral technique
was used. The political campaign for the April 1954
congressional election in the Federal Capital, was carried
out by the officialist party as a simple presidential
mandate. The personal merits of every candidate were not
only ignored by the propaganda, but as far as the election
was concerned it was totally irrelevant. On this occasion
the tactic was based on a poster of President Pcron with
only this statement: "Support Peron by voting his
candidates.
"
^'^Provincia de Mendoza, Mensaje del Gobernador Dr.
Carlos Washington lencinas , 1922, n. p.~XHereaf ter cited
as Mensaje del Gobernador .
194
elements in bureaucratic positions. Sometimes, the voices
from the comites were capable of blocking appointees who in
their eyes were not real party loyalists. ^8 Through the day-
by-day maneuvers, there arose a cadre of Lencinist leaders,
caudillos of lesser stature who in the folkloric nature of
such a personalist regime played a role much larger than
their capabilities warranted. ^9 The Mendozan historian Juan
Draghi Lucero believes that one of the negative aspects of
Lencinism was its exclusion of the other sectors of Mendoza.
Guided sometimes by a spirit of political revenge, it
fostered the creation of a provincial group of favorites.
Marianetti has observed that many of Lencinists' followers
were motivated to participate in public life not by political
reasons, "but for the purpose of resolving their own
problems. "-^^
This type of local leader had a tremendous influence at
popular level, and was therefore, very useful in gathering
mass support for the party. The highest Lencinist officials
were aware of the mediocre caliber of many of these local
?8Such was the case in July 1922, when the Senate
rejected lencinas' appointment of Ramon O'Donnell as judge
and Samuel de Rosas as prosecutor. Neither v/as a member of
the party nor a Lencinist.
29 *Among them, the case of Tomas A. Lima is one of
the more interesting. Known throughout Mendoza as "One-eyed
Lima," he was given municipal positions from v/hich he became
engaged in many partisan affairs. He was widely known for
his skillfulness in handling dubious situations and through
the years his name has grovm to become a legend of unenvied
reputation.
^*^Personal interview with Juan Draghi Lucero, June 14,
1972, and with Benito Marianetti, June 21, 1972. Ivlendoza,
party politicians, but tolerated and even patronized them
because of their rapport with the rank and file. Antulio
Lencinas, the youngest brother of Carlos Washington,
ascribed this tolerance to the need to fill party position
with the people it could get. The party, despite its wide
political base, exercised power with loyal but poorly-
disciplined and inadequately-trained local leaders, a
situation that forced Lencinism to commit mistakes.
Prom a historical perspective, however, it seems
questionable whether the price paid for admitting such
elements within Lencinism was not too high, for the time
came when the movement had to prove before the public
opinion the honesty of its leaders and the efficiency of
its procedures in the government. On the other hand, it
appears doubtful that a party with such grass roots
strength could have been politically effective without
the assistance of minor leaders who were socially and
economically close to the masses. This seems to be a
normal pattern for populist regimes. Theoretically, they
are the most democratic because they claim to derive
their power straight from the people, that is, the
largely underprivileged majority. In an underdeveloped
society, like that of Mendoza in the 1920' s, if the
majority were to rule, it had to be a government where
the "one-eyed Limas" would play an important role, since
•^^Personal interview with Antulio Lencinas, June
17, 1972.
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they were more representative of the majority than was any
of the leaders from other parties.
Los Andes, which originally welcomed Lencinas as a
promising young ruler, urged him after several months in
office, to draw a line separating the business of the
government from that of the comite.^^ Assimilating the
politics of the State with those of the party, noted Los
Andes on another occasion, was like making a small hole
in a rice hag. The loss of the grains would be hardly
noticeable, but it would be unceasing, and although it
would take time, it would end by emptying the bag.^^
In the legislature the strength of the Lencinist
majority gave rise to abuses, especially in the
treatment of opponents. This was the case when in 1923
the credentials of the conservative-inclined provincial
Senator-elect Julio Cesar Raffo de la Reta was impugned
on the basis of anonymous charges. The Lencinist Senators
did not find this procedure objectionable. Instead, they
extended full credit to the accusation, and by rejecting
his credentials penalized a man who had been highly
esteemed in Kendozan public life.
A year later, in May 1924, the provincial Chamber
Los Andes, December 20, 1922. This newspaper
had strongly censured Jose Nestor Lencinas. But with
respect to Carlos Washington, it adopted a conciliatory
position, encouraging him to carry out a positive
government. It criticized the governor often, but did
so with moderation.
^^Ibid. , March 5, 1923.
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Of Deputies took a similar action against conservative
Deputy-elect Joaquin Mendez Calzada. He had been an
unrelenting critic of lencinis. and a legal dispute he had
With Deputy Governor Gargantini served as a Justification
to reject his admission to the provincial Chamber of
Deputies. This act against Mendez Calzada had its roots in
the vituperative criticisms he directed against Lencinism
from El Censor, the official publication of the Liberal
Party, of which he was the director.
There were also instances in which political
adversaries were subject to rough treatment by unruly
Lencinist party zealots. In December 1922, for example,
Gregorio Caro, owner of the opposition paper La Gensura,
was physically assaulted; on another occasion shots
34Por example, the report made by this newspaper
of a huge Lencinist political celebration is a testimony
01 Its intemperance. Few lines could be found to match
the savageness of this report. El Censor (Kendoza)
,
January 12, 1924, included these excerpts:
...alguna cuchipanda populachera organizada por
empleados publi cos
. .
.
que sienten la necesidad de emborra-
charse en presencia y compania del Sr. Lencinas, y darde paso rienda suelta a su ululante salvajismo indigena,
entre alaridos a la memoria desdichada y nefasta de ese
gaucho barbaro y torpe que se llamo Jose Nestor Lencinas..,
...entre el refusilo de las dagas, el vaso de
vino, y la chillona griteria de un par de cientos de
vagos ebrios, es donde el gobernador Lencinas se encuentra
a sus anchas...^
...esa fiesta memorable, mi tad bacanal dionisiaca
y mi tad cuchipanda de burdel arrabalero, es una afrenta
para Mendoza. En ella este gobierno de melena y taco
punteagudo tiene su mas signifi cativa expresion y su
exacto retrato.
All the individuals who were interviewed by the
author, from all political sides, attested that Carlos
Washington never drank with excess.
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were fired agai„st the leading provincial conservative,
Deputy Mario Arenas; and the Liberal and Socialist parties
often denounced the arbitrary police decisions to prohibit
opposition rallies.
While the lencinists engaged in this kind of
aggressive action against their opponents, they fanned the
support of the people by extolling the virtues of their
maximum leader. They tried to assign to the late Jose
Nistor Lencinas a place in destiny even before history
could pass a judgment on his merits. Hence, the pro-
monument fervor of the Lencinists was displayed again in
June 1922 when the Central Committee approved raising a
statue in homage of the deceased caudillo, in a prominent
place in the capital. Another panegyric attempt was a
decree of March 1924 entrusting former Minister of
Hacienda Dardo Corvalan Mendilaharzu, with the task of
writing a biography of Jose Nestor Lencinas. These two
resolutions, although they never materialized, were
evidence of the personalist nature that was the lifeline
of Lencinism. Critical of these self-serving projects,
La Prensa stated that "yesterday's statue and today's
biography, of the same origin, reveal a social and
political climate that saddens the spirit. "^^
^^La Libertad (Mendoza)
,
April 4, 1924.
^^La Prensa, April 1, 1924.
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A comprehensive view of the behavior of the opposition
during Carlos Washington's rule, indicates that it did not
have a very significant influence in the political situation
of the province. The conservatives had been in a defensive
position since I918, when Jose Nestor Lencinas defeated
Civit. The populist tide had buried their chances to become
the party preferred by the electorate. The Mendozan
Socialist Party, although small in size, was dogmatic and
aggressive, and therefore, presented a distinctive facet in
provincial politics. As was its traditional posture, the
Socialists adopted a moralizing position. They preached
against alcoholism, the civic degradation which was
represented in the comites, and the ill-effects of illiteracy.
With a strong admonishing voice, the party newspaper. El
Socialista
, alerted the people stating:
Citizens: you must not go to the comites, which
are centers for corruption and barbarism, and
where the old politicians offer you wine just to
degrade you.... You must not go to the taverns,
where you drink poison, because poison is what
the bodegueros produce and what the bolicheros
sell. ... 37
The Socialist press was implacable against the
government of Carlos Washington. Once it published the words
of an hypothetical former supporter of Lencinas who stated
that a good Lencinist "is one who knows how to steal, how to
bribe
—
coimear— , and be a blind servant of the governor."
^'^El Socialista , March 13, 1924.
^^Ibid.
,
August 15, 1924.
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The Socialists admitted that for the ignorant masses, who
comprised most of the electorate, the social and popular
postulates of Lencinism resembled Socialism. But
-between
a Socialism like ours," they said,
which does not open comites or gambling houses,and advises [people^ to drink water; and a
'
Socialism" like the Lencinist, which providesfree and abundant alcohol during the long
electoral campaigns, the ignorant masses preferthe "Lencinist Socialism. "39
Mario Bravo, the Socialist Senator for the Federal
Capital, after a tour of Mendoza province in March 1923,
expressed the harshly critical views that typified
Socialist attitudes toward the provincial political
leadership. Noting the dreadful housing of the poor, the
inadequate salaries, the long hours of the bodega worker,
the high illiteracy rate, the widespread incidence of
diseases like typhus and syphilis, Bravo accused both the
Conservative and Radical parties of responsibility for
the decline of civic spirit and the debasement of the
voter. "Alcohol is the base of the organization of the
political parties," he stated, "and gambling is a
propaganda device tolerated in order to keep the comites
alive. "^0
^^Ibid., May 1, 1926.
^ Los Andes , March 28, 1923. In the next issue
Los Andes editorially rebuked Senator Bravo affirming
that Mendoza's social ills were not imputable only to
its domestic politics, and that "all the parties
everywhere in the nation behave alike," Ibid . , March 29
1
1923.
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Benito Marianetti, then a Socialist Party leader,
acknowledged that their political preachings were sectarian
and, therefore, limited in effectiveness/1 As the polls
repeatedly indicated, the masses preferred to be ruled by a
gaucho of flesh and bones rather than by rigid ideological
principles of the proletarian cause.
Besides the inter-party collision, the sharp
dissensions between Radical factions, which had been a
feature of political life since 1918, and especially after
the death of Jose Nestor Lencinas, were also manifested in
the legislature. The governor had to appeal directly to
party members to overcome their antagonisms, so as to be
able to block the anti-Lencinists.^^ In his 1922 message,
Carlos Washington stated his desire to reorganize the
Radicals under his principles and hegemony. A party union
promoted from the highest level, he said, was auspicious
when carried out with justice and equity.
41Personal interview, June 21, 1972. The Lencinists
used to refer to Socialism as "cosa de gringos," while the
Socialists termed Lencinism as "la politica criolla."
Marianetti claims that no other party was engaged in a
permanent civic enlightening campaign deeper than the
Socialists.
The Socialist position, although well inspired,
failed to consider human nature as it is. The gambling
casino built by the Lencinists in 1924, in the city of
Mendoza, is still functioning in the same building, and
opening its doors six days a week.
^^Related to this matter, Jose Hipolito Lencinas
affirmed that undated resignations were never requested in
advance from any legislator. Personal interview, June 23,
1972.
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But such a solution was not possible. In spite of the
fact that Lencinas was beyond question the leader of the
majority of the Radicals of Mendoza, he had to face the
permanent opposition of the Yrigoyenist Radicals. This
alienation, begun during the government of Jose Nestor
Lencinas, had become more acute under Carlos Washington.
His relationship with Yrigoyen, in spite of their early
mutual acceptance, and the congratulatory telegrams sent
by Lencinas to the President, soon faded away, since the
Personalist Radicals of Mendoza considered the Lencinists
as deviationists from the party.
The channel of political alliances followed a logical
path; the final break between Carlos Washington and
Yrigoyen was a corollary of the situation in the province,
where Lencinists and Yrigoyenists were at each other's
throats. The accession of Alvear to the presidency in
October 1922, and the further detachment between
Personalists and anti-Personalists
,
placed Lencinas
squarely in the anti-Yrigoyen sector.
In the Mendozan scene Carlos Washington also sought
the shelter of a friendly Judiciary, taking advantage of
the so-called Jurado de En juiciamiento
, a Judiciary
Review Board for members of the judicial system. To this
end the majority in both branches of the legislature
appointed only Lencinists as their representatives to the
Board, as they did when Jose Nestor Lencinas was governor.
Once again the opposition raised its protest in vain. The
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lencinists restated their viewpoint that the Board was a
political body, and as such, it was logical for the ruling
party to fill m the membership with its own men. When the
provincial charter called for minority representation,
they claimed, it did so explicitly, as in the provisions
dealing with the electoral system.
The seriousness of the situation lay in the fact that
the Lencinists controlled the legislature, and consequently,
the Executive could control the Judiciary by using the
Review Board to remove, legally, the judges it wanted to
eliminate. Traditionally, this had been a provincial fact
of life. Until 1918 there had been "conservative" Judges;
with the Lencinists in power, it was the turn for "Radical"
judges.
The most resounding case involving the Board was the
impeachment of Judge Jorge Vera Vallejo.^^ This judge had
been suspended by a decree of Jose Nestor Lencinas in
December 1918, but he had been reinstated by Interventor
de Veyga in February 1919. In August 1923 he was accused
^This situation demonstrated the relevance of the
words of Agustin Alvarez, a noted Kendozan thinker (1857-
1914) , who wrote that "V/e have enough talent to know the
vital role of Justice, but enough weakness in our
character so as to fail to put it into effect." I.!anual
de patologla poll tica (Buenos Aires, 1947), p. iB"^
Originally published in 1899.
''''^Besides the wide coverage given in the daily
press from August 1923 to January 1924, this case is
reported in detail in Jorge Vera Vallejo, I.li maris tratura ,
2d revised edition (Mendoza, 1966), pp. 9^2057
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of having illegally arranged a transference of funds.
Whatever the reason, he was charged before the Review Board
with "desconcepto publico"—dishonorable conduct—in his
performance as a judge. Neither in the constitution nor the
laws was mentioned such a juridical offense. Joaquin Sayanca,
president of the Supreme Court, described this term as simply
an impudent invention of the lencinists.
Whether to embarrass Vera Vallejo or simply to test his
endurance, a final decision by the Board was delayed beyond
the time-limit determined by the constitution. Finally, Vera
Vallejo was removed as a judge by the ten votes of the
Lencinists against four cast by the members of the Supreme
Court in the Board.
Apart from the legal charges brought against one member
of the Judiciary, the Lencinists harassed other members whom
they considered representatives of the Regimen. These were
vaguely charged with delaying the administration of justice
in order to serve the interests of the upper class, that is,
purposely discriminating against the welfare of the people.
"We want an honest system of justice, fairly distributed to
the rich as to the poor," stated one of the slogans raised
A T
by the Lencinists.
^^La Prensa, September 4, 1923.
^^The Mendozan Bar Association reacted at once
demanding that Congress vote for a federal intervention of
Mendoza.
^'^Los Andes, October 14, 1923.
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But, did the removal of Vera Vallejo reform the
prevailing system of quick Justice for the rich, unfair and
belated for the poor? Did the prestige of Lencinism increase
by focusing the alleged ills of the Judicial Power upon a
single judge? Was it plain coincidence that the deposed
Judge was the same one who had criticized the arbitrary
actions taken by Jose Nestor Lencinas against a portefio
journalist? If the official action was well inspired, it did
not bear the fruits which Lencinism hoped for. If the
Lencinist move was essentially politically motivated, it
backfired. For in Buenos Aires, where the anti-Lencinist
forces—Yrigoyenists, Socialists and conservatives—were
looking for an opportunity to purge Mendoza of the Lencinist
rule, this episode received adverse publicity.
If in the realm of the Judiciary Carlos Washington
revived the high-handed methods of his father, at least he
improved on Jose Nestor Lencinas' record of performance as
regards the normalization of municipal institutions. After
several years in which departmental self-government was a
dead principle, elections were held in July 1922 in which
the Lencinists succeeded in gaining the majority in the
capital and all the departments, except one. This
normalization represented a considerable advance over the
de facto status in which the municipalities had been kept
during the first Radical government and the federal
interventions. However, in subsequent elections, in the
very few instances where non-Lencinists gained control
206
either of a municipal council or a mayoralty, the Lencinist
resorted, in traditional political behavior, to the
governor's constitutional power to intervene in the
departments.
Thus, Lencinism was apparently not content 'with
controlling the affairs of most provincial bodies, but
insisted on unanimity. This was best exemplified in the
conflict involving Las Heras, a department bordering the
capital from the north, whose mayor, Roberto Zapata, was a
non-Lencinist. He was pressed by the governor to resign,
without success, whereupon the Lencinist majority in the
departmental council suspended him in December 1923. The
provincial Supreme Court voided this resolution but when
Zapata tried to reassume office, he was blocked by the
police. Zapata at once asked the National Congress to
enact a federal intervention in Mendoza, contending that
the provincial government was violating Article 5 of the
national constitution, which guaranteed the autonomy of
the municipal system. Lencinas then issued a decree
reinstating Zapata, which was legally superfluous, since
what was needed was simply to enforce the ruling of the
provincial Supreme Court.
Why was a minor situation like this not allowed by
Lencinas to be resolved by a subsequent election? To what
extent could his government be politically damaged by
tolerating one mayor from the opposition when he enjoyed
3
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such overwhelming support in the rest of the province? Why
did Lencinas allow an almost trivial situation to grow so
uncontrolled that a mayor of a provincial department would
demand a federal intervention from National Congress? La
Prensa stated that the governor was only satisfied with
unanimities, as had been the case under the Regimen; "he
admits unconditional friends," it said, "but not
adversaries."''-^ As could be expected, this issue was
seized upon by the anti-Lencinist National Deputies from
Mendoza to request appointment of an investigating
committee to report on the alleged political maneuvers
ordered or consented to by the governor.
With respect to the election of local irrigation
authorities—a constitutional provision of major
importance in Mendoza—the law was obeyed under the rule
of the young Lencinas, but its results were diluted by
administrative decisions taken a posteriori . After
assuming office, Lencinas appointed new irrigation
authorities until November 1922, when elections were held
50
as prescribed by the constitution. But the road ahead
for the new authorities was not smooth. In some cases,
^^La Prensa
,
September 25, 1923.
^^Diputados
,
1923, V, 607-615; VI, 460-464; VII,
50-53. This petition was sent to the committee, but no
further action was taken on this specific proposal.
^^Although according to the constitution the
elections should have been taking place each November,
the last election had been held in November 1919.
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ces
their assumption of office was delayed, in other instan
the Superintendent of Irrigation replaced them by his own
fiat, without the legal consent of the Irrigation Council.
Marianetti states that the Superintendency abused its
powers and entered into many "maniobras escandalosas"
concerning the transference of "water rights," which were
illegally sold independently of the lands.
This marked the return to the familiar abuses known
as "el torniquete del agua," always useful to harass a
landowner or contratista opposed to the government, and
as a vehicle for personal revenges. Favoritism, or lack of
it, in the irrigation shifts, was enough to alter the
value of the lands. But it would be unfair to blame the
Lencinists exclusively for this situation. Water was life,
and therefore, its importance transcended party lines.
The Populist Performance. The Social Sphere
lencinism was not only a political force sustained by
a numerically significant popular base, it was also a
pioneer regional social movement. For it was in the social
sphere, with its concern for the underdogs, where it made
the largest impact. Under the rule of Jose Nestor and
Carlos Washington Lencinas the first significant social
legislation in all of Argentina was enacted, and under
their leadership the Cuyan masses acquired a new sense of
^^Marianetti, Problemas de Cuyo , pp. 188-189.
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dignity and self-recognition.
In their quest for social justice the Lencinists did
not arouse the kind of dogmatic class consciousness which
the Socialist instilled into their political action.
Lenoinism, in comparison, was inorganic, devoid of a well-
founded ideology, and its methods, to a large extent,
resembled that of the traditional "polftica criolla." While
the Lencinists praised themselves for what they thought
were their towering social accomplishments, their
adversaries branded them as simple political opportunists.
What, then, were the true social achievements of the scion
of the old Lencinas? Was Carlos Washington a sincere social,
reformer or just a demagogue?
Carlos Washington inherited the luster which his
father had acquired as crusader for the lower groups. Jose
Nestor Lencinas was always hailed in public memory for his
legislation on the 8-hour day, the minimum wage, and
retirement benefits for public servants. With the same
spirit, Carlos Washington kept the door of the government
house, and his own, open to the workers and campesinos with
whom he liked to evoke his father's memory.
As of 1922 the social conditions in Mendoza had
improved substantially. Carlos Washington was spared the
hard post-war times of his father, when strikes and
disorders plagued not only Mendoza, but the whole country.
In his inaugural message he announced that in the
immediate future he would submit to the legislature "social
legislation based on modern principles. "52 in December he
did send a message to the legislature that proposed the
creation of the so-called Caja Obrera de Pension a la Vejez
e iQvalidez, which would provide pensions for the aged and
the invalid, establishing a monthly payment of fifty pesos
for any person 65 years old or over. Lencinas' initiative
sought to help those unable to earn their own subsistence.
In his message he referred to the natural lack of provision
of the worker, who with his reduced resources was neither
inclined nor prepared to accumulate savings, "nor to think
of a distant future, because he has enough preoccupations
with the present. "5^ In this message, the governor
remarked that with this legislation Mendoza would continue
to be the leader in this field among all the other
provinces, and he praised the innovative social
accomplishments of his father, "the first who as a ruler
rooted in the great Radical movement, was able to instill
it with a social content, its real character and purposes,
beyond the single political objectives."^
The pension plan for the aged enacted in 1923
represented a giant stride in the arduous task of
^^Mensaje del Gobernador, 1922, n. p.
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Ministerio de Industrias y
Obras Publicas, Mensajes ^ proyectos de leyes . Pension a
la ve.1 ez e invalidez (Mendoza, 1922J, p. 34.
^^Ibid., p. 35.
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providing social benefits for workers and the retired, and
enhanced the popularity of Lencinas' name in Mendoza as
well as in the nation.
In his second annual message, in June 1923, Lencinas
anticipated the enactment of other social measures, such
as life and unemployment insurance, and maternity
benefits. But these ideas were never formally introduced
to the legislature. 55 ^^^^^ ^^.^^ promises
outlined in the annual messages, the only major social
legislation enacted under Carlos Washington's term was
the pension for the aged.^^
The enforcement of existing social laws was also at
issue. Complaints of lack of proper implementation during
Carlos Washington's rule were numerous and continuous.
The government, it is true, did not set up effective
machinery for enforcement, although it greatly improved
the Departamento Provincial del Trabajo from the neglected
status in which it was received in 1922. No doubt, the
novelty of the social legislation conspired against its
enforcement. It is hard to imagine how a simple worker
^^Mensaje del Gobernador, 1923, n. p.
5^Pelix Luna stated that Lencinas enacted "good
social laws in principle," but that they were technically
unapplicable. Yrigoyen
,
p. 385. In fact, Carlos Washington
only promulgated one social law of importance.
^''^In his 1922 message, the governor stated that
there were 1,255 demands paralyzed, and that inspections
were not made, even in the capital. Mensaje del Gobernador ,
1922, n. p.
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who depended on his job for family sustenance, could have
ordered his employer to adhere strictly to the S-hour rule,
or have demanded the minimum wage, or even threatened t
complain to the authorities, without having any protecti
at all for his job. The price for these daring social
innovations was paid in the abuses which took long years
to root out.
The failure of the social legislation to produce
immediate significant changes should be placed in proper
historical perspective. For the laws fulfilled the all
important function of cracking a system which had fought
very hard to block them. They opened up for the first time
the possibility of altering the traditional one-sided
relationship between workers and patrones, even though
full observance of that legislation was not possible
because of inadequate governmental control and, more
important yet, because of the prevailing mentality of the
patrones coupled with the lack of adequate protection for
the workers.
The slowness of the State in implementing social
legislation perhaps may also be attributed to the fact
that the government viewed the improvement of the most
needed sectors with an exclusively political criterion,
rather than as a change required by the incessant social
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evolution of mankind.^S outside the Lenoinist circles the
belief prevailed that the populist governmerits had enacted
this type of demagogically-inspired legislation, solely or
for the most part, to retain power for their own benefit.
In defense of the Lencinist position, the best argument
perhaps is offered by the conservatives themselves. When
they returned to office, from 1932 to 1943, they did not
repeal the basic social laws enacted by the Lencinists
—with the exception of the minimum wage, ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1929—but rather
improved them by bringing them up to date.
In similar fashion, the Lencinists themselves brought
to light the shortcomings of Carlos Washington's rule in
this area. At a party convention held in December 1924,
they approved a "minimum program" which postulated, among
Other goals, the 8-hour rule.^^ This indicates the extent
to which the 1918 law was still unenforced. Moreover, not
until 1926, under the Lencinist government of Alejandro
Orfila (1926-1928), was a raise in policemen's salaries
granted, the first since 1916;^^ and not until that year were
^^This was Los Andes ' view, November 18, 1923. El
Socialista
,
January 17, 1924, called the pension law for
the aged, "a major my thification" made by Lencinism,
because it was only inspired by electoral purposes.
^^La Prensa , December 15, 1924.
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Recopilacion de leyes ,
1926-1937, I (Mendoza, 1938), p. 93.
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minimum wages raised from 2,00 and 2,50 pesos per day, to
4,00 and 4,80, respectively. This was the first time they
were increased since they were enacted by Jose Nestor
lencinas in 1918.^1 In 1927 also there was established,
for the first time, a minimum wage and a Sunday holiday
for people in domestic service. ^2 therefore, with the
exception of the old-age pension, Carlos Washington failed
to introduce to the legislature the new social programs he
had promised. In view of the high objectives for social
betterment which Lencinism ostensibly represented, it
might have been expected that he would, at least, have
sponsored a raise of the minimum wage.^-^
This minimum wage was enacted by Law No. 922. InOctober 1929 this law was ruled unconstitutional by the
National Supreme Court, which stated that the provinces
could not enact such legislation because the power to do
it^was delegated to the national government. The case was
Vinedos ^ Bodegas Ari zu v. Mendoza . Santos Primo Amadeo,
Argentine Constitutional law (New York« 1943), p. 151.
6 2It is worthwhile to note that in Governor
Orfila's message to the legislature proposing these
benefits for the large number of people working as
servants, he stated that these workers "could have been
playing the role of humble slaves for life, as it was in
older times, when they were transferred with the property
where they worked." Mendoza, Recopilacion de leyes
, p.
176 •
^^Jose Hipolito Lencinas erroneously stated that
Carlos V/ashington raised the minimum wage from 2,50 to
4,80. Carlos Washington Lencinas . Mi si on ^ futuro de una
epoca (Mendoza, 1963), p. 116. As was mentioned, the
raise was enacted by Law No. 922, of 1926, under the
government of Alejandro Orfila.
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The Lencinist administration, however, should be
credited for providing one of the most important tangible
benefits for the lower classes in the field of public
health. Two new hospitals were inaugurated, one in the
capital, the other in San Rafael. ^4 Likewise, public works
received a preferential attention from the government,
including important irrigation projects, so essential to
Mendoza's prosperity.
But in the sphere of popular education the reality
was a pale reflection of what was promised. In February
1922, when Carlos Washington took office, the condition of
the school system was insolvent and inefficient. An
education bill to replace that of 188? was still to be
enacted; the School Board continued deficit-ridden, and a
large number of children of school age remained
permanently absent from the classroom, increasing the
appalling number of illiterate adults.
Lencinas' messages to the legislature to remedy this
situation, were little more than words. In June 1922 he
promised that emergency taxation laws would resolve the
school deficits. The following year, the governor reported
that primary education was maintained "within the regular
^^The latter, whose construction had begun in 1910,
greatly benefited the population of the whole southern
region of the province, which before had depended
exclusively on the capital for any major medical problem.
^^Juan Agustin Moyano, who was Director of the
School Board, stated that only 36 per cent of all the
children who should do so were attending school. La Prensa ,
June 27, 1922.
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norms set up by the government, which keeps its daily vigil
for its efficient operation," a naive and uncritical
statement, to say the least.^^ In the 1924 message the
governor ceased to make any comment on the financial status
of the School Board.
The administrative disorder of the school system was a
consequence of the lack of proper observance of the proce-
dures already established. Ever since 1897 a provincial
law required that the municipal governments contribute 1
per cent of their revenue to the school fund. But this
obligation had remained unfulfilled since the first years
of the century. The provincial constitution in its Article
212 also had assigned 20 per cent of the provincial
revenue to the School Board, with the specific warning
that these funds could not be diverted for other purposes.
But a law to implement this constitutional principle was
never enacted during the Lencinist governments. In 1922
so-called emergency laws aimed at putting an end to the
traditional arrears in teachers' salaries. These did not
work as planned, however, judging from the data: in March
1922 the salaries were behind eight months; in December,
ten; in April 1923, five; in November, six; in March 1924,
five.^'^ The publication of the Federacion de Maestros de
^^Mensaje del Gobernador , 1922, n.p., and 1923, n.p.
^'^The revenue from law No. 779, one of the emergency
laws, should have been allocated to eliminate the School
Board deficit. When these laws expired, but not the
deficits, the province borrowed 500,000 pesos from a Buenos
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Mendoza said in Aufmst 1Q24. fha+ «^ ^^ ^^u ±^£^4, tn t in some departments the
salaries from 1918 and 1919 were still unpaid.
The National Board of Education was to some extent
made the scapegoat for the persistence of the deficits.
National Law No. 2737, (1890), granted financial
assistance to the provincial School Boards if at least
ten per cent of the provincial budget was allocated to
primary education. Mendoza, therefore, received a yearly
grant. But early in the 1920' s the payment of the national
subvention was delayed by the National Board of Education
because it considered that Mendoza had breached the
agreement by paying its teachers with letras, whose value
was less than that of pesos. Mendozan officials, including
the governor, pleaded before the National Board and even
to President Alvear, to obtain the remittance of the
grant.
Meanwhile, in response to constant complaints by the
large number of its unpaid teachers and suppliers, the
School Board placed the blame on the national government
for failing to fulfill its financial obligation. The
Mendozan authorities affirmed that the letras were
accepted at par—which was not entirely true in all
cases—and that "the insignificant fluctuations are due
Aires firm for the same purpose. Eventually, in 1926,
the bodegueros set up a loan to the province for
1,345,000 pesos just to bring the teachers' salaries up
to datel
68Palanca (Mendoza), August 30, 1924.
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exclusively to speculators . "^^ But thp -f«.+J3U-U ne fact was that the
National Board of Education did not obieot +n -.v.iivi Dj c to the payment
Of the salaries with letras-it had been customary in
Mendoza since the governments of the Regimen-but that the
salaries were paid in a currency undervalued with respect
to the peso. The temporary suspension of the federal grant,
moreover, could not have been responsible for the widespread
failure of the Board to pay its bills, for it amounted to
less than 10 per cent of the total outlays of the School
Board.'^^
As to educational achievements, Lencinas' accomplish-
ments were also meager. Abrahan J. Jofre, Regional
Inspector in Cuyo of the National Board of Education, said
in March 1924 that of 70,000 children of school age, only
60 per cent were registered, and only two thirds of those
attended classes. This indicated that more than half of
69Los Andes, January 25, 1923. Telegram of the
governor to the Minister of Interior.
70These are the figures:
Year Total outlays Federal % covered by
School Board grant the grant
1922 e 2,998,177 $ 270,000 9.0
1923 3,143,840 270,000 8.6
1924 3,589,922 270,000 7.5
Provlncia de Mendoza, Slntesis de la Bireccion General
de Estadisticas t 1930-1931 (Mendoza, 1932), p. 100. (Por
the total outlay of the School Board only).
'^Hos Andes, May 17, 1924.
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the children did not receive even the least acceptable
level of education.
The Provincial School Board admitted the sad reality
of the statistics, but said it did not have any direct
responsibility for them. The Board stated that the
situation was not the result of the scarcity of schools
or of indifference by the government, as J ofre had
reported. Instead, it was the consequence of the "innate
malice and ignorance of a part of the population, which
in its drive for money and its over-preoccupation for
material well-being, forgets the duties it has toward
its children. ""^^
In a government devoted in principle to satisfying
the needs of the masses, one of its main priorities
should have been to provide an education to thousands
of underprivileged children. Those of the well-to-do
sectors had the means to attain satisfactory
educational levels, preparing them to be the future
"men of property," well-endowed to enjoy the fruits of
life. In order to diminish the social and economic gap
of the future generation, what better program could
have been offered by Lencinism to the children of the
"chusma de alpargata," than a first rate primary
^^Ibid.
,
May 22, 1924. La Prensa , May 30, 1924,
reacted against this opinion, stating that there were
no grounds to believe that the inhabitants of Mendoza
had a larger "innate malice and ignorance" than the
rest of the population of the country.
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education?
Confidence, loyalty and affection from the masses
continued to be the bountiful harvest of Carlos Washington
for his endeavors in their behalf. Nevertheless, his
political success did not always represent a triumph of
civic virtues. And for all the proclaimed purposes of
achieving a better social justice, the social innovations
of his government were less significant than those of
Jose Nestor Lencinas,
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CHAPTER VII
THE SECOND LENCINIST EXPERIENCE.
THE ECONOMIC PHASE. AN APPRAISAL OF C. W.LENCINAS' RULE
The Populist Performance. Economy and Pi nances
If the political and social phases of the government
of Carlos Washington Lencinas may be characterized as an
evolution marked by plateaux and regressions, what does an
examination of his economic and fiscal policies, measured
against his avowed populist stand, reveal?
At the time Carlos Washington assumed office, the
financial situation was desperate, the result in large
part of the inefficient administration of Federal
Commissioner Vargas Gomez. Confronted thus with an
immediate crisis, Lencinas suspended payments on salaries
and debts incurred prior to 1922, until revenues could be
provided to meet these obligations. Toward that end, the
legislature in May 1922 enacted the so-called emergency
laws."^
Although the revenue from these taxes was generous,
the old debts were not entirely cancelled. There were
These laws were: No. 776, imposing a special tax
on tobacco, cigarettes, beer, and a few more items; Nos.
777 and 778, authorizing three million pesos in bonds
for school buildings, and No. 779, taxing wines and
grapes, earmarking 60 per cent of the revenue to pay
debts from previous years, and 40 per cent to finance
the regular expenses of the current year.
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always some salaries left in arrears and, of course, the
teachers continued to be the cinderellas of the Kendozan
administration. Likewise, two serious malpractices were
continued by the government, that of applying funds for
other purposes than those for which they were approved, and
that of resorting to "emergency" laws to finance regular
expenses, which in theory should already have been covered
by permanent revenue. Moreover, the legislature failed to
enact budget laws except for 1924. In response, in what
had become a normal procedure in Mendoza, the governor
resorted to cabinet agreements as a backdoor solution for
keeping his government functioning.
Another grave anomaly was the lack of a Tribunal de
Cuentas, an agency indispensable for verifying public
expenses and forcing the Executive Power to keep its
financial operations on a sound basis. Under the terms of
the 1916 provincial constitution this tribunal should
have been created by law before the first of January, 1918.
In fact, the legislation providing for it was not enacted
until May 1922 (Article 11 of Law 779). This could have
been a belated solution, but the governor never implemented
Article 11 in spite his assertion in his first annual
message to the legislature, in June 1922, that without any
doubt, the Tribunal de Cuentas would be "the most adequate
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institutions to carry out an efficient control.
Complementing this objectionable handling of financial
matters was the failure of the Lencinist government to
release proper and complete statements on the provincial
debt. Thus, there was no way to verify the real financial
needs, or the extent to which the taxes imposed corresponded
to real requirements. Creditors filled the government house,
and the administration was accused of applying a "politica
de aparceria," that is, using favoritism as a guideline to
make the payments.^ Neither these procedures nor the
practice of using emergency revenues to meet normal
expenditures were originated by Lencinism. What is
significant, however, is that in matters as important as
these, they performed no better than the conservatives."^
The wine industry, naturally, continued as the
2
Mensa.je del Gobernador
, 1922, n.p. There was a
General Accounting Office in Mendoza, which had the right
to verify the payments to be made, but it was a mere
bureaucratic office and lost all its strength as a firm
watchdog. This was so because the Executive Power could
override any objection. Jose Leguida (h.), "La ley de
contabilidad y contaduria general de la Provincia de
Mendoza. Organizacion general," Revista de Ciencias
Economicas
, XXVI (1926), 346.
^Los Andes, February 7, 1923.
4.
Luring the second Lencinist administration
financial disorder continued uncontrolled. The provincial
debt to the nation was also in arrears. As of the end of
1924 no payments of principal or interest on the External
Public Debt of 1909 had been made since 1921. Corporacion
de Tenedores de Titulos y Acciones, Memoria del primer
eemestre del ejercicio de 1924-1923 (Buenos Aires, n.d.),
p. 20. This is a publication of the Bolsa de Comercio de
Buenos Aires.
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economic lifeblood of the province. When lencinas took
office harvest perspectives were gloomy, mainly because of
the uncertainties of the consumer market in the Littoral
and the lack of proper coordination of the industrial
activities within the province. But well-timed measures
taken by the governor improved the situation in only a
few weeks.
A permanent source of dissatisfaction on the part of
vinateros and bodegueros, however, stemmed from the financial
burden imposed by Laws 758 and 759 (enacted in 1919 under
the sponsorship of Jose Nestor Lencinas)^ which set up
compulsory insurance against hail damages and provided funds
for the construction of regional bodegas.^ The growers and
processors claimed that the only part of these laws to be
fully implemented was the collection of taxes; as far as
reimbursement for hail damages was concerned, these were not
paid on time—except when payments were expedited by the use
of interested middlemen
— ;
furthermore, not a single
regional bodega had been built.
The discontent of these sectors was channeled into
action with the initiation of an intense campaign known as
the deroguista movement, aimed at repealing Laws 758 and
759. Minister of Industries Suarez energetically defended
5 See note 54, p. 143.
^Specifically because of the industrial situation
in 1922 La Prensa sent Rodolfo Luque as special correspondent
to Mendoza, to analyze and report on the general conditions.
His articles appeared in November 2, 8, 13, 19, 21, 23, 27,
and December 2, 6, 10 and 15, 1922.
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these laws on the grounds that "they had fulfilled and
continue fulfilling the high purposes" for which they were
created. '7 In his view, without some kind of support, the
price of grapes would decline and therefore, the economic
value of the lands would be lowered. He affirmed the
government's intention to protect the vinateros without
bodegas in view of the significance of their interests.^
Minister Suarez contended that he could not favor an
industrial policy guided solely by the principle of supply
and demand, for in that case the vinatero would not have
any protection from an intentionally-provoked decrease in
the price of grapes. Contrary to what was generally
possible with grains the grapes could not be stored or
preserved for a period of time. They had to be gathered
at the proper time or they would be entirely lost within
Q
a few days.
7
'Los Andes
,
August 14, 1922.
gSuarez provided the following statistics:
Number Hectares
Vinateros without
bodega 3,768 40,657 56.9
Vifiateros/bodegueros 1,349 30,812 43.1
Bodegueros without
vineyards 375
5,492 71,469 100.0
Ibid
. ,
September 17, 1922. Thousands of
contratistas aided the vinateros.
^Ibid.
,
September 22, 1922. Suarez reaffirmed his
stand in the Ministry's annual report, stating that Laws
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or
s
Suarez- efforts to assure a reasonable protection f
the vinateros was strongly supported by Los Andes
. Thi
newspaper insisted time after time that any industrial law
which did not protect the vinatero from the bodeguero was
worthless; that the 1919 legislation needed to be reformed,
not repealed, and that the new course followed by the
government was purely a "bodeguero solution. "^^
The deroguista forces engaged Minister Suarez in a
heated controversy throughout Mendoza during a good part
of the second half of 1922.^^ They insisted that the price
of the grapes should not be determined a priori
, but
instead, be left to market forces. Before a committee of
the provincial Senate, the bodeguero sector reiterated the
views of their group: total repeal of the laws regulating
the industry, the worthlessness of building any regional
bodega, and the uselessness of the State insurance against
hail. The bodegueros' position was summed up with the
758 and 759 "...bear my signature," and that they were the
"saviors of the industry." Memoria presentada a l_a Honorable
Legislatura por el Minister! o de Industrias ^ Qbras Publicas ,
Ing . Leopoldo Suarez (Buenos Aires, 1924), p. 25. Suarez'
viewpoints were explained in great detail in his works La
industria vitivinicola en I.lendoza en 1922 (Mendoza, 192*27,
and La accion del estado en 1^ industria vitivinicola
(Mendoza, 192277"
^°Los Andes, March 5, 1923.
•^^The deroguista forces were: Sociedad Agraria e
Industrial (a strong bodeguero voice). Centre de Vinateros,
Union Comercial e Industrial, and Centre de Almaceneros
Minoristas.
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statement that each viSatero "should be able to protect
himself. "^^
The compulsory insurance against hail established by
law 759 was a heavy burden for the vinateros and became an
ideal target for the bodegueros to attack. During 1920 and
1921 the revenue of Law 759 amounted to $ 11,052,000—an
enormous sum-while the indemnifications paid until the
end of July 1922 did not exceed $ 5,390,000. The industrial
sectors were especially critical of the administrative
expenses of the ^omision de Pomento, the agency
supervising the two laws, which amounted to $ 3, 044, 000. "'•^
Taking into consideration that not all the compensations
to the vinateros were paid, and that not a single regional
bodega was built, the opposition was amply justified in
asking the government what it did with the funds. Although
many vinateros abused the system by exaggerating their
losses, it was apparent that the government wasted in an
unnecessary bureaucracy funds that were an important part
of the provincial wealth. "^^
An answer to the controversy was worked out in direct
^^Los Andes, August 5, 1922.
^^Ibid., August 15, 1922.
^^Lencinas stated that 4,775 hectares reported as
destroyed by hail, were not. This amounted to an illicit
claim made by the vinateros for $ 1,710,000. Mensaje del
Gobernador, June 1922, n. p.
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discussions between the governor and the bodegueros.
Accordingly, as Lencinas yielded to bodeguero pressure, the
legislature repealed most of the laws regulating the wine
15industry.
Jose Nestor lencinas had tried in 1919 to counter-
balance the traditional supremacy of the bodegueros over
the vinateros through the enactment of Laws 758 and 759.
But these laws were only partially enforced, and the huge
sums collected from the vinateros and the bodegueros had
fed a provincial bureaucracy often accused of inefficiency
and corruption. It might then be asked why Carlos
Washington did not try to reform the laws instead of
yielding to the demands of the bodegueros. Could he ignore
the argument that giving a free hand to the processors
meant diminishing the bargaining position of the vinateros?
Did he underestimate the fact that there were thousands of
contratistas whose fate was bound to that of the
vinateros?
In his second annual message, in June 1923, Lencinas
acknowledged the indisputable weight of the deroguista
movement, and praised his own decision for accepting a
view which was contrary to his own personal position. It
^^Law 810, of February 1923, repealed Laws 758 and
part of 759. The bodegueros obtained still another triumph.
In December 1923, Law 866 was enacted, reinstating a tax
on grapes sold outside the province for the purpose of
producing wine outside Mendoza with grapes from this
origin, and forced the vihateros to resort to the
bodegueros as the only source available to sell their
production.
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seems that Lencinas, as head of a movement claiming to be
free from the oligarchical virus, should have been able
to remedy the widespread deficiencies of the Comision de
Pomento, while using it to balance the interests of the
two most important groups in the provincial economy, and
not simply conceding to the wishes of the bodegueros.
The wine industry had other reasons to be content
with the years 1922-1924. Not only were Laws 758 and 759
repealed, but the labor climate remained very peaceful
compared with the agitation which Jose Nestor Lencinas
had to endure in his two troubled years in power. The
industry, as a consequence, was able to leave behind the
period of crisis, and indeed in 1924 enjoyed one of the
best years of the decade. Prices for wine were good,
consumption increased, public works, both national and
provincial, improved the utilization of water resources
and communications, and with the economy on the upswing,
immigrants once again settled in Mendoza in growing
numbers, although far from the high figures of the first
decade of the century.
Poreign immigration to Kendoza increased
steadily after World V/ar I, as indicated by the following
figures:
1918 547 1922 2,865
1919 885 1923 3,953
1920 1,740 1924 3,837
1921 1,528
Ministerio de Agricultura de la Nacion, 1.1em ori a
de la Direccion General de Inmigracion (Buenos Aires,
1928), p. 192.
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Political favoritism was a ubiquitous feature of the
Lencinas administration and this readily led to abuses in
the handling of funds. This was particularly true in the
Provincial Bank where the conduct of its directors, mostly
political confidants of Lencinas, created a scandal that
even affected his good name. Moreover, his first
appointee as general manager of the Bank had to resign
amid cries of anomalies, but the man Lencinas chose to
succeed him was no better, ending up in the courts under
prosecution for wrongdoing. ^'^
But the Achilles' heel of the Mendozan government,
the letras de tesoreria, were to bring the province once
again under federal tutelage. The use of the letras as
17 miThe gross mishandlings in the Provincial Bank not
only involved high officials of the administration, but
also two Lencinist National Deputies, Jose A. Nunez and
Luis Olmedo Cortes. They were investigated by a committee
set up by the National Chamber of Deputies and after
disclosure of their extensive illicit maneuvers in
connivence with the high authorities of the Provincial
Bank, they were expelled from Congress, further damaging the
reputation of Lencinism. DiDutados, 1925, I, 340-354; III,
761-770, 838-855; IV, 342-361, 449-471, 533-557, 574-586;
V, 30-33.
Carlos Washington's intention to transform the
Bank into a semi-private institution was repeatedly
expressed, and to that effect several meetings were held
in Buenos Aires and Mendoza, In a press interview the
governor announced in August 1923 that all preliminary
steps had been successfully taken, and reiterated his
wishes that at the end of his terra the new bank would be
already functioning. Los Andes
,
August 19, 1923.
1 8
Curiously, the most recent general work on the
history of Mendoza, Jorge M. Scalvini's His tori a de Mendoza ,
does not mention at all the letras when referring to the
government of Carlos V/ashington.
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a substitute for national currency had begun with the
national government's reluctant tolerance at the end of
the nineteenth century. Although their value was not at
par with the peso, the letras were usually accepted for
domestic transactions without any reservation, to the
point that almost all provincial salaries were paid with
them. The first symptoms of a noticeable devaluation
appeared in 1921,^^ and gradually the situation became
more acute. As confidence in the letras eroded, nickel
coins began to disappear from public use, and then pesos
followed the same path. The principle of Gresham's Law
was confirmed in Mendoza, where the "bad" currency
removed the "good" from circulation.
The government believed that the bodegueros were by
and large the beneficiaries of the situation, because
they sold most of the production outside the province, in
pesos, while they paid all local salaries and other
expenses in letras. The Lencinist press put it in a very
simple, one-sided perspective: the depreciation of the
20letras was "a new political maneuver of the conservatives."
Although the devaluation of the letras was small, the
difference of exchange was significant because of the
large volume of the wine trade. Los Andes estimated the
bodegueros' windfall ranging from six to eight million
^^endoza was then ruled by a federal commissioner.
^^El Latigo
,
February 1, 1923.
pesos annually. 21 with this fact in mind, the government
decreed in October 1922 that the tax on wine imposed by
Law 779 should not be paid entirely in letras, as had been
the case until then, but that 60 per cent be paid in pesos
and the rest in letras. ^2 The industrialists rightfully
protested that the government was violating the existing
law which allowed full payment of taxes with letras. This
action proved that the government was the first to show
lack of faith in the papers it had issued. Moreover, the
bodegueros argued that they were handling the funds they
received from outside the province in the same manner
that the government did with its grant from the National
Board of Education, receiving it in pesos while paying
out teachers' salaries in letras,
Judging the situation from a different angle,
however, the measure taken by the government appeared
reasonable, considering that the bodegueros were making a
profit without justification. The government rule,
nonetheless, worked in reverse, since by reducing the
acceptability of the letras as payment for fiscal
obligations, it diminished their market value.
2^Los Andes
,
May 29, 1924.
^^During a four-month period in 1923, it was even
decreed that the taxes be paid fully in pesos.
2^Los Andes, November 17 » 1922.
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Whatever the merits of the argument, the real value of
the provincial money continued to decline. The devaluation
rate reached 3 per cent by mid-1922 and increased to 4 per
cent at the end of that year; it was lowered temporarily
early in 1923 because of the large demand for letras to
pay the wages for the harvest, but later climbed again,
reaching 5 per cent in June 1923. The government,
apparently did not welcome the devaluation of the letras,
but defended them as instrumental to the economic progress
of the province.^''" Los Andes contended that the avowed
position of the governor was fictitious, for the letras
were basically intended to provide the Lencinists with
illegal currency to use for electoral needs, and to
finance the provincial cash deficits.
In August 1923 Lencinas affirmed that the government
wanted to restore the letras to par value, and v/as
considering their full acceptance for tax payments. In a
stance resembling that of the governments of the Regimen,
he insisted that the province had the right to issue
^/lensa je del Gobernador , June 1923, n. p. Federico
J. Moyano, former Dean of the Law School of the Univer-
sidad Nacional de Cuyo, and brother of Juan Agustin
Moyano, asserts that it would have been a catastrophe
to have withdrawn all the letras at once, since everything
was traded in such currency, and some people did not have
a chance to see a peso for a long time. Personal
interview, Mendoza, June 25, 1972.
25Los Andes, June 12, 1923.
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letras unless the National Supreme Court ruled otherwise,
because it was one of the prerrogatives not entrusted t.
the federal Government. ^6 This was the same thesis that
Governor Emilio Civit had enunciated in I908, in response
to a reprimand from Buenos Aires.
Another factor adding to the growing apprehension
about the provincial money, was the spread of a rumor to
the effect that the value of letras in circulation
exceeded the S 9,380,704 the governor had reported in his
1922 message. This rumor was soon shown to be true when,
in July 1923, Minister of Hacienda Soto's plan for a
gradual withdrawal of the letras, involved the issuance
of $ 12,000,000 in so-called "bonos del tesoro." How was
it possible that in spite of the fact that no law had
authorized any further issuance of letras, 12,000,000
were now needed to replace $ 9,380,000? The explanation
given by the government was that in addition to this
amount, there were $ 2,586,982 held under the custody of
the Public Credit, amounting to a total of $ 11,967,686.^'^
The situation in Mendoza by now was such that
national currency, for all practical purposes, was like
a foreign currency. The pesos disappeared from local
^^Ibid ., August 10, 1923.
^'^Public Credit was the provincial agency
exclusively engaged in handling public debt, both
internal and external, letras, and any other negotiable
papers.
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day-to-day transactions, while businessmen sought to
protect themselves by raising the prices of goods when they
were paid in letras. The vanishing coins were replaced by
small substitutes—pieces of cardboard stating their
equivalency-which the merchants used as exchange when they
were paid in letras. Los Andes sadly referred to the "bad"
currency, the letras, and the "worst" currency, the small
cartoncitos, which brought to Mendoza a variation of the
abusive system applied to the laborers in the workshops at
Chaco.^^
In these circumstances, the national government seemed
to be the only agency capable of putting an end to the
dubious provincial money. Already in July 1923, the Acting
Attorney General recommended that the national government
demanded the immediate withdrawal of the letras. Thereupon,
President Alvear proposed legislation to Congress to avoid
further violations of the constitution in this matter. As
a result of this pressure, Lencinas issued a decree on
October 27, calling for a full count of the letras in
circulation, and suggesting that the Mendozan government
was at last determined to solve the problem. But the
required action did not follow with the speed demanded by
the situation. The disarray provoked by the letras
^^Los Andes
,
February 2, 1924.
^^The further devaluation of the letras added more
pressure to the beleaguered provincial government. By
reverberated in National Congress, where the prospects for
a federal intervention grew with every day. Paced by this
somber perspective, Lencinas hastily obtained legislative
approval for a bill by which the letras would be
gradually withdrawn.
The unlawful position of the government was put in
evidence by a decree of September 11, which sought ex
facto to legalize the unauthorized issues made during
Carlos Washington's administration. This decree approved
the exchange of $ 5,209,000, in addition to the
$ 12,000,000 of the Law 871. This action was taken at the
time when the National Chamber of Deputies was about to
decide on federal intervention. As the situation in
Congress still allowed some flicker of hope that the
intervention could be averted, Lencinas attempted an
eleventh-hour solution, sending another bill on September
24 to the legislature, asking now for the immediate
withdrawal of the letras, to be financed by a special
tax on wine and grapes. This was the first serious step
taken by the government in almost three years, to correct
a situation which, besides being unconstitutional,
eaco\iraged speculation, reduced the real wage of the
worker, and provided Lencinas' opponents with their most
July 1924 the discount reached 12 per cent, and the
authorities tried a stopgap measure decreeing that all
taxes could be payable again with letras.
^^It was Law 871, promulgated on July 31, 1924. It
authorized the issue of "bonos" for 12 million pesos.
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effective issue for toppling him from office. The bill was
hastily approved by the provincial Chamber of Deputies,
but by that time the ax had already fallen in Buenos
Aires on Lencinas' government.
The lack of diligence with which Lencinas handled the
issue of the letras seemed to indicate a confidence on his
part that Alvear and the anti-Personalists in Congress
would provide a shield against any intervention. But
apart from this group, all other parties represented in
Congress, by now extremely critical of Lencinism, pushed
for intervention. It was the Federal Commissioner who
investigated the status of the letras and took the steps
for their eventual elimination. As it turned out, the
total amount of letras withdrawn from circulation was
$ 16,638,920. Since Governor Lencinas had declared the
total to be $ 11,967,686, at least S 4,671,234 in letras,
issued without any legal authorization, were in
circulation. Early in 1926, just at the end of the
federal intervention, two series of letras amounting to
$ 1,707,000 were discovered to be forgeries. The
Lencinas' administration should not be blamed for this
but it was responsible for at least $ 2,964,234 in
illegally issued letras. -^"^
^"^Clarification of the report issued by the
Federal Interventor, Enrique M. Mosca, in Senadores ,
1929, II, 499-502.
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The intense rivalry among national political groups
gave Lencinas' enemies an opportunity to press for the end
of his rule in Mendoza. The letras scandal was a prime
issue for mounting a campaign for intervention. Why did
Lencinas not take firm steps to eliminate this issue
before the storm became unavoidable? Why did he tolerate
the speculation that grew around the provincial money?
In theory, the letras were one of the best means to
finance public works of general interest. When some
special program required additional financing, the
solution was to issue letras and to set up a regular
timetable for their gradual withdrawal. As such, the
letras yielded the same benefits, and played the same
role, as municipal bonds. In practice, however, a number
of transgressions violated the principles on which the
letras were issued. They were not always applied to the
purposes for which they were authorized; there were
issuances of letras without the approval of the
legislature; and instead of being issued for large amounts
as was customary with bonds, they were printed in small
values, with a format and size resembling that of the
national currency. What is more, they were not withdrawn
on schedule; or when they were, new ones were put in
circulation in lieu of the old, thus maintaining the same
quantity in the market when in fact they should have been
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diminishing.
The bodegueros and businessmen in general tolerated
and even accepted the issuance of letras. They found that
by pumping money into the economy, more was to be gained
than lost. They had supported such a policy on the part
of the governments of the Regimen because they benefited
from the artificial stimulus it gave to the economy. The
bodegueros were always in the strongest position, since
they traded the provincial wealth mostly in pesos. But
the responsibility for this type of currency rested
exclusively in the hands of the provincial governments.
If the letras were devalued to the extent of being
referred to as the "Mendozan Marks, "^^ it was the
provincial authorities who were responsible, and it was
their decisions which had the effect of driving the
national currency, the only legal tender, out of
circulation.
Was the Lencinist government too weak or simply
negligent in solving the chaos of the letras? Jose
Hipolito Lencinas asserts that some of Carlos Washington's
collaborators were not seriously interested in finding a
Los Andes
,
July 21, 1923, noted that the
government was like the magicians, on one side they burned
the letras being withdrawn, with showy publicity, but on
the other side, new letras were turned over to the public
to replace those burned.
^^Ibid.
,
August 3, 1923.
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prompt and lasting solution. ^4 Beyond this speculation,
however, it appears that Governor Lencinas and his
financial Ministers Soto and Moyano, failed to measure the
power of the weapon they were placing in the hands of
their political rivals. They vainly tried to cover up a
fraudulent situation for which they were directly
responsible.
Buenos Aires: The Final Test for Regional Populism
The iron-fist political methods of the Lencinists, the
"packing" of the Judiciary through the Review Board, the
problem of the letras, and the populist nature of the
government in general—resembling that of Federico Cantoni
in San Juan—had transformed the apparently rosy picture
of Mendoza of February 1922. The relative political
harmony existing at that time all but disappeared.
Relations between the Lencinists and the opposition were
in a state of collapse. By mid-1924, moreover, the
political opponents—conservatives and popular parties
(Personalist Radicals and Socialists)—had grown stronger
in number and aggressiveness, encouraged by the misguided
policies of the Lencinists.
The March 1924 election for National Deputies
vividly displayed this growing antagonism. Although no
opposition party could overcome the Lencinist majority in
^^Personal interview, June 23f 1972.
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)ecame
Mendoza, the relations among the political rivals b.
increasingly hostile. It was a prelude to the vindictive
encounter which lencinas and his enemies, especially the
Yrigoyenists, would hold in Congress toward the end of the
decade.
The Lencinists appealed to the populist rhetoric they
had been displaying ever since Jose Nestor Lencinas
campaigned for governor in 1917. But what made the 1924
election different from previous contests, was that now
the opposition openly accused the government of corruption,
While in the elections for the governorship, in January
1918 and December 1921, Lencinism had portrayed itself as
a distinctive alternative to the Regimen, in 1924 its
traditional anti-oligarchical position was challenged by
its opponents. They claimed that lencinism had taken on
the attributes of their alleged enemies. The Socialists,
applying their customary moralistic approach, depicted
the Lencinists in blunt terms: "Each country has the
government it deserves; Mendoza has a government of
thieves. ... "-^^ With the same critical tone, the Liberal
Party spokesmen also denounced the climate of corruption
and complained chiefly about the massive personalist
propaganda of Lencinism. They contended that "people
wants less turbulence, less 'gauchitos,' less pictures.
^^El Socialista, January 3, 1924.
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and a bit more public honesty. "^^
These defiant attitudes were also reflected in Buenos
Aires, where national politics played an increasingly
Significant role in the Mendozan situation. This province
and San Juan, were the only ones in the country ruled by
populist governments that were at the same time strongly
anti-Yrigoyenist. In a complex mosaic of political
interests, the two Cuyo governments shared with the
conservatives a hostility toward the Personalist Radicals,
although there existed a profound aversion between them.
But the Lencinists were accepted within the anti-
Personalist faction, together with San Juan's Bloquism,
not so much because of their own merits as branches of
National Radicalism, but mainly for the contribution they
made to the struggle against the Personalist faction.
Lencinas' popularity allowed his party to win handily
the national and provincial elections in Mendoza. But it
was in the National Congress that he had to face the
implacable attacks of his old adversaries—conservatives
and Socialists—and his new enemy, the Yrigoyenists. The
examination of the credentials of the representatives
from Mendoza in the National Chamber of Deputies, provided
the opponents of Lencinism with the occasion to discredit
•^^El Censor (Mendoza), January 12, 1924. The
Lencinists distributed, among other things, thousands of
calendars, pictures of both Lencinas, porcelain cups and
alpargatas. In their rallies they played the hymn to Jose
Nestor Lencinas.
the Mendozan government.
The selection of national senators had always
generated intense interest, both at provincial and
national levels. During the years of Lencinist rule, only
one Senator had been chosen, Jorge Cespedes, an old
Radical and personal friend of Yrigoyen, whose credentials
were accepted in June 1922. But when the Lencinists sided
with the anti-Personalists, Cespedes remained loyal to
Yrigoyen. Ironically, the only Mendozan Senator chosen by
the Lencinists became openly anti-Lencinist.
The second Mendozan seat had become vacant on May 1,
1922, at the end of Benito Villanueva's term, but was
never filled. The legislature elected Jose M. Puebla, the
former Minister of Government under both Lencinases, but
his credentials were rejected by the National Senate,
supposedly because he was born in Chile. ^'^ The local
press speculated over the extensive delay in filling
Villanueva's vacancy, which left Mendoza only half
represented in the National Senate. One intriguing
interpretation was that the choice of Puebla had been made
deliberately with the idea that he would be rejected by
the Senate. This would buy time until Carlos Washington
ended his governorship and thus be available to fill the
empty seat. At any rate, the Lencinists had a very weak
•^'^Senadores, 1924, I, 73-93. Puebla contended that
he was born in Mendoza but baptized in Chile.
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voice in Congress, where their representatives, restricted
to the Chamber of Deputies, poorly served the interests of
their province. -^^
The credentials debate over the National Deputies
elected in 1924 provided the forum for the Radical
Yrigoyenists, conservatives, Socialists and Progressive
Democrats, to launch a searing indictment of Lencinism.^5
No facet of the Mendozan government was free from the
^^^^
Their legislative initiatives were extremely few.
^\}^PJ^^^^onal Deputy Jose Hipolito Lencinas introduced
a bill to remove the tracks of the Pacific Railway
crossing through the city of Mendoza. Jose A. Nunez
re-introduced the bill on guidelines for the wine industry,
which had been already reproduced by Carlos Washington
Lencinas in July 1920, when he was National Deputy. In
1924 none of the three Lencinists deputies, Jose Hipolito
Lencinas, Jos6 A. Nunez and Luis Olraedo Cortes, introduced
a single bill. Their participation in the debates was nil,
except those concerning the political situation of Mendoza.
As noted earlier, in 1925 Nunez and Olmedo Cortes were
expelled from the Chamber because of the Provincial Bank
affair.
^^Diputados
. 1924, II, 289-310; 341-371. June 9, and
10. According to the national constitution, it is the
exclusive right of each Chamber of Congress to be the judge
of the credentials of its members. The Chamber can reject
any of them if it is proven that the election was not
properly conducted at the ballot box. But the Chamber is
not entitled to base its judgment on the local political
conditions of the campaign, or any other situation not
specifically related to the act of casting the ballot. This
had been a traditional procedure of both Chambers of
Congress. But the enactment of the Saenz Peha Law and the
changes it provoked in voting procedures, made this
requirement almost worthless. Por a new factor began taking
shape in the political habits of the parties and the
electorate, which consisted of transferring the vices of
the old days—fraud at the ballot box—to more
sophisticated means, equally objectionable, of pre-electoral
manipulation.
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criticism of the representatives from those sectors.
Mendozan Deputy Prank Romero Day, independent but anti-
Lencinist, asserted that the two pillars of Lencinism were
money and the abuse of power-two corruptive elements.
Enrique Bordabehere, a Progressive Democrat for Santa Pe,
referred to a situation in the Department of la Paz, in
Mendoza, in which policemen and "dead" persons had voted,
as proof of the fraudulent nature of Lencinism. For what
was most disturbing, Bordabehere observed, was that they
had resorted to transgressing the law exclusively for the
sake of transgression, since their electoral success was
never in jeopardy. And the deputy for Santa Fe added
these concepts of universal weight:
The amorality that characterizes the governments
that subvert all norms of administrative and
political decency, leads to this conclusion:
that corruption, fraud, and wrongdoings, are
traits that become ingrained in them and are
practiced under the pretension of adding luster
to these governments. 40
Socialists and conservatives repeatedly emphasized
that their approval of the credentials of the Lencinists
followed the specific rules of the Chamber, but did not
represent, under any circumstances, an acceptance of
Lencinas' government. "We will approve Mendoza'
s
credentials, not because we want to," said the Socialist
Deputy Adolf 0 Dickmann,
^^Diputados
,
1924, II, 359. Benito Marianetti
believes that Carlos Washington could have been a more
law-abiding ruler without risking the large majority he
enjoyed. Personal interview. June 21, 1972.
246
Of '^he Itunflt ^^"^^ political reality
related to the casting of the b^in nt s +o1t"^^
The Lencinists' credentials were accepted, but it was
a lackluster victory, for by June 1924 the pressure
against Carlos Washington's rule kept mounting in Buenos
Aires. La Epoca claimed the "moral necessity to intervene
in Mendoza, calling the situation there, as in San Juan,
an "infectious case of political pathology . "^2 in June
1924, a one time notorious lencinist, Roberto J. Rincci,
now a zealous Yrigoyenist, introduced a bill to place
Mendoza under federal control again. The originality of
his bill was its Article 3, which called for 30 per cent
of the provincial revenue to be allocated to withdrawing
the letras.
The Alvear government, anxious to avoid the fall of
a friendly governor, tried to block congressional
approval of this bill. The Minister of the Interior,
Vicente C. Gallo, in a very brief appearance before the
Chambers' Committee on Constitutional Affairs, insisted
that there were no grounds for the intervention. Unable,
however, to prevent approval of the bill by the Committee,
the anti-Personalists tried to delay the debate in the
^•^Diputados
, 1924, II, 364.
^^La Epoca , June 17, 1924.
era
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Chamber. This strate^ took into consideration the fact
that it was already mid-September and that Congress would
adjourn at the end of the month. Moreover, Lencinas- t
would end in February 1925, before the legislator
to convene again.
The other political parties, however, were firmly
detemined to end the Lencinist rule. The Personalists,
especially, hated Lencinism not only because it had
departed from Yrigoyen's hegemony, but also because of
its close affinity with San Juan's Bloquism—now the most
irreconcilable enemy of the Yrigoyenists. The
conservatives in the Chamber sided with their party
colleagues from Mendoza and supported the intervention.
But here too there was a labyrinth of interests, because
a group from the province of Buenos Aires, headed by
Rodolfo Moreno, was not in favor of conceding any indirect
help to the Yrigoyenists. The bonaerense conservatives
had received support from the Lencinists when their own
credentials were under fire in the Chamber, and the
Lencinists had also sided with the conservatives in
opposing the Yrigoyenist drive to intervene in Cordoba in
1923. The Socialists were in a special situation. Although
on principle they were opposed to federal interventions in
the provinces, the party had taken an official stand
against any provincial government issuing provincial
currency. In accordance with this policy, the Socialists
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were committed to vote favorably on any intervention in a
province engaged in such a practice.
During the two-day debate in the Chamber the
opponents of the intervention attacked the measure in its
financial provisions, alleging that it was unconstitutional
to alter a provincial law by congressional decision/^ They
also argued that it would be practically impossible to
attend the normal bureaucratic needs of the province with
only 70 per cent of its regular income. To counter the
government's strategy of delay, the Personalist deputies
threatened not to attend any sessions if the intervention
in Mendoza was not dealt with in the Chamber. The
lencinists' hope began to vanish when on September 24, by
a close vote of 60 to 52, the deputies decided to debate
Mendoza' s case.'^^ Later, the Chamber approved the
intervention by 77 votes to 22.^^
^^Diputados
, 1924, IV, 449-517; 530-606. September
23 and 24.
44The affirmative vote of five Socialists was
decisive in determining Lencinas' fate. Joaquin Coca,
then a Socialist National Deputy, referred to this
situation in El contubernio . Memorias de un diputado
obrero (Buenos Aires, n.d.), pp. 116-120.
45During the debates, the climate in the Chamber
of Deputies was highly antagonistic, to the point that
Deputies Rincci and Jose Hipolito Lencinas exchanged
very offensive terms. In a m.ove to delay the last
session, the meeting was adjourned close to midnight of
September 23, in what appeared to be an irregular
procedure of the anti-Personalists, who presided over
the session. This touched off a major scandal, with
fist-fights and guns dominating the Chamber, and
involving also the numerous public in the galleries.
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Alvear now tried to persuade a majority of the Senate
to block approval of the bill, pointing out that if the
intervention were sanctioned, it would represent a triumph
for the Yrigoyenists, at the expense of the government.
But his efforts proved fruitless. During the debate in the
Senate, Francisco Vergara, a Personalist for Buenos Aires,
restated the position of his sector that Mendoza's case
was not only a political question, but also one of
"social hygiene and national decency. ""^^
The real battle-line lay between the Yrigoyenists
and the anti-Yrigoyenists. Mendoza provided the stage
for their new confrontation, and the decision to
intervene or not in that province reflected basically
the positions of the different groups in national
politics. The government of Carlos Washington was
almost a bystander in the debate. There was not even a
Lencinist Senator to speak in its behalf. San Juan
Senator Aldo Cantoni, tried a mild defense of Lencinism,
but he was not convincing. Quite different had been the
proposed intervention in Buenos Aires, sought by the
anti-Yrigoyenists, and the proposed intervention in
Cordoba, pushed by the Personalists. In these two
instances there was a balance of forces in Congress
which precluded either projects from materializing. But
Amidst the chaos, the Yrigoyenist Deputy Romeo Saccone
demanded the continuation of the session and shouted
that "If the police are against it, we will expell them
with our guns:" La Prensa, September 25, 1924.
46Senadores, 1924, II, 767-793 (September 29).
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Meadoza could only rely on the numerically-insufficient
anti-Personalist faction.
The senate approved the intervention by 16 votes to 9.
Alvear could have vetoed the law on the grounds of the
alleged unconstitutionality of Article 3~allocating 30
per cent of the budget to withdraw the letras—but he
decided not to do so/'^ Enrique M. Mosca, a former
National Deputy and a prominent Radical leader for Santa
Pe, was appointed Federal Commissioner.
Carlos Washington Lencinas and Lencinism.
An Evaluation
Federal intervention had been associated with
Lencinism from its inception to its end. Both Lencinas'
governments—lasting a total of four and a half years
were interspersed with four federal interventions. These
interludes did not affect the continuity in the style of
government of Jose Nestor Lencinas or his son. Both
represented a special type of popular caudillo, in the
sense that both had experienced the distinction of a
university education. It was common for the well-to-do
families of the province to train their sons in the leading
professions, but it was unusual to have the doctores
The provincial Lencinist Senators appealed to the
National Senate contending that the National Supreme Court
in Anvaria v. Buenos Aires , in 1918, considered that
federal interventions were actions of political nature,
their scope limited by the constitution and the laws. Los
Andes, September 27, 1924.
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leading the crusade in defense of the "chusma de
alpargata.
"
As had also been his father's policy, Carlos
Washington frankly rewarded his political friends to the
extreme of sheltering elements which eventually
discredited his government. He adhered rigorously to the
principle that to the victors belong the spoils, and he
was given to nepotism, assigning posts to his brothers
Jose Hipolito and Rafael Nestor, and other members of
the family. Both of these practices were to cause him
trouble. In the case of his brothers, their political
actions reflected directly upon the governor, and
whatever they did that was questionable or controversial
inevitably affected his reputation.
The general mediocrity of his collaborators in the
government indicates perhaps the paucity of talent
within lencinist ranks. There was a good number of
lawyers among them, but they were not able to provide
the movement with the efficiency and ethical spirit that
would have improved the quality of the government. If
some men were simply mediocre or not qualified to fill
positions of responsibility, others engaged in illegal
or controversial activities, placing on the government
a stigma of corruption that exceeded by far anything
that was ascribed to the regime of Jose Nestor Lencinas.
Carlos Washington himself complained about the questionable
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schemes brought up to his desk at the government house,
which he called "solicitations of the most dubious and
complex nature. "48 ^^^^.^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
period, Jose Hipolito Lencinas acknowledges that as the
exercise of power often paves the way of corruption, so
it was with Lencinism.^^
At a time when the only means of mass communication
was the newspapers, and their impact was limited by the
high rate of illiteracy and semi-illiteracy in the adult
population, regional caudillos had to resort to other
measures to maintain ties with the people. Lencinas
travelled constantly all over the province, mending
political fences and approaching people on a personal
basis, as if he were also a member of the family. In
this connection, it is said that he used to tour the
departments carrying in his car a good number of coats.
On occasion, when greeting or visiting some humble
supporters, he would take off his coat to offer it as a
personal gift to a man who warmly welcomed such a
needed present. Then, as Lencinas moved to another
place he would repeat the same action, thus
establishing his image as a man of noble instincts and
A ft
Mensaje del Gobernador , June 1923. n. p.
"El cambio fue muy grande para no marearse,"
he said. Interview with Jose Hipolito Lencinas.
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open heart,
Another popular story about Carlos Washington relates
to his well known capacity to get acquainted with peopl,
and to his receptivity to the numerous invitations and
toasts which were offered him everywhere he went. On th(
frequent occasions on which Carlos Washington had to cope
with a succession of invitations involving food and wine,
he is said to have resorted to voluntary regurgitation in
between engagements. In this way he was able to keep his
physical and mental abilities unimpaired by the excessive
food and alcohol, without having to refuse an invitation,
which would have been inappropriate on any occasion, and
especially so for a man permanently under the people's
eyes. Other anecdotal references seem to have evolved
more from what his popular appeal suggested than from
the real facts.
Whatever the credibility of these stories, the fact
is that Lencinas was extremely well-liked by the common
50 This is a widespread story which had been
repeated to me endlessly. The earliest instance in
which I found such reference printed was in Jose Maria
Rosa, Resurgimiento de un pueblo
.
Kend[oza, setiembre
1930 a febrero 1932 . Documentaci5n complementaria
(Mendoza, 1932), pp. 21-22. Rosa was the i^'ederal
Interventor appointed by the facto government after
the September 1930 revolution.
51For example, in trying to add to Carlos
Washington's stature as a populist leader, Dardo Olguin
stated that he was "a fair singer and guitar player,"
"...y en el medio de mi pecho....," p. 30. But some
contemporary observers affirm that Lencinas did not
play guitar.
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maa. Ironically, in an administration discredited by
charges of corruption, emanating from different political
quarters, Carlos Washington was considered an honest
leader. His inefficiency as an administrator may be
attributed in part to a spirit always receptive to
fiestas and warmly accepted by the feminine segments.
These may have distracted him from fulfilling his duties
more throughly and from setting a better example for his
subordinates. But this could be only part of the
explanation. Either he was deceived by people he
appointed to high public positions, or he was been very
neglectful in demanding observance of the law by those
responsible for watching over the public interests, or
he himself was the source and bad example of corruption.
Without discarding the other two, the second alternative
seems to be most plausible. The common men, many of them
illiterates, did not comprehend the complexities of
government and could not have understood that many of
those purporting to represent the people—el "pueblo"
—
were in fact engaged in self-serving activities.
As to his political strategy, Carlos Washington
only had to remind his followers that the Lencinist
governments had implemented the minimum wage, the 8-hour
maximum and the old-age pension, to undermine the
charges made against him by the opposition. His political
propaganda centered on these three basic accomplishments,
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and they were appealing enough to retain the loyalty of
his supporters.
The confrontation between Lencinism and its criti
symbolized the class conflict existing in Mendozan society,
since the political alliances were mostly determined by the
economic status of the citizens, and the social values to
which they conformed. Lencinism under Carlos Washington
continued to represent, at least symbolically, the values
of the lower segments, in opposition to those of the well-
to-do. The hard core conservative element always
considered the Lencinist movement as a distortion of
traditional values, and rejected with contempt the "chusma
de alpargata." "The Mendozan society does not exist any
longer," claimed a typical representative of the creole
upper class, "the depraved indigenous element [creole]
fraternizes admirably with the corrupt and exotic sector
[jforeign inmigrantsj, to undermine the foundations of
society and degrade the provincial ambience. "^-^
52Moreover, they enjoyed recalling that Carlos
Washington has vetoed a bill in March 1922, which granted
his mother the salaries which would have been collected
by Jose Nestor Lencinas until the completion of his term.
If he was so concerned with money, the Lencinists
contended, there he had an open opportunity to accept a
sizeable figure, which after all was given to his mother
through a legal, customary procedure.
^^Severo Gutierrez del Castillo, £1 Dr. Severe
Gutierrez del Castillo , al pueblo culto de Mendoza
(Mendoza, 1922), p. 3.
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The opposition against Carlos Washington wai
aggressive as it had been against his father. The dogmatic
Socialists fought tooth and nail against what they
considered the political vices and social ills of some
Lencinist groups, whom they also depicted as servile
adulators of the "gauchito." Moreover, the position of the
Socialists in regard to the letras placed them in total
opposition to the Lencinist view on this matter. The
conservatives, although electorally diminished in the
province, were able to agitate the political sectors in
Buenos Aires, where rested their only chance to get rid
of Lencinism through a federal intervention. The
Yrigoyenists regarded the Lencinist support for the anti-
Personalist cause as a shameful abjuration of the noble
Radical principles and their proclaimed interest for the
underdog as simply demagoguery. As one Yrigoyenist stated
in the National Chamber of Deputies, "I am a true worker,
not one of those who profit at the expense of the
54
worker. "^^ But the fact is that the Yrigoyenists were
unable to make serious inroads into the provincial
political scene, and for this reason they vigorously
Joined the pro-intervention forces in Congress,
Regardless of their respective political orientations,
the opposition groups within the province looked more
^^Words expressed by National Deputy for Mendoza,
Prancisco Rubilar, Diputados , 1921, IV, p. 155.
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toward Buenos Aires than to the legal resources available
at home, to redress their grievances against the
government. Countless telegrams poured into the Federal
Capital, addressed to Congress, the Minister of the
Interior, the President, and the so-called "prensa
seria."55
^^^^^ ^^^^ opposition felt
undefended by the provincial institutions and sought the
protection of the Federal Government, especially when
the letras became the major issue. But it also seems
clear that the opposition was compelled to appeal to
Buenos Aires because of their permanent minority
political status, and the fact that the Lencinists
appeared to be unbeatable at the polls.
Since freedom of the press was absolute at this
time, it was the best forum for all the groups and
political parties to present their views and to
criticize their opponents. It seems certain that the
endless political documents, manifestos and telegrams
issued by the different sectors reached a newspaper
office before that of its addressee. In this respect,
the appeals to La Nacion and La Prensa played a most
significant role in shaping the image of Lencinism
La Prensa,
55This expression was used for La Nacion and
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outside Mendoza.^^
There is no doubt that the weight of these two porteho
dailies was very important in influencing public opinion,
especially among conservative, well-to-do elements. Their
criticism of Lencinism was based many times on
constitutional grounds, and the objections they raised were
in line with the orthodox viewpoint which guided their
political philosophy.
The unfavorable comments of these two newspapers
intensified as reports of corruption grew and as Lencinism
imposed a climate of political intolerance in Mendoza. At
one time La Prensa stated that in that province it was not
possible to dissent with the Executive without risking
freedom or life itself. ^'^ Unfortunately, their
correspondents in Mendoza were local people directly
associated with the conservative sectors, and as such,
they reported one-sided versions most of the time. Because
of the great influence they exerted, it is regrettable
56The following evaluation of Lencinism serves to
illustrate this fact.: "...este circulo demagogico y
regresivo odia cordialmente a la ilustracion, especula con
la ignorancia de las masas, las incita a vilipendiar a la
sociedad culta y a burlarse de la gente que viste con
decoro y se comporta con correccion, simboliza sus ideales
y su concepto de la evolucion mental en la alpargata;
administra los dineros publicos con la mas absoluta falta
de escrupulos y abre las puertas de las carceles a los
procesados por delitos vergonzosos. " La Prensa , March 14,
1926.
^'^La Prensa, August 13, 1924.
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that while condemning the excesses of lenolnlsm, la Nacion
and La Prensa did not envision the social transformation
that this populist movement symbolized.
There was a noticeable change in the position of the
Yrigoyenist La E^oca as a result of the definitive
alliance of the Lencinists with the anti-Peronists. During
the years when Jose Nestor Lencinas was governor of
Mendoza, he was constantly assailed by La Prensa and La
Nacion. On the other hand, because he had been a
traditional supporter and political friend of Yrigoyen,
La Epoca openly defended Lencinas in the early part of his
administration, but refrained from attacking him when his
relationship with Yrigoyen began to cool. At the same time.
La Epoca rancorously attacked La Nacion and La Prensa with
a language highly indicative of its hatred for the two
well-established newspapers.
Conversely, during the governorship of Carlos
Washington, as he openly embraced the anti-Personalist
forces. La Epoca gradually became more hostile to his rule
and his miovement. But as La Nacion and La Prensa were also
opposed to Lencinism—as well as to San Juan's Bloquism
—
La Epoca found itself sharing with the two former
"villains" the same feelings on both governments of Cuyo,
and therefore ceased to attack La Nacion and La Prensa
almost completely.
The conservatives resented Lencinism, as they would
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have resented any political force that took a pro-worker
stand, regulated their business and taxed thei
operations. However, prosperity returned to th
mercantile sectors, and the bodegueros especially
profited from the lencinist decisions. Carlos V/ashington
followed the recommendations of the industrialists in
implementing changes that served the interests of the
bodegueros more than the general interests. But the
businessmen and industrialists in general could not
absolve Lencinas for his pro-worker position and the
heavy taxation imposed upon them by the populist and
costly administration. It was estimated that 70 per cent
of the production costs of wine were taxes. It turns
out that under lencinas' rule, the wine sectors improved
their business. During the not too distant past, they had
appealed to the provincial government for its support,
and millions had been spent in destroying grapes and
disposing of wine, just to protect the industrial
interests. During the government of Carlos Washington
they did not have to raise their cries for help, as in
the past, but were intensely committed to let supply and
demand rule the market. What better sign than this to
prove that they were enjoying a period of
Ovidio V. Schiopetto, "La doble imposicion
Interna en la Republica Argentina. Estudio del sistema
impositivo de la Provincia de Mendoza. " Facultad de
Ciencias Economicas. Investigaci ones de Seminari
o
, V
(Buenos Aires, 1927), 362.
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prosper! ty?^^
Beyond economic considerations, however, the upper
segments could not approve either the Lenoinist
philosophy or its methods. Political rivalry, with strong
social overtones, was a fact of life, be it called
"Causa versus Regimen," "poor versus rich," "bodeguero
versus peon," "Jockey Club versus C£roulo de Armas,"
59
Lencinist''period:'' " ''^^'^ ^^^^^-^ -
1922 407,065,000 liters
1923 428,061,000
1924 472,084,000
Provinoia de Mendoza, Sintesis de la DireccionGeneral de Estadlstica
. 1930~1931 , p. i6qT —
~
,
likewise, wine consumption per capita reachedits peak for the decade in 1924:
1920 50 liters 1925 59 liters
1921 55 1926 62
1922 64 1927 50
1923 62 1928 56
1924 66 1929 57
Provincia de Mendoza, Ministerio de Industrias
y Ohras Publicas, El prohlema vinicola . Memorial
_de la
intervencion nacional en. Mendoza a la Comision Asesora
para la industria vltivini cola (Mendoza, 1931), p. 110.
The prosperity of the wealthier sectors was
also indicated by the growing number of cars:
1919 827
1920 946
1921 1,407
1922 1,582
1923 2,294
1924 3,409
Provincia de Mendoza, Sintesis de la Direccion
General de Estadistica, 1930-1931
, p. 142.
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"gansos versus pericotes. "^O The rivalry became more acute
toward the middle of 1924, when political abuses,
administrative corruption and the debacle of the letras,
cornered the provincial government in an untenable
position.
The fact is that in spite of the populist glamour of
Lencinism under the guidance of Carlos Washington, its
real achievements were less significant than its failures.
Its promises went unfulfilled in every major field.
Financially, not only was it unable to restore the value
of the letras, but the government was seriously involved
in illicit activities. The gross mishandling of the
provincial money provided a measure of the inability of
the Lencinas' administration to deal seriously with a
complex and vital problem. Without diminishing the
responsibility of the provincial authorities, the Federal
Government was also to be blamed for not taking the
proper action when it was needed. For years the central
governments "conveniently" ignored these constitutional
violations. Would they have had the same tolerance if any
province had set up its own custom house or created a
parallel army? With respect to social legislation
Lencinism deserves credit for the old-age pension law.^^
Pericote was a popular name, despectively given
to the Lencinists by their opponents. A pericote is a
rodent.
^''Provincial Deputy Luis Olmedo Cortes expressed
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But this solitary achievement shows the neglect in which
the glowing promises of Carlos Washington were left.
In his relations with other branches of government,
Lencinas resorted to the highhanded methods of his fathe
in "punishing" opposition members, and tampering with the
Judiciary in a most arbitrary manner. Administratively,
the corruption in the Provincial Bank, the failure to
make it a semi-private institution, and the lack of
responsibility in other agencies of government, meant
that the situation inherited from the oligarchy, as the
Radicals denounced it in 1917, had not improved. Perhaps
there is no better example of unfortunate negligence than
the School Board's administration: no massive effort was
made to reduce the lack of attendance at schools;
literacy was far from universal; no real interest was
shown in making the school administration more reliable
and efficient, and the teachers continued to be the
pariahs of the provincial budget.
To what extent was Carlos Washington a demagogue in
that it was a "Lencinist Law," adding, "y digo asi,
veinte veces lencinista." Legislatura de Mendoza,
Diputados
, 1922, II, 1558. February 16, 1923.
6 2In 1926 Governor Orfila intervened in the School
Board. He appointed Leopoldo Suarez as interventor. In
Suarez' critical report of the school system, he noted
that the teachers' salaries were in arrears as follows:
1920 $ 89,752 1923 t 87,601
1921 31,050 1924 328,568
1922 142,665
Los Andes, February 3, 1927.
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his quest for social justice? Every man can be his
historian in this matter, but a sound Judgment must take
into consideration both the inner motivations of the
leader and the external expressions in which his
purposes were carried out. A sympathetic writer would
view Lencinas as a sincere reformer and a man aware of
his tremendous popular attraction, who thought of
himself as a positive leader, without properly realizing
the magnitude of his shortcomings. A critical view would
note that rhetoric replaced substance, since the
positive accomplishments were meager in comparison to
the professed purposes of protecting and improving the
lot of the popular sectors. Under Carlos Washington's
rule, only one major piece of social legislation was
enacted. Here, moreover, is a good example of demagogic
techniques, for Lencinists placed posters on the walls
of Buenos Aires, praising the old-age pension law as an
example of advanced social legislation, just for the
self-aggrandizement of Lencinas' political stature in
the national circles, because the law was only
applicable 600 miles away.
Lencinas' ascendancy was conclusively proved by
the electoral returns from 1922 to 1924. Apparently he
saw in the people's support the best indication that
he was following in the right path, when in fact his
tremendous popularity blinded him to the real nature
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of the problems he was facing. He said in his 1923
annual message that everything was satisfactory, without
a single cloud in sight; and in 1924 he repeated that
concept with the same naivete. His movement was victim
of the endemic problem which affects all personalist
regimes: it did not exercise self-criticism and seemed
to be mostly immune from the criticism of its opponents.
Did Lencinas government fail to carry out its promises
because its very nature was a contradiction of
"efficient" government? Or did he fail because under a
populist facade, his rule degenerated into one of
"populachera" nature?
But in spite of his numerous failings, it is hard
to close this evaluation of Carlos Washington without
pointing out his most redeeming value. Por he was a
true popular leader who enlightened the lives of
thousands of humble people Just by being a symbol of
a better life for them.
Although he fell from power by his own wrongdoings,
he also became a casualty of the strange alliance of
Yrigoyenists, conservatives and Socialists, who had
their own special reasons for seeking the political
destruction of Lencinism. Pictured against the higher
designs and intrigues of national politics, it seems
as if Carlos Washington's role was bigger than the man
himself.
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But the Mendozan leader was in October 1924 as
popular as he had been in February 1922. At 35 years of
age, he still had a great political future to explore,
and from his first minute out of office he began an
aggressive campaign to regain power. His departure from
the government marked the start of a new political
trail which eventually led him into a direct
confrontation with Yrigoyen.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE ErmGENCE OP POPULISM IN SAN JUAN.
THE CANTONI CLAN
The thrust for political regeneration that led to the
prominence of Jose Nestor Lencinas in Mendoza during
Yrigoyen's first term was also experienced in San Juan.
Before the Radical wind swept the land of Sarmiento, this
province was poorly developed economically and ruled by an
entrenched oligarchy, socially and politically backward.
Furthermore, the provincial Radical Party was not infused
with the reformist spirit of the Mendozan Radicals under
the leadership of Jose Nestor Lencinas. Although it
represented a somewhat different voice from that of the
conservatives, its leaders were also a part of the
traditional provincial structure.
The changes experienced in the 1920*3, which greatly
modified this general setting, were mostly due to the
energy and strong personality of Pederico Cantoni, a
young Radical who had no reservations about alienating
the more moderate members of the party. This paved the
way for the clash of the divergent Radical elements and,
more importantly, shaped San Juan's destiny for a
tumultuous decade.
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The two Radical factions were the Intransigents and
the Nationalists. The former group represented the non-
conformist branch of the party, while the latter was
more traditionally-oriented and loyal to President
Yrigoyen. The Intransigents considered the other faction
to be a virtual representative of the Regimen, while the
Nationalists, and those of the conservative Concentracion
Civica as well, viewed Cantonism as a leftist movement
whose pro-populist position was close to International
Socialism, a force which in their minds represented
social anarchy.
The prominent leaders of the two factions were
Cantoni, of the Intransigents, and Napoleon Rosellot and
Ventura Lloveras, of the Nationalists. Cantoni was born
in San Juan in April 1890. His father, a man of pleasant
manners, came from Italy and devoted his efforts in San
Juan to his profession of engineer. His mother, also an
Italian, had a very strong character and was very
domineering. It has been generally pointed out that
Federico inherited and absorbed from her his tough
personality. He graduated from the Medical School of the
University of Buenos Aires in 1913» and practiced in his
native province. In 1917 he was elected to the Municipal
Council and became provincial deputy a year later.
^
Rosellot was the traditional Radical leader of
San Juan, so closely related to the provincial elite
that he had been in 1911 the president of the Social
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Following in the steps of Jose Nestor lencinas, to
whom Cantoni looked for political inspiration, the
Intransigent Radicals were committed to the longings of
the popular sectors. In contrast with the traditional
stance of the Radical Nationalists, they adopted the
alpargata as their political symbol. Thus, the Intransigents
pursued the social objectives of the Lencinists, and
shared with them the symbol which best illustrated the
nature of their followers, the "chusma de alpargata."
The reform of the provincial governments was, as
noted earlier, a fundamental priority in Yrigoyen's
program of national political reparation. Accordingly, the
conservative government of San Juan became the target of
the Radicals, who regarded the Sanjuanino administration as
a fraudulent one. Submitting its complaints to the Minister
of the Interior, the Radical Party stated that the
republican system of government was not functioning in San
Juan because of repeated electoral frauds and the shameful
arrangements of the conservatives aimed at perpetuating
themselves in office. The Executive Power granted full
credence to these partisans accusations. Indeed, they
Club, an institution harboring exclusively the well-to-do.
In 1917 he was the party candidate for the governorship,
but was defeated by the conservative Amador Isaza. Since
that time, Rosellot and his political friends had
quarrelled almost constantly with the young Cantoni,
although all of them pledged their allegiance to national
Radicalism. Rosellot died in November 1919.
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constituted the legal foundation on which it justified
its action, for on October 17, 1919, less than three
weeks after Congress had adjourned, President Yrigoyen
issued a decree placing the three governmental branches of
San Juan under federal jurisdiction. Manuel P. Escobar,
then President of the Supreme Court of Buenos Aires
Province, was appointed commissioner with ample powers to
carry out his duties.^
Naturally, the conservatives considered this action
another manifestation of Yrigoyen's authoritarian rule.
But the Radicals, who were the sole beneficiaries of this
situation, found themselves deeply troubled by their
internal dispute. If the intervention were to succeed, it
was imperative for them to achieve some kind of workable
unity. Thus, from the outset of Escobar's rule, it became
evident that it had been easier for Yrigoyen to tumble
the provincial government than to unite the members of
his party.
When efforts undertaken by delegates from the
National Committee of the Union Civica Radical failed,
the Yrigoyenists blamed the "Maximalist Cantonist ferment"
for the lack of success in forging party unity. Moreover,
2Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno , VI, pp. 402-420.
Illustrative of the local conservative reaction against
the presidential decision was the fact that several
statues in the city of San Juan appeared covered with
crape the following morning.
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they argued that there was no possibility of uniting with
the Intransigents because the two factions represented
positions as divergent as "light and darkness, treason and
loyalty, honesty and perfidy."^ However, the results of
the elections held for National Deputies on March 7, 1920,
were a warning that a divided party couldn't capture
political control of the province/
Although the two Radical factions together obtained
more votes than the conservatives, by presenting
candidates independently they had to accept a minority
status. Until this election the Radicals had been
confident that the conservatives would have no possibility
of preserving their majority. After that contest, however,
they strove to unify the party at any cost. Even so their
negotiations reached a stalemate, and Interventor Escobar
chose to postpone the elections for a new governor for a
few more weeks. Escobar's action was blatantly partisan,
since his official obligation was to set up the legal
conditions by which San Juan could be restored to its
institutional powers, not to pursue the amalgamation of
the officialist party.
•^la Prensa, February 19 1 1920.
^The conservative Concentracion Civica got 7»712
votes against 4,929 of the Intransigent Radicals (Cantoni)
and 4,275 of the Radical Nationalists. The Socialists
polled 1,741 votes. Ibid . , March 15, 1920.
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To break the impasse, the selection of the Radical
candidate for governor had to be maneuvered from Buenos
Aires. Yrigoyen believed that a figure removed from the
local scene might best guarantee the support of the
Sanjuaninos. Other provincial leaders, especially National
Deputy Marcial Quiroga, agreed that this action was the
only means to rescue the party from irreparable
fragmentation. 5 Accordingly, with presidencial advice and
consent, San Juan's Radicals proclaimed the candidacy of
Amable Jones for the governorship of San Juan.^ The
Cantonists were dissatisfied with this arrangement for
although they were the strongest faction electorally
speaking, they had no representation on the ticket.
Nevertheless, they accepted Yrigoyen 's decision in order
to maintain a united front.
^Diputados
. 1922, I, 132.
^Jones was born in San Juan but had not lived in
the province for many years. He was a distinguished
psychiatrist who had participated in professional
meetings in Europe and the United States, authored a
good number of works, taught at the University of
Buenos Aires, and was director of the main mental
hospital in Argentina. Politically, he was a Radical of
"the first hour" and a trusted friend of Yrigoyen. He
had been a delegate from San Juan to the National
Committee and a member of the Radical Convention which
nominated Yrigoyen as a presidential candidate in 1916.
Aquiles Castro was chosen as the candidate for deputy
governor. Castro, representing a small, traditional
wing of the party, commanded little political
significance but, by the same token, was a non-
controversial figure in the dissention-ridden domestic
Radical scene.
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Jones was highly respected because of his professional
qualifications, but his debut in provincial politics had a
touch Of arrogance. After having been away from San Juan
for many years, he returned to his native province only
nine days before the elections to declare that although
the history of the Radicals of San Juan was written with
a "blurred pencil," he would mark it with "indelible
characters. ""^
As expected, Jones triumphed although by a narrow
margin, in the elections held on May 16, 1920. On July 9
he was installed in office, becoming the first Radical
in history to serve as governor of San Juan.^ Political
regeneration thus finally reached the province but only
after extremely laborious party maneuvers. The problem
ahead for the Radicals was how to avoid the desintegration
of their "patch-quilt" unity.
Whatever the expectations and anxieties of the
Radical groups about the performance of the newly elected
governor, the authoritarian way in which he initiated his
rule deepened their antagonism. The Sanjuanino historian
Hector D. Arias has stated that Jones created a sui
generis Radicalism, which can not be properly called
Q
"Yrigoyenismo, " but "Jonismo." Jones was quoted in a
^La Prensa, May 8, 1920.
o
The electoral returns were: UCR 8,997; Concentracion
Clvica 8,272. Ibid . , April 1, 1922.
^Arias and Varese, Historia de San Juan , p. 434.
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congressional report as having asserted that he would
govern "with the party, without the party and against the
party. ••'^
The political situation thus seriously deteriorated
within a few months after Jones took office. The police,
implementing the governor's policy, arbitrarily curtailed
the activities of his opponents; the non-officialis
t
press became subject to growing harassment. The governor
was also criticized for having recruited from outside the
province most of the high level staff of his administration
and the Judiciary. In the unpretentious provincial
environment of San Juan, the higher bureaucratic positions
were closely connected to social standing. Hence, Jones'
appointments ran counter to the interests of many local
people, and offended their ever prevalent pride in the
"patria chica."
The legislature took a decisive stand to check Jones'
affronts, and especially the arbitrariness of his Supreme
Court nominations. Jose Flores Perramon, president of the
three-man Provincial Supreme Court, was the only member
of this tribunal who was properly appointed, for the other
two judges proposed by the governor were denied
confirmation by the Senate. Jones then appointed two other
judges but without seeking the consent of the Senate, he
^^Ministerio del Interior, Intervene! on naci onal en
la provincia de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1921), p. lib.
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proceeded, with assistance from the police, to expel
Plores Perramon from his office and install his new
appointees. Other judicial positions were filled in a
Similar fashion. These arbitrary manipulations by the
governor ruptured the fragile Radical unity.
Under the leadership of Cantoni, then a provincial
Senator, the Radical Intransigents and the conservatives
decided to confront the governor squarely in the
legislature by resorting to the drastic legal solution of
impeachment. The governor had already convened the
legislature for a special meeting of January 29, 192I,
the sole purpose of which was to approve the 1921 budget.
With this as grounds he insisted that he would not
recognize any other motions made by the legislative
power. A few days later, however, realizing that in spite
of his warning the Chamber of Deputies was still seriously
considering his impeachment, Jones adjourned the
legislature by decree on December 24. This dramatic
action stirred up even more criticism and, contrary to
Jones' wishes, failed to prevent the confrontation between
the two powers.
Following this action, each side tried to anticipate
the other's move. Their inflexibility made any compromise
almost impossible. Since the legislative building was
guarded by the police, the anti-Jonist legislators met
secretly at the home of one of the members on February 26,
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1921. At this secret meeting, they approved the initiation
Of impeachment procedures against the governor, and
suspended him. On this occasion, and to express their
solidarity against Jones, they formed a legislative bloclc
-a bloaue-and it is from this that the name Bloquista.
thereafter associated with Cantoni's movement, was
derived.
Jones reacted angrily to the action of these
legislators, ordering their arrest and charging them with
conspiracy and rebellion. Almost all of them were arrested,
including Cantoni. The press, however, except the
officialist, was critical of Jones' autocratic rule, and
reacted with indignation. The massive arrest of legislators
was such a flagrant violation of their prerrogatives that
the Minister of the Interior ordered Jones to release them
immediately. The echoes of these serious discords reached
the halls of Congress, and at the end of January 1921 the
National Chamber of Deputies appointed an investigating
committee to study the political situation in San Juan."'--^
Naturally, Yrigoyen was opposed to this congressional
initiative and informed the Chamber that it did not have the
legal power to appoint such a committee; if the Chamber
wished to have some information concerning San Juan, the
normal procedure was to request it of the Executive Power.
•^^Diputados
,
1920, VI, 131-183 (January 27, 1921)
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Moreover, asserting his authority, the President affirmed
that the provincial conflict had to be resolved by
observing the provincial legislation. ^2 ^^.^ ^^^^^
between the President and a branch of Congress was a
confrontation over whose decision was to prevail in
solving San Juan's dilemma. Prom the institutional
viewpoint the provincial situation was a chaos. The
governor was facing an attempt by the provincial Chamber
of Deputies to impeach him and he had been suspended by
a process which did not follow the proper legal steps.
At the same time, Jones was taking the legislators to
court, another unconstitutional act, before judges who
could not legally perform in this capacity because they
had been appointed by the governor but without the
consent of the Senate. The hope for an institutional
solution within the province was totally unrealistic.
Forced by the circumstances in San Juan, which
could not be modified locally, Yrigoyen finally acceded
to the request of the National Chamber of Deputies and
introduced a bill on March 4, 1921, intervening in San
Juan. Understandably, Yrigoyen' s bill was very short
on words. The need for the intervention was stated in
generalities. The official verbosity of seventeen
Ibid
. ,
255-256. The request of the anti-
Yrigoyenist Radicals to intervene in San Juan and the
report of the investigating committee are on pp.
441-537 (February 25, 1921).
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months ago when conservative Governor Isaza was displaced
from office in the name of "political regeneration" was
altered now in typical Yrigoyen-style Justification, that
is, that the intervention would "restablish the functional
regularity of the government .^^ congress, however, did
not accept these hollow words and modified the text of
the law specifically stating that the intervention should
guarantee the proper constitutional functioning of the
legislative and judicial powers, as well as municipal
self-government.^^
Yrigoyen needed this law in order to rescue a
friendly governor in serious distress. On the other hand,
he was most reluctant to comply with it in view of the
terms in which it was passed. To indicate his displeasure
to Congress, Yrigoyen did not sign the bill and it was
automatically promulgated ten days after he received it.
Even so, he let four more weeks elapse before appointing
the commissioner, Rayraundo M. Salvat, another member of
ISthe Federal Judiciary.^
^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno , VI, pp. 421-445.
Yrigoyen' s message to Congress is on pp. 436-437.
^^This was Law No. 11,112, dated March 9, 1921.
^^Salvat' s arrival v/as warmly greeted by the
Cantonists, who displayed their antagonism against
Jones chanting enthusiastically, Cantoni si, otro
no'." La Prensa, April 22, 1921.
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In a few weeks Salvat completed the analysis of the
provincial situation. Like Interventor de Veyga in
Mendoza in 1919, he based his actions on constitutional
law. Therefore, on the first of June he ordered the
withdrawal of all troops guarding the legislature,
declared null and void all appointments to the Judiciary
made without the consent of the Senate, ordered the
reinstatement of all the judges dismissed by the
governor and invalidated the municipal elections held in
November 1920. The Bloquists were joyful about Salvat's
decision, but their euphoria was short-lived. On June 3,
abruptly, Yrigoyen decreed the end of Salvat 's mission,
stating that he had fulfilled the purpose for which he had
been sent to San Juan."^^ The fact was that whereas
Yrigoyen considered Salvat' s mission to be finished when
he was ready to uphold the suspension of Governor Jones,
Salvat had not even intimated that he considered his work
17
completed, '
,
Ironically, on the same day of Yrigoyen' s decree.
La Epoca expressed editorially that the measures taken
by Salvat, forcing Jones to rectify his highhanded
decisions, proved that the President had never
interferred with the situation in San Juan.
17Shortly thereafter, the Minister of the Interior
published all the documents pertaining to this
intervention, but omitted Salvat' s report of Kay 6, in
which he outlined the steps he was contemplating and the
reasons for them. Noting this intentional omission in the
official publication, La Prensa, warned the President not
to ignore Salvat' s report as it had Commissioner's
Saavedra on Mendoza in 1917. August 4, 1921.
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Pressed by Congress to explain the premature
termination of Salvafs intervention, Yrigoyen simply
reported on July 7 that the conflict between the
executive and the legislature of San Juan had been
resolved by the commissioner. The President was more
specific in criticizing the provincial legislature for
resorting to an illegal procedure in trying to impeach a
duly elected governor. However, he added, if Congress
considered that the forthcoming elections for the new
legislature ought to be held under federal supervision,
he would approve a bill declaring a new intervention in
18San Juan. This in itself demonstrated the weakness of
Yrigoyen' s defense for ending Salvat's commission. In
Congress a bill was immediately introduced authorizing
a further intervention, but it was stalled in a
committee for almost three months.
In San Juan, meanwhile, the situation was the same
as it had been before Salvat: a virtual impasse. The
bitter animosities were as pronounced as ever, but now
there were further complications. Since the legislature
had suspended Governor Jones, the provincial Senate
appointed its president, Juan Estrella, as the Chief
Executive. Thus, each side in the dispute now had its
governor, although in reality, Jones* rule wasown
^^La Prensa, July 8, 1921.
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uncontested because Yrigoyen had authorized the 15th
Infantry Regiment to provide the governor with all
necessary protection.
But in mid-September 1921 Congress was renewing its
interest in San Juan's affairs and approved a new
intervention, the second in only six months, in order
to normalize the Chamber of Deputies and the municipal
governments.^^
Appraising the provincial situation, Sergio W.
Bates, a contemporary journalist, thought that in spite
of his errors, Jones was a sincere man. But as a
psychiatrist practicing his profession among unbalanced
patients for thirty years, Bates suggested that Jones
believed San Juan to be a huge asylum where the "insane"
20
opposition could be domesticated with cold showers.
Jones himself had made a depressing psychological
appraisal of the province and the people he was ruling.
He described it as a dormant environment, devoid of
patriotism and dominated by obscure and inferior groups,
obsessed with political ambitions. Jones believed it was
the consequence of the biological heritage, the lack of
a large, beneficial immigration, the influence of a very
This was Law No. 11,168, dated September 24, 1921.
Sergio W. Bates, Muerte de Jones (La tra^edia
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low-quality press and the general absence of cultural
21
values.
The heated controversy of "Jones versus anti-Jones"
gradually reached a crescendo. Acts were countered by
others, words of condemnation were repudiated with others
more aggressive. Political tolerance had evaporated to
the point where the only possible solution appeared to
be the total exclusion of one side and the absolute
supremacy of the other. For several months serious warnings
were raised suggesting that such political intransigence
could only result in a total struggle. The grave and gloomy
tone of the admonitions became a constant theme in the
press. In November 1920, La Prensa pointed out that the
road chosen by Jones forecast the barrenness of his
government. When he arbitrarily suspended the provincial
elections scheduled for January 1921, it was predicted that
only regrettable consequences could be expected from such
overbearing procedures by the governor. In despair that
Jones would never soften his arrogant stand, Los Andes
stated that he was approaching "the abyss where he will
be irremissibly buried." A few days later a manifesto of
the Concentracion Civica suggested that those who opposed
^^Provincia de San Juan, Libro bianco. Documentos
oficiales de los hechos producidos en San Juan ^ el
procedimiento empleado por el gobernador Dr . Amable J ones
(San Juan, 1921), pp. 4-5.
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the governor should get together "to overthrow as soon as
possible the sacrilegious standard-bearer of the anarchy."
In June, La Prensa reiterated that by exerting
uncontrolled power, Jones would lead San Juan to
lamentable extremes. The same day Los Andes resignedly
concluded that perhaps the only way to bring a solution
to the crisis was "the sacrifice, the immolation [of the
governor] by his own will in his place of duty."^^ In
fact, Jones was conscious of the danger to which he was
exposed and in order to prevent a probable attempt on his
life he protected himself by spending nights at
different places.
The pugnacity of Jones' enemies in San Juan and
Buenos Aires, who were Yrigoyen's enemies too, the
deliberate inertia of the President in forcing a change
in the governor's course of action, and the overweening
attitude assumed by Jones, combined to create a situation
which could only be modified if one of both sides would
adopt a sincerely conciliatory attitude toward the other.
But political hatred was not appeased and the situation
continued to follow a hopeless downhill path.
Early in October Cantoni was assaulted by the
police in his home in Jachal, the second city in the
^^La Prensa
,
January 3, 1921; Los Andes , March 2,
1921; La Prensa , March 14, 1921; ibid . , June 12, 1921;
Los Andes, June 12, 1921.
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province, and was wounded in the foot. His political
adversaries, however, claimed that it was in fact a self-
inflicted wound. Back in the capital, in a gathering at
the Plaza 25 de Mayo, in front of the government house,
Cantoni pronounced on October 25, these menacing words:
The tyrant Jones has to be thrown out of the
government house, dead or alive. Every man must
have ready a Kauser, and if he does not have it,
a Winchester, and if he does not have a
Winchester, a shotgun, and if he does not have
it, a gun, and if he does not have any firearm,
he must seek a club, a hoe, a pocketknife or a
suncho. But we have to thrown him out, dead or
alive. 23
It was not by chance than, that early in the
afternoon of Sunday, November 20, 1921, when Jones, Juan
Maglioli, a well-known bodeguero, and Luis J. Colombo,
President of the Supreme Court of San Juan, were
entering the little town of Rinconada in Jones' car, a
hail of bullets struck them, killing Jones and Maglioli
instantly. As if to make sure, a handbomb was also thrown
partially disfiguring Jones ' body.^^
Critica, January 9, 1923.
^^The town of Rinconada is located twelve miles
south of the capital, in the Department of Pocito. Jones
was not the first provincial prominent figure to die
because of violence. San Juan had a long and bloody
history of political passion. In 1858 former Governor
Nazario Benavidez was killed while he was in jail; two
years later Governor Jose Antonio Virasoro died leading
an armed movement; in 1861 former Governor Antonino
Aberastain was shot after being defeated by the federal
forces at the battle of La Rinconada, the^same place
where Jones fell; in 1872 Governor Valentin Videla was
assassinated, and in 1884 National Senator Agustin
Gomez suffered the same fate.
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Within a few hours the police began arresting suspects
and in a few days most of those implicated were in jail.
Among the arrested were Federico Cantoni and his brother
Elio, also a physician, although they were not present at
the Rinconada when Jones was killed.
Federico Cantoni refused to make any statement on the
grounds that he was protected by legislative immunity. The
other defendants, however, contended that the Cantoni
brothers had planned the whole attack. They explained that
their intention was not to assassinate the governor, but
rather to kidnap him in order to force him out of office.
They stated that they believed it was the only means
available to break the provincial stalemate. In
justification, the Bloquists claimed that when the plan
was carried out some of the men were not too sober and
others were unable to control themselves, and so,
unfortunately, the situation got entirely out of hand.
Considering the state of political hatred existing in
San Juan, it seems more plausible that the real motive of
the Cantonists was to eliminate Jones. The mere kidnapping
of the governor did not promise an effective change in the
None of the accused were professional trouble-
makers, none had a police record and some were even
members of well-known families in the province. One of the
arrested, Vicente Miranda Jameson, who was accused by the
Jonists of having mutilated the governor's right ear,
had his left ear cut off in retaliation.
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political situation. Did the Bloquists believe that
Yrigoyen would keep his hands in his pockets? From a
strictly political viewpoint, the episode of the Rinconada
appears almost useless when it is considered that Yrigoyen
could appoint a new commissioner to pursue the same
political action which Jones had been following, as in
fact he did. But the Bloquists were ready to pay the price
for getting rid of what they believed was a tyrant. This
priority, apparently, overshadowed any other consideration.
Thus, Jones was removed from the scene, but not the system
that supported him, for Yrigoyenism was, after all, the
root of the problem for the Bloquists.
Understandably, after the Rinconada there was a
recrudescence of the animosities between the two opposing
groups, Aldo Cantoni, another brother of Federico who was
living in Buenos Aires, went immediately to San Juan to
rally the Bloquists in a campaign of public agitation in
behalf of the men arrested.
26
Aldo was 29 years old and was practicing medicine
in the Federal Capital, where he also had gained the fame
of being the "doctor of the poor." Politically, he was a
member of the International Socialist Party and had
openly defended the Maximalist principles, both in San
Juan—where in 1916 he was the candidate of his party for
National Deputy, and in 1917 the candidate for deputy
governor—and Buenos Aires. He also took part in the
Comite de Agitacion Cordoba Libre, in favor of the
university reform. To assist Aldo Cantoni some of his
political friends like Cesar A. Moya, Graciliano Recai and
Aldo Pecchini, also came to San Juan from Buenos Aires
and joined the UCR Bloquista.
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The situation in San Juan excited national concern.
Within the political parties and in the press, the comments
and criticisms focused intensively on the behavior of the
President. In general, his foes contended that his guilty
tolerance of Jones' excesses had been the fundamental
cause for the tragedy. The Yrigoyenists
, on the other hand,
blamed the event of the Rinconada on their opponents-
spirit of revenge. La Epoca
, for example, specifically
accused La Prensa and La Nacion in numerous heated
editorials of being the real instigators of the crime.
As noted earlier. Congress had approved a limited
intervention in San Juan, two months before Jones'
assassination. But Yrigoyen did nothing to implement it
until early in December, almost three weeks after the
governor's death, when he appointed Julio Bello as
28Federal Commissioner. Bello did not carry an olive
27Aquiles Damianovich, a prosecutor during Jones'
governorship, wrote his own account of the intrigues
which led to the governor's assassination. He blamed
most of the local politicians for their selfish
political ambitions, and asserted that former Minister
of Interior Rosendo Gomez, in connivence with the
Bloquists and acting as a fifth column within Yrigoyen'
s
cabinet, masterminded Jones' elimination, so Gomez could
outbid him as the party candidate for vicepresident in
the 1922 elections. El crimen ^ el poder . La lucha por
la vicepresidencia ^ _el asesinato de Jones (Buenos Aires,
1922), p. 258.
Bello was a loyal Yrigoyenist political leader
in Santa Fe province. Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno ,
pp. 4-46-455.
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branch when he arrived in San Juan in mid-December, for it
was intended that the Bloquists pay dearly for every drop
of blood of the Rinconada. The Yrigoyenists had had enough
of Cantoni. Jones' death was the final straw, and they
confronted the Bloquists with vehement rage. Neither mercy
nor forgetfulness would be granted to the assassins of
Jones. The clash between Yrigoyenists and Cantonists
during the 1920' s would mark one of the unfortunate
political events of the decade.
San Juan was then ruled by Deputy Governor Aquiles
Castro, a hesitant and timorous man who had spent most of
his time away from the province. But at the end of
February 1922, Bello took control of the Executive Power
in spite of the fact that the intervention law did not
confer upon him the right to assume executive office.
Commenting on Bello' s abuse of power. La Prensa stated
that San Juan was not under a federal intervention but
under "an arbitrary proconsulate at the service of the
pq
supreme personalism. " This comment was typical of the
Buenos Aires' press opposed to Yrigoyen. Although they
had condemned the crime of the Rinconada, from a
political viewpoint they were cautious about
criticizing Cantoni' s action. This attitude underscored
the fact that Yrigoyen was the axis of national politics.
Provincial affairs as well as provincial caudillos were
^^La Prensa, March 21, 1922.
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simply dependent clauses of the two major currents: for
Yrigoyen or against Yrigoyen. This rationale determined
basically what was principal and what was accessory in
the political game. It explains why at this time Federico
Cantoni received such benevolent treatment from the
powerful anti-Yrigoyenist press.
Another paradox was that while Cantoni was
recognized as the image of Jose Nestor Lencinas in San
Juan, his evaluation by the national press was quite
distinct. The anti-Yrigoyenist newspapers had bitterly
criticized Lencinas for his political methods and
"populist deraagoguery. Thus, if it were agreed that
Cantoni was Lencinas' alter ego, why did he receive such
different consideration in the "prensa seria" than his
mendocino preceptor? Their respective relations with
Yrigoyen seem to be the logical explanation. Although
during his administration Lencinas had severed his
former warm ties with the President, he was regarded by
the press as a fervent supporter of the "Causa" and an
old-time friend of the President. The Yrigoyen-Cantoni
relationship, however, had never been so close and, in
fact, Cantoni had been at odds with the traditional
wing of the UCR in San Juan which professed total
loyalty to Yrigoyen.
Cantoni, therefore, was not treated in the press as
an "Yrigoyenist" as Lencinas had been, but quite the
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opposite for he had faced the President head on by openly
confronting Jones' rule in San Juan. Accordingly, the
conservative and liberal papers in Buenos Aires and the
Cuyo softened the rough edges of Cantoni's behavior,
because in spite of his excesses, his actions served the
important purpose of condemning Yrigoyen's rule. Los
^^^Qs provided an example of this attitude when
referring to the April 1922 elections which took place
after the events of the Rinconada, it praised the
Bloquist electoral success as a proof that the people
were against the absolutism exerted from above. -^^ And a
few months later, La Prensa referred to Bloquism as a
"democratic force. "^"^
Meanwhile, Interventor Bello successfully blocked
any judicial action intended to obtain the release of
Federico Cantoni. When a judge ordered it on the grounds
that Cantoni was protected by legislative i'lhmunity and
was not caught in. fraganti in any wrongdoing, as stated
in the constitution, Bello ordered the police not to
obey the judicial ruling. When the same judge complained
about this to the Provincial Supreme Court, its president,
who had been appointed without the approval of the Senate,
^^Los Andes, April 11, 1922.
^•^La Prensa, September 4, 1922.
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ordered the complaint to be filed.
Undiscouraged by these official actions, Aldo Cantoni
kept the Bloquists throughout the province constantly
agitating for the release of the prisoners. At the same
time he took care of the medical duties of his brothers
Federico and Elio. It was not difficult for Aldo to rally
popular support for his two imprisoned brothers. Both
Pederico and Elio enjoyed considerable prestige with the
people, for their profession had put them in daily
contact with the less fortunate segments of the population,
and as a general rule they had not charged any fees to
indigent people, but provided them with medicine and even
with money. A special correspondent of Los Andes stated
that in San Juan there were countless followers of Cantoni
who would offer their lives to defend him.^^ There seems
little doubt that the people whom the Cantoni brothers
had assisted professionally felt obligated to them, and
that their sense of gratitude far outweighed any
reservations they might have had for their part in the
Rinconada.
The first test of the popularity of the Bloquists
^^Ibid., June 2, 1922.
^^Ibid. , December 2, 1921. See the special comment
on the professional activities of both Federico and Elio
Cantoni
.
•^"^Los Andes, November 29, 1921.
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after Joqgs' death, took place a the elections held in
April 1922. Revealing their growing political alliance
with the masses, they were able to defeat both the
Yrigoyenists and the conservatives.^^ The counting of
the ballots, however, did not resolve the controversy
for in Congress Yrigoyenist members, whether in
discussions of Bloquist credentials or in other debates,
permanently reminded the latter of their shortcomings.
Indeed, down until 1930 the assassination of Jones was a
constant note in the polemic and the Yrigoyenists labeled
their rivals, in the words of one deputy, as a mafia
devoid of humanitarian feelings. -^^
Meanwhile, the judicial process of the Rinconada, in
the hands of the Yrigoyenist court, was moving forward.
On October 10, 1922, two days before Yrigoyen ended his
term, the prosecutor demanded a sentence of life
imprisonment for Federico Cantoni, as the "moral author"
of the crime, for having planned it, selected the men to
do it, supplied the weapons and "having exerted spiritual
75
^^The electoral returns were as follows: UCR
Bloquista 7,240 votes; UCR 5,685, and Concentracion Civica
5,461. Diario Nuevo (San Juan), January 4, 1923. The
personal nature of this civic confrontation between
Bloquists and Yrigoyenists was also evident in the ballots
themselves, in what can be termed "the battle of the
pictures." The former showed the pictures of Leandro N.
Alem and Pederico Cantoni and a five-point star, their
symbolic mark. The latter' s ballot carried the picture of
Alem, Yrigoyen and Jones.
36Diputados
,
1922, I, 121 (May 12).
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influence over the weak minds of other people." The
prosecutor demanded a 20-year sentence for Elio
Cantoni . ^'^
The inauguration of Marcelo T. de Alvear as
President introduced a new factor in the relations
between the national government and the political
situation in San Juan. From the time Bello became
commissioner in December 1921, he had merely perpetuated
the Personalist rule in San Juan and President Yrigoyen
did not have any visible intention to normalize the
TO
situation. Bello returned to San Juan after Alvear'
s
inauguration, and this led La Epoca to affirm that the
commissioner's trip proved the continuity between the
previous and the present administration, for Alvear was
following in Yrigoyen' s steps. But La Epoca was
entertaining a wrong notion. The Minister of the
Interior, Jose Nicolas Matienzo, provided the new
administration with quite a different political
approach. As a strict believer in the supremacy of the
^'''La Prensa, October 11, 1922.
^^In this respect, the province of San Luis
provided the most ominous example of Yrigoyen' s intent,
Although federal intervention began in April 1919, at
the end of Yrigoyen' s term, three years and a half
later, San Luis still continued under the federal
tutelage.
^^La Epoca , November 4, 1922.
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constitution, Matienzo, nine days after Alvear took office,
instructed Bello in firm and unmistakeable terms that San
Juan had to regain at the earliest possible time its full
constitutional control.
The drastic change in the attitude of the national
government was also reflected in the decision of Minister
Matienzo that the coming elections for governor of San
Juan, finally scheduled for January 14, 1923, should be
held under the control of a Federal Electoral Board. Bello
had argued that the intervention law required that the
provincial norms should be applied and that the board
should be a provincial one. The significance of this issue
was that if Bello* s contention was accepted, the electoral
judges would be those appointed by the Yrigoyenists. Vexed
by Matienzo' s decision, Bello resigned on December 8, and,
without waiting for his replacement, hurriedly left the
province. His rule as Federal Commissioner had begun under
painful conditions; it ended as badly as it had begun.
Soon thereafter Alvear appointed Manuel Carlos to replace
Bello, and finally the electoral phase began in earnest.
The first experiment with a Radical government in San
Juan had ended tragically because of the profound division
in the party ranks. Now, for the first time, one of the
factions, the Union Civica Radical Bloquista, emerged as a
strong political force with extensive grass roots support,
^^La Prensa, October 22, 1922.
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trying to assert electorally the power of its numerical
strength.
By the end of December each party had determined its
course of action. The Yrigoyenists decided to abstain from
the election since they were left with few friends once
Bello had been swept from power. The conservatives
proclaimed Duilio Graffigna and Alberto Vidart as their
candidates. Graffigna has been the most prominent name in
the industrial circles of the province. Thus, the fact
that the most powerful bodeguero headed the conservative
ticket helped to imprint Bloquist propaganda with a heavy
anti-oligarchical overtone.
On December 26, the convention of the UCR Bloquista
proclaimed the candidacies of Federico Cantoni and Juan
Estrella.^"'' The electoral campaign in San Juan had a
strong populist flavor, similar to that in Mendoza in
1918 when Jose Nestor Lencinas was running for governor.
But unlike that campaign, in which there was a clear-cut
Cantoni had been regarded as a candidate for a
long time. In fact, even in the April 1922 elections, when
Cantoni was in jail, there were posters bearing his face
throughout San Juan stating: "The eyes of the martyr
contemplate you. Vote for the UCR Bloquista." La Epoca ,
March 22, 1922.
^^A special report by a Los Andes correspondent,
stated that Dr. Cantoni "es hoy lo^que fue el Dr. Jose
Nestor Lencinas antes de su eleccion, un idolo lleno de
sugestiones de bien; una promesa acariciante. . . es el
representante mas genuine de la masa popular...."
January 16, 1923.
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alteraative between the candidates of the Regimen and the
Causa, in San Juan the Bloquists not only had to face the
traditional provincial oligarchy, but also the vindictive
Yrigoyenists Radicals, who were now more than ever ready
to make a pact with the devil himself if it meant the
destruction of Federico Cantoni.
The candidacy of Cantoni, a man who was facing the
possibility of spending his life in prison for Jones-
assassination, inflamed the Yrigoyenists. La Epoca
criticized Cantoni stating that it was a disgrace to
allow the moral author of such a crime to become a
candidate for the highest provincial office/^ What La
SpQca termed a criminal act, however, was for the
Bloquists an act of patriotism. Irreconcilable
viewpoints'.
The Yrigoyenists recommended that their supporters
vote for Graffigna, because he offered "order, security
and tranquility" in contrast to the hecatomb they feared
would certainly occur under Cantoni. In view of the
political agitation he was directing from his cell, they
wondered how Commissioner Carles could allow Cantoni to
convert his jail into the party headquarters. This was
not an overstatement on the part of the Yrigoyenists,
for Cantoni was engaged in intense political activity.
^^La Epoca , January 6, 1923.
297
in fact, he issued the party- s program-manifesto from the
jail.
This document, despite its origins or perhaps
because of them, set forth the most advanced ideas
expressed by any Radical group anywhere in the country
to that time. It offered an innovative program in all
aspects of provincial life, assigning to the State a very
prominent role, especially as concerned social legislation
and public works. The more important principles were:
amnesty for political prisoners; proportional
representation for legislative and municipal bodies; the
direct election of National Senators; political rights
for women; 8-hour maximum workday and minimum wage;
protection for pregnant women; free medical attention in
the capital and the departments; a campaign against
gambling, vagrancy and alcoholism; reform of the tax
system; priority for irrigation works and for worker
housing; transformation of the Provincial Bank into a
semi-private institution; extensive public works and
simplification of the bureaucratic apparatus. These
principles were quite a departure from what was the
traditional role of the government in the provinces, and
the nation as well. This program is evidence that
Provincia de San Juan, Mensaje de S.E. el Sr .
Gobernador de la Provincia Dr . Federico Cantoni TSan
Juan, 1923), pp. 5-9.
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Bloquism, at least in theory, was oriented toward reforms
far more advanced than those advocated by national
Radicalism.
The electoral campaign was virtually monopolized by
the Bloquists/^ Their speakers proclaimed in every
corner of the province that it was imperative that they
win the election so that Cantoni could be liberated. This
made a great impact on many people who viewed Cantoni as
a doctor of the poor and helper of the needy and not as a
political criminal. Indeed, the profession of the three
Cantoni brothers was very useful to them in a popular
campaign. More than mere political leaders, they were
considered by the masses as "humanitarian saviors." The
authority which was theirs as doctors was transferred to
the political situation, and they won as politicians the
aura of confidence and respect which they had as doctors.
Moreover, as the election day approached there was a
growing rumor that even if Cantoni did not win the
election, the "people" of San Juan would prove its
strength of character and energy by liberating the
political prisoners.
^They introduced popular entertainment as part
of their political campaign, shov/ing movies between
speeches. Jose P. Gallardo, Definicion doctrinaria del
bloquismo san.juanino (Rosario, 1932; , pp. 17-1^.
46 Critica, January 9, 1923.
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The electoral battle in San Juan echoed in Buenos
Aires. The porteno press devoted
.uch space and attention
to the events in that province. Under normal
circumstances, political and economic interest in the
affairs of San Juan would be very modest in comparison
with other provinces, but Jones' assassination and the
dramatic popular rise of Federico Cantoni gave to the
Sanjuanino dilemma an extraordinary relevance.
The positions taken by the leading newspapers
projected their views of the provincial situation on the
wider screen of national politics. La Nacion and La
Prensa, always moderate, indicated a somewhat benevolent
opinion toward Cantoni because of his singular resistance
to the personalist policy of former President Yrigoyen.
Both papers refrained from referring directly to the
affair of the Rinconada, but blamed the "political
regeneration" policy of Yrigoyen for the abuses
committed in San Juan by Governor Jones.
Critica, an anti-Irigoyen newspaper, widely read by
the popular sectors, became the supporter of Bloquism in
the Pederal Capital. Critica ' s special correspondent in
San Juan, Jose P. Barreiro, wrote juicy notes strongly
tinted with populist overtones, which served to stir up
fervor in Buenos Aires for Cantoni 's candidacy. The
prominent attention given by Critica to the election in
San Juan brought the campaign to the concern of thousands
in Buenos Aires. In one of his reports from San Juan,
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Barreiro termed Bloquism a "party for a class, anti-
capitalistic above anything else."'^'^ Graffigna, the
conservative candidate was characterized as the
representative of 360,000 casks of wine, but not as the
representative of the people. This could only result,
Critica claimed, in a government of bodegueros for the
bodegueros. In this black-and-white type evaluation, the
provincial alternative was presented as one of choosing
between the oligarchy and the people, with the
connotations that each term conveyed to the masses.
Critica stated in brief, if in uncritical and simplistic
words: "the struggle is polarized between the bordalesas
and the Bloquism."^ Moreover, seeking to grant
respectability to the incident that ended Jones' days,
Cantoni was referred to as "the chief of the events of
the Rinconada. "^^
The people who gathered at the Cantonist rallies in
San Juan were overv/helmingly of humble extraction. The
fact that they frequently came from far away indicates
the attraction exerted among the masses by Cantoni'
s
aura as defender of the poor. Barreiro wrote in Cri ti ca
that the wishes of the Bloquist leader were a
47Ibid. , December 23, 1922.
"^^Ibid.
,
January 3, 1923.
49Ibid.
,
January 6, 1923.
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commanding order to his followers, for they felt for him
almost an idolatry, "to the extreme that many religious
women placed Cantoni's picture together with those of
the saints of their devotion." Barreiro added that it
was frequent to find "in the ranches of the interior of
the province the picture of Federico Cantoni side by
side with that of Saint Anthony or San Vicente de
Paul."^^
The vigorous campaig-n waged by Critica in behalf
of the Bloquism emphasized that more than an ordinary
election was involved; it would be a revolution in the
ballot boxes. The newspaper recalled in its columns
some of the traditional methods which the patrones had
used for years to influence the way their peons voted.
But the Bloquists seemed assured that although nothing
appeared changed on the surface, the people this time
would know how to behave when casting their votes. As
Critica noted:
On election day the peasants
—
chinada—will
have money, will eat and drink well and will
get a ride to the voting place at the expense
of the charitable Concentracion Civica...the
chinada is too wise as to allow itself to be
bribed with fifteen pesos, a liter of cheap
wine and two or three meat pies
—
empanadas .
The chinada will accept all that, but in the
dark room they will remember Cantoni...Pl
50ibid.
^^Ibid
. ,
January 7, 1923. The term chino and
chinada refers to the lower class citizen of non-
urban areas.
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Judging the campaign from another facet of the
political prism, La ^oca considered Cantoni's exaltation
to be the glorification of crime. It felt it was
appalling to see the Bloquist candidate did not show any
repentance after the event of the Rinconada and, in fact,
that his electoral success could result in his getting
out of jail with impunity. La Epoca wrote that it was
inconceivable that such a criminal might not only be
spared the legal punishment he deserved, but had already
been elevated to the dignity of a candidate to the
governorship .
^
Cantoni had represented the Radicals of San Juan
when the Lencinists held important meetings in Mendoza.
He acknowledged with pride that Jose Nestor Lencinas was
his political guide. This close ideological association
between Lencinists and Bloquists provoked fear among
those in San Juan who were opposed to the Mendozan
regime and its populist political style. They were afraid
that the administrative and financial disorder of the
governments of Jose Nestor and Carlos Washington Lencinas
might be duplicated in San Juan. Hence, the opposition
^^La Epoca , December 29, 1922.
^heightening the fears of the anti-Bloquists,
many Lencinists travelled to San Juan, with provocative
intentions, to participate in the campaign. But
Interventor Carles sent them back to Mendoza, at once.
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to the Bloquists was very strong among the propertied
elements, especially those of the wine industry.
The propaganda of the Concentracion Civica was
mostly devoted to raising an alarm about the possibility
of a Bloquist government. They recalled to the electorate
the excesses of Lencinism, and especially those
committed against the workers who had disagreed with
Lencinas. The conservatives added, with candor or malice,
that Lencinism was the enemy of the working class and
that following in its steps, the Bloquists were really
wolves disguised in sheep's clothing.
Diario Nuevo
,
the leading voice of the conservatives
in San Juan, claimed that the Bloquist program was
deceitful because the workers did not owe anything to
Cantoni, and that poor people had always earned good
salaries and found enough jobs.-^^ They were especially
critical of the massive propaganda energetically directed
among the v/orkers and campesinos by Aldo Cantoni. They
considered a substantial raise in all taxes, which they
would bear almost exclusively, as the major threat from
Cantoni 's program. They viewed Aide's unremittingly
campaign as machinations of a dissolvent propagandist of
International Communism. Expressing the fears and
^"^La Prensa , January 9, 1923.
^^Diario Nuevo, January 11, 1923.
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anxieties of the propertied groups, Dlar^o Nuevo commented
that the Bloquists intentionally sought to pit one class
against another, trying to break the harmony between
capital and labor, because by
fostering the low passions of the vile elements,
they seek to conciliate the Utopias of a
senseless Communism with the coarse ambitions of
people from the coraites, which look at the
government as spoils of war..., 56
The conservatives believed that if the Cantonists
attained power, this would constitute a threat to social
peace in the province. To prevent this calamity, Diario
Nuevo alerted its readers as would a commander in the
battlefield, reminding them that the Marseillaise had
always been a "hymn on the lips of the oppressed," and
exhorted them:
Aux armes, citoyens I To the good Sanjuaninos,
to those who sincerely wish their land free
and prosper, to the workingmen who have civic
dignity and a moral conscience, and aspire to
extol their material well-being by their own
intelligent effort. ... 57
This, in a nutshell, was the prevalent political
philosophy of the conservatives. In their view, the
electoral process was pitting noble men against ignoble
men, as if on the one side were decent people imbued
with the ethical values of self-discipline and masters
of their own effort, and on the other, social agitators.
^^Ibid
. ,
January 13, 1923.
^'^Ibid.
,
January 14, 1923.
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depraved and ignorant men, who aspired to live in a
society mediocrely leveled from below rather than
judiciously improved from above. The predicament for the
electorate, as it was posed by the conservatives, was
one of the utmost significance, because the crux of the
matter was to choose between justice or crime, order or
anarchy. Moreover, to protect the interests of the class
it represented, the Goncentracion Civica proclaimed
itself "the traditional party of our democracy," which
raised "the flag of law and order.... "^^
To counterattack the conservative version of what
Bloquism represented, the Cantonists tried to enhance
their image by reiterating that theirs was an organic
movement, based on sound political and institutional
principles. In a declaration issued at the close of the
campaign, they asserted that victory was in their hands
"because we sustain principles of sound government and
civilized ideals," and they affirmed that they would
redeem the province with "respeto y orden."-^^
The Bloquists flooded the province with
^^Ibid.
^^La Prensa
,
January 14, 1923. A few days before
the election the independent newspaper of San Juan
Debates (January 10, 1923), interviewed Cantoni in jail,
where the candidate stated his confidence in the outcome
of the elections, especially because it would not be
"el resultado de la dadiva que deprime ni del hartazgo
de bestializar, ni de la inconsecuencia de la
borrachera.
"
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propaganda and posters eulogizing. Cantoni
. One of them
was a large red heart with the words "In the heart of the
people there is only one man: Cantoni." Another showed
him, with an inquisitorial look, stating: "The eyes of
the martyr of the democracy are looking at you from
jail." Another poster prepared by Ramon Columba displayed
Cantoni behind bars with this epigraph: "The people who
love Federico Cantoni, defender of the freedom of San
Juan, won't allow him to remain in jail and will place
him in the government house. "^^ Meanwhile, in contrast
to this display of confidence, the candidate of the
Concentracion Civica admitted that, at best, his party
could win in three or four departments, out of a total
of eighteen.
On election day, Sunday, January 14, 1923, the
ballot boxes amply ratified the great popularity of
Federico Cantoni. The Bloquists won all over the
6 ?province, except Jachal and Valle Fertil. What many
^^Critica, January 9, 1923.
^•^La Prensa
,
January 13 » 1923.
The UCR Bloquista received 12,042 votes against
8,119 for the Concentracion Civica. Ibid . , January 18,
1923. The election return at the Rinconada, the little
tovm where fourteen months before Jones had been
assassinated, gave the Bloquistas 218 votes against 96
for the conservatives. Ibid . , January 17, 1923. Once
the electoral phase was completed, Interventor Carles
ended his mission and placed the province in temporary
charge of Deputy Governor Castro.
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had hoped and what many had feared had finally happened:
Federico Cantoni, the rebel politician who one day led
his men against Governor Jones, was now ready to change
his status from that of a man almost ready to he
sentenced to imprisonment for life to that of the newly-
elected governor of the province. The distance of a
single block between the jail house and the government
house had never had such a strange symbolismi A little
over three years before, when Yrigoyen intervened in
San Juan for the first time, Cantoni had been greeted
upon his arrival from Mendoza with hails for the
"radicales de alpargata," and for the "gaucho
Lencinas. "^-^ Now, San Juan's "chusma de alpargata"
had elevated Cantoni to the height once attained by
his revered Mendozan leader. More than a year in jail
had created for Cantoni a new public image. He was now
not only the good doctor in the minds of the easily
suggesti enable masses, but to most of his followers he
was also a martyr, a man who had risked his life
fighting against Jones' tyranny.
Four days after the election, the only member of
the Supreme Court who had been duly elected, ordered
the release of Federico Cantoni. The emotion of his
followers was already noticeable in the jail and the
^^La Prensa, November 26, 1919.
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popular joy spread into the street. He had to seek
refuge in the legislature to avoid the effusion of the
masses. Later, when he addressed the people gathered in
the Plaza 25 de Mayo, Cantoni stated that his government
would be one of open doors. He asked the people to keep
a vigilant eye upon the Bloquists and warned that he
would be inflexible with dishonest officials. Expanding
his views beyond matters of local concern, and entering
into what might be called his political thoughts,
Cantoni referred to what he considered the true
meaning of fatherland. Por him, "the fatherland of
showy little flags" was a vain word. Instead, its real
meaning was the welfare of its people, its good health,
hard and honest work properly remunerated; in sum, he
said, the happiness of the person who works, not the
spirit of the drone. As for his political enemies, he
stated harshly that they were "sick people who must be
secluded in asylums." Thus, while Cantoni appealed to
work as a creative source of the well-being of the
individual as well as the society and assigned a sense
of responsibility and duty to the concept of fatherland,
he was unequivocally scornful of his opponents, and
showed his reluctance to abide by the rules of any
political compromise.
^^Los Andes, January 20, 1923; La Prensa ,
January 20, 1923.
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Cantoni's words did not ease
-the fears of his
adversaries. On the contrary, only a few days later
Cantoni deepened the apprehensions of the industrial and
commercial sectors of the province. At a meeting held at
the legislature, attended by bodegueros, virlateros,
workers and bureaucrats, among others, Cantoni accused
the industrialists of laying off many workers in revenge
for his electoral success. The bodegueros rejected the
charge but touched off a kind of verbal warfare between
them and the workers, with the laborers noisily and
enthusiastically supporting the fiery warnings made by
65Cantoni. Hardly a conciliatory beginning. Then, as if
further evidence were needed to demonstrate Bloquist
political power, at the end of January the legislature
elected Aldo Cantoni National Senator.
But more was in the making by the provincial
lawmakers. In the already tropical summer of San Juan,
the Bloquist-controlled legislature added more heat to
the political situation. On February 22, in accordance
with the promises made during the campaign, it
approved an Amnesty Law for all those involved in the
incident that caused the death of Governor Jones, on
the grounds that it had been an act of sedition,
^^La Prensa, January 27, 1923.
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strictly political.
It was time of vindication for the Bloquists, who
praised the men of the Rinconada as heroes. Aldo Cantoni
stated in the Provincial Senate that they were seeking
the amnesty
not as an act of pardon or grace toward
political prisoners, but as an act of perfectjustice for those who have sacrificed their
tranquility and personal freedom, and even
risked their own lives to free San Juan from
the evils of tyranny. 67
Castro, the acting Governor, vetoed the Amnesty
Bill stating that the case was under consideration by
the Judiciary and that it alone had the authority to
pass a judgment. His veto had only the value of a
protest however, for the legislature easily overrode it. 68
66Eventually, the Bloquists initiated a new
judicial expendiente
,
totally justifying their action at
the Rinconada. Fearing its future "disappearance," the
original expediente was copied by Interventor Bello and
placed in the hands of the national Radical authorities.
Today, neither expediente exist in San Juan archives.
67 'La Epoca , March 14, 1923. A few days earlier
Pederioo Cantoni expressed the same viev/s to his
supporters, thanking them for believing that the
Rinconada was "something other than a repulsive crime."
La Prensa, March 8, 1923.
6ft
Castro had replied to the legislature on March
12 that because of the uniqueness of the case, he could
not sign the Amnesty Bill until the National Government
and Congress had resolved what to do. The Minister of
the Interior quickly and properly informed Castro that
his view was a judicial nonsense.
On March 7, when the Provincial Chamber of
Deputies rejected Castro's veto, the Bloquist Carlos
Valenzuela praised Federico Cantoni for being the only
politician in Argentina "que habla quebrado la prepoten-
cia de Yrigoyen." Legislatura de San Juan, Camara de
Diputados, Actas, libro No. 376, p. 23.
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The enactment of the Amnesty Law was the final blow.
The Jones' case was completely closed before any judicial
decision had been rendered. Whether assassins or political
revolutionaries, those who had planned and participated
in the Rinconada did not have to fear any further legal
action. Cantoni had spoken grave words before Jones was
assassinated, and he spoke with the same severity after
being released from jail. The Yrigoyenist Radicals
predicted the proximity of the storm and demanded early
in March a new intervention by the Federal Government.
This request was an extraordinary one in a situation
marked all along by unusual events. The Yrigoyenists
, in
theory, were asking something very strange: that the
Federal Government declare that it did not consent that
the duly elected authorities of San Juan assume power.
This may well be the only case in Argentine institutional
history in which intervention was demanded in the
affairs of a province before its new officials were
installed. However, there was a rationale for this
attitude no matter how strange it might have been. The
anti-Cantonists had a great fear of Cantoni and the
Bloquists, fear of what they called the "gauchocracia
go
atropelladora. " ^ The resoluteness shown by Cantoni in
previous incidents had proven that he was not a paper
^^La Epoca , March 11, 1923.
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tiger. What would come next, the anti-Cantonists
wondered, once Cantoni was sworn in as governor?
In an interview held in Buenos Aires on March 18,
Cantoni justified his position once again and outlined
the role and philosophy of the Union Civica Radical
Bloquista. He pointed out that the electoral plank had
specifically listed as its first priority amnesty for all
political prisoners involved at the Rinconada. If the
people of San Juan, well aware of this fundamental
principle of the Bloquist program, had voted
overwhelmingly for him, then it was reasonable to
interpret that the people also voted for an amnesty law.
Turning to his own interpretation of the role of
Bloquism and its ideological position as a branch of
national Radicalism, Cantoni observed that
our Radicalism is not like any other Radicalism
in the nation, which does not have any program
or a specific political goal. Neither is our
party the leftist movement which provoked so
many comments from easily frightened
individuals. To ask that the workers of the
wine industry in San Juan earn a salary of 3
pesos per day instead of 1,50 is not a
demonstration of a Bolshevik tendency, much
less when it is considered that an hectare of
vineyard yields from 3»000 to 4,000 pesos.
Cantoni stressed that the UCR Bloquista had clearly
defined its principles and goals, and that to implement
them he was committed to being the governor of the
^ 70
province and not the boss of a party.
'^^La Nacion, March 19, 1923.
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But before beco.iag the ruler of all the Sanjuaainos,
Cantoni had to surmount still another challenge. Acting
Governor Castro declared that the date for the
installation of the new government should be July 9, that
is, exactly three years after Jones began his term in
1920, and not May 12, as the Bloquist legislature
contended. This became a major issue sparking once again
high emotions in the opposing sectors. The date as such
did not have a great significance, but each side tried to
demonstrate its power by forcing the other to accept its
installation date.'^-^
On May 12, the day on which the government should
have changed hands, Castro remained in control of the
capital. Cantoni had moved to the neighboring town of
Concepcion, a few miles from the capital, where in its
City Hall he was sworn in as governor before the
legislators. He then stated that he was ready to enter
San Juan with 3,000 men and take it by force, if
necessary. On the brink of such an encounter. President
Alvear declared that Cantoni was the legal ruler of the
province, thereby bringing the threatened conflict to
71 'La Epoca advised Castro not to let the new
government be installed in May, no matter what
consequences followed. Whether it provoked a federal
intervention, as the Yrigoyenists wished, or a major
commotion, the important fact was not to surrender power
before July 9. furthermore, the Yrigoyenist paper labeled
Cantoni an anti-governor and termed his ascendancy to
pov/er the triumph of barbarism over civilization. May
12, 13, 1923.
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an end.
Upon entering San Juan to start his government,
Cantoni, in a conciliatory mood, declared that all should
"put the past away... Trying to dispel the growing fears
of the traditional sectors, he affirmed that he would
prove how a government can legislate for the working
Class without being Communistic. He recommended to all
the people that they go back to work, each with his own
tools, a hoe, a plow, or a pen, so that all together
could transform San Juan from being a province exploited
by bad governments into a prosperous land."^^
But although both sides had apparently lowered
their arms and the threat of warfare dissipated after
the presidential order, the deep and bitter animosities
between Bloquists and anti-Bloquists remained as intense
as before.
Before turning to examine the first Bloquist
government it might be well to assess the political and
moral climate that led to Cantoni' s election, as well as
the responsibility for the violence displayed.
Halfway through his presidential term, Yrigoyen had
decreed the "political regeneration" of San Juan. But
three federal interventions in as many years proved the
sterility of his policy and his efforts. Contrary to
^^La Prensa, May 14, 1923.
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what happened in Mendoza as result of Yrigoyen- s I917
intervention, the Sanjuanino Radicals were badly split
and Jones' nomination as a compromise gubernatorial
candidate reflected this division. Unfortunately, Jone.
understood little of what political compromise meant.
But the fact that he failed to carry out some of his
duties in accordance with the law and was unable to
achieve a workable harmony among the local Radical
groups was not entirely his own fault. He was not a
politician and his profession had not trained him in
the artful maneuvering of give and take. Indeed, those
who erred most were Yrigoyen and the Radicals of San
Juan who selected Jones, for although the governor
behaved in an authoritarian fashion, he believed in his
righteousness up until the very moment of his
assassination.
It seems reasonable to conclude that when Jones
took the grave actions which raised general protest,
Yrigoyen shrank from squarely facing the problems
created by the man for whose selection he was mostly
responsible. He had a unique opportunity to clip the
wings of the controversial governor through two federal
interventions. In both instances the President
preferred to adhere to the principles of party loyalty,
first by suddenly terminating the Escobar intervention,
whose decrees aimed at restraining the excesses of
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Govertior Jones, and secondly, by procrastination in not
implementing the second intervention voted by Congress.
At any rate, Yrigoyen's position did not allow for any
fact other than that Jones was entirely right and his
opponents entirely wrong.
Apparently, Yrigoyen took any criticism against
Jones as criticism leveled against himself, and thus he
defended the authority of the governor as he defended his
own. His adversaries argued that he could have avoided
Jones' death if he had complied within a reasonable
time in instituting the intervention voted by Congress
in September 1921, for the unnecessary delay caused more
exacerbation in Jones' opponents. Although this seems a
plausible argument, this action might only have
postponed Jones' fall because both sides were frantically
intransigent.
The governor considered himself to be not only a
good governor, but an exceptional one, and rejected any
compromise. But Jones' opponents were not blameless.
Professing to correct the wrongdoings of the other side,
both parties acted illegally. Both considered their
actions as defensive in nature, neither side ever
admitted to being wrong. In the process, justice was
ill-served, federalism continued to be a dead principle,
political accommodation was unknown, and tolerance was
viewed as cowardice. Since Jones had the upper hand
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because of the protection he received from the federal
army, the Bloquists, although they were the largest
faction of the Radical Party, felt irremissibly left out
and reacted like desperados.
Whatever they had planned, the kidnapping or the
assassination of the governor, they shouldered the burden
of a deplorable act. It can be speculated that time was
on the side of the Bloquists. Jones could not be
reelected, his term would have ended on July 9, 1923.
More importantly yet, Yrigoyen could not have reelected
either, and his successor would have been installed in
the Casa Rosada by October 12, 1922. These dates did not
mean an instant solution to the grievances of the
Bloquists, but certainly they offered hope for an end
to the authoritarian rule of Governor Jones and the
political hassles he provoked. Why did not they await
the outcome of these timed events and avoid the blemish
of a despicable human sacrifice?
It appears that political hatred was too deeply
ingrained to be effectively controlled. The high emotions
of the Cantonists who had decided to face any risk
provided that Jones was removed from the political scene,
left no room for alternatives. Thus, inevitably, Jones'
elimination became the original sin of Bloquism.
Reviewing the history of those turbulent times
leading up to the beginning of Cantoni's government, the
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most significant achievement of the Bloquist movement was
the inspiration of a new sense of class solidarity among
the lower segments. The poor, illiterate campesino could
not understand the meaning of "Aux armes, CitoyensV" but
he could follow every word from Cantoni when he promised
a minimum wage, an 8-hour day, and the taxation of the
wealthy few to alleviate the necessities of the deprived
73many
.
Because of the political conditions in San Juan,
where the conservatives had ruled for so long, Cantoni 's
personality and program galvanized the poor and frightened
the well-to-do. He polarized the politics of this hitherto
quite province by kindling the hopes of the common man
which in turn frightened the local elite. As it was under
the Lencinas in Mendoza, the involvement of the masses
with Cantoni was emotional, not ideological, folkloric,
not doctrinaire, as if imbued with the fervor of a Bible
belt revivalism. Although Cantoni did not promise to
convert San Juan into a Socialist province, but only to
balance the existing inequalities, he could not avoid
provoking a political confrontation because of the strong
class overtones of his social program. For in January
^^According to the 1912 provincial census, there
was in San Juan 43.2 per cent illiteracy, ranging from
32.5 per cent in the capital to 75.7 per cent in the remote
department of Iglesia, in the northwest corner of the
province. San Juan, Segundo censo general de la provincia
de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1910-1912), p. TT. Alejandro £.
Bunge stated that according to the electoral records,
empadronados , in 1916 there was in San Juan 45.6 per cent
illiterates. La Nacion, July 13, 1939.
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1923, revealed the forcefulness and determination of
Federico Cantoni. They attested to his temperamental,
obdurate, and redoubtable personality. Such was the
image the "gringo- Cantoni had in the eyes of thousands
of Sanjuaninos when he moved from the jail to the
government house to begin the first populist
experiment in San Juan. His political ascendancy has
no parallel in the history of the provincial caudillos
in twentieth century Argentina.
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CHAPTER IX
PELERICO CANTONI
AND THE PIRST BLOQUIST GOVERNT.:eNT
Pederico Cantoni, in the best tradition of the
provincial caudillos, embodied the soul of Bioquism. He
was the leader who had taken the major steps in
consolidating the movement: he had severed its ties with
the established UCR in the province, he was responsible
for the event of the Rinconada, and he provided the
party with an unprecedented socially-oriented reformist
program. However, Cantoni tried to portray his movement
as being one dependent upon principles. In consonance
with this view, his basic instruments for action were
the party, the UCR Bloquist, and its program, which he
had outlined when he was in Jail. In spite of his out-
and-out command over the Bloquist conglomerate, he
persistently alluded to the goals of the party, for he
believed that an institutionalized Bioquism could
achieve its reformist objectives without falling into
the excessive personalism he had condemned in former
President Yrigoyen.
Despite Cantoni' s pretense of subordination to an
impersonal organization, he was in reality the symbol
and substance of his regional movement. He not only
set the tempo of its populist drive, but by his own
conduct set the example to be observed by all his
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followers. As a logical corollary of this personalist
vertical structure, those who challenged his leadership
from within found themselves out of the movement. Thus,
notwithstanding Cantoni's efforts to "institutionalize"
it, Bloquism and Cantonism shared the same political
identity and ideological foundation.
The social question awakened by the Bloquists in
the popular sectors of the dormant environment of San
Juan, provoked in the masses a feeling of confidence and
hastened their desire for social advancement. The 1923
election had proved that the impoverished and mostly
illiterate people were ready to follow a leader who had
shown a sincere understanding of their social
degradation and an earnest preoccupation to find the
means to improve their living conditions.
Cantoni's crusade for the underdogs, as that of
Lencinas in Mendoza, was a grass roots movement, with
emotional overtones. He championed specific, down-to-
earth goals for social justice which were written into
the program of the party. But his ideals were not
infused with an intellectually-developed ideological
content. The only doctrinaire influence reached
Bloquism through Aldo Cantoni and his friends from
Buenos Aires, all militants of the political left. But
primitive San Juan was more receptive to a pragmatic
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leader than to advanced social theoreticians. A man who
served with him many years in the political field
recalls that for Cantoni there was little significan(
in the stereotypes of left, right, or center, for
Cantoni was a doer par excellence, who applied his
yardstick to appraise the needs of the Sanjuaninos.^
Therefore, political doctrines or mere lucubrations on
the social conditions were to a large extent irrelevant
to him, although, of course, his actions and his
movement represented a practical application of
innovative social theories.
Besides being a doctor-politician, Cantoni was also
a farmer at heart. As such, he was constantly advising
people to devote their energies to agricultural labor
and to bringing new land under irrigation. like a
Physiocrat, he thought that tilling the soil was the
most noble activity in life. Moreover, Cantoni set an
example for his people by rejecting gambling and
drinking, and he impressed upon the movement the quasi
Puritanism of his personal habits and the inflexibility
of his character.
Cantoni spoke to the people in simple words, in a
language dressed with popular, and sometimes, coarse
Personal interview with Dr. Eudoro Rodriguez,
who v/as a very close political friend of Federico
Cantoni during the 1930' s. July 6, 1972, San Juan.
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terms. He adorned it with acute and ingenious sent,
so typical of the men of the interior.^ Besides hi,
distinctive verbal way of communicating with people,
Cantoni had a very peculiar characteristic, for which he
also became well known later outside his province: he
dressed in a very sloppy manner, wearing slovenly suits
and filthy shirts.^ Those who collaborated with Cantoni,
of course, accepted him as he was. One of his more
severe critics in our time, however, asserted that
Cantoni deliberately "did not use either the comb or the
soap," in order to appear more like the rabble he
protected, or perhaps his slovenliness was merely a result
of his low-quality Italian style upbringing."^
This was the man who many believed would bring
social justice to San Juan by narrowing the gap between
2Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro, who was
Undersecretary of Government during the governorship of
Pederico Cantoni and Secretary of Government during the
governorship of Aldo Cantoni (1926-1928). Buenos Aires,
May 16, 1972. Barreiro was a young correspondent for
Critica
,
the Buenos Aires newspaper, when he joined
the Bloquists. He fulfilled the intellectual side of
Bloquism, not only for his editorial v/riting in San Juan's
La Reforraa, the voice of Bloquism, but for the writing
of documents and statements.
^In a humorous way, one of Cantoni' s friends once
stated that the caudillo bought his new suits with stains
already on them. Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro.
^Personal interview with the Sanjuanino historian
Emilio Ivlaurin Navarro, son of one of the bitter foes of
Cantoni. San Juan, July 3> 1972.
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the rich and the poor, while others thought that he would
transform the province into Dante's hell with his Con>munist
ideas.
Cantoni, like Carlos Washington Lencinas in Mendoza,
was 33 years old when he assumed power. His figure was
tall and imposing. Strong and solidly built, he had a
round, stolid-looking face; small, almost beady eyes, and
a walrus mustache. Judging him by his contemporary
photographs, his expression impresses as stern and rather
unsympathetic.
His political baptism as governor of San Juan did
not portend tranquil days. The event of the Rinconada had
shaken the provincial scene so intensely that from his first
day in office he had to face not mere political
adversaries, but unwavering enemies. These were the
Yrigoyenist Radicals and the conservatives, who neither
asked nor offered a single day's truce to the Bloquist
governments in the 1920' s. In Yrigoyenist eyes, San Juan
under Cantoni was a land of barbarians, La ^Ipoca simply
5termed that province "the country of the extraordinary.""^
The tenuous harmony betv/een the Bloquists and
conservatives when both were aligned against Jones' rule,
evanesced as soon as Cantoni became the governor-elect.
Thus, by May 1923 the province was deeply polarized, with
most of the Sanjuaninos engulfed in the political rancor
^La Epoca
,
July 18, 1923.
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between the Bloquists and anti-Bloquists.
Social Reformer, "Grite Quien Grite."
The election returns had clearly revealed that most
of the citizenry supported Cantoni and his well publicize
program of government. So, with characteristic personal
determination and aggressiveness, he began to carry out
the party's platform. Among the more important laws
enacted by the legislature were the 8-hour workday and
the minimum wage, a pioneer landmark in San Juan's social
legislation.
To reinforce the workers' support on this matter and
to indoctrinate them about its importance and proper
observance, the government sponsored the creation of the
Centre de Accion Obrera, a non-official labor branch of
Bloquism. The result of these measures was a sharper
To this effect the province was divided into two
areas, with a set minimum salary of % 3»00 per day in
the capital and surrounding departments, and S 2,50 in
the more remote areas. Cantoni by decree expanded the
schedule of the provincial employees, including working
on Saturdays. "No somos ingleses," he said, "somos
criollos, el sabado es para trabajar." La Prensa, I.'ay 20
1923.
These laws were published in a pamphlet which
was widely distributed. It informed the workers that
they did not need any kind of outside assistance in
order to contact the Department of Labor. Thereupon, the
workers were advised that in case these laws were
violated by the employers, they should simply notify the
Department of Labor or the police authorities. Provincia
de San Juan, I.linisterio de Gobierno e Instruccion Publica,
Departamento del Trabajo, Estadistica y ^Archive, Las
leyes de .jornada de 8 horas ^ salario minimo (San Juan,
1924).
326
confrontation between patrones and workers with the
governor determinedly taking a pro-worker position. The
reaction of the employers was as militant as that of the
governor. They threatened to close their business in
protest against the "Communist" Bloquist legislation,
and many did so. Cantoni, in turn, retaliated with the
same uncompromising attitude. At a special rally of the
Centre de Accion Obrera, in February 1924, he reiterated
that the first priority of the government was to satisfy
the needs of the workers, even if it meant colliding
with the interests of the capitalists. He asked the mass
of wage-earners to boycott the business which laid off
personnel, and to those out of work he announced that
the government would provide them with jobs. Leaving no
doubt as to his intentions, he restated that he would
carry out his social policy no matter "grite quien
7grite." The governor's pro-v/orker position was
reaffirmed in 1924 when he declared May 1st a provincial
holiday. The decree associated the international
celebration of the day of the workers with the success
of Bloquism in implementing social benefits for the
Sanjuanino laborers.
This stern stand of the Bloquist leader was
consistent with his avowed posture in favor of the
'^La Nacion, February 11, 1924.
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workers. His principle was illustrated by what he often
stated as his guiding rule on the subject: If the peon
is a Bloquist, the peon is right; if the patron is a
Bloquist, the peon is right; if both the peon and the
patron are Bloquists, the peon is right. ^ Corroborating
the firmness of Cantoni's policy and actions, a
contemporary observer expressed that in general, "all
"the descamisados—shirtless—improved their living
conditions, upgrading the social situation of the
province. Since Cantoni ruled San Juan, the poor were
always considered right, even at the expense of the
Q
rich men.
"
Because of the critical attitude of the government
toward the business groups, the main anti-Cantonist
force was not organized under party leadership in
traditional political fashion, but rather in a
heterogeneous association of property owners and
mercantile sectors. V/ithin the context of Sanjuanino
politics this v/as a logical alignment because the
businessmen and industrialists were forced to become
the financial pillars of the Bloquist "social
revolution." This association was established in
December 1923, under the name of League for the Defense
^Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro.
^Jose Palermo Riviello, Filipicas argentinas
(Buenos Aires, 1939), P- 524.
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of Property, Industry and Commerce of San Juan, and its
declared purpose was to protect the economic interests
of the province. Although the League claimed to be non-
partisan, its president was Juan Maurin, one of the
more influential landowners and bodegueros and a
prominent member of the conservative Liberal Party, the
former Concentracion Civica. Among the other leaders
were the Yrigoyenist National Deputy Ventura Lloveras;
the provincial Senator Eudolio Lopez, who had been
expelled from the Bloquism; the former conservative
National Deputy Juan P. Tierney, the leader of the
Progressive Democratic Party in San Juan, Ventura
Larrosa, and Domingo Elizondo, one of the directors of
Diario Nuevo. The League was in fact a political block
composed of all the segments of the anti-Bloquist
spectrum. It was as passionately anti-Cantonist as
the Cantonists were fiercely anti-Leaguers. Their
viewpoints v/ere totally uncongenial, the men of the
League believed that Bloquism represented evil
Communism, while the Cantonists considered those who
formed this mercantile-political melange as "exploiters
of the people."
The disciple of Jose Nestor Lencinas was opening
in San Juan a new and risk-filled path. His frank
and fiery verbal tirades against the capitalists often
provoked irate comments from the traditional sectors
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inside the province and elsewhere. The Kendozan los Andes
.er
s
asserted that the country had never experienced a rul<
so audacious and desorbitado, adding that Cantoni-
mentality was the epitome of the suburban agitator or the
demagogic caudille^-jo of long agc^^ ^ ^^^^^^ accused
him of dividing the people into antagonistic camps,
workers against capitalists, thus encouraging a class
struggle in the same fashion as was predicted by the
believers of the dangerous theories emanating from
Moscow. -^-^ The business and industrial sectors of San
Juan regarded Cantoni' s position as that of an extremist.
They resented the seeds of hatred he planted in the
labor groups by portraying the patrones as "enemies and
exploiters of the working class. ""^^
Cantoni was neither a follower nor an ideologist
of the Soviet regime, but by his words and actions he
brought to the forefront of the social scene the
problem of the disparity between the "haves" and the
"have-nots." This new approach weakened the traditional
authority of the well-to-do and led the lower sectors to
abandon their previous subservient social and political
role. What the anti-Cant onists viewed as a foreign
•^^Los Andes
,
February 12, 1924.
•^•^La Prensa , February 12, 1924.
-•^bid.
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ideological influence was in reality only a crusade for
mass rights led hy a reformer, not a revolutionary, one
whose ideas and endeavors were rooted in the region and
who had a first hand knowledge of the living conditions
of the lower groups and of their more pressing needs.
The Bloquist lahor policy stripped the conservative
class of its dominant status to the extent of placing
it in a defensive situation. La Reforma, the semi-
official newspaper in San Juan, referred to the
provincial "aristocracy" as "reactionary, religious and
traditionalist," and deplored the fact that in the past,
merely bearing a certain name entitled a person to a
special consideration, while the poor people had to
acquiesce submissively to their inferior position. To
the "respectable" families, la Reforma added, the
"chinaje" were almost non-existent, they were just like
serfs. "^"^
Not surprisingly, anti-Cantonist phobia was at the
highest level in the Club Social, the provincial refuge
of the prominent and the well-to-do. The church was
also under the influence of these sectors, not because
^"Se diviniza la alpargata," disdainfully stated
a prominent Mendozan conservative. In fact, he summed up
in these four words the whole dimension of the social
change brought by the Bloquists. Los Andes , September
16, 1923 (Article by Lucio Punes, "El drama de la
Rinconada.
"
)
^^La Reforma, August 27, 1924.
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of a direct involvement of its hierarchy against
government, but due to the resistance of the religiously-
minded upper sectors, who viewed with apprehension the
anti-clerical overtones of the Bloquist program and
propaganda.
Cantoni attempted to tear down the social barriers
which until then had separated the rich elements and the
poor ones into two totally separated worlds, by castigating
what he believed to be the arrogant social position of the
upper groups. Soon after he assumed office, Cantoni had
the opportunity to assail the ceremonial apparatus of the
elitist elements. He decided that on Hay 25, the new
anniversary of the revolution for independence, the
traditional Tedeum would not be financially supported by
15the State. Cantoni, an egalitarian at heart, contended
that it was not proper to place a national celebration
under the mantle of a Catholic ceremony
,
when, precisely
because of the freedom of worship guaranteed by the
constitution, the province should refrain from officially
favoring any specific religious creed.
The governor's anti-church position was seized on
by his foes as a basis by which to berate the "foreign,"
15 The Tedeum is a religious service, traditionally
performed nationwide to commemorate important patriotic
events. It provided some pomp for the authorities and the
church, but it never had any real meaning for the people
at large.
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"exotic-, mentality of his movement and to rally politioal
opposition against Bloquism. This was especially evident
on the occasion of the same celebration in the following
year, 1924. Since at that time the struggle between the
government and its opponents was at its peak, the anti-
Bloquists took advantage of the patriotic celebration to
rebuff strongly the social policy of the government on
behalf of the "chusma de alpargata. "^^ In a backward
province like San Juan, where the religious tradition
carried a weight among the upper sectors, Cantoni's
attitude may be considered truly revolutionary. The only
precedent for an attempt to separate the business of the
State from that of the church was in the province of
Santa Fe in 1921, when a new provincial charter embodying
that principle failed to be approved.
Besides challenging the role of the church as a
vehicle for upper class preeminence, Bloquism also
questioned the meaning generally assigned to the concept
of patria
. Here too the Cantonist approach clashed head-
on with the conventional concepts of the higher social
1 ft
Debates
,
Kay 26, 1924, reported that the Tedeum
was attended by the most "selected and distinguished"
people of San Juan, "as in the good old times," openly
rebuffing the "absurd pretension of the governor of
eliminating a traditional act." That was the occasion,
it added, to see with full splendor again "el ele£ante
traje de gala, el guante bianco y el zapato de charol,
prendas que raira con horror el oficialismo, que en un
acto de ridicule concepto personal ha trocado por el
chambergo polvoriento, el chiripa y la alpargata."
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ity-filled ritual, holding a sumptuous ball for the
Cantonist views were striking at the heart of the banal,
revered traditions of provincial life.
Perhaps the most significant social reform of the
Bloquists lay in utilizing the provincial budget as a
tool to effect a better distribution of wealth. The
magnitude of the change, when compared with previous
budgets, is illustrated by the figxires themselves: the
expenses for 1923 had been $ 2,420,000 while those for
1924, the first Bloquist budget, amounted to
$ 7,249,000. A 300 per cent increase'. "^^
Through the 1924 provincial budget the Bloquists
put in motion their program aiming at bettering the
social and economic equilibrium in the provincial
well-to-do or in attending a useless Ted eum. 18 The
17La Reforma
,
May 19, 1924.
18Ibid July 4, 1924.
Juan, 1923), n.p.
San Juan, Presupuesto general para 1924 (San
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society. The new budgetary policy of San Juan, which
placed responsibility for the welfare of its inhabitants
on the shoulders of the State, represented a pioneer
application of a system that through the decades was to
become a universal feature of modern States.
The significance of the budget was that it
substantially raised all the lower salaries while it
left almost untouched the higher ones, that it created
and extended the existing primary social services, and
planned an extensive program of public works. The monthly
salaries of the lower positions were changed as follows:
Ordenanzas (blue collar)
Supervisors (blue collar)
Office workers
Poli cemen
Firefighters
Ordenanzas (departments)
Policemen (departments)
Source: Presupuesto general para 1924
,
n.p,
Prom To
S S
70-80 100
90 120
100 130
65 95
75 95
50 95
50 95
20San Luis, another province of the Cuyo region,
offered a marked contrast with San Juan regarding the use
of the budget as a social leveler. V/hen the conservative
governor of San Luis, Alberto Arancibia Rodriguez, ended
his term in 1930, he remarked with satisfaction and as a
sign of his austerity as a ruler, that he had governed
his province with budgets always below Z 3»000,000.
Moreover, he added that he had always allocated lower
amounts than those that were authorized. Reynaldo A.
Pastor, San Luis , su gloriosa ^ callada gesta , 1810 -1967
(Buenos Aires, 1970T, p. 324. In 1928 the San Juan
budget was S 12,174,000, four times larger than San Luis
budget, although its population was only 60 per cent
larger. Thus, both Cuyano provinces illustrated the
obverse and reverse on the vital issue of the degree of
State participation through fiscal policy, in the
economic and social development of the provinces.
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The public health services were tremendously
improved. In the capital, the only existing hospital
increased its personnel from 42 to 69, and its annual
budget from $ 36,000 to 369,000. Por the first time it
provided odontological service, and free prescriptions at
an annual budget of $ 180,000. Also for the first time
nine medical centers were created in the departments to
minister directly to the poor people living far away from
the capital in a province where means of transportation
were almost non-existent.^^ Moreover, these measures were
an effective attack against the widespread number of
quacks.
New blood was pumped into the Provincial Department
of Labor by more than doubling its personnel and by
increasing its budget from S 10,000 to $ 25,000. Public
works also received prominent attention, in line with the
job-oriented objectives of the budget, with the allocation
of S 2,718,000, an amount larger than any total budget in
the past.
Although the 1924 figures promised to transform the
living conditions of the lower segments and the economy
of the region in general, the burning questions were: who
21Presupuesto general para 1924
,
n.p. The signifi-
cance of these measures is illustrated by the fact that
the trip from the capital to Jachal, 120 miles to the
north, demanded eight hours by car. La Prensa, T.larch 2,
1925. There was no railway line connecting these two
cities. Likewise, to the distant Valle Fertil department
the mail was delivered by mule, once a week. La Rcforma,
February 4, 1926.
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s
would bear the burden of financing such mammoth figures,
and how. The business and industrial sectors, already at
odds with the government because of the obrerista policy
of the Bloquists, realized that their fears about the
"Communist" regime were becoming a reality. A compa
of the revenues collected during 1923 and 1924 reveal
the reason for the somber mood of the business community
and the propertied class:
Tax 1923 1924
j;^^^
,
^
1,011,000 1,685,000General Franchise 294,000 392,000Property 355,000 1,247,000
Additional on Property
- 212 000Sales 48,000 248|oOO
^If-"^^^ - 1,424,0000-ther 1,134,000 1,598,000
Total; 2,842,000 6,806,000
Difference over 1923: 3,964,000
Source: San Juan, Kensa.je del Excmo
. Sr . Gobernador
Dr. Federico Cantoni (San Juan, 1925)
, p. 25.
Cantoni believed that these sectors were capable of
absorbing a significant increase in taxation because the
provincial wealth was practically in their hands,
especially in those of the landowners and bodegueros.
The governor repeatedly affirmed that as a consequence
of the protective policies of the Regimen in the past,
they enjoyed an undeserved privilege and were in fact
undertaxed.
337
The governor was determined to carry out his policy,
and there was no way for the opposition to block it.
Their only recourse was to issue one protest after
another, but no one in the provincial government lent
them a benevolent ear. Furthermore, the income of the
bodeg^eros was made almost entirely in pesos because they
sold most of their production outside the province. As
letras were also circulating in San Juan, this allowed
the industrialists to profit by their devaluation, as
had their Mendozan counterparts. Cantoni was dead-set
against speculation with the letras and tried to end it
by heavy taxes on those engaged in the exchange of
currency and through direct police repression.
As was the case in Mendoza, the letras had to be
fully accepted as means of payment for all the provincial
taxes. Disregarding the law, in October 1923 Cantoni
ordered the bodegueros to pay all taxes and the salaries
of their personnel in pesos. But in contrast to the
vacillating attitude adopted by Carlos Washington Lencinas
in Mendoza, where the bodegueros were never seriously
pressed by the government, Cantoni resorted to expeditious
22
The most striking case involved Aldo Galletti,
general manager of a private bank in San Juan. He was
accused by the government of speculating with letras and
he was very heavily fined. As Galletti was an Italian, his
appeals involved the Italian Minister in Argentina and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Eventually, the legal dispute
had to be resolved by the National Supreme Court.
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methods to enforce his decree: he allowed the bodegueros
48 hours to Obey his ruling and in case they attempted
to resist his order, he threatened to set up a new
five-cent tax on wine, with the exclusive purpose of
calling in the letras in circulation. The forceful
attitude of the governor allowed him to impose his will,
but the devaluation of the letras persisted because they
could not be applied for tax payment purposes.
The business and industrial sectors, however, did
not remain passive. In February 1924, when the
legislature enacted a new tax on grapes, the bodegueros
decided to take a firm stand and suspended all shipments
of wine in protest. This paralyzed the collection of
taxes, and almost 80 per cent of the bodegas closed
23their doors. But Cantoni was not a man to remain idle
while facing such a challenge. In an officially-
sponsored rally in front of the government house, he
accused the bodegueros of exploiting the working people
and warned them that it was useless to protest because
the more they protested, the higher would be the taxes
that they would have to pay. Moreover, Cantoni
threatened to have the State take over the administration
of their business in case they declared a lockout, and
On this occasion the bodegueros decided to pay
half of the salary to their personnel during the
lockout.
339
to produce wine and sell it at cost price.
The mercantile interests became extremely concerned
and once more, responded by crying out to Buenos Aires.
They condemned Gantoni's "Bolshevik- policy and his
professed purpose of destroying the productive forces of
the province. In response to their request for a federal
intervention Cantoni stated that he was not preoccupied
at all about the situation because he would be elected
again by the people.
The unflexible position of the governor increased
the number of protests sent to Buenos Aires and hardened
their tone. The nature and extent of the complaints
finally became so serious that Cantoni had to go to the
Pederal Capital to counteract the pressure of his
enemies. There, he said that the position of the
bodegueros was merely revengeful, because he had forced
them to become honest industrialists. Cantoni also
cast doubts on the motives of the bodegueros in closing
their business. Since it was harvest time, he accused
them of speculating on the delay in purchasing the
grapes, in order to exact a lower price from the
^^JjB. Nacion
,
February 29, 1924.
^^La Prensa , I.iarch 3, 1924.
^^Ibid. , March 12, 1924. To avoid the adulteration
of wine Cantoni had imposed an exorbitant tax on brown
sugar, a vital element needed to adulterate wine.
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vlnateros. In general Justification of his tax policy,
Cantoni asserted that high taxes could only be applied
when the industry and business were experiencing a
prosperous situation. High taxes could not be imposed if
they were affected by unfavorable circumstances . ^7 si^^e
the government did not back off an inch from its
original position, finally there was no alternative for
the bodegueros and vinateros but to return to their
normal activities. They grudgingly paid their taxes but
under protest.
When the harvest ended, however, a large number of
workers were laid off placing a social burden upon the
government. Cantoni knew by direct observation the
backwardness in which the peasants and unskilled v/orkers
were permanently living. Believing that it was a primary
duty of the State to pro\ade Jobs and security for the
humble sectors, Cantoni started a number of projects to
develop the means of transportation in the province,
^'^la Prensa, March 12, 1924.
The largest business concern in San Juan,
Santiago Graffigna S.A., a vineyard-bodega complex,
reported very good profits during the Cantoni years, as
follows: 1923: ^ 413,120; 1924: "l^ 605,170, and 1925:
% 229,932 (From the yearly State of Accounts and
General Report furnished by the Graffigna Corporation
to the author). The 1925 report, however, referred to
the "difficult financial situation" being experienced
in San Juan. Doubtless, other less important mercantile
sectors were hard-hit by the tax increases sanctioned
by the Bloquists.
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was
while helping the jobless men. His policy, however,
not to institute the government as a big hearted
distributor of the spoils of office, for there was in
Cantoni an inveterate belief in the work ethic, which
he preached by his own example. Although he was the
first ruler in his province to alter the traditional
governmental policy of non-involvement in socially-
related matters, Cantoni was a stalwart against
handing out government jobs, a custom deeply rooted in
provincial life. He always rejected the view that the
budget should serve as an umbrella to protect
parasites, for he believed in the innate virtues of
the "self-help" philosophy, and he clearly disdained
the evils associated with a bureaucratic-plagued
administration.
Besides the heavy taxation on grapes and wine,
the Bloquists greatly modified property taxes. Not
only was the tax rate increased, but more significantly,
the assessments of the properties, especially those
valued above 6,000, were adjusted to values ranging
from three to fifteen times higher than before. This
was in fact an undisguised attack against the opposition
since most of the men of property were ragingly anti-
Cantonists
.
The franchise tax on business in general was also
substantially raised, and a new and very heavy one was
342
applied to those dealing with the exchange of currency.
This tax was aimed at preventing speculation on the
letras. The highest taxation, S 30,000 per annun was
imposed on those institutions where gambling was
allowed, a tax mainly leveled at the Social Club, the
exclusive gathering place for the more wealthy men of
San Juan and a bastion of the opposition.
In defense of the new taxes, Cantoni stated in his
usual amusing but pungently verbal style, that before
he assumed power only three groups paid taxes, "the
poor, the gringos, and the fools," and he added that it
was time that the rest also paid them.^^ Regardless of
the seriousness of such an assertion, it is
understandable why such draconian tax legislation raised
a clamor and even provoked the political rebellion of
the taxpayers.
With regard to the role of the letras in the local
economy, Cantoni shared the long-held belief of many
Cuyano leaders, both conservatives and Radicals,
favoring their use. Therefore, in June 1923, the
legislature authorized the issuance of 4,000,000, the
main purpose being to reinforce the capital of the
Provincial Bank and to finance public works. Following
the pattern of similar currency in the provinces of
^^La Prensa, May 23, 1924.
or
e
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Mendoza and Jujuy, within a few months the Sanjuanine
letras began depreciating. In view of the limited amount
of currency handled by the campesinos and the workers,
Cantoni always contended that they could not be a faci
in the deterioration of the value of the letras. H
specifically accused "capitalist speculation in
connivence with the political Kachiavellism of the
opposition" of being responsible for their devaluation.
Regardless of the veracity of this charge, the fact was
that the root of the problem was not the lust of the
opposition but the existence of illegal provincial money
in circulation. At the retail level the national currency
practically disappeared. Consumer goods were given one
price in pesos and another, higher, in letras, and the
cartoncitos replaced the coins for small-scale
transactions.
But Cantoni learned from the example of neighboring
Mendoza that the letras could become an issue which could
topple his government. Therefore, he allowed the payment
of taxes to be made in letras again. But this was not
enough to preclude the danger of a federal action,
especially since Congress had eagerly and almost
unanimously voted in December 1924 to discuss the
provincial situation. Realizing his diminishing chances
Mensa.je del Gobernador
,
Kay 12, 1925, n.p.
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to maneuver, Cantoni decided in February 1925 to get rid
of the letras once and for all. Most of them were
publicly burned within a few months, and by Kay 12, when
Cantoni completed his second year in office, the letras
had practically become a thing of the past. In contrast
to the inefficiency of the government of Carlos
Washington lencinas in dealing with the letras, Cantoni
did not hesitate to severely tax the mercantile sectors
in order to get the funds with which to replace the
provincial money. Only by firm determination could he
end a situation upon which the political future of his
government was hanging.
Another manifestation of Cantoni' s strong grip on
provincial affairs was his manipulation of the municipal
system. Since the intervention into the government of
Isaza by the federal authorities in October 1919, there
had been no self-rule in the departments. Cantoni kept
them under his direct control, to the point where by
mid-1924 more than half of the districts in which San
Juan was politically divided were under the total
command of the governor. In a few departments where the
local authorities disputed with Cantoni, they were
easily removed from office by the Bloquist legislature.
The importance of this issue was basically political
because from the economic viewpoint the departments had
a very modest role. In fact, the services to the
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inhabitants of many departments improved when the
provincial government took all matters concerning
public health and public works into its hands. One
serious problem arose, however, in the municipality of the
Capital. The electorate for municipal elections was
restricted to property owners and those who paid a
business tax. A large number of them were anti-Cantonists
.
Therefore, at the municipal elections held on December
1924, Dr. Indalecio Carmona Rlos, a physician, was elected
mayor of San Juan as a candidate of the League for the
Defense of Property . -^-^
Cantoni did not have much patience with his political
adversaries and soon a serious conflict developed between
the provincial and the municipal government allegedly
involving a refusal of the neighboring departments to
admit the refuse disposal of the Capital. Since Carmona
Rios gave one order and the police gave a different one,
this resulted in a colossal headache for the mayor. As the
police were under the command of the governor, Carmona
Rios had no other recourse but to complain to the Kinister
of the Interior demanding a federal intervention because
^^The restrictive nature of the municipal elections
is well illustrated by the figures themselves. Carmona
Rios got 383 votes against 176 for the Bloquist candidate,
both totalling 559 votes. La Frensa , December 8, 1924. But
in the national election held in April 1922 in the city of
San Juan 5,797 citizens voted, almost ten times the number
which participated in the municipal election of 1924.
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Of governmeatal violatioa of the principle of municipal
autonomy. Minister Gallo replied to the Mayor after
Carmona Rios wired his complaint for the fourth time,
stating that it was purely a local matter. This
domestic incident, however, greatly inflamed the desires
of the anti-Cantonists to get Congress to abolish the
Bloquist government.
The partisan zeal of the Bloquists was also evident
in the field of popular education. Pollowing political
tradition, as soon as Cantoni assumed office, a large
number of teachers were laid off for clearly political
reasons. On the positive side, however, the 1924 budget
significantly, raised the teachers' salaries from 100 to
150 pesos monthly for those in the elementary schools,
and from 150 to 200 pesos for those in the secondary
schools. In line with Cantoni' s wishes to redress the
failures of previous governments, he kept the salaries of
the teachers almost up to date, but he did not pay the
fourteen months which were in arrears when he assumed
office. Furthermore, the educational system was placed
under a new, non-traditional orientation. Although the
number of schools remained virtually the same,-^"^ there
^^La Prensa, March 31, 1925.
^•^There were 55 public provincial schools in San
Juan in 1923 and 1924, and 56 in 1925, Consejo Nacional
de Educacion, Educacion comun en la capital , provincias
y territories naci onales , renorts for those years
(Buenos Aires, 1924, 1925 and 1926).
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were some beginnings on the teaching of practical
subjects, such as agricultural techniques and sewing for
girls. Moreover, special classes were devoted to
educating the pupils in personal hygiene and the
prevention of contagious diseases.
Political Scene: Room for Bloquism Only
These social changes made an impact in the daily
lives of the lower classes by upgrading the quality of
life in their sedentary lethargic communities. But
heightened political hatred obscured the advantages
derived from the progressive ideas implemented by the
Bloquists. They used their tremendous political strength
to divide and stereotype the citizenry between "good
guys" and "bad guys." This led the Bloquists to accuse
the dissidents in their movement of being traitors and
to regard criticism by members as misbehavior— "incon-
ducta partidaria." Such was the fate of a few Bloquist
legislators who openly rebelled against what they
considered the tyranny of the party, asserting that they
were, above all, representatives of the people rather
than servants of the comite. This attitude fostered a
climate of fear and distrust because being an active
opponent of Bloquism meant risking official harassment,
if not open persecution.
Their complete control of the legislature enabled
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the Bloquists to Justify their actions on legal bases.
The opposition claimed that Cantoni's actions, regard-
less of their formal legality, were the arbitrary acts
of a despot. The Bloquists, of course, always stated
that they were faithful observers of the law.^^ Thus, the
weight of the law represented at times a tyranny against
the opposition, and an instrument of the capricious will
of the governor. The Bloquists applied the "theory of
virtual and immanent infallibility," contended La Prensa,
derived from a popular support which the Cantonists
regarded not as a temporary electoral preference, but as
a historic mandate, a real plebiscite in the Yrigoyenist
connotation of the term.-^^
In the political atmosphere of San Juan, where the
will of the governor prevailed so ostensibly and where
the program of the party was the backbone of governmental
action, the legislature, naturally, played a secondary
role. But to say that it was a rubber-stamp body, which
in fact it was, does not reflect its real character. The
task of the legislature was to enact laws based on party
Jose P. Barreiro recalled the tenacity of the
Provincial Department of Labor against Juan luaurin, a
leading landowner and bodeguero of San Juan, and an
unbending opponent of Bloquism. Kaurin was fined
several times by the Department, some of them on
flimsy allegations. But he paid all the fines punctually
and never appealed to the governor or asked for any
clemency. Personal interview.
^^La Prensa, November 18, 1923.
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guidelines which had heen established in advance. Hence,
it did not function as a deliberative body independent of
the Executive, but rather as a complementary branch of
government. This enabled Cantoni to present his views as
if they were the rule of the entire party, and not of
one person.
He met periodically with the deputy governor, the
ministers and the Bloquist legislators to deal with the
agenda of the legislature.^^ Thereupon, when the lawmakers
met in formal sessions, they simply ratified what had
already heen decided in the general party meeting. There
was no discussion of the proposed legislation in both
branches of the legislature because the objections of the
few opponents were easily overruled. ^'^ Although in theory
^^In May 1925, a book was stolen from the
Cantonists which contained the proceedings of the meetingsheld by Cantoni with the other high officials of the
administration and the legislators. Its content was v/idely
publicized in San Juan and in Buenos Aires. It was
emphasized that one of the points approved in the meeting
of June 13, 1924, stated that any Bloquist Deputy or
Senator who did not vote according to the instructions of
the party would be fined 400 pesos. The opposition to
Bloquism tried to stir up public opinion in light of such
irrefutable proof of subordination of the legislative power
to the executive,
yr
Perhaps there is no better example of abusive
legislative behavior than the way in which the 1924 budget
was approved by the provincial Senate. In order to
overcome the opposition of some members, the Cantonists
met on a Sunday at 8:00 in the morning, without notifying
those Senators they knew were questioning the enormous
size of the budget. But as more Senators were needed to
obtain quorum, two from the opposition were brought to
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this system denied the principle of separation of powers,
the government defended this procedure alleging that its
major responsibility was to enact the legislation
promised to the electorate before they were elected by
the people. According to the Cantonist theory, the
electoral support for Bloquism had endorsed the view that
it was unnecessary to have a major argument on projects
which were already backed by the majority of the people.
What was needed, they asserted, was to implement the
principles outlined in the program, fulfilling in this
way what had been promised to the citizens when the
Bloquists had sought their vote. To enhance their
viewpoint, the Bloquists repeatedly pointed to the
regrettable spectacle of the National Congress, which had
been transformed into a sterile body because of the
spirit of obstruction prevalent among the congressmen,
and the lack of definitive guidelines on which course to
follow.
The legislators not aligned with the Bloquists faced
steadfast official hostility in the legislature. This was
extended to the point where those members opposed to the
government were unable to collect their salaries, while
the Bloquists cashed their dietas regularly. The
the Senate by the police. Then the budget was approved
"a libro cerrado," that is, without any discussion in
the Senate. La Prensa, February 25, 1924.
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credentials of newly elected opposition legislators
were routinely sent to a committee and simply left to
die there. it seems that the Bloquist attitude was in
part a reaction to that of the National Senate where the
members elected by the Bloquists were left waiting for
months for a decision as to whether they would be
accepted by that body.
The political climate of San Juan was one of
growing intolerance with each sector reserving cutting
words for its opponent. In his annual messages to the
legislature Cantoni referred to his adversaries with
typical aggressiveness. In his view, his opponents were
the representatives of reactionary interests who blocked
the government merely for the sake of obstructing it and
maliciously ignoring the progress achieved by the
Bloquists. -^-^ In May 1925 he referred to the League as
the symbol of a greedy and sordid capitalism.
Conversely, for the opposition a Bloquist represented a
kind of barbarian under the evil influence of Marxism
•5 o
The most publicized case was in the provincial
election held in January 1924, in which Sergio V/. Bates,
a former independent supporter of Cantoni and director
Debates
,
was elected Senator for the Capital by a
split hair margin over the Bloquist candidate. Kis
credentials, however, were never approved.
^^Kensaj_e del Gobernador
,
Kay 12, 1924, n.p.
"^^Ibid.
,
May 12, 1925, n.p.
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whose sole aim was to destroy the moral and material
well-being of the Sanjuanino society.
If the legislative power appeared submissive to the
desires of the executive, the Judiciary as a whole played
a similar role. The majority of the judges who had been
appointed by the Bloquists did not challenge the
decisions of the provincial administration. In general,
the Judiciary observed a very cautious attitude and
never presented to Cantoni the defiant challenges which
the Mendozan Judiciary had to Jose Nestor Lencinas. There
was one important case, however, in which Cantoni had to
face an adverse judge. The directors of the leading
opposition newspaper, Diario Nuevo, Domingo Elizondo and
Hector Conte Grand, charged in mid~1923 that illegally
issued letras were in circulation. The government denied
the allegation and jailed both men. The ensuing
investigation proved that the letras the two men
presented as evidence had been adulterated to make them
appear to have been illegally issued.
The government, then, seized the occasion and
accused Elizondo and Conte Grand, two of its major
political enemies, of being responsible for having
altered the letras. In August 1923, Judge Augusto
Castellanos ordered Elizondo released from jail— Conte
Grand was ill and therefore allowed to be out of prison
—
but the governor ignored this decision. Cantoni believed
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that Castellanos, a judge appointed to the bench by the
Bloquists, was unfaithful to the party, and, in
consequence, from that month on his salary was not paid.
This situation raised the protests of the opposition
against Cantoni, in San Juan as well as in Buenos Aires,
but to no avail. Even the Provincial Supreme Court
remained silent on the issue. As the Judge Castellanos
did not show signs of giving up and resigning, in June
1924 the government eliminated his post from the judicial
system and, accordingly, from the budget. Thus, through
an apparently legal administrative arrangement,
Castellanos was purged for confronting the governor.
Another instance of Cantoni' s authoritarian
behavior involved a Bloquist provincial legislator under
indictment in the federal court in San Juan. Cantoni
ignored the federal legal action alleging that the
legislator was protected by immunity, and denied the
assistance of the police to arrest him.^"'' As only national
lawmakers were free from federal prosecution, Cantoni'
s
position was in fact a contempt for national authorities.
President Alvear had to order the 15th Infantry Regiment,
^Furthermore , the semi-official newspaper La
Reforma alerted Sohar Ruiz, the federal judge, that
"patience is running thinner" in the government and
vmrned him that the day vail come in which he will be
punished for his "canallesca conducta." La Prensa , April
25, 1925. Sohar Ruiz suffered a "financial" punishment
from the Bloquist government. His properties, which were
assessed at v 192,000 were re-assessed to si; 615,000. La
Prensa, Fiay 13, 1925.
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stationed in Saa Juan, to enforce the ruling of the
federal judge. Only then did Cantoni acquiesce.
The opposition press, through artificially-created
conflicts, was subjected to similar rough treatment by
the Bloquists. Sometimes the distribution of newspapers
was impeded, at other times there was physical
intimidation of non-Bloquist newsmen. On another
occasion, the independent Debates urged journalists
toward Bloquism to stay away from San Juan in order to
be spared the government's ire.'^^ official pressure
against Diario Nuevo was such that the paper finally
suspended publication in June 1925, hoping that
eventually a federal commissioner would repress the
"forajidos erabravecidos" Bloquists.
These grievances had been voiced by the press
before. Bates' newspaper Debates had stated that Cantoni
42Debates
,
December 21, 1923, warned its colleagues
Tu que das en el diario cuatro palos
al gobierno que ves que no anda bien
vas a cobrar el milagro de las mieses,
por un palo que des, te daran diez.
Compafiero, comprende lo que di^o,
compadece a los pobres que alia van
no te vendan halagos ni promesas,
companero, no vayas a San Juan.
In June 1925, the distribution of Diari o Nuevo
was prohibited because it had printed the full speech of
National Deputy Llarcelo Sanchez Sorondo urging federal
intervention in San Juan. la Prensa, June 27, 1925.
^^La Prensa , June 28, 1925.
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was a trampler, an atro^ellado, as a .an, and a trampler
as a ruler. Still more antagonistic to Cantoni's actions,
La libertad
,
from Mendoza, claimed that it was time to
think about Cantoni as a "morally insane" as had been
the cases of the Parag-uayan dictators Francia and
Prancisco Solano Lopez.
In reality, by 1925 the opposition in San Juan was
forced into a corner. Bloquism enjoyed such sizeable
popular support that it rendered its adversaries
politically impotent; it was hopeless to try to defeat
Cantoni electorally. To liquidate the "provincial
Communism," the League had no recourse but to knock at
the doors of Congress. They flooded Buenos Aires with
aggrieved telegrams and manifestos protesting the
draconian taxes imposed by Cantoni upon their properties,
grapes, wine, and business in general. They clamored
for federal intervention*.
Buenos Aires Stops Bloquism
The two most important newdpapers in Argentina, La
Nacion and La Prensa
,
played a major role in giving
Bloquism national focus. Both were highly critical of
Cantoni and his movement once he became governor. Very
often they exposed in their columns what appeared to be
1924.
"^Debates
,
June 11, 1924; La Libertad , March 20,
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the arbitrariness of the Bloquist re,i,e, and publicized
the afflictions denounced by the League.
As happened in Kendoza, the permanent correspondents
of La Nacion and La Prensa in San Juan were active
opponents of the government. La Nacion was especially
linked with the anti-Cantonists because its correspondent
was Domingo Elizondo, one of the directors of Diario
Nuevo. In consequence, the information published by both
Buenos Aires newspapers was typically one-sided and the
editorial comments reflected the same political views.
For example, for the liberal, legalistic-minded La Prensa,
Cantoni's rule was a mixture of autocracy and demagogy.
As for La Nacion
,
it pointed out that the Bloquists
controlled the judge, the policeman and the journalists,
what else was needed to impose their absolutism?^^
The Bloquists assailed both papers for neglecting
to report what was significant in the provinces while
providing a wide coverage of foreign affairs. La Reforma
ridiculed La Naci on and La Prensa for ignoring the fact
that they were Argentine, not foreign papers. For while
they informed their readers about the industrial
situation in Vladivostok or that in Shanghai three
Chinese had died of a dreadful plague, they only
^^La Prensa
,
May 5, 1925.
^^La Nacion, September 27, 1924.
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reported political news out of the
. Argentine provinces,
without properly analyzing other spheres of general
interest. It was more imperative and relevant, added La
Reforma, to write about the economic and social
developments in Salta, San Juan or Catamarca provinces,
than to write a detailed report about the cost of
living in New Zealand. ^'^
The anti-Cantoni forces had two powerful allies in
Congress: conservatives and Yrigoyenists
, and from the
outset of the Bloquist government they attempted to
crush it. The first major confrontation took place
during 1923 when approval of Senator-elect Aldo Cantoni's
credentials was deliberately delayed, almost to the end
of the session. The National Senate was already
entangled in the partisan intrigues which rendered that
body so ineffective during the 1920' s, and the Cantoni's
credential issue became one more factor added to the
political machinations taking place in that branch of
Congress
.
4-7
La Reforma
,
September 22, 1924. Meanwhile, the
biting attacks on Cantoni in La J^lpoca continued
undiminished. Their fierceness v/as exemplified by the
terms it constantly used v/hen referring to him and his
movement: "desborde de barbarie," "iracundia salvaje,"
"personaje de tolderfa," "satrapa," "gobierno barbaro
y barbarizante, " "comunismo semigaucho," "oficialismo
mazorquero." July 3, 1923; January 11, 1924; January
21, 1924; April 1, 1924; August 20, 1924, and March 26,
1925.
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Aldo Cantoni was admitted as a Senator in September
1923, but when another Bloquist, Carlos R. Porto,
appointed National Senator by the provincial legislat
in February 1925, he had to resign before his credentials
were discussed. The majority of the National Senators
were not only interested in rejecting Porto as their
peer, but were also ready at that time to approve a
federal intervention in San Juan.
The Bloquist predicament in Congress was the result
of two insuperable barriers: the Yrigoyenists could never
forgive the event of the Rinconada, and the conservatives
could not swallow the "Communist system" by which they
believed the Bloquists were dispossessing the productive
sectors of San Juan of their wealth.
In January 1924, the League presented to Congress a
statement highly critical of the Bloquist rule. They
claimed that the Provincial Bank was basically serving
those in the official circle in open disregard of the
rules of the institution. They blamed the "famosas
leyes obreristas," the 8-hour daywork and the minimum
wage, for the existing unemployment. Furthermore, the
League stated that the property tax was merely an act of
revenge against the well-to-do, and that the fines set
up for violating the labor laws v;ere so high "as to make
any infringement of its regulations impossible." A candid
comraent, to say the least. The extensive document of the
359
0
oors
league coacluded that the unruly Bloquist administration
not only had suppressed the right to work, freedom of
the press and of trade, but even the freedom to thinkl
There was no other place to turn, it claimed, except t
the Federal Government because all the provincial d
were closed to their appeals. Every time they complained
to the Bloquist government, it responded with more
stringent laws. Justice, they added, was submissively at
the mercy of the oppresive Executive Power.
In mid-1924 a bill calling for federal intervention
in San Juan was introduced in the National Chamber of
Deputies by the Yrigoyenists. The reactions in the press
reflected the three basic views on the matter that
characterized the political sectors. La Epoca was
jubilant at the prospect of intervention. It stated that
San Juan was under the tyranny of a government
varnished with a university-prestige facade
which disguises its real appearance. But the
clothing and the university front are its only
civilized features. Its mentality, its
passions, its procedures, identifies it with
the most irresponsible and barbarian
government during the sad era of the national
organi zati on . ^9
The Bloquists, scornful of the intervention bill,
reaffirmed the class overtones of their political stand.
/ o
Liga de Defensa de la Propiedad, la Industria y
el Comercio de San Juan, L'emorial presentado al Poder
E j ecutivo de la Nacion, January 19 » 1924.
49La Epoca
,
June 28, 1924.
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They claimed that they had successfully defeated the
representatives of capitalism, the bode^^uoros, the large
landowners, and the aristocratic sectors. Proudly, they
stressed the fact that Cantoni was not an "illustrious
name," that he had never set a foot in the Club Social,
and that his family was not one of those boasting a
noble descent. They claimed it was the "chusma," as the
conservatives had called them, who had attained power
by their own right.
Between these two opposed viewpoints, there was
another, mildly critical of Cantoni. It reproached the
governor for not controlling his primitives impulses
and his intolerance, which had led him to rule the
province as if it were his personal property with no
feeling of obligation to account to the people for his
51
acti ons
.
The National Congress now became the arbiter of
Bloquism's fate. In December 1924 the National Chamber
of Deputies debated a conservative-sponsored request to
the Executive Power to include the intervention in
San Juan on the agenda for the coming special
52
congressional period. Among the stream of invectives
^^La Reforma
,
July 5, 1924.
^ -^Debates
,
July 7, 1924.
^^Diputados
,
1924, VII, 82-111 (December 4).
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against Bloquism, no words were more biting than those of
Deputy Matias Sanchez Sorondo. He referred to San Juan as
if it were a strange land, totally alien to Argentina,
located "in the center of wildest Africa or in the depths
of the barbarian Polynesia." He recited the Cantonist
faults with sordid overtones; persecution of capital, of
the Judiciary and the opposition; absolute control over
the legislature, and a Soviet mentality of government.
Sanchez Sorondo referred to the similarities between the
regimes of Cantoni and Lencinas, calling them a "holy
brotherhood." Moreover, he termed the Bloquists a "horde,"
an adjective which since then was often used by the
critics of the Bloquists. The fiery deputy for Buenos
Aires completed his diatribe by inserting into the
congressional record the large number of suits leveled
5 ^
against Cantoni before he assumed the governorship.
Belisario Albarracin, a deputy for San Juan, had to
bear the burden of defending and justifying the Bloquist
government. The essence of his position was that
although it could be admitted that Cantoni was somewhat
violent in the expression of his political views, no
person could claim to be more honest than Cantoni. But
the heated debate proved to be a mere formality since
the conservative request was approved by the Chamber
almost unanimously. Later, when it was discussed in the
^^Ibid., 83, 90. The insertion is on pp. 112-114.
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National Senate, Aldo Cantoni placed special e.phasis
on the social accomplishments of the Bloquists and
their efforts in behalf of the needy sectors of San
Juan. Stressing the populist nature of the Sanjuanino
government, Senator Cantoni stated that the political
problems of the province were no longer solved at the
Club Social or decided by a clique of "half a dozen
of big names." The anti-Cantonists repeated the
familiar charges and the Senate approved the resolution
overwhelmingly.
But this emotional congressional encounter only
served as a wide display of anti-Bloquist sentiment,
for President Alvear not only did not include the
intervention in San Juan on the parliamentary agenda,
but he cancelled the whole special congressional
55period. ^
54
^ Senadores, 1924, II, 63-101 (December 18). The
quotation is on p. 73.
55Besides the problem of San Juan, Alvear wanted
to prevent that Congress discussed other disputed issues,
especially once he had secured the extension of the
budget for 1925.
The political adversity affecting both I.'endoza
and San Juan led to a reinforcement of their political
ties. The lencinist convention held in I.lendoza in
December 1924 voted its solidarity with the Bloquist
government. Cantoni replied to Carlos Washington Lencinas
that "conoces demasiado mi temperamento, vigorizado
civicamente al lado de tu austere padre, Jose Nestor
Lencinas, para que esa amenaza pueda llegar a preocuparme
La Prensa, December 19» 1924.
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Nevertheless, the anti-Bloquist aaimosities grew
steadily as Federico Cantoni solidified his one-man rule
in San Juan. The new congressional drive against Cantoni
began soon after Congress convened for the ordinary 1925
period. The Yrigoyenists sponsored another intervention
bill and mounted an implacable attack against the
Cantonists.56 Radical Personalist Deputy Vergara led
the push to liquidate Cantoni. He retold all the economic
and financial grievances as they were reported by the
conservative Leag-ue for the Defense of Property. He
sneered at the pro-worker stand of the Bloquists,
believing it a fraud against the workers and a vehicle
57for class hate. Striking a theme which had been burning
the Yrigoyenists since 1921, Vergara condemned again the
fact that all those who participated in the attack
against Jones at the Rinconada had become provincial
legislators or had been rewarded with jobs in the
administration. Vergara summed up the Bloquist program as
one of "violence, dissolution, anarchy and class struggle,"
and asserted that San Juan had fallen into the clutches
^^Di putad os, 1925, II, 67-100 (June 10); 169-198
(June 18); 212-228 (June 19), and 289-336 (June 24).
^'^The same view was expressed thirty years later
by a Radical author who referred to both Eloquism and
Lencinism as devoid of ethical principles, and as
movements v/hich dealt with the social question in a
demagogic fashion. Gabriel del I.'azo, El radicalismo .
Notas sob re su historia ^ doctrina , 1922-1952 (Buenos
Aires, 1955), p. 131.
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of Bolshevism.
The Bloquist representative, Albarracin, tried a^ain
to justify the rough spots of Cantoni's behavior. He
practically left unanswered, however, the serious charges
made in the Chamber that the leading Bloquist officials
from Cantoni down had benefited with extremely generous
credits from the Provincial Bank. 59 ^he Sanjuanino Deputy
Ventura Lloveras, an Yrigoyenist, made another explosive
accusation. By resorting to mathematical computations
which remained both unproved and unchallenged in Congress,
he affirmed that according to the taxes in force, the
government was not collecting just over seven million
pesos annually as it declared, but more than four times
that amount. This simply meant that either the difference
was netted by people in the government or that there was a
58Diputados
, 1925, II, 78. The ':>ocialist Jacinto
Oddone also joined the anti-Bloquist chorus. However, he
did not see any reason to criticize the meetings held by
the governor with the legislators to coordinate in
advance the labor of the legislature. In the Socialist
Party, he said, they not only would fine the dissidents,
but they would expel them. Ibid
. ,
89.
The list of those implicated in the Rinconada
and the public positions held by them afterwards is in
Juan Alberto Bracamonte, Una verguenza nacional . El
Cantonismo en documentos (Buenos Aires, 1927 ) , pp. 57-59.
50
However, it is fair to state that during the
extensive congressional debates, the anti-Bloquists
never mentioned what type of guarantees were backing
the munificent loans granted to the Bloquists by the
official bank.
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e
giant slovealiness in accountine, or perhaps both at the
same time.
Sanchez Sorondo, who had spearheaded the attack
against the government of San Juan in December 1924,
reiterated with impassioned words that that province
a "real cancer of democracy.- He insisted that th
intervention in San Juan was not like any other federal
intervention, but a real expedition against an Indian
incursion. By a vote of 84 to 3 the Chamber of Deputies
left no doubts that the anti-Bloquist sentiment was
riding at high crest.
The National Senate witnessed a new and extensive
parade of arguments pro and con Cantoni. Vices and
virtues were analyzed again through the partisan light
of each sector. That cataract of words seemed
unnecessary. Cantoni 's fate was decided before the
debate began. Out of nineteen Senators only three voted
against the intervention, Pedro Larlus, for Cordoba,
Leopoldo Melo and Aldo Cantoni. A few days later
Alvear appointed General Eduardo Broquen as interventor.
Meanwhile, in San Juan, Cantoni defended his
battered administration by opening to the public two
new buildings of the Rawson Hospital, the only one in
the Capital. His improvised speech on that occasion
^^Senadores, 1925, I, 346-358 (June 27); 401-410
(July 2): 425-429 (July 16); 469-489 (July 23); 490-530
(July 24), and 532-602 (July 25).
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alluded to the fact that while the sterile opposition
in Buenos Aires was ready to conquer San Juan as if it
were a malon, he provided the poor with another
humanitarian roof to assist them and to give them comfort
and hope.^*^
Using all possibilities on hand, the Cantoni
government tried to clog San Juan administrative wheels
in order to reduce to a minimum the financial resources
at the disposal of the intervention. All possible
allocations were made, fines were condoned or dismissed,
a general moratorium on the paying of taxes was granted
and a very slow process to collect taxes through the
courts was established.^^
A last stand was attempted by Governor Cantoni, who
wanted to read before Commissioner Broquen the last
decree of his administration. It expressed a protest at
the intrusion of the central government and its violation
of the federalist spirit of the national constitution.^-^
But Broquen did not allow Cantoni to voice this last
minute piece of his mind. Though the federal intervention
^^La Reforma , June 30, 1925. A malon was a
devastating Indian incursion on a white settlement.
6?
Reacting against this unusual move. La Prensa
sadly commented that it was as if the end of the Bloquist
government meant that the province ought to disappear.
July 9, 1925.
^^Ibid.
,
August 9, 1925.
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did not ena Bloquis., it closed the fi.st and
.ost
important chapter in the history of the movement.
The literature on Cantoni and Bloquism is scant.
Naturally, the pro-Yri,oyenist writers have strongly
criticized the Sanjuanino leaders. Manuel Galvez stated
that Pederico Cantoni resembled a "Stalin abur^uesado
,
with talent but without scruples, who granted benefits
to the lower classes and was blindly admired by them.
But Galvez believes his methods were so violent that his
regime surpassed anything known in Argentina; not to
side with him, was to be against him.^^ Felix Luna
asserted that the Cantonis transformed San Juan in a
land where only the best armed man, the most resolute,
the most macho could survive. In the Par West, in Sierra
Morena or in Sicilian lands, added Luna, they would have
been celebrated highwaymen for their propensity to loot
for their loyal followers and for the downtrodden who
considered them their caciques
.
Analyzing Cantoni and Bloquism from a different
angle, the Sanjuanino historian Juan Romulo Fernandez
gives a brief account of the Cantonist era, concluding
that Federico Cantoni was the politician "que mas altos
puntos calza en todo el pais argentine." This may be
^^Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen
, p. 395.
65
Luna, Yrigoyen
, p. 348.
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understood as a complimentary remark on Cantoni, but
the real meaning of this evaluation is not clear.
Pernandez' account, however, does not mention
specifically the social legislation enacted by the
Bloquists, and his short reference to the 1927 provincial
constitution does not mention granting suffrage rights
to women. The local historian Hector D. Arias had
treated the subject in a balanced, although
traditionally narrative way.^'^
Judgments of Cantoni' s rule reflect the controversial
and still emotional involvement provoked by his personality
and his actions. The three following views project a range
of opinions held by observers who v/ere directly or
indirectly close to the contemporary scene. The Sanjuanino
historian Emilio Maurin Navarro, son of Juan Kaurin,
believes that Cantoni was an "atropellador , " a
characteristic he links with the "Italian impulses" of an
Al Capone, and that Cantoni' s personality resembled that
Fernandez, "San Juan, 1862-1930," Historia
argentina contemporanea
,
IV, pp. 534-537. Quotation is on
p. 537.
Arias and Varese, Plistoria de San Juan, pp. 440-
455. The only biography of i'ederico Cantoni is an
unpublished doctoral dissertation by Robert R, Smith
(University of California, 1970), This is a researched
work, narrative in nature, which handles evenly the
virtues and failures of Pederico Cantoni. Noticeable
among its conclusions is that Smith finds somewhat
difficult to understand in 1970 "the furor, heated
controversy and even class hatred" generated by Bloquisra,
p. 288. "Radicalism in the Province of San Juan. The Saga
of Pederico Cantoni (1916-1934)."
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of the Louisianian Huey Long. Maurin Navarro can not see
anything positive in Bloquism, which he believes was a
"permanent illegal association."^^
Another Sanjuanino, the competent historian Horacio
C. Videla, whose father was bitterly opposed to Cantoni,
thinks that although the reforms carried out by the
Bloquism were progressive, it would have been preferable
if they had been implemented through more orthodox means,
free from the violence which permeated the actions of the
Bloquists. Videla contends that Cantoni was a man sincere
in his beliefs and acknowledges that Bloquism represented
a new experiment oriented to benefit the popular sectors
which until then had been neglected in San Juan.^^
Jose P. Barreiro, the intellectual force in the
Bloquism of the 1920' s, presents the most sympathetic
view toward Cantoni. He agrees with his critics that
Cantoni was an arbitrary ruler, but firmly points out
that his first government was "an exemplary one."
Barreiro rejects the view that Cantoni was a demagogue,
but recognizes that he lacked the self-restraint to curb
his arbitrariness and to smooth the rough edges of his
personality.'^'^
^^Personal interview with Erailio Maurin Navarro.
^^Personal interview with Horacio C. Videla, San
Juan, July 6, 1972.
"^^Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro.
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These three dissimilar views are, in general,
representative of the diverse opinions expressed about
Cantoni and Bloquism. The historian will find that they
contain some grains of truth, because Cantoni- s real
image is somewhat reflected in all of them. Certainly,
the personal nature of the Sanjuanino leader and the
extent of his accomplishments and failures are so
controversial that to judge him and the movement he led
would be a task permanently subject to challenge and
revision. '^^ Already in the 1920- s there was almost a
traumatic preoccupation on both sides with what history
would say about them. Cantonists and anti-Cantonists
elevated their vision above their daily acrimonious
disputes, and placed themselves on a moral, superior
level, beyond their generation, when presumably the
"final truth" would emerge. "The day of judgment for
this historical government," asserted La Reforma, will
71Political legend had weaved around Cantoni a
very widespread story, that of "giving away" coats or
overcoats to the poor people, and thus, posing as a
"benefactor" when in reality he would be a plain
demagognJ-e* The same attitude, as noted before, was
attributed to Carlos Washington Lencinas, and so, both
Cuyano leaders share the anecdote. Most of the persons
who have been witness, directly or indirectly, of
Cantoni' s times, seldom fail to mention the story of
the coats. However, two persons closely associated
with Cantoni, Jose P. Barreiro and Eudoro Rodriguez,
flately denied that this v/as ever true.
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show nhe titanic material and spiritual aoccnplishments
achieved by Cantoni
.
La e^, on the contrary, appealed
to that time "when in the future the people will learn
about the atrocities committed by the gangsters who today
dominate San Juan.. .."72
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^.^
that both sides were mistaken believing that history
could speak with one voice or that it could render a
"final" verdict. Bloquism, as any other personalist-rooted
enterprise—as attested in the major examples of Rosism
and Peronism—would be always subject to a historical
inquiry in which opinions will surely differ far and
wide.
Both sides seemed to have played the dual role of
exploiters and exploited, both lacked moderation in
attacking and defending themselves. Political polarization
clouded the issues in dispute and passion replaced reason
in the daily exercise of their antagonism, where even
minor events or disagreements were enlarged out of
proportion.
The first Bloquist government achieved most of its
social goals and these accomplishments constitute a
watershed for v/hich Gantoni deserves full credit. He
represented the first tangible hope for the humble people,
with better working conditions, better salaries and
spreading health services into far corners of the province.
'^^La Reforma, August 1, 1924; La ]^poca , July 10,
1924.
372
Where it still was almost aa adventure to live. Bloquism
however, failed to enact the political reforms it
promised, such as proportional representation in the
legislature, or to insure full municipal autonomy.
Economically, its fiscal program for a better balanced
distribution of wealth was another landmark in an era
in which any scheme smacking of Socialism or even
advocating a mild welfare State was generally rejected
as "exotic." But in the process, the financial torniquet
was applied too drastically to the business sectors. This
inflamed the opposition to seek the political annihilation
of Bloquism. Defending their position, the Cantonists
disregarded civil liberties, basic freedoms were curtailed
or placed under a permanent siege and the judicial system
lost its most precious foundation: its independence.
But a further appraisal of the historical role of
Federico Cantoni and Bloquism will be developed in
following chapters, after the results of the last federal
intervention in San Juan, the fourth in only four years,
are discussed. Cantoni, like Lencinas in lucndoza, was
enjoying large popular support when the federal
intervention brought to an end his populist experiment.
Its political enemies were able to stop Bloquism in 1925,
but it was too strong to admit defeat.
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CHAPTER X
LENCINISM AND BLOQUISM PROVE THEIR RESILIENCE
Federal interventions, in Mendoza since September
1924 and in San Juan since August 1925, had placed these
provinces again under the control of the national
authorities. And once again the two Cuyan populist
movements were confronted with the need to re-establish
themselves as the strongest political force in their
respective provinces. To regain their leadership they had
to overcome a barrage of criticism and taunting reproaches
from their opponents, both in Mendoza and San Juan, and in
Buenos Aires.
Unlike the previous interventions during Yrigoyen's
presidency the anti-Lencinist and anti-Bloquist forces
hoped that this time the Federal Government would not
thwart their aspirations for a definite change in the
provincial scene. In theory, at least, the federal
commissioners were not only to probe into scandal-tainted
administrative proceedings and abuses of political power,
but to restore some kind of harmony in both western
provinces.
Lencinism: Prom the Llano to Power Again
Lencinas' opponents pressed the federal interventor
to try in earnest to bring into court all the Lencinists
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accused of corruption. "jA la carcel los ladronesl"
-to jail With the thieves-a phrase coined at the giant
rally of anti-Lencinists held in November 1924 in the
capital of the province, became their permanent war cry.
The non-Lencinist press, in Mendoza as well as in Buenos
Aires, began reporting details of the dubious dealings
in which many Lencinists had been involved while serving
as government officials. The charges of corruption
ranged from the alleged appointment of large numbers of
aviadores ,^ to the more serious accusations of fraudulent
operations within public institutions, especially the
Provincial Bank. However, most of the cases aired in the
press were never brought to trial. These cases, mostly
involving low-level hirelings, became lost in a labyrinth
of charges and denials, without ever reaching the courts.^
Thus, only a few months after Kosca began the intervention,
it became clear to the frustrated anti-lencinist sectors
that the intervention was not aimed at destroying their
political adversaries.
On the contrary, the political activities of the
Lencinists were neither forbidden nor curtailed, and they
"^"No show" employees and workers who cashed their
salaries without ever working.
2
The most important Lencinist officials, of the
few who were prosecuted and found guilty, were the
director of the Provincial Bank and the Superintendent
of Irrigation.
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were able, therefore, to maintain active political support
throughout the province. The instructions of Minister of
Interior Gallo to Mosca clearly reveal the "white glove-
policy with which the central government handled the
situation:
The federal commissioners are sent to theprovinces neither to turn its files upside down,
nor to make inquiries and investigations
searching for guilty men and criminals, which
will be processed before judges appointed by
the commissioner himself. Your duty is not to
render verdicts in favor of or against friends
or political adversaries. Your mission is to
guarantee the free expression of opinions and
to insure the impartiality of the Federal
Government in reorganizing the public life of
the province.-^
Because of this attitude emanating from Buenos Aires,
the focus of political concern in Mendoza turned from
possible judicial prosecution of the Lencinists, to the
new challenge of electing a constitutional government.^
The beginning of a new electoral cycle inevitable renewed
political hostilities, but now they seemed even more
bitter than in December 1921 when Carlos Washington was
elected governor. For the Lencinists now had an additional
hostile public opinion to confront because of the charges
of corruption against many of their leaders.
^inisterio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interior, 1924-1925 (Buenos Aires, 1925T7 pp. 119-120
^The intervention set the date of the election
for August 1925, after it had been twice postponed.
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At the end of May the Liberal Party selected Mario
Arenas as its candidate for the governorship, m the
Lencinist camp, with Carlos Washington barred from running
because the constitution prohibited a man from serving
two consecutive terms, there was a struggle among other
prominent Lencinists, especially between Leopoldo Suarez
and Alejandro Orfila. Finally Orfila managed to get the
support of the majority.^
Because of the Interventor' s reluctance to
investigate former Lencinist officials or curb their
political activities after Lencinas' ouster from power in
September 1924, the Lencinist chances for returning to
office were extremely favorable. The great personal
popularity of Carlos Washington continued to be the
backbone of his movement. Most of his supporters remained
unaffected by the charges of corruption leveled against
party leaders and persisted in their loyalty to the
caudillo.
^
5 The Lencinists completed their ticket with Carlos
Saa Zarandon, who had been the provincial Police
Commissioner under Jose Nestor Lencinas.
Very often the Lencinists expressed in popular
verses their feelings of admiration for their two
undisputed leaders, Jose Nestor and Carlos Washington
Lencinas. A book could be compiled of all the laudatory
popular poetry written in their praise, and against the
conservatives, during most of the 1920 's. In general, it
extolled the gaucho-qualities of the two leaders,
imitating on many occasions the criollo language and
metrical style of Jose Hernandez' Martin Fierro . The
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This phenomenon from a conservative viewpoint, was
evidence of a deplorable demagoguery that existed at both
regional and national levels. The metropolitan daily La
Prensa maintained its criticism of the Lencinists,
insisting that they were exploiting the feelings of the
simple people much as the Bloquists were doing in San
Juan, and contending that both movements were offsprings
of the personalist model set up by Yrigoyen from the Casa
following verses illustrate the indomitable spirit of the
modest Lencinist troubadours:
Es el gaucho verdadero
es la tradicion, la raza,
es el buen criollo que pasa
arriscandose el sombrero
Es el sagrado heredero
de la patria tradicion
es la chusma en redencion
que en estas tierras andinas
Don Jose Nestor Lencinas
salvo de la humillacion
Las obras de esos cretinos the conservatives
a todo gaucho lo espanta ~^
(Secar la uva en la planta
producto del suelo andinol
jTirar al canal los vinosl
|no darle trabajo al pobrel
^que hay con que a ustedes les sobre,
ganzotes camanduleros?
si en ese tierapo el obrero
no podia ganar un cobre
Estan rotas las cadenas
en la tierra mendocina
; abajo gansos de Arenas',
jviva Washington Lencinas
I
La Palabra , December 28, 1925; December 18, 1924;
January 29, 1925.
378
Rosada. La Prensa's criticism focused in fact, on a very
significant political paradox. Both the Bloquists and the
lencinists were not only branches of the old Radical
trunk, but both were, in general, pursuing the same
fundamental goals as the Personalist Radicals. From this
hypothesis, lencinism, Cantonism and Yrigoyenism constituted
a vanguard of the "Causa" against the "Regimen." These
three sectors appealed to the popular segments and all
represented the side of reform in politics. Nevertheless,
the Cuyano movements proved to be far more committed to
social reform than were the Yrigoyenists. Moreover, the
clashes first in Kendoza between Jose Nestor Lencinas and
Yrigoyen, and then in San Juan over the Jones' affair,
opened such an irreparable breach between the regional
parties and the national Radicals under Yrigoyen, that
their great affinity of principles was destroyed by the
personalist ingredients which rule everyday politics.
The electoral campaign in Mendoza contributed once
again to a charged political atmosphere as Lencinists and
anti-Lencinists gave vent to a political rhetoric and
style that was permeated by strong class overtones.
Society ladies (the damas mendocinas) threw flowers fr(
the balconies of the Jockey Club at the Liberal Party
candidates marching together with the legion of old
conservatives, the living symbol of the "Mendozan
'om
"^La Prensa, July 18, 1925.
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patricians." Their sense of upper class superiority was
also reflected in the slogan directed against the
Lencinists:
" A la carcel los ladronesl" The response of
the Lencinists was a mixture of pride and arrogance:
" ;Viva el gauchito ladron!" (Hail the "little gaucho"
thief:).
The Bloquists came from San Juan to campaign once
more on behalf of their neighbors. Lencinism and Bloquism,
as the Mendozan La Palabra put it, constituted liberal,
advances forces in support of the lower classes, and a
curb to the haughtiness of the "aristocrat, capitalist,
and conservative elements. "^ Such a categorization of the
anti-Lencinists, regardless of its accuracy, served the
Lencinist purposes of advertising the socio-political
situation in terms of rich versus poor. The Lencinists,
moreover, answered their opponents' accusations of
corruption by affirming that those who had violated the
ordinary procedures while in office, did so to return to
the people the pillage they had sufiered under the
governments of the "Regimen."
Climaxing the populist stance of the Lencinist
campaign, Palabra referred to their opponents on the
eve of the election as the "young idlers who show off
^Ibid.
,
July 27, 1925.
^La Palabra, January 4, 1926.
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the established prestige of their illustrious aaoestry,'.
comfort-loving and parasitic people, who had never
experienced adversities in life, lived in permanent
slothfulness, looked down on the humble people, and were
anxious to gain power in order "to enslave those who live
chained to the heavy capitalist machine." In contrast,
noted La Palabra,
The Lencinist Radicalism symbolizes democracy,
evolution and revolution Will they fthe
conservativesj understand tomorrow ["electiondayj and forever that it is the shirtless
people, the rabble, rejected and cursed... who
will impose their principles and willpower tobring new conceptions, new horizons and new men
to the polity, marching straightforwardly to
achieve truth and justice.
The Lencinist newspaper added, "let them j^their
opponents^ call us the rabble, the shirtless.
. .let those
dirty souls discharge all kind of adjectives upon us...
let them wallow in their political impotence and their
orphanage of popular support...." Nothing, it concluded,
would prevent the Lencinist victory. "^^
Ibid., January 2, 1926. The editorial stated in
Spanish: "El radicalisrao Lencinista, que es democracia,
evolucion y revolucion, les hara comprender mahana y para
siempre, que es el pueblo descamisado, ^ue es la ' chusma'
despreciada y maldecida. .
.
quien impondra su pensamiento y
voluntad para dar al Estado politico nuevas formas, nuevos
horizontes y nuevos hombres y marchar camino recto al
triunfo de la verdad y la justicia." "...que se nos moteje
de chusma, de descaraisados. . .que gasten los ronosos de
alma y corazon todos los adjetivos. . .que se revuelquen en
su impotencia de vencidos y huerfanos de simpatias
populares. ..."
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The Socialists of Kendoza, reacting to both the
Lencinist and anti-Lencinist campaign were appalled by
what they called the "Mendozan chaos." They viewed the
masses as perennial victims, earlier under the rule of
an oligarchy which simply ignored them, and now under
a Lencinist tutelage, which perverted and degraded
them. The Socialists referred to the Lencinist leaders
as common criminals, assassins if they needed to be,
"coimeros" by their own recognition, corrupted and
corruptors."^^
As was usual during elections, especially at the
national level in twentieth century Argentine politics,
each party proclaimed itself to be the only one able
to promote general prosperity in Mendoza. If the
political propaganda were to be believed, depending on
which party won the province would either become a
paradise or would disappear off the face of the earth
after the election. The Liberals, professing to
represent the feelings of all the social groups "from
•'--^El Socialista (Mendoza), August 1, 1925. The
Socialists watched with dismay during the electoral
campaign "the parade of cars and trucks filled with
reckless men, drunkards and roughnecks, yelling,
insulting and provoking pacific people by shouting
•;Viva el gauchito Lencinas, borracho y ladron!'"
Stressing the fact that these were not isolated
incidents, the Socialists added that all the Lencinist
posters bore the inscription: ";Yiva la chusma de
alpargatal" Ibid .
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the palace of the fortunate to the shack of the humble
peon," stated that they were "the only hope to save the
province. j,,,,^^^^ ^525, the Lencinist convention
which chose the party candidates, proclaimed that "only
Radicalism could save the future of the province."!^
Another sector, the Yrigoyenists, before they decided to
withdraw their candidates in November, issued a statement
rejecting all compromise with other political forces. In
their view, the choices at stake were "freedom or
servitude, truth or deceit, a free election or a
fraudulent one, justice or iniquity." The Yrigoyenists
felt these fundamental principles should not be
compromised by entering into any sort of political
alliance. 1^
In a last effort to stop what appeared to be a
certain return of Lencinism to power, the Yrigoyenists
requested a new postponement of the election. They posed
this dilemma to the Minister of Interior; hov/ was it
possible, they argued, that men who had engaged in
illegal activities could now be able, "by an aberration
l^La Prensa, June 1, 1925.
l^Ibid
.
, December 7, 1925.
l^Ibid. , November 24, 1925.
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of the popular mind" to serve again as the representatives
of the people?15 federal Government preferred to
let the issue be decided at the ballot boxes.
On Sunday, January 3, 1926, Lencinism received
overwhelming support at the polls. Many anti-Lencinists
felt, now more than ever, that the Mosca intervention had
been a useless, ineffective interlude. But some Liberals
took confort in the fact that the new governor would be
Orfila and not Carlos Washington. Their hope was that the
powers of office placed in the hands of the former would
serve to offset the preeminence exerted by Carlos
Washington. The novelty of this political situation was
that for the first time the Union Civica Radical
Lencinista had voted in a governor who was not a Lencinas.
This broke the monopoly of a prominent popular name, a
personalist characteristic which was even present in the
name of the party itself. But the lencinists had no doubt
that despite the fact that Orfila would be the new
15Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interior , 1925-1926 (Buenos Aires, 192^ p. 116.
T 6 ' f
The election returns were: Union Civica Radical
Lencinista 20,405 votes; Liberal Party 14,308; Socialist
Party 4,381. La Prensa , January 10, 1926. The Lencinists
also obtained a majority in both houses of the
legislature as well as in the municipal contests,
except in the capital and two departments, where the
Liberals won.
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governor, power had really reverted back to the "gaucho
17Lencinas." '
Por the coQservatives and the anti-Lencinists in
general, it was a sad reality to have to accept Lencinism
in power again. In their opinion, its victory constituted
the triumph of corruption and opened the door to a
repetition of the excesses of the "inorganic populacheria"
of the Lencinists. la Libertad, the fierce voice of
the conservatives, even urged Mosca to remain as
commissioner until public opinion, the "sana y decente"
one, could see confidence in government restored. "^^
La Prensa attributed the electoral success of the
Lencinists to their manipulations with the emotional
feelings of the masses, v;ho tended to attach a character
of martyr to any leader who was under the accusing finger
of the law and surrounded himself with an aura of
"persecution.""^^ In reality, the angry criticism by the
anti-Lencinists during Mosca' s intervention did not
This situation may be considered somewhat as a
historical antecedent to the event of almost half a
century later at the national level. In the presidential
election of March 1973, the major slogan of the
Justicialista Liberation Front was: "Campora to the
government, power to Peron." As in Peron's case, lencinas
continued to be the undisputed leader of his movement.
18La Prensa, January 29, 1926.
^%bid
. ,
January 7, 1926
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permeate the simple mentality of the common man. By using
honest or despicable means, depending on the views of
each side, the "gauchito Lencinas" continued to be the
patron saint of the lower groups.
The Lencinists celebrated with fervor their return
to the government, revelling in their own familiar way.
The Lencinist La Palabra expressed its views in a scornful
way calling the conservatives of the Jockey Club "a caste
of usurers and exploiters. "^^ Even the inmates at the city
jail collectively expressed their exultation at the
victory of the "noble y valiente chusma de alpargata. "^-^
The joy displayed by the Lencinists, however, was observed
by the opposition as further evidence of the revengeful
attitude of primitive people. In the words of the Mendozan
correspondent of La Prensa, the Lencinists provoked
"populacheros" episodes, of intolerable "gangsterism" whose
pleasure was to parade drunk in front of the Jockey Club,
in the heart of the city, "shouting insults impossible to
22be reproduced."
These events and the style and language used by the
opposing sides indicate that the electoral decision was
based fundamentally on emotional feelings. The majority
Palabra
,
January 7, 1926.
^"Ibid.
,
January 18, 1926.
^^La Prensa, February 6, 1926.
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was committed to a caudillo, more by sentiment than
ideology. The opposition was also temperamentally
committed to reject the values and social standing
represented by this caudillo and his followers. Class
differences, however, continued to be a vital factor in
deciding the behavior of the electorate and in
subordinating every other issue to a single one: are
you for or against the populist cause.
The return of Lencinism to power also served to
frustrate the hopes that the opposition had placed in
the federal intervention. If it was a fundamental
principle that the people must govern themselves,
commented La Prensa, the I^endozan experience indicated
that interventions were nothing but arbitrary measures
taken against the provinces by a stronger power that
abused its constitutional authority . ^-^
For Carlos Washington the electoral victory of his
movement gave him the opportunity to move onto the larger
stage of national politics. Following a practice that
they had condemned in the Regimen of appointing former
governors to Senate seats, the Lencinist-dominated
legislature named their hero to the post vacated by Benito
24.
Villanueva.
^^Ibid
. ,
January 10, 1926.
^^Lencinas had also been elected provincial Senator
in the January 1926 election and held this position and
that of National Senator-elect concurrently.
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In spite of Lencinas' commanding role within the
party, he did not exert a very strict control over the
Orfila government. 25 The new administration, reflecting
the different personality and interests of the governor,
had its own characteristic, more attuned to what could
be considered a traditional provincial rule than to the
populist-oriented style of Jose Nestor Lencinas or
Carlos Washington. From a political viewpoint it was a
Lencinist government, but Orfila relied to some extent on
his own men and his own ideas. Moreover, his modus
operandi had to be different for he did not have the
appeal associated with the name Lencinas.
Orfila was one of the most prominent bodegueros of
Mendoza. Understandably then in his first message he
promised not to damage the interests of the capitalists
and warned the legislators that it would not be prudent
for the government to transform itself into the tutor of
26the wine industry. But Orfila also improved the existing
2^Lencinas was regarded as the supreme caudillo,
never losing the power with which he kept his movement
alive. In truly paternalistic fashion most of the
correspondence from his partisans and political friends
addressed him as "jefe unico," "soldados disciplinados ,
"
"jefe espiritual y unico," "unico y genuine jefe." From
the correspondence in the hands of Antulio Horacio
Lencinas.
^^Provincia de Mendoza, Mensaje de S.E. el
Gobernador de Mendoza D. Alejandro ^ri'ila TMendoza, 1926),
p. 13.
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social legislation, increasing substantially the mini,
wage, which had remained at the same level for the private
sector since enacted by Jose Nestor Lencinas in 1918. He
also extended the minimum wage provision to domestic
service, and granted it also the Sunday holiday. Orfila,
however, plunged the province into major financial
difficulties, which included a sizeable loan from the
United States that greatly increased the provincial debt.
Worse yet, this large indebtedness did not correct the
ills which the huge loans were supposed to cure,
especially the perennial deficit of the School Board. ^'^
Lencinism received a very serious political setback
in 1927, on the occasion of the April 3 provincial
elections. The political campaign had been very heated,
but the Lencinists were confident of another victory.
However, when the votes began to be counted, the support
for the Yrigoyenist candidates proved to be stronger than
the Lencinists had anticipated. Facing the possibility of
an electoral defeat, on the night of the 6th a Lencinist
group invaded the electoral office and violated several
ballot boxes. Civic life in Mendoza was still primitive
and personalist-oriented, but that night it was set back
to the dark ages of caudillismo. Eventually the April
^Orfila' 3 government was referred as "the alleged
reign of extortion" by the weekly The Review of the River
Plate, LXVI, December 14, 1928, p.~J^.
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elections were declared void, but the wrong step had
already been taken. By this pitiful action the Lencinists
contradicted the noble efforts of Jose Nestor Lencinas in
his life-long pursuit of a true political democracy.
Curiously, most of the tarnish affecting Orfila's
rule and the unfortunate events of April 1927, did not
diminish Carlos Washington's prestige. He was able to
preserve the immense popularity he enjoyed with the
common man, both in the city and throughout the
departments. Moreover, his personal charisma was so strong
that it seemed an impossible task for the opposition to
eclipse his fame among the masses of Mendoza. In fact, the
political change in the governorship seemed just a tactical
step within the Lencinist strategy; nothing could restrict
the future moves of Carlos Washington if he wished to
return to rule the province after Orfila's terra.
If within their respective provincial borders
Lencinism and Cantonism were so powerful that they could
cope with a federal intervention and later attempt to
return to power, the situation outside the patria chica
was totally different. In Congress, conservatives and
Yrigoyenists were gathering the strength to challenge the
ambitions of the men from Mendoza and San Juan.
Although Carlos Washington had been elected early in
1926 to a vacancy in the National Senate, that body
allowed eighteen months to pass before taking up his
390
credentials. In the meantime the Senator-elect could not
participate in its deliberations or do much besides
denouncing the chamber as a docile body that was
subordinated to the aims of "politiqueria" and insensitive
to popular feelings.
Finally, by the end of Augxist 1927 the Senate's
Credentials Committee got around to recommending that
Carlos Washington's diploma be rejected. Almost certain
that the Senate would endorse its committee's
recommendation, Lencinas decided to spare himself the
defeat and resigned his post to the Mendozan legislature.
This move left the Senate empty-handed, without credentials
to reject. In marked contrast to its premeditated idleness
in taking up Carlos Washington's credentials, the Senate
urged the provincial legislature to appoint a new Senator,
presumably with the objective of reviewing his credentials
and rejecting them before adjourning on September 30. The
Mendozan legislature deliberately ignored the Senate
request, but on October 1, the day after Congress recessed
for the year, the legislature also rejected Lencinas'
resignation, thus, allowing Carlos Washington to enjoy his
status of Senator-elect.
Bloquism: A Second Popular Mandate
As with Mosca in Mendoza, General Broquen, the Federal
28La Prensa, August 16, 1927.
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Commissioner in San Juan, did not intend to "liquidate"
Bloquism. In fact, during the fifteen months he ruled
the province, Broquen maintained a policy of tolerance
toward the Cantonists.29 They too retained their
partisan fervor, as had the Lencinists under similar
circumstances. The anti-Bloquists raised protests against
what they felt was a too lenient attitude on the part of
the Federal Government, and because the authorities had
not conducted a full investigation into the Cantonist
rule. The Yrigoyenists in particular, urged the post-
ponement of the elections until justice was done with
regard to Jones' assassination.
In disapproval of Broquen' s policy, both
conservatives and Yrigoyenists abstained from
participating in the national elections for National
Deputies held in March 1926. The statement in which the
Yrigoyenists announced their abstention was indicative of
their extreme dislike of the Cantonists. They called the
Bloquists "an army of fanatics. . .spreading the seeds of
class hate, social dissolution, violence and bloodshed
in simple-minded humble people. ... "-^^ In spite of these
dreadful invectives, the Bloquists again proved at the
^Felix Luna refers to Alvear's policy toward the
Cantonis as one of "tacita proteccion." Alvear (Buenos
Aires, 1958), p. 71.
30La Prensa, March 2, 1926.
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polls the large popular support they enjoyed.
The Cantonists took advantage of the non-punitive
attitude of the intervention to promote their political
comeback. To this end they selected Senator Aldo Cantoni
as their candidate for governor. The Yrigoyenists, as
they had since Jones' assassination, proclaimed their
electoral abstention. The conservative Liberal Party
adopted the same position, alleging that Cantonism
continued to be at war with the civilized values of
order, stability and respect for the law. In this way,
the political field was again left open for the election
of a Bloquist government. Regardless of the benefit
v/hich they could gain from their enemies' abstention,
the Cantonist newspaper asked the anti-Bloquists to
reconsider their attitude; to give up the "Jockey Club
mentality" and the stupid prejudice of "believing they
were different from and above the workingmen." Kore
significant yet, La Prensa lashed the anti-Cantonists
for their negligent inertia. The ills affecting the
provinces of Mendoza and San Juan, it said, were a
result of "the lack of preoccupation of the well-to-do
and cultured class with public affairs, having devoted
themselves to the pleasures of the material well-being
^-^The Bloquists polled 13t 333 votes against
2,563 for a group of "Independents." Canton, Mat eri ales
para el estudio , II, p. 96.
•^^La Reforma, July 13, 1926.
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they were en joying. ... "^^
Meanwhile, the Bloquists stressed that historical
experience strongly suggested that what the province needed
was a government with an iron grip, energetic and firm,
like that which Aldo Cantoni could provide. They appealed
again to their followers for order and discipline in
exercising their civic duties. With a moralistic tone, the
Union Civica Radical Bloquista warned its rank and file
that they did not wish any citizen to be drinking or
provoking the opposition, to prove that they represented
a movement of responsible men.^^ As expected, in the
elections held on October 31, 1926, Aldo Cantoni was
elected Governor of San Juan by a decisive vote.^^
Broquen's report of his rule as Federal Commissioner
justified his refusal to become engaged in the investigative
process demanded by the opponents of Bloquism, into the
financial situation of former government officials and to
•^^La Prensa
,
July 16, 1926.
^^La Reforma , October 29, 1926.
^^Aldo Cantoni received 17,125 votes, against 7,069
for the candidate of the Concentracion Civica. Senadores,
1929, I, 204. The Bloquist success was a reward for their
unabated political activism. They were only defeated in a
few municipal elections, where a restricted franchise to
vote still existed. The opposition won in the municipal
election in the Capital again, as well as in two
departments
.
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reopen the judicial process of the Rinconada. No anti-
Bloquist, explained Broquen, was willing to understand
that the intervention could not and should not perform
any acts but those specifically aimed at reestablishing
constitutional rule. On the contrary, he stated that some
groups had entertained the erroneous belief that the
Federal Commissioner had gone to San Juan to deliver the
government to them on a silver platter.
From Buenos Aires La Prensa observed with deep
pessimism the political reality of the two Cuyano
provinces. It felt that both the Mosca and the Broquen
interventions had not brought any changes, but had
simply marked time until the return of the Lencinists
and Bloquists. In its frustration, la Prensa concluded
that the Saenz Pena Law had failed, for in reality the
mere superiority of the number had only satisfied the
will of the populacherla.
When Governor Aldo Cantoni began his term early in
December 1926, he inherited the same political climate of
intense loyalties and hatreds which had existed under his
brother's rule. Even the sporadic flashes of violence
Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interi or , 1926-1927 (Buenos Aires, 1927T7 PP- 145-147.
Broquen also pointed out that the opposition to the
Bloquists could only organize a weak propaganda apparatus,
for in the March 1926 elections the Bloquists had opened
47 comites, in contrast to only 13 Yrigoyenists and 4
Liberals.
^"^La Prensa, November 17, 1926.
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returned to the Sanjuaaino land. On November 30, 1926,
only a week before inauguration, an attempt was made on
the life of Aldo Cantoni. He escaped death only
accidentally by having exchanged seats in his car with
his chauffeur, who died instantly. Thus, by a whim of
fate, San Juan was spared another political tragedy.
Federico Cantoni had begun his populist government in
1923 with the events of the Rinconada in the immediate
background. Three years later, only a miracle allowed
Aldo Cantoni to reassume the populist crusade from the
government house. Hatred and political violence in San
Juan took no respite.
The second Bloquist administration constituted a
harmonious extension of the previous government of
Pederico Cantoni. Such continuity had not been present in
Mendoza when Orfila succeeded Carlos Washington. However,
although to a large extent the governments of Federico
and Aldo Cantoni in the 1920 's can be considered a unit
in their policies and their actions. Aide's administration
made evident the personality differences between the two
Cantoni brothers. For Aldo was less tempered and a better
organizer than Federico, Despite Aide's long indoctrination
in the ideals of the political left, his government did not
convert San Juan into a Socialist model. Basically, he
The assailants fled to the mountains, but they
were caught by the Bloquists. The man who had shot
Cantoni 's chauffeur was killed. This led the opposition
to charge that the Cantonists had taken justice into their
own hands.
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accentuated the characteristics that had provoked the
fierce opposition against Pederico's rule, especially its
financial aspects. Business and property taxes, which had
been substantially raised by the first Bloquist
government, were now heavily increased again. This
renewed the adamant opposition of the mercantile sectors
against the Cantonists. Aldo also carried out an
ambitious program of public works, which remain to his
everlasting credit.
Paralleling Carlos Washington's steps, Federico had
been elected provincial Senator and soon thereafter the
legislature of San Juan appointed him National Senator.
As with the Mendozan caudillo, Federico also continued to
be the undisputed leader of Bloquism. Under his guidance,
the populist seal of the government, as well as the
innovative, reformist spirit which so especially
characterized Bloquism, was kept alive.
The rhetoric of class conflict continued to be
present in the Bloquist literature, which viewed the
province as divided between exploiters and exploited, and
between "pueblo" and "anti-pueblo." The Sanjuanino
patricians, said La Reforma in one of its many editorials
critical of the opposition, represent the old castes,
parasitarians and useless, who lecture on "civic action"
•^^The Sanjuanino historian Horacio C. Videla
summed up the rule of the Cantonis as "grandes vientos de
reforma." Retablo san.juanino (Buenos Aires, 1956), p. 96.
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in front of the poker tables. Federioo Caatoni, on the
other hand, was portrayed in the official press as a man
who knew the sufferings of the poor people and who was
engaged in a permanent struggle against the privileged
and the exploiters.^*^
Two special illustrations serve to reveal the
intensity and determination of Federico and Aldo Cantoni
and their movement to effect an integral reform of the
Sanjuanino society. One was a license tax imposed upon
the medical profession; the other, of far reaching
importance, was an amendment to the provincial
constitution.
Early in 1927, in line with the Bloquists'
traditional approach to revenue raising, the government
of San Juan greatly increased all business and
professional franchise taxes. Of particular interest,
it established an extremely high tax of $ 5,000 per
year on doctors, but exempted them from paying it if
they agreed to work two hours daily, without pay, in
the Asistencia Publica, the Public Health Agency.
According to the Bloquists, this severe action was
taken in order to control what they considered the
abuses and lack of humanity of the medical profession.
They specifically assailed the medical association
40La Refqrma, January 26, 1927.
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view,
for setting up guidelines, which, in the Cantonist
constituted a cynical commercialization of a most
important social service.
Beyond the technical or administrative conflict
which resulted from these guidelines, the affair had a
clear political dimension. Most of the doctors were
opposed to the Bloquists and they interpreted the
imposition of the tax as a hateful political tourniquet,
inspired not with an eye to the provincial coffer, but
engineered by the government to reap political benefits
by offering free medical service to the population,
without costing a cent to the province. Since the large
majority of the people who attended the Public Health
Agency were from the poorer classes, who constituted
the political following of Bloquism the anti-Cantonist
doctors would be forced to cooperate, indirectly, with
the policy of their adversary
.
41The bylaws of the doctors' mutual association
stated that they would not accept employment at any
hospital unless they were paid $ 200 a month, and that
they would not assist patients in consultation v/ith
other physicians without a payment of 50 pesos and
previous approval of the deal by the association.
^^It also seems that the doctors feared an
outright Socialism, as can be inferred from the
conservative-sponsored bill to approve another
intervention in San Juan, which was introduced in the
National Chamber of Deputies in 1927. It stated that if
all doctors were to cooperate with the government,
there would be no patients left to be assisted
privately, because all the people would be entitled to
free medical assistance. Diputados , 1927, It 769
(June 22).
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Enraged by this, the doctors of San Juan with the
cooperation of the medical profession in other provi.nces,
launched a campaign to repeal the tax/^ A war of word
broke out between the doctors and the supporters of th
regime. With his typical bluntness Federico Cantoni
stated that if a butcher paid over $ 1,000 annually in
municipal taxes, it was only fair to demand $ 5,000 from
a doctor who earned ten times as much."^"^- The Bloquist
press, for its part, denounced the doctors as insensitive
to need, and depicted them as mercenary members of a
privileged caste.
The fiscal and social aspects of the tax issue soon
became entangled in politics, providing one more
battleground for continuing the permanent struggle
between Bloquists and anti-Bloquists.^^ The issue
43According to Dr. Indalecio Carmona Rlos, a
Socialist leader and a medical doctor himself, of the 56
doctors registered in the city of San Juan, only 12
agreed to pay the tax. Personal interview. July 6, 1972.
San Juan.
4.4M Reforma , December 30, 1926.
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The Sanjuanino doctors appealed to the courts
to void such a high tax. A year later, the National
Supreme Court ruled on this thorny and highly emotional
issue, asserting that this license tax was
unconstitutional because it had been levied with the
purpose of penalizing a special class of persons.
Rizzotti V. San Juan (1928). Araadeo, Argentine
Constitutional Law , pp. 211-212.
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demonstrates, in a capsule, the combative nature of their
relations. The populist stand of the former and their
position in behalf of the humble sectors irked the
traditional segments of the provincial society. Besides,
the fiscal policy of the second Bloquist government
alienated the business and land-owning sectors to the
point of total irreconciliation.^^
The second illustration, symbolic of the reformist
nature and resoluteness of the Sanjuanino movement,
refers to the amendment of the provincial constitution
which took place early in 1927. This was one of the most
important and least known achievements of Bloquism. The
plans for a constitutional reform had been expressed by
the Cantonists in the early stages of their movement,
and the reformist impetus was mainly engineered by the
leftist intellectual mentors of Bloquism.
^'^
46The provincial budget for 1927 surpassed
10,000,000 pesos, an exceedingly high figure for an
underdeveloped province. Therefore, all levels of
taxation were raised again. A sizeable amount of the
budget was allocated for public works, especially for
highway construction. The Bloquists built a road to the
west, to Calingasta, which was heralded as a model.
However, as the finca of Aldo Cantoni was located there,
the opposition contended that this monumental work
through mountaneous terrain was intended to serve the
personal economic interest of the governor. A significant
step was the enactment in April 1928 of an old-age
pension, financed through an additional tax on wine. The
pension, on paper at least, granted financial assistance
to persons 60 years old and older.
^"^Three days after assuming office, Aldo Cantoni
sent a message to the legislature proposing constitutional
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The 1927 reform constituted a pioneer experiment in
light of the new principles it embodied. Some of its
provisions were so innovative that they invited challenge
as unconstitutional. But most of its clauses revealed the
advanced nature of the document. In fact, some of its
principles were not incorporated into the national
constitution until two decades later. The populist spirit
which guided this reform, as well as the new socio-
political principles it comprised, could be a theme for a
special work in itself. Only the thrust of the most
salient reforms and the Bloquist justification for them
will be given here.^^
In the political field the principal innovations
were: (1) it granted universal suffrage for women, both
in municipal and provincial elections. Until then only
reform. It acted very promptly and early in January the
delegates to the constitutional convention were elected.
The Bloquists obtained 13,245 votes; the Socialists
1,863 and the Progressive Democrats 1,208. Fourteen
Bloquists were elected along with two Socialists and one
Progressive Democrat. The new charter became effective
on February 11, 1927. La Prensa, January 12, 1927.
^^Provincia de San Juan, Diario de sesiones de la
Honorable Convencion Reformadora de la Uonstitucion
(San Juan, 1927). Graciano Recca, a leftist politician
who came to San Juan with Aldo Cantoni, was the
factotum behind the constitutional amendment. Grecca
stated that the fundamental reform they could
accomplish would be to grant constitutional status to
the rights of the workingmen. La Prensa , January 9t
1927.
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men voted and even in municipal elections there was
restricted franchise; (2) it declared the total separati
of church and State; (3) it established the single-member
district electoral system instead of the two-thirds
majority system, sanctioned for the nation by the Saenz
Pena Law. In this way only the winner of every district
was elected, without any representation assigned to the
minority in any district; (4) in case of a federal
intervention the provincial budget would have no legal
force; thus the "intruding" federal authorities would not
be able to handle any provincial funds, and (5) it set up
a unicameral legislature by abolishing the Senate.
In the social field, the new constitution established
the right of every person to a minimum of economic
security, a minimum wage, labor protection and safe working
conditions. It reaffirmed the principles of National Law
1420 that public education should be lay, compulsory and
free of charge. It also provided direct assistance to
pupils whose parents could not afford to acquire school
materials.
Pederico Cantoni, who had been elected delegate to
the convention, was the leading Bloquist spokesman. There
were no extensive debates at the convention partly because
of the small non-Bloquist representation, and partly
because the Cantonists had prepared and discussed the
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constitution in advance. They therefore, believed that it
was not necessary to delve extensively into matt<
which the majority had clearly made up their mind,
indicated by their having voted for the Bloquists. In
this respect, the Bloquists applied in the constitutional
convention the same procedures as they had in the
legislature.
Because of the strong social accent of the proposed
reforms Cantoni made precise references throughout the
debates to the social situation in San Juan. He
emphasized time and again the populist principles with
which Bloquism was identified, and by referring to the
unfortunate condition of the lower sectors, he underscored
the basic class differences afflicting the Sanjuanino
society. Justifying the need for setting up welfare
legislation for rural workers, Cantoni recalled that the
patrones always reserved for the peons the storage area,
or the worst room of the house. He asserted that the
solution to these problems lay in promoting the right of
the workers to demand social justice based on principles
of social solidarity and not as a handout or an act of
charity,
Cantoni agreed that the workers should have the right
to strike, but only through pacific means. This thought
liSi Epoca , which had never printed a single word
of criticism of Yrigoyen, referred to the Bloquist delegates
as a "conciliabulo de serviles." January 30, 1927.
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suggests that in addition to Cantoni's concern for social
justice, he also believed, in line with his paternalistic
style, that the labor movement should be somewhat
controlled or regulated by the State. At the same time
the Bloquist caudillo reaffirmed his known opposition to
transforming the State into an employment agency. Thus,
in justification of his exclusion of government personnel
from the constitutional minimum wage provision, Cantoni
stated that people should not be encouraged to seek
government jobs, a practiced so rooted in the minds of
the individuals. On the contrary, he asserted that people
should invest their savings in the creation of small
industries and other business. Cantoni dreamed of
transforming the laggard provincial economy into an
active center composed of independent shopkeepers and
industrious small-size landowners.
The Socialists agreed with most of the reforms
introduced by the Bloquists, but they expressed their
total opposition to the election of the legislature by
districts. The Socialists argued that one party could
obtain the majority in all of the districts, as actually
happened with Bloquisra, even if it was a split-hair
margin, and the new legislation would not allow any
representation for the minority.
^^This system had been applied briefly in Argen-
tina early in the century and it was established in
Great Britain and France.
405
But what provoked the rage of the anti-Bloquists
was Cantoni's open statement that the representation of
minorities was useless. This scorn for minority
representation, anti-democratic as it appeared, has to
he analyzed in conjunction with his view of grass roots
government. Cantoni thought of a representative of the
people as one who was closely identified with the needs
of the district he represented. At the same time, on a
larger scale, Cantoni felt the role of the representatives
as a group was to fulfill the program outlined by their
party. Therefore, there was no need for a politician to
act independently of the norms and principles set up by
his political organization. This fundamental assumption
led Cantoni to state at the constitutional assembly that
"caudillismo" was dead in San Juan because Bloquisra was
an organic party, at the service of an official program
of action and not men's own ambitions.
The Majority-only system so enthusiastically
defended by Cantoni elicited cutting criticism from
almost all national sectors. In their eyes, it confirmed
the opinion about the authoritarian nature of Cantonism.
The Socialists strongly objected to including the single-
member electoral provision in the constitution and pointed
out that the Bloquists were following in Mussolini's
steps, for the Italian leader also believed that the
minorities were worthless. Apparently, Cantoni refused
^^La Vanguardia , February 8, 1927
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recognize that although the majority should in fact have
the right to rule and dictate policy, any majority,
regardless of its size, represented majority but not
absolute power. Aside from this major objection, the
Socialists gave their support to most of the Bloquist
reforms, especially to the provision granting universal
suffrage for women.
The Socialist La Vanguardia, which had always been
critical of Bloquism, recognized that "there are many
innovations which are badly needed in the national
constitution, in order to bring it up to the times we
53live in." In fact, the Sanjuanino charter incorporated
many features which were very close to the Socialists'
heart: a non-religious stand, popular education under the
principles of law 1420, universal vote for women, and
bringing down the barriers of a restricted electorate for
municipal elections. In comparison to the provincial
constitution, noted La Vanguardia
, the national one "is
54
an anacronism, something very inferior."
52
The Progressive Democrat Ventura Larrosa was the
only delegate who was opposed to this step, believing
that women's right to vote should be granted gradually.
The first priority, Larrosa said, was to improve the
procedures and habits of the males voting before
allowing women to vote.
^•^La Vanguardia , February 15, 1927.
^^Ibid . In his 1927 annual message to the
legislature Governor Aldo Cantoni proudly pointed out
that those scholars who had until then looked at the
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The anti-Bloquist sectors, however, believed that
such a reform was less than an asset for San Juan. Thus,
when the reforms were proposed by Governor Aldo Cantoni,
they were scorned as an attempt to intrude one-sided
partisan views into the fundamental law of the
province, in order to please "populachero" desires.
Another major criticism of the opposition focused on the
right to a minimum of economic security, a principle
which they considered would pave the way for a
guaranteed "salary for loafing. "^^
As for universal suffrage for women, Juan Antonio
Gonzalez Calderon, an expert on constitutional law,
believed it to be a legal provision, but questioned
whether it would not cause a deterioration in family
life. Furthermore, Gonzalez Calderon declared that the
principle of universal suffrage would transform democracy
into demagogy, as had been the case in the municipal
elections. He felt that if the electoral system were to
be entirely democratized, it would end up being
56
corrupted. Another criticism pointed out that there
social legislation of Uruguay as the most advanced or at
the Mexican constitution as a model, now had in the
constitution of San Juan a testimony of progressive,
modern constitutional law. Kensaje del Gobernador de la
Provincia , Dr. Aldo Cantoni, May 12, 1927 (San Juan,
1927), p. 11.
^^Diario Nuevo , February 10, 1927.
^^La Prensa, January 3, 1927.
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would be nothing evil in a federal intervention-whioh
Bloquism attempted to quash through financial
strangulation-if it aimed at restoring law and order in
the province.
What was perhaps one of the most significant
achievements of the constitution became a reality in the
elections held on April 8, 1928. On that day women
throughout San Juan exercised the right to vote for the
first time, without any restrictions. It was a harbinger
of the more significant day in November 1951, when women
all over Argentina were able to vote under the same
unrestricted conditions for the first time. Thus San
Juan had the privilege of being the first province in
Argentina where women exercised the right of universal
suffrage, and hence the leader in the crusade for
equality
.
This achievement was especially remarkable because
it was implemented at a time when there was generally
strong sentiment against granting women a right
(57
Diario Nuevo, February 19, 1927. Experts in
constitutional law who examined the 1927 San Juan
constitution contended that the provision declaring
that the provincial budget was unappli cable under a
federal intervention, was unconstitutional. Arturo M.
Bas, El derecho federal argentine . Nacion ^ provincias
(Buenos Aires, 1927), p. i-ix; Octavio Gil, Autonomia
provincial . Historia ^ concepto constitucional (Buenos
Aires, 1928), p. 186; Eaustino J. Legon, Cornentario de
la nueva constituci5n de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1927),
p. 69.
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traditionally reserved for men. This sentiment was due in
part to the fact that women were not considered politically
prepared to exercise their right to vote, and in part
because of the desire, especially of the upper classes, to
protect women from the abuses generally associated with
politics and voting practices. The April 1928 provincial
election proved, at least, that women could exercise voting
rights without giving up their values and their way of
life as many widespread critics had feared.
58
.
^he Bloquists also led the way in promoting femaleparticipation in the activities of the party to the extent
of setting up special women's organizations. With women
voting, citizen participation in the electoral process inSan Juan improved significantly to 36.6 per cent of the
total population (56,000 voters on a provincial population
of 153,000 inhabitants). In comparison, the figures for
national elections, vdth only men voting, were:
Population Voters ^
1926 147,097 20,473 13.91
1928 161,592 28,918 17.89
Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Minis tori
o
del
Interior
, 1927-1928 . p. 73.
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'^^The Bloquists were as successful with the feminine
side of the electorate as they had been with males. The
returns of the April 8, 1928, provincial election were as
follov/s:
Male Female Total
U.C.R. Bloquista 21,363 24,771 46,134
Socialist Party 2,933 2,130 5,063
Blank 2,146 2,665 4,811
Total 26,442 29,566 56,008
Provincia de San Juan, Junta Electoral de la Provincia,
Libro de Actas No. 6, pp. 233-258.
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After the federal interregnum, Lencinism and
Bloquisrn had proven their strength by returning to
office, largely because of the unabated support of the
"chusma de alpargata." While the second Bloquist
government honored its promises for social and political
reform, and continued exerting an authoritarian rule,
Lencinism was much less effective in making a reality
of its avowed populist stand. But now the solid
leadership earned by Carlos Washington and Federico
Cantoni in their Cuyo provinces, had to confront in
Buenos Aires the opposition from hostile and powerful
political forces. For in Congress they had to become
engaged in an ofensive-defensive operation, that is,
projecting a positive view of the principles and
procedures of their regional movements and staving off
the attacks and challenges of their embittered political
adversaries.
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CHAPTER XI
LENCINISM MID BLOQUISM. FROM CUYO TO BUENOS AIRES:
NEW CHALLENGES AHEAD
Bloquism Encounters the National Senate
With the designation of Carlos Washington Lencinas
and Federico Cantoni as National Senators by their
respective provincial legislatures in Mendoza and San
Juan, the National Senate became the scene of a direct
confrontation between Cuyano populism and Yrigoyenist
Radicalism. The conflict took the form of a debate over
credentials. In the case of Cantoni, and of his fellow
Senator-elect Carlos R. Porto, the issue seemed simple."^
Carlos R. Porto, who had been Minister of
Government under Federico Cantoni, had also being
appointed National Senator and his credentials were
considered together with Cantoni 's.
To emphasize the special nature of their
movements, the Lencinists and Bloquists in Congress
organized a parliamentary group called the "leftist block."
Their aim was to adopt a "uniform policy" in Congress,
molded in "liberal, progressive, reformist and humanist
principles, for the benefit of Argentine democracy." This
political cluster constituted in theory an ideological
force aspiring to project into national level policy the
creed of their provincial movements. Their Radicalism, they
stated, was leftist-oriented and eminently liberal. They
offered guarantees to a "sano" capitalism and pledged to
protect the lower class sectors "so neglected by the
Regimen and some Radical governments." La Hcf orma , April
22, 1926. This parliamentary scheme, however, have no
effect because the lencinists and Bloquists congressmen,
small in number even under normal circumstances, were
practically excluded from Congress by the rejection of
their credentials. Regardless of its ephemeral existence,
the creation of this self-serving block served to
demonstrate the special ideological ties between the two
populist Cuyano movements.
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Under the constitution the Senate only had to determine
whether their election by the legislature was made in
accordance with the law. In reality, however, national
political interests as well as personal rivalries entered
into the picture. Besides the sharp animosities aroused
by Cantoni's personality, a complicating factor was the
detenrdnation of the Yrigoyenists to seek revenge for
Jones' martyrdom.
Yrigoyenist hatred for Cantoni extended to anyone
sympathetic to him and his movement. Thus, the association
of Carlos Washington with the Bloquists hurt the former's
chances of having his own credentials accepted by the
Senate. Jorge Calle, the Lencinist National Deputy, noted
this when he wrote to Carlos V/ashington that many
congressmen were unhappy with the brutality of Cantonism
and warned that "it is very unwise to be aligned with the
political situation in San Juan. This is the least I can
tell you."^
The opening of the debate over Cantoni's credentials
aroused wide public interest; all the halls and corridors
of the Senate building hummed with people avid to attend
the meetings; the visitors gallery, the barra, was filled
to capacity; an air of expectancy settled over the
Chamber.
^Jorge Calle to Carlos Washington Lencinas, May 18,
1927. Correspondence in the hands of Antulio Lencinas.
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Senator Mora Olmedo, of San Luis, spoke for the
madority of the Credentials Committee in urging rejection
of the credentials. Mora Olmedo in his address critically
reviewed the performance of the Bloquist governments, and
based the Committee's negative recommendation on the
contention that Bloquism represented a system of
immorality and tyranny, in open defiance of the national
constitution. Cantoni and Porto responded to Mora Olmedo'
s
stinging remarks by mounting a counterattack, pointing
out the underdeveloped and elitist conditions that
prevailed in Mora Olmedo own province, San Luis, and citing
numerous examples of its inadequate social organization,
its backwardness and the parasitical nature of its
bureaucracy. Porto, for example, contrasted San Juan with
San Luis in the fields of public works, education and
finances, amply demonstrating the deplorable conditions in
the latter province.^
When it was Cantoni 's turn to defend his credentials,
he proved to be the attraction of the debates. His
picturesque language and the unusual frankness with which
he spoke to the Senators aroused general attention.
Cantoni 's main contribution during the several days of
debate was an impassioned defense of the workingmen of
San Juan. In a blunt reference to the very Senators who
would decide his seat, Cantoni proclaimed
^Senadores, 1927, I, 472-481 (August 18).
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the more I know the most important men of m.v
country, the more I love the chinos of mypatria chica. They have a greater sould anddeeper 1 eelings.
. .and I am convinced that their
sentiments are superior and nobler than those
of the men sitting in this hall.
4
He also warned the leaders of the country not to
neglect paying attention to the stomachs of the poor, and
he justified on moral grounds the license tax set up for
doctors in San Juan. Cantoni also reiterated his views
against the State functioning as an employment agency,
deploring the fact that many people in Argentina were
begging to enter the bureaucracy, while the poor farmer,
his wife and children, had to work hard from sunrise to
sunset. The Senator-elect told his attentive audience
that he always advised the Sanjuaninos to increase their
personal wealth, to avoid vices in order to be thrifty,
and to work harder to produce more goods, because the
Ibid
. , 506. Cantoni expanded this views in an
outspoken and direct way:
El senor presidente Qof the Senate^ habra oido
hablar de esos chinos rohosos, y yo digo sehores
senadores: la roha del trabajo es una rori'a
superior y tiene mas merito y mas prestigio por
su virtud y menos mal olor que esta rona inteli-
gente y cerebral que cree que se puede servir al
pais solo con discursos . , ,y hace tambien perder
el tiempo en discusiones como estas, en la que
no se hace mas que gastar papel impreso y muchos
miles de pesos para la impresion del diario de
sesiones, que en realidad no sirve sino para
demostrar que algunos hablan mas o menos bien,
otros mas o menos regular, o mas o menos
brutalmente como lo hace el que habla.
Ibid. , 512.
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better off they became economically, the more independent
they would be. Thus, all the citizens would have more
freedom to vote for whomever they wanted, instead of being
compelled to follow the choice of the patron.
As in every occasion in which Yrigoyenists and
Bloquists confronted each other, the events of the Rinco-
nada, which had been hotly disputed since 1921, were
discussed again, but now neither group was able to
convince the other. At issue in the debate, however, was
a conflict over political style as well as philosophy.
This was well revealed in the following exchange between
Cantoni and Senator Luis Linares, for Salta:
- Linares: In San Juan the Senators-elect are very popular.
How could it be different if they, by a well conceived
and coldly executed system dispossess a minority to give
to a majority?
- Cantoni: That is democracy! to rule for the majority'.
- Linares: That is demagogy I It is a shame, a despoilment'.
Such was the strength of the Cantonist arguments,
however, that La Prensa
,
certainly no friend of the
Bloquists, asserted that the decisive stand of Federico
and Porto had pulverized a number of adverse viewpoints
and had won wide support for the Sanjuanino Senators-elect.
Commenting on the frankness of speech which was habitual to
^Ibid., 626. The full debates are in 448-491 (Aug. 18);
498-507~TAug. 20); 508-548 (Aug. 22); 549-593 (Aug. 23);
594-648 (Aug. 24).
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Cantoni, La Prensa stated that he had "called by their
proper names things which were usually referred to by
euphemisms." The porteno paper also praised Porto for his
description "in master strokes," of the pitiable working
conditions of the laboring sectors in San Luis, and
concluded that "until now never had anyone spoken in the
Senate with such frankness and fairness."^
But the oratory of the Upper House did not change
the minds of any Senator, for the vote followed well
defined positions; the credentials of Cantoni and Porto
were rejected 14 to 5.'^ The Bloquists, however, took the
view that they had lost only a battle and not the war,
for less than two weeks after the rejection of the
credentials, San Juan's legislature again elected Cantoni
and Porto as National Senators.
Lencinism and Bloquism. Bulwarks of anti-Yrigoyenism
The importance of these two Cuyo movements as part of
the sector nationally opposed to Yrigoyen, was emphasized
by the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for April
1, 1928. The political climate in Argentina heated up well
in advance of that date. The strong possibility that
Yrigoyen could be elected for a second presidential term
had already in 1927 provoked euphoria among the Yrigoyenis ts
.
^La Prensa, August 22, 1927.
"^The Yrigoyenists and the conservatives voted for
rejection; four anti-Personalists and two Socialist
Senators, Juan B. Justo and Mario Bravo voted for approval.
As for their oppoaents, early that year and after entangled
maneuvers, the anti-Personalists proclaimed the
candidacies of National Senators Lepoldo Melo and Vicente
G. Gallo for the presidency and vicepresidency
.
Because Mendoza and San Juan were important anti-
Yrigoyenist bastions, a very peculiar situation developed.
The conservatives were adamant against Yrigoyen. But at
the same time they cherished the same feelings against
lencinism and Bloquism, which they considered to be as
demagogic and pernicious as Yrigoyenism. On the other
hand, the political reality was such that they needed the
support of the Cuyo movements in order to attempt the
defeat of the Personalists in 1928. The conservative-
oriented Melo-Gallo ticket created problems in Mendoza
for both the conservatives and the lencinists. The
Liberals of Mendoza considered it impossible for them to
enter into any kind of political partnership with the
Lencinists in support of the same presidential ticket.
The Mendozan conservatives were torn by the decision they
had to make and they debated heatedly over the proper
course for them to follow. In December 1927 the majority
of the Liberal Party decided to reject any common cause
with the Lencinists, and therefore, to endorse their own
presidential candidates. "We never could join in a
presidential ticket supported by Lencinism," declared
the conservative Raffo de la Rata on this occasion. "Not
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even if it is only the presidential candidate," added
Gilberto Suarez Lago, another liberal leader.^
Since they were committed to preventing the return
of Yrigoyen to power, the anti-Personalist sectors
outside Mendoza harshly criticized the attitude taken by
the conservatives of that province. What was necessary,
sadly commented la Prensa, was to think of national
interest first and local interests later. ^ But most of
the Mendozan conservatives remained totally intransigent.
For them the first priority was "to destroy Lencinism. "^^
While the conservatives thus found themselves in a
crossfire, the Lencinists fortheir part viewed the return
of Yrigoyen to the presidency as a sure sign of a new
federal intervention in Kendoza. Thus, the presidential
election was a fundamental matter of political survival
for them. It seemed terribly awkward that a populist
caudillo like Lencinas should be supporting a "galerita"
like Melo, but Carlos Washington did not have any other
alternative in his drive to prevent Yrigoyen' s victory.
The Yrigoyenists, both in Mendoza and Buenos Aires,
revived the memory of Jose Nestor Lencinas from the
oblivion in which they had buried him since 1919. They
recalled his letter to Kelo of that year in which he
^La Prensa , December 17, 1927.
%bid . , December 22, 1927.
^^Ibid., December 17, 1927.
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told him "you will never be president." Thus, one strong
weapon against Melo's candidacy, which Carlos Washington
openly supported, was, ironically, Carlos Washington's
father letter. The Yrigoyenist emphasized the duplicity
of the son in comparison with the integrity of the
father, to the point of affirming that Jose Nestor
Lencinas "never was a Lencinist , "that he had nothing to
do with his descendents, whom the Personalists referred
as a "generation of cockroaches."^^ Ten years after his
heralded assumption of power in Mendoza, Jose Nestor
Lencinas' memory was revived in the turbulent presidential
campaign of 1928, but this time as a banner of the
12Yrigoyenistsi
In San Juan Bloquism also constituted one of the
supporters of the anti-Yrigoyenist camp. The same anomaly
evident in Mendoza was present here, where a populist
leader like Cantoni was supporting Melo for president.
But the anti-Yrigoyenist fervor they shared forged a link
•^Ha Epoca , March 10, 1928.
12Since both sides had high stakes at issue,
Mendoza witnessed a political campaign of abuse and
intolerance. As an illustration, a few days before the
election, Walter Rittrcan, a young iiinglishman who had
arrived recently in Mendoza to work for the Banco Anglo
Sudamericano, was stopped one night in the street by a
group of roughs who ordered hira to cheer for the gaucho
Lencinas. Rittman was unable to understand what he was
asked to do, but his silence was taken as a provocation
and he was fatally shot. The Review of the River Plate ,
LXVI, April 6, 1928, pp. 7, 9.
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between Cantoni and the anti-Personalist national leaders.
The participation of Federico Cantoni in political
rallies in the Federal Capital was one of the most
colorful characteristics of the 1928 campaign. In contrast
to Melo's dull and unattractive style, Cantoni spoke to
the people in plain words, highly flavored with popular,
vulgar terms, which La Reforma defined as "unkempt
oratory,""'-^ but which always created an impact on the
audiences. Cantoni 's presence at political rallies was in
permanent demand. Night after night when he announced
that he was ending his speech, the people asked him not
to end it but to go on. The familiar and aggressive tone
of his attacks against the Personalists stirred up the
Yrigoyenist aversion for him more and more. Partisan
fervor thus led to street violence and one night Cantoni
saved his skin only miraculously after his car was fired
upon several times."'"''''
The 1928 presidential campaign clearly placed
Pederico Cantoni on the national stage. His case was
practically unique in Argentina's political history after
•^^La Reforma , March 14, 1928.
"^^Violence, of course, was not exclusive with one
sector. But when a few days before the election a new and
serious armed confrontation took place between the
Yrigoyenists and their opponents after a rally at which
Cantoni had spoken, the Personalists abruptly decided to
end their political campaign, they said, in order to
avoid more bloodshed.
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1862, for Cantoni was a provinciano who had gained fame
in his native land, not in Buenos Aires. In 1928 his
personal style and commanding rhetoric produced an
impact on the portefios, a fact which becomes more
significant when it is realized that Cantoni was from a
backward province far away from the influential and richer
littoral. Whether Cantoni was hated or applauded, the fact
is that his name became a household word in the very heart
of the nation's capital. Domingo P. Sarraiento, another
Sanjuanino, had also been "a bull in his ring and a super-
bull in other people's ring,"— "toro en su rodeo y torazo
en rodeo ajeno"—as he put it, but he had not built up his
national stature in his native province. On the contrary,
Cantoni was attractive in Buenos Aires because of the
qualities he had already shown as a popular caudillo in
San Juan; and, equally significant, while he was in Buenos
Aires, he retained his native Sanjuanino spirit and
mentality.
Yrigoyen's Political Regeneration Revived
Despite the efforts of the anti-Yrigoyen forces, the
presidential election of April 1928 constituted a sweeping
personal triumph for the ex-president. Yrigoyen popular
vote was twice as large as that received by his leading
opponent, Melo. In Mendoza, where the Lencinists and
conservatives supported rival slates, Yrigoyen won by a
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much smaller margin than his national percentage. Even so,
this marked the first electoral defeat for Lencinism since
1918. San Juan, on the other hand, gave a clear majority
to Melo, the only province to do so, but here of course,
the Yrigoyenists, aware of their disadvantage had abstained
from the election. "^^
As feared by the Lencinists and Bloquists, the
Personalist victory meant that their days in power were
numbered. The fate of the governments of Alejandro Orfila
and Aldo Cantoni was as certain as the sun which rose
everyday in the east. The Yrigoyenists had been pressing
since 192? for Congress to vote a federal intervention in
San Juan, but without result. With the support of the
conservatives they had been successful in blocking
acceptance of the credentials of Cantoni and Porto as
Senators-elect. But the election of April 1 opened the
door of political opportunity for which the Personalists
15 The election returns in Mendoza were: UCR
Personalist 27,323 votes; UCR Lencinist 20,166. Canton,
Materiales para el estudio
,
II, p. 114. In San Juan
the returns were: UCR Bloquist 19,594; Socialist Party
6,001. Pablo Alberto del Carril Quiroga, Antecedentes
electorales nacionales . Distrito San Juan , 1927-1943
(Cordoba, 1948), n.p. For this election the Bloquists
formed two other political organizations, called Comite
Pro-Ferrocarril a Calingasta and Comite Pro-Perrocarril
a Jachal. The Socialists impugned this maneuver, for its
purpose was to give the Cantonists both the majority and
the minority seats. Therefore, the electoral judge
declared the election void. Ibid . , pp. 233-243.
^Siputados , 1927, I, 752-779 (June 22).
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had been waiting since 1922.-^'^
The new Congress, where the Yrigoyenists enjoyed a
larger voice in 1928, especially in the Chamber of
Deputies, proceeded to debate the sending of an
intervention to San Juan, even before Yrigoyen's
inauguration. These debates constituted another chapter
in the continuing three-way struggle between the Cuyano
populist movements on the one hand and their enemies, the
Yrigoyenists and the conservatives. The terms used by the
anti-Cantonists in Congress to characterize the Bloquists
and their leaders, marked a special chapter in Argentine
congressional annals. A collection of all the words
expressed to denigrate the Sanjuanino movement would
comprise an anthology of hatred very seldom, if ever,
leveled at a provincial political force and a provincial
caudillo. Cantoni was depicted, among other things, as a
despot, madman and a monster, the ruler of a "sinister
mafia," who was only satisfied with the blood of his
enemies
•
17Jorge Calle wrote to Carlos V/ashington that
Yrigoyen had decided that no Senator from the opposition
coming from a province won by the Personalists would be
accepted in the Upper House. Calle also told Lencinas
that Diego Luis Molinari had said informally, but for
everybody inside Congress to hear, that Yrigoyen would
dissolve the Senate if this body accepted the credentials
of Cantoni and Porto. Jorge Calle to Carlos Washington
Lencinas, April 21, 1928. Correspondence in the hands of
Antulio Lencinas.
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The Yrigoyenist position was based on the uncompromising
principle that after the assassination of Governor Jones
nothing legal had occurred in San Juan. They repeated this
point over and over; after November 20, 1921, nothing
legal happened in San Juan, absolutely nothing. The
Yrigoyenists were committed to the view that Bloquism and
the Cantonis had done nothing in accordance with the law.
Thus, the representatives of the Radical Personalists who
proclaimed themselves to be defending the rights of lower
segments, the "causa," ignored whatever positive action
might have taken place socially in San Juan under Bloquism.
The Rinconada affair marked for them a fundamental dividing
line. Since Jones' death, stated the Yrigoyenist Deputy
A. Gonzalez Zimmerman, "all the political life of San Juan,
all the rights and guarantees of the people, all the
institutions, have been under the sole jurisdiction of the
federal government and National Congress." Hence, from the
Personalist perspective, San Juan had been in theory, and
was now placed in fact, under a kind of "super-intervention."
Dissenting from the Personalist view, the Socialist
Adolfo Dickmann contended that not all the blame should be
placed upon the Cantonis' shoulders, for the real enemy of
San Juan was the abject condition and misery of the poor.
More responsible for the conditions in San Juan than the
Cantonis, Dickmann added, were
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the spurious capitalists of San Juan, who duringthe long years they ruled that province never
^
Whafdid th^r.' the'lower seS?o?s.
San Tu^n 2 the wealthy class of
the i^l%r ^^^i^^^^a^sing a fortune thanks totariff protection? When the federal
commissioner [BroquenJ went to San Juan, the
i^'L^^^^'^^''^''^^^'^ was to demand the
w^Si minimum wage act; they wanted
and fLlT'^ '^^^ P^^^^^ pesoa half, as during the "Regimen"
In the National Senate the Yrigoyenists emphasized that
the election of April 1928 had constituted a plebiscite
,
and as such, nothing contrary to the will of the majority
could prevail any longer. Therefore, the anti-Cantonist
rhetoric was tinted with grave epithets. The Cantonists
were branded "pigmeos morales," "gangsters," " zaparrastrosos
turned wealthy," "criminals." For Senator Molinari, of the
Federal Capital, Cantoni's rule represented the "most dismal,
ominous and darkest era of any civilized nation." The fiery
Yrigoyenist Senator also predicted that Federico Cantoni,
"Jones' assassin," would never rule San Juan again. "^^
President Alvear approved the intervention law a few
days before ending his term, but it was left to President
Yrigoyen to appoint the federal commissioner. His choice
was Modestino Pizarro, a former Radical member of the Buenos
The intervention bill passed in the House with the
support of the Yrigoyenists and the conservatives against
the anti-Personalists and the Socialists. The only
Socialist in the Senate, Mario Bravo, did not cast his
vote. Diputados
,
1928, II, 264-334 (July 13); 384-448 (July
18); III, 24-36 (Sept. 24 and 25); 804 (Sept. 30).
Senadores
,
1928, I, 583-649 (Sept. 20). Deputy Dickmann's
quotation is on p. 302.
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Aires province legislature. The instructions issued to
Pizarro stated that he should perform his duties
providing "the most complete freedom and political
guarantees," as well as with "absolute impartiality . "^^
But words aside, the political climate of San Juan was
especially tense. Now for the first time Cantoni's enemies
had both control of the provincial government and the
support of the federal power to offset the numerical
superiority enjoyed by the Bloquists. Any hopes that the
intervention could bring peace and stability to the
province was illusory.
The arbitrariness of the Pizarro intervention,
exemplified in the persecution and harassment of Yrigoyen's
opponents, opened a new cycle of repression and political
intolerance in San Juan. Furthermore, the economic
situation took a turn for the worse in 1929. The wine
industry was severely affected an unemployment, which had
been non-existent during the Cantoni governments, added
another somber note to the deteriorating provincial scene.
Violence only encouraged more arbitrariness as evidenced
in the primitive way in which domestic political quarrels
were settled.
The mad rush of the intervention and the tenacious
opposition against Yrigoyen lowered a temporary mantle of
^%inisterio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interior, 1928-1929 (Buenos Aires, 192^77 P. 21.
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forgetfulness over the reproaches made against the
Cantonists ia the past by the non-Personalists adversaries
Of Bloquism. Before they had been assailed as executioners,
now they were becoming martyrs. ^0 But in spite of the
growing tribulations, Pederico Cantoni continued enjoying
the fervor of his supporters as firmly as ever. "The
chinos know three things that are essential for them,"
reported a special correspondent sent by La Prensa to
analyze the situation in San Juan,
that their salaries have been raised, that their
working hours have been shortened, and that the
chief of the party takes care of them in his
medical office, free of charge, and that if they
need it, he gives them the medicine, also
without charge. 21
The province of Mendoza, sharing San Juan's fate, was
also placed under the federal intervention.^^ Yrigoyen
appointed Carlos A. Borzani, a trusted aide and long-time
Yrigoyenist from Buenos Aires province, as commissioner.
20In February 1929, while Aldo Cantoni was brought
from the jail to the court house, there was an attempt
against his life, but it failed. Later on, the
assassination of Manuel Ignacio Castellanos, a lawyer for
the Bloquist leaders in jail, including Aldo Cantoni; in
February 1930, strained even more the antagonistic
relationship between the intervention and its opponents.
^•^La Prensa
,
February 6,1929.
22
The congressional debates brought to light the
old familiar charges against lencinism. And it vms almost
defenseless, in the Chamber of Deputies there was only
one Lencinist member, none in the Senate. Diputados ,
1928, II, 649-720 (July 26); 738-757 (July 27). Sonadores ,
1928, I, 654-678 (Sept. 22).
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This marked the first time that Mendoza fell properly into
Yrigoyen's hands since in his first administration Jose
Nestor Lencinas had run the provincial Radical Party and
the government with considerable independence from Buenos
Aires. The federal intervention meant hard times for the
Lencinists, for they, like the Bloquists, became the open
target of police repression. Although in theory the
federal commissioner was instructed to guarantee all
liberties and to fulfill his duties in the shortest
2possible time, his unwritten purpose was to achieve the
political destruction of Lencinism. This was evidenced by
the constant harassment of its leaders, a fact acknowledged
by a sympathetic Yrigoyen's biographer, who stated that
"the decent Radicals are repugnant to the atrocities
which were committed and are committed in San Juan and
24.
Mendoza.
The popularity of the Lencinist movement had in fact
been diminishing largely as a result of the unfortunate
administration of Alejandro Orfila. However, it now began
to experience a political revival as a reaction to the
cruel position in which it was cornered by the Yrigoyenists.
The repressive nature of the intervention and the growing
economic crisis helped to lift the fallen image of the
^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno , VI, p. 491.
^^Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen , p. 427.
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Lencinists.
A few months after Borzani was in power, Carlos
Washington complained to the Minister of the Interior
about the persecution against his party carried out
throughout Mendoza. The continuation of such a policy,
warned the Mendozan caudillo, "could degenerate into
deplorable events, and might eventually affect the social
and political peace of Argentina. "^^
The National Senate Rebuffs Regional Populism
While the main assault against the Cuyano populist
bastions was being carried out by the interventors within
the provincial borders, the National Senate once again
provided the stage for a public confrontation between the
Yrigoyenist national spokesmen and the defiant popular
leaders. The issue was again the credentials of the Senators-
elect of Mendoza and San Juan, Carlos Washington Lencinas,
Federico Cantoni and Carlos Porto, As noted before, they
had been named Senators again by the respective provincial
legislatures in 1927, but during 1928 no action had been
taken on their credentials. Only in July 1929 did the
Senate begin to study them in earnest. The resulting
political debates greatly contributed to the gradual
La. Prensa , March 7, 1929. Lencinas also regretted
that Mendoza v/as again absorbed by the portenismo , a direct
allusion to the large number of public officials from the
Federal Capital, and some from La Plata, brought in by the
intervention. There was widespread resentment among the
Mendozans at being governed by "forasteros , " people from
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paralysis which was taking hold of the executive and
legislative branches of the Federal Government
.
The great excitement aroused in 192? when Cantoni's
credentials were first considered and rejected, was minor
compared to what now was taking place. Several weeks were
devoted to the discussion of the credentials of Cantoni
and Porto. On the days when the Senate met, a large
crowd congregated around the entrance of the building, on
Victoria Street (later renamed Hipolito Yrigoyen). The
President's supporters comprised a large majority of the
spectators. From an improvised tribune set up just
across the Senate entrance, their heated words helped
create a climate of anxiety and expectation, and
demonstrated an open hostility against the anti-Personalist
Senators, especially Leopoldo Kelo. Indeed, the first
scheduled session to discuss the credentials had to be
called off because the anti-Personalist Senators refused
to walk through this hostile gathering to reach the Congress
In contrast with the usual empty galleries for the public,
all the tickets available to people wishing to attend the
meetings had been given away well in advance, and, once
another region, a situation which even led a small group of
Yrigoyenists of Mendoza to take an anti-J3orzani position.
^^Ramon Columba, a direct observer of such barren
political performance, as a member of the staff, recalled
that the senatorial hall looked like "el patio de un
inquilinato con ocupantes desunidos que se sacan los
trapitos al sol." El congreso que yo he visto , II, p. 197.
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more, the entire building was invaded by curious spectators
filling halls and corridors. Congress was placed under
strict security and even the newspaper correspondents were
frisked. La Nacion, a severe critic of Bloquism, explained
that such popular commotion was due to the fact that
"people who had never attended a legislative debate were
anxious to watch the great congressional scandal. "^'^
The unusual show outside Congress had its counterpart
in the Senate hall itself. The traditional three warning
bells at the disposal of the President of the Senate to
keep the sessions in order, but which still allowed
journalists to hear the tempestuous arguments on the floor,
were reinforced with three additional bells. They deafened
all voices and were used several times at the peak of the
most heated debates. Cantoni displayed the same oratorical
characteristics that he had in 1927, but now the words
exchanged by the two opposing sides were more cutting than
ever. In contrast to the stereotyped language of protocol
usual to the Senate, Cantoni 's rhetorical style was
distinguished by its blatant sincerity; it seemed as if he
were talking informally around the table in a bar. At
times, his picturesque phrases even prompted the laughter
of the Yrigoyenists themselves. La Razon referred to his
28
unorthodox language as a "cult of vulgarity."
^'^La Nacion, July 19, 1929.
^^La Razon
,
July 23, 1929. A correspondent from the
pro-conservative newspaper El Pais , of Cordoba, reported
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The newspaper Critica, which had been the loyal
spokesman of Cantoni in the Federal Capital since he had
been jailed in 1921, maintained all out support for the
Bloquists. This enhanced very significantly the
personality of the Sanjuanino caudillo in Buenos Aires. ^9
In response to the criticisms made of Cantoni 's style
during the debates, Critica asked since when had being
frank and honest, and calling things by their proper
names become anti-parlamentarian. There was nothing
strange in Cantoni 's language, argued Critica on another
occasion, because this was the way he always talked with
the workers and farmers. The real anomaly, it added,
would have been if Cantoni had made academic speeches.
The Vice President of the nation, Enrique Martinez,
who chaired all the Senate meetings on the San Juan
credentials, reprimanded Cantoni on several occasions
about Cantoni: "if this man governs as he speaks—and it
is the most probable—we realize why he has so many
adversaries." But the correspondent also added that
Cantoni referred to matters known to all members in
Congress but never mentioned before. David Paredes, La
demagogia en accion . Fisonomla del confireso argentine
,
1929-1930 (Buenos Aires, 1937), p. 139.
OQ
The impact of the role played by Critica on
this occasion can be measured by its large circulation.
On June 29, 1929, this paper issued a record 529,669
copies. Moreover, Critica published in full Cantoni 's
speeches in the Senate.
Critica
,
July 24, 1929.
^^Ibid.
,
July 27, 1929.
433
for using such unparliamentary language, "el viejo
Irigoyen" in referring to the President of Argentina, or
calling the Personalist wing of the Radical Party the
"Partido Peludista," or "Peludismo, " and for alluding
to the famous presidential "amansadora, " the waiting room
at the government house, as "Juntando orines."^^
The Yrigoyenists, however, were well on the way to
getting even with the Cantonists. They had disposed of
them in San Juan through the federal intervention, and
now they felt was the time to liquidate them in the
33Senate. The most severe clash of the long debates took
place between Diego Luis Molinari and Cantoni. Prom the
outset Molinari had voiced the Personalist position with
impressive clarity: "Never, never will Cantoni and
32After one of the most tumultuous meetings. La
Nacion reported that in the number and caliber of
insults exchanged between the two sides, it could be
compared with nothing in the past. July 24, 1929. La
Vanguardia
,
July 29, 1929, called the debates "la
payada—a singers* duel
—
parlamentaria. " Interest in
the meetings was so great that the Chamber of Deputies
could not meet on several occasions for lack of a
quorum because so many members had gone to the Senate to
follow the debates.
-^•^In May 1929 the Personalists had requested,
without success, that Cantoni and Porto's credentials be
filed because theirs were "dirty credentials," and as
such, non-existent. Senadores , 1929, I, 17-28 (May 13).
Manuel Galvez stated that before the credentials were
discussed in Congress in 1929, President Yrigoyen told
some friends that "the people should go to the Senate
to prevent Cantoni 's admission." The President, said
Galvez, could not think anyone being indifferent in this
matter. Vida _de Hip5lito Yrigoyen , p. 415.
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Lencinas be seated in the Senate "adding
straightforwardly that "there is not one single Argentine
who can deny that Lencinas is a thief and that Cantoni is
a murderer." As the Yrigoyenists had repeatedly pointed
out, their fundamental objection to accepting the
Bloquists was the Rinconada murder in 1921. Neither peace
nor pardon would be possible, Molinari asserted, until
the guilty men were duly punished. His extreme antagonism
to Cantoni was illustrated in the somber image he painted
of the Sanjuanino caudillo, at the time he assumed power in
1923: "...thirsty for revenge, he looked like an
exacerbated wild animal, with his reddish mouth and
blood-filled eyes.... At his side, corpses were lying, but
this was not important...."
Cantoni spoke at a great length in defense of his own
credentials. For four and a half consecutive sessions his
speech monopolized the attention. His words, sometimes
caustic and impassioned, at other times candid and
unruffled, filled hundreds of pages of the congressional
record as he offered a justification of his actions, and
explained the tenets of his pragmatic political principles.
He began his extensive defense by recalling his early steps
in the Radical Party, and the influence exerted upon him
by Jose Nestor Lencinas. Cantoni stressed the firm attitude
taken by the Mendozan leader, who had not hesitated to
confront Yrigoyen when the President attempted to usurp for
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hiw own advantage the political priaciples of Radicalism.
As for his rule in San Juan, Cantoni reiterated the
norms which guided his government at the grass roots
level, such as his permanent advice to his comprovincianoa
to work the land instead of seeking non-remunerative and
unchallenging jobs in the government. More poignantly,
Cantoni leveled severe criticism against negative
characteristics of the provincial society. Why, for
instance, did the Bloquists allow most doctors in the
interior of the province to be foreigners practicing
without Argentine certification? Because the cri olios
were leisure-lovers, comedos
, affirmed Cantoni, and they
were unwilling to make the sacrifice of living in the
countryside. Moreover, the criollo population seemed
content with being cured with herbs, but the gringos
wanted to have a doctor and proper medicine, otherwise
they would not go to live in the interior.
The Bloquist leader pointed out how he had introduced
courses in the provincial schools dealing with practical
activities. Likewise, Cantoni emphasized his preoccupation
with providing jobs for every person in San Juan. But at
the same time he questioned the usefulness of having a
growing number of idle doctors, lawyers and engineers when,
by working the land, anyone could improve his economic
position and therefore, be politically independent.
When Cantoni referred to the masses, he specifically
436
included women. He was concerned with the practical means
to promote their social and economic advancement, such as
training them to work in factories that processed
agricultural products. Through economic independence a
woman would have a catalytic effect on her family life
because
li^i'tf ^ r?''^^ '^'^''^^ instill in her husbandan attachment toward their home, helping him ingiving up the habit of getting drunk in a ^ulperla,
when he finds his rancho in a miserable condition,
where even the bare essentials for life are
unavailable.
Such were the shameful conditions, added Cantoni,
prevalent in the Argentine provinces. The solution, as he
saw it, was to promote the role of the State as a social
protector under special circumstances, like assisting the
needy in general, and the elderly in particular,
because if the Yrigoyenists believe it is necessary
to give retirement pay to bank personnel and those
in the armed forces after thirty years of service,
besides granting them other important benefits, the
Sanjuaninos also believe that the government has
the obligation to avoid a situation where the
unfortunate people have to beg to survive.
Recognizing that certain habits were deeply rooted
at all social levels, Cantoni defended the high licence tax
imposed by the Bloquists on gambling activities. We cannot
stop people from gambling "even if we jail them," he said,
"they will bet to see who spits farther or whose spittle
dries sooner." Therefore, Cantoni believed it reasonable
that the State should have an important share of the
gambling revenue, to use for the general welfare.
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The Sanjuanino caudillo also underscored the importance
of having established in San Juan a school-home for unwed
mothers and abandoned children, so they could learn how to
protect themselves in life. "Because in our country,"
Cantoni stated, "when a woman gets into trouble, the first
thing her family does is to throw her out of the house."
Delving into political matters Cantoni replied to the
Personalists assertion that the 1928 electoral landslide
gave Yrigoyen a free hand to "regenerate" the provincial
governments, by demanding that Buenos Aires observe a fair
play rule. If the Yrigoyenists had been elected to govern
the nation, it was their right to do it. For the same
reason, however, since the Bloquists had been elected by
the majority of the people to rule San Juan, the popular
will had to be respected. If the people were really
sovereign in selecting who would govern them, this
principle had to be applied at the provincial level as
well as the national level, "because there is no difference
between a Yrigoyen for the nation and a Perico de los
Palotes in the provinces."
Trying to dispel the charges that he ruled his party
autocratically, Cantoni explained to the Senate the
organic structure of the Union Civica Radical Bloquista. In
contrast to the procedures followed by the Personalist
Radicals, Cantoni stated that
^^Perico de los Palotes is an expression meaning
any undetermined person.
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We wrote a party platform, because we believethat in order to ask a citizen for his vote itIS imperative to inform him what we hoplto'
^res?de?ifnf\J^' government. We believe that ap i nt oi the nation, that a governor of aprovince, is not an individual without
obligations toward his supporters, but a manwho must introduce himself to the people with am l^'' program in his hand; because the peopleare tired of only listening to rhetorical
I^f^^S^^!-,^^^^^ "^^^ constitution, the fatherlandana the flag.
Close to the end of the long debate Cantoni added a
note of caution, warning the Yrigoyenists not to lead
Argentina into a dead end:
$he friends of the president, jubilant in their
victory, do not realize that they are pushing the
country—more by the actions of the
incondicionales that surround the President than
by his ov/n lack of capacity—towards a collapse
which unfortunately, may set the country back
for many years to come.
While the main debate lay between Cantoni and the
Yrigoyenists, other sectors had a chance to express their
viewpoints. The position of the Socialist Party on the
credentials issue was voiced by its lone Senator, Mario
Bravo, who represented the Federal Capital. Like Cantoni,
Bravo noted the wide gap which had separated the patron
from the worker in San Juan, the latter being economically
impoverished by meager wages and politically subordinated
to the will of his employer. Bravo recognized the major
accomplishments of the Bloquists, especially women's
suffrage, the minimum wage, the 8-hour maximum and the
pension for the aged. But Bravo did question the value of
these social benefits when accompanied by a general
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curtailment of political freedom and basic civil rights,
and the establishment of a rigid, autocratic government!
In his final analysis Bravo considered that the mockery
which Cantoni and his men had made of law and order in
San Juan, was a strong and sufficient enough reason to
persuade him against accepting the Senators-elect
credentials.
The great expectation about the final outcome of
the debates ended when the Socialist Mario Bravo
expressed his opinion supporting the rejection of the
credentials. Critica appealed to Bravo to sustain the
position he and Juan B. Justo—who had died in 1928 had
taken during the credentials debate of 192? in favor of
accepting the Senators-elect from San Juan. But it was in
vain, for by a vote of 13 to 12 the Senate rejected a
motion to postpone the discussion of the credentials until
San Juan returned to a constitutional rule. This vote
sealed the fate of Cantoni and Porto's senatorial hopes. -^^
15A sepulchral silence was observed while the
Senators voiced their crucial vote. V/hen it ended, the
people jamming the gallery exploded with wild enthusiasm.
Later that night, the Yrigoyenist followers improvised a
parade through the popular Avenida de Llayo in celebration
of the Senate decision. La Prensa
,
August 3» 1929. The
debates for Cantoni 's credentials were S enadores , 1929, I,
59-63 (June 25); 107-110 (July 4); 117-127 (July 11);
129-191 (July 16); 193-220 (July 18); 287-309 (July 20);
315-342 (July 23); 345-388 (July 25); 423-461 (July 27);
466-496 July 30); 497-548 (July 31); 549-616 (Aug. 1);
617-692 (Aug. 2).
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Certainly, Bravo- s vote would have reversed the final
result. The Socialist Senator consequently became the
target of bitter criticism from the Bloquists for his
attitude. La Vanguardia
, on the other hand, carried a
campaign in defense of Bravo' s position, and labeled as
"a misguided interpretation" the Bloquist charges that
Bravo had "sold" Cantoni. The Socialist newspaper claimed
that the Bloquist view blurred the real issue in dispute,
because under the pretext of raising a banner against
Yrigoyen, the country was taking the risk of creating a
national figure out of a caudillo far more dangerous than
Yrigoyen.
The Senate decision on Cantoni 's credentials made
clear the outcome of Lencinas' diploma. Carlos Washington
made an extensive and detailed defense of his government
during the Senate debates. But he had to face grave
accusations of administrative corruption during his term
as governor and for the huge fees he collected while being
a lawyer for the Provincial Bank. Given the mood of the
Yrigoyenists and conservatives, there was nothing the
"gauchito" could do to offset the adverse decision of the
^7Upper House.
36La Vanguardia, August 6, 1929.
Senadores, 1929, I, 139-190 (Sept. 10); 300-325
(Sept. 19); 351-390 (Sept. 20); 398-402 (Sept. 23);
499-585 (Sept. 25).
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After the distressing Senate experience, Lencinism
and Bloquism had to travel the road of adversity. Unlike
1927, the rejection of their leaders' credentials left
them without any official base. In 1927 the two
caudillos had the support of their respective provincial
governments, and their legislatures could insist on
appointing them National Senators. Now, both provinces
were in the hands of their foremost enemy. Making the
situation even gloomier, their followers were the target
of constant harassment by the intervention authorities.
Left powerless in the patria chica as well as in Buenos
Aires, they had to resume the uphill road from the llano.
lencinism: On the Road to Nowhere
The Personalists, at last, had avenged the old wounds
inflicted by the Cuyano movements. But the ills of the
year-old interventions in Mendoza and San Juan were
seriously damaging the Yrigoyenist image. This raised anew
the hopes of Lencinism and Bloquism that they might regain
power in a future electoral confrontation. The gross
abuses of both interventions were especially helpful to
the Lencinists, for in terms of prestige they were in a
30
much weaker position than a few years before.
Carlos Washington seemed to be aware of his more
^ Edmundo Correas stated in his reference to this
period that the procedures of the intervention were
"retrogrades y barbaros." "Historia de Mendoza," p. 502.
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exposed position, for his views oa the way to handle public
affairs underwent a dramatic change. In theory, at least,
he diassociated himself from many of the policies he had
observed while in office. "Ten years of active political
action and many bitter experiences," Carlos Washington
said in an interview with La Nacion, "have changed many of
my old beliefs." Among other things, he was critical of
the previous Lencinist policy toward the Judiciary, which
curtailed its basic independence to perform justice. He
advocated that the Judiciary Review Board should seat
representatives from the opposition, a view which the
three Lencinist governments had flatly rejected when they
were in power. Carlos Washington also stressed the need
to create the Tribunal de Cuentas, to check handling of
public funds—as required by the 1916 provincial
constitution, but never implemented. He urged the
transformation of the Provincial Bank into a semi-private
institution, a pledge voiced by him and his father many
times in the past, without practical results. Lencinas
also stated that his party was the friend of the worker,
but added that it was equally the friend of capital, thus,
greatly softening the tone of the old propaganda tirades
which helped so much to shape the Lencinist image in
earlier times. Finally, Carlos Washington asserted that
he had already shown that he had the personal qualities
to serve as leader of a party. Now, he said, as youth
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paved the way for a mature mind, his ambition was to become,
above all, a statesman.
Meanwhile, in Llendoza, Judge Alberto Gomez Cabrera-
the executioner arm of the Borzani intervention-had issued
a warrant charging Carlos Washington with political
corruption and maladministration during his governorship.
Without the shield of congressional immunity, the Lencinist
leader faced the certainty of arrest once he returned to
his province.
After the Senate rejected his credentials, Carlos
Washington's mood continued very sour against Yrigoyen. But
he was confident that the deteriorating national political
situation was brewing the possibility of a change. "It is
simple to predict the future of the government," he wrote
to a political friend and leader of the party, "for it is
losing prestige day by day." The signs of corruption could
be seen everywhere; rumblings of protest filled the air,
sometimes soft as a rumor, sometimes openly shouted.
According to Lencinas, the old timers recalled that the
same symptoms had been present in 1890, just before the
crisis. There was a general malaise then, sometimes felt
very strongly, sometimes mildly, but alv/ays in crescendo.
Carlos Washington expressed in his letter that he
was planning his return to Kendoza once he had settled a
39La Nacion, April 25, 1929.
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suit against him/^ 3^, concerned about the attitude
the commissioner would assume, as well as about the
uncertainties ahead for his movement. "I don't know if the
miserable people of the intervention will arrest me later
hijunagranput_a Gomez Cabrera will be anxious to
lay his hands on me." Anyhow, asserted Lencinas, "we will
have the pleasure of attending the funeral of this rotten
government, for the people are getting sick of it, more
and more every day."^"^
On October 17, 1929, Carlos Washington sent a
telegram to Yrigoyen complaining of new arrests of party
members in Mendoza. He indicated to the President his
pessimism about a possible change in the policy of the
intervention. But he wanted public opinion to know about
his unanswered appeals to the Federal Government, in order
"to defend myself and my party against the 'barbarism' of
AO
the provincial police."
In Mendoza the Lencinists began to plan for the
forthcoming return of Carlos Washington. The Yrigoyenists
were incredulous that Lencinas would risk a return to his
Francisco Benavidez, President Yrigoyen' s secretary
had sued Lencinas for libel based on the terms he had used
in the Senate.
^"^Carlos Washington Lencinas to Jorge Albarracin
Godoy, Buenos Aires, October 15, 1929. Lencinas considered
that the years ending with zero had witnessed grave
developments in Argentine history, and he looked to 1930
with the expectation that it would mark the end of
"peludism.
"
"^^La Prensa, October 18, 1929.
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province. A vitriolic Yrigoyenist paper predicted that
Lencinas would not be able to return for twenty years,
until all his judicial troubles had ended.
On November 8, a federal judge in Buenos Aires
ruled in favor of Lencinas with regard to Benavidez'
accusation, thus clearing the last legal obstacle to his
immediate return. However, as the proximity of Carlos
Washington's trip increased, so did tension and
anxiety in Mendoza. In an effort to avoid public
demonstration by the Lencinists, the police prohibited
any rally welcoming the caudillo. Applauding this
decision, La Voz Provincial urged that any violation of
that order be crushed by whatever means were
44
necessary.
Lencinas' concern for his homecoming trip was
heightened by an anonymous phone call he received in
Buenos Aires warning him that an attempt on his life
would be made upon his arrival in Mendoza. In response
to this threat Lencinas at once sent a telegram to the
President, alerting him to the potential disturbance he
might encounter and placing all responsibility squarely on
Yrigoyen's conscience. "Before I depart for Mendoza,"
Lencinas said,
Zi^ Voz Provincial (Mendoza), October 24, 1929
This partisan publication referred to the Mendozan
caudillo as Carlos "Chicago" Lencinas, connecting him
with the style of the mafia in that American city.
44La Voz Provincial, November 9, 1929.
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Lthoritiernf ^^^J^^i^g to some accounts, theauth ties of the intervention, under your
Mendoza'wJ??^^''' ^^nounced that my arrival inraena will be prevented, even if to do so thev
oir.y violence. I do not knowrofcou se, the extreme measures the intervention
may take.... Perhaps these rumors are only anintimidation plan.... But if instead of beinp theexpression of a churlish policy, they are in fact
nT^Pn^'"^"" l^'t "'^'^ repression prevalentin Mendoza, which has voided all rights andIreedoms, it is Your Excellency who must take allthe required steps to prevent any excess, if youdo not wish to assume before the nation the
responsibility for whatever might happen upon my
arrival in Mendoza, in case there is an attempt
against my life.... 45 ^
The President did not take the situation lightly.
Through the Minister of the Interior he ordered the
intervention authorities in Mendoza^^ to revoke the
prohibition against a rally welcoming Lencinas, and to
take all necessary precautions to avoid any disturbance,
no matter which kind of provocation was given by the
Lencinists.
On Sunday, November 10, La Nacion reported the
observations of its Kendozan correspondent written the day
before. He indicated that there was widespread belief that
Lencinas would be arrested when the train entered the
province, and that a number of Lencinists were to board
the train in the city of San Luis in order to prevent the
arrest of their caudillo. The dispatch from Mendoza
45La Prensa, November 10, 1929.
^^Commissioner Borzani was outside Mendoza, and
Alfredo Sosa was replacing him.
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concluded that "this aofpntnc+oo aoi ib cce xuates the impression that
tomorrow grave events would occur. ••'^'^
Lencinas and his entourage arrived at Kendoza on the
afternoon of November 10. In traditional fashion, he was
warmly greeted by the multitude, although some provocative
Yrigoyenist groups were also in the vicinity. With Carlos
Washington in front of the people, as was their custom,
the Lencinists marched in civic procession the ten blocks
separating the Pacific Railroad station from the Circulo
de Armas. From a balcony of the Circulo party leaders
addressed the people gathered in the street and in the
adjacent San Martin Plaza. Then, in a split second, while
the orator preceding him was winding up his speech,
Lencinas was shot from a short distance. A tremendous
confusion ensued v/ith more guns being displayed and more
shots terrorizing the area. In a few seconds the peaceful
welcome home rally had turned into a nightmare. Carlos
Washington was hurried to a hospital but he was already
dead. Jose Caceres, the person who shot Lencinas, died
the following day, victim of the shots fired at him in
the aftermath.
Suddenly, the threats and warnings of the last few
days and the nervous exchange of telegrams gained dramatic
relevance. Mendoza and the whole nation were shocked into
disbelief and engulfed in consternation at the
^'^La Nacion, November 10, 1929.
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assassination of Carlos Washington.
Who was responsible for what happened? The heavy
burden of responsibility for the death of the popular
Mendozan caudillo fell inevitably upon the intervention
authorities and on President Yrigoyen. The reports from
acting-Commissioner Sosa to the national government
provided the official explanation for Lencinas' ill-fated
return. According to the investigation of the Mendozan
police, Lencinas had had relations with Caceres' wife,
and Caceres had sworn to take revenge. Thus, the
intervention concluded, Lencinas' assassination had
nothing to do with politics, but was merely the act of an
aggrieved and desperate individual who tried to take
justice into his own hands against a man who had violated
4.Rhis honor.
The Yrigoyenist press, both in Mendoza and Buenos
Aires, adhered to this interpretation of the event.
However, the non-Yrigoyenist publications throughout the
country granted this view very little credence. Dismayed
by Lencinas' tragic end, the more important newspapers in
the Federal Capital and the interior attributed the crime
to the growing mood of intolerance which, late in 1929,
49
was undermining the political life of the nation.
^^Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interior, 1929-1930 (Buenos Aires, 193077 pp. 44-4b.
49Jose Hipolito Lencinas stated that Yrigoyen was
449
President Yrigoyea ordered a special inquiry into
the assassination, and appointed the Minister of Public
Education and Justice, Juan de la Campa, to take charge.
A few days later, de la Campa concluded his analysis of
the situation and reported to the President that the cause
for Lencinas' death was that previously reported by the
intervention authorities. The government had gathered
testimonial support from people who asserted they had
heard Caceres promising to take revenge against Carlos
Washington. Prom the Judicial viewpoint, since both
Lencinas and Caceres were dead, the investigation led to
no other conclusion and, accordingly, the case was
officially closed. Justice had been evaded once again.
The case was not closed, however, in political
circles or for a large part of the public. Except for the
core, ultra-partisan Yrigoyenist newspapers, there was
general revulsion over the crime. Most of the press
the moral author of his brother's death. Carlos Washin/^ton
Lencinas . Realidad, mision ^ future de una epoea
, p. 149,
50Minister de la Campa' s report is in Ministerio del
Interior, Memoria
,
1929-1930, pp. 49-55.
An Argentine author lends support to the view that
the assassins of Lencinas were the "gansos," the
conservatives. But he does not indicate any evidence
thereof. Roberto Juarez, Atentados poll ticos en la
Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1970), pp. 285-286. This
author' s account of the assassination of Amable Jones
(pp. 252-257), and Carlos V/ashington Lencinas (pp. 279-
286), contains several factual errors.
450
concurred in the view that Lencinas' political
assassination was a step back into the past era of
caudillism. They also agreed that despite the criticism
Lencinas deserved, he was the standardbearer of the
popular sectors of Mendoza and because he was a politician
of tremendous popular persuasion, he still would have had
much to offer in public life.^^
The Mendozan movement had been built around the all-
encompassing personalities of Jose Nestor and Carlos
Washington Lencinas. Reflecting on the political significance
Of the tragedy befalling the UGH Lencinista, their followers
asserted that the movement already had its apostle in Jose
Nestor Lencinas and now it had its martyr in Carlos
Washington. "Two are now," they proclaimed, "los muertos
que raandanl"
51Lencinas was killed three days before his 41st
birthday. His brother Jose Hipolito made public the
maneuvers by which the federal intervention was promising
freedom for all Lencinists in jail if the three Lencinas
brothers were away from Mendoza until after an election
was held. La Prensa, November 12, 1929.
5 2La Accion (General Alvear, Mendoza), November 23,
1929. This Lencinist newspaper of southern Mendoza
published a verse, among the many from Lencinist inspiration,
entitled "The dead who lives," which partially said:
Noble gaucho que ya has muerto
de cuerpo, pero no de alma;
hoy la provincia te llama
porque fuiste el defensor
del pueblo trabajador
en esta tierra cuyana
Padre fuiste para el pobre
y noble para el obrero
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The repercussions of the Mendozan event on national
politics were felt in the deepening of the breach between
Yrigoyenists and anti-Yrigoyenists. The possibility of
any kind of accommodation between the opposing sides now
appeared remote. After the enactment of the Saenz Pena
law, Argentina had entered into a period of reform
politics. Although slowly, the electorate had been moving
forward in making political tolerance a fact of civic
life. The return of Yrigoyen to power in 1928, however,
had awakened old animosities and generated new tensions.
These were evidenced in the growing want of forbearance
as reflected in street riots in Buenos Aires in October
1929. But Lencinas' assassination evoked the fear that
the worst evils of caudillism
—
personalism and blind
support by followers—were becoming entrenched in the
dominant political forces in Argentina.
y ahora, el pecho lleno
de tus memorias divinas
te vivan, por ser soldados
del batallon de lencinas.
Para nosotros no has muerto
noble Guasinton Lencinas
porque tu alma querida
palpita entre los cuyanos
fuiste generoso y bravo
y p'al obrero, un hermano
Ya termino esta versada
y una plegaria te envio,
porque fuiste un noble amigo
en estas tierras andinas
mis lagrimas son tu sangre
porque muero por Lencinas.
The name "Guasinton," for Washington, was the way
in which his name was popularly pronounced. Ibid .
,
January 11, 1930.
452
How did various sectors of opinion view the episode?
Critica placed Lencinas- fate within the larger framework
of national politics. "We are going through a civic
depression," it noted, "that could lead us into the hands of
tyranny or crime." Future historians, Critica warned, would
have to analyze in depth the pathological crisis of the
Argentine democracy . ^-^
Focusing on the general depression gripping Argentina,
Benito Marianetti stated that the idea that Lencinas'
assassination was the work of an enraged individual was not
acceptable. He recalled that when the train passed through
Gutierrez, a town near the capital of the province, someone
shouted from the platform of the railway station: "you are
accompanying a corpse!" The Socialists interpreted this
new outburst of political violence as a result of the
"politica criolla." In their view the "matones Lencinistas"
and "matones Yrigoyenistas" were all products of the same
54.
regressive political school.
la Epoca
,
which did not publish a single word about
Lencinas' funeral, pressed the official interpretation
that Lencinas' death was due to personal revenge, but
soon thereafter switched its emphasis to demonstrating
the humanitarian values for which President Yrigoyen
stood. To that effect, it filled its columns day after
day with documents, letters and manifestos issued years
^^Critica , November 13, 1929.
^^La Vanguardia, November 19, 1929.
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before, stressing the fact that Yrigoyen had always being
a messenger of peace toward his political opponents. ^5
Perhaps National Deputy Nicolas Repetto, a Socialist,
stated the correct views. He did not believe President
Yrigoyen had any advance knowledge of the attempt to
assassinate Carlos Washington. But Repetto thought that
in committing such a crime "someone had wished to
interpret the political conveniences of President
Yrigoyen in Mendoza."^^
The untimely death of Carlos Washington Lencinas
marked the virtual end of Lencinism. Since 1918 the
Mendozan movement had enjoyed the warm support of the
masses, but its image had also been tarnished by its own
excesses while in power. At the end of 1929 Lencinism
55 Spoca reproduced notes sent by Yrigoyen to
the President of the Conservative Party of Kendoza in 1918,
in v/hich he painted the principles of the Radical Party with
glowing colors, as well as the note the President sent to
the Mendozan damas, also early in ^1918, conveying his deep
concern for all human rights. La Epoca also stirred up
support for Yrigoyen by reprinting his decree of November
1921 condemning Governor Jones' assassination. The paper
reproduced the instructions given to the interventors
Borzani and Pizarro to illustrate the political honesty
observed by the Federal Government. The assassination of
Jones suddenly became a very important defensive tool to
stave off the anti-Yrigoyenist sentiment created by
Lencinas' death. In Mendoza, the Yrigoyenist La Voz
Provincial , headed its issue of November 20, 1929: "Today
is the 8th anniversary of the assassination of Dr. Jones
by the Cantoni brothers."
56Diputados
, 1929, lY, 209 (Nov. 20).
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was in the process of regaining its strength in IVlendoza
while Yrigoyenism, all over Argentina, was becoming more
and more a political prisoner of its own growing
shortcomings. But on that fateful November 1929
afternoon, Lencinism was left stranded in a political
limbo from which it never escaped. The leadership of the
Union Civica Radical fell into the hands of Carlos
Washington's brothers, Jose Hipolito and Rafael Nestor.
But they could not duplicate the emotional rapport their
late brother had enjoyed with his followers, and were
unable to cement the movement at a time of acute
political confusion and duress.
The federal interventions in Mendoza and San Juan
continued on their reckless paths, performing their
duties in effect as militant branches of the officialist
party. The words of Interventor Pizarro in San Juan
provide an illustration. Bloquism, he said, "has
inculcated hatred for the people well-dressed," and had
instilled in its supporters the glorification of
57
^ The split which took place in the Lencinist
camp is evident in the candidacies for the governorship
of Mendoza in the February 1946 election. Jose Hipolito
Lencinas headed the Union Civica Radical Lencinista
ticket; Bautista Gargantini, who had been Deputy Governor
during Carlos Washington Lencinas' rule, was the
candidate of the Union Civica Radical; and Faustino
Picallo, who had been a Lencinist leader in the 1920 's
was the candidate of the Peronist coalition.
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barbarism, as exemplified in their war cry "|Vivan los
macho Cantoai!" As during Rosas' times, with the "Hail to
the Restorer of the Laws," added Pizarro, "it chilled the
spine of the • gente de Men'."58 la Prensa
, which had so
often criticized the Cantonists in the not too distant
past, now castigated with the same vehemence the repressive
tactics of the federal authorities in San Juan. It was,
said that newspaper, as if everything in Bloquism was evil
simply for being Bloquist, and as if the virtues of
honorable behavior were at the exclusive domain of the
Personalists.^^
In fact, the national elections held in March 1930
indicated that in Cuyo the political wounds were not
healing but deepening. In Mendoza the lencinists were able
to improve their electoral standing in comparison to the
1928 national election, but the Yrigoyenists polled the
majority of the votes in an election plagued with gross
irregularities. The election in San Juan was an
unbelievable story, for the figures were the reverse of
1928: UCR Personalist 22,672 votes; UCR Bloquista 2,885;
Socialist Party 2,332. These figures are clear evidence
of the incredible electoral farce perpetrated by the
^^Modestino Pizarro, La verdad sobre la intervenci on
en San Juan ( 23 de diciembre de 1928-6 de setiembre do 1930 )
(Buenos Aires, 1930), pp. 61-62.
59La Prensa, November 4, 1929.
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federal intervention in San Juan.^° Thus, the electoral
frauds which were the ominous trademark of the decada
infame—the era of conservative dominance over most of
Argentina from 1932 to the advent of Peronism—were
masterfully foreshadowed in San Juan in March I930, under
Yrigoyenist authorities.
At last, after almost two years under federal
control, the election of the new provincial authorities
was scheduled for Sunday, September 7, 1930.^^ But this
test never took place, for a day before, on September 6,
Yrigoyen was toppled from office. With his ouster an era
in Argentine history came to a close.
Carril Quiroga, Antecedentes electorales
,
n.p.
La Prensa March 9, 1930, asked if there were only 2,885
Bloquists in San Juan, why so much blood and persecution?
A sympathetic biographer of Yrigoyen stated that
the comparison between tne March 1930 and the April 1928
elections "no ofrecio mayores novedades," except for the
Federal Capital, where the previous Yrigoyenist strength
weakened. Luna, Yrigoyen
, p. 444.
ft")
Rafael Nestor Lencinas headed the Lencinist
ticket in Mendoza; Rufino Ortega that of the Yrigoyenists.
In San Juan, Federico Cantoni v/as the Bloquist candidate,
while Carlos Conforti was the Yrigoyenist one.
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CHAPTER XII
THE POPULIST MOVEl^ffiNTS OF MENDOZA AND SAW JUAN.
AN OVERALL VIEW
For Mendoza and San Juan the Radical interlude had
brought in many respects a social and political
transformation, which through hindsight appears even more
historically meaningful today than in the 1920' s. Beyond
the impact exercised by Lencinism and Bloquism on the
provincial societies and at the national level during
their own times, their importance must also be considered
in a long-range perspective. For both movements
anticipated some of the significant changes which took
place throughout Argentina during the 1940 's and 1950' s.
Peronism was not patterned after Lencinism and Bloquism,
but in many ways, its nature, structure and performance
paralleled those of the popular regimes of Mendoza and
San Juan in the 1920' s.
Let us attempt a comprehensive view and further
generalizations on the historical significance of the
two Cuyo movements.
Lencinism and Bloquism symbolized a practical
regional effort to bring about new social conditions for
the common man and to implement a new style in provincial
politics and citizen participation. In the process,
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successes and frustrations intermingled, for although
Lencinism and Bloquism were prominent regional, socially-
oriented movements in the 1920- s, politics became
extremely personalized, federalism a largely ignored
principle and even reform an evasive goal.
The socio-economic conditions in the two Cuyo
provinces late in the second decade of the century
favored the development of the incipient populism,
especially in San Juan, where a more primitive physical
and cultural environment prevailed. Its geographical
isolation contributed to economic stagnation and to the
preservation of a rigidly stratified society. By and large,
the impoverished and disorganized masses were subject to
difficult, sedentary living and working conditions. Against
this background, the significant social and political
reforms which took place in Cuyo appear all the more
remarkable considering the obstacles the Lencinas and
Cantonis had to face at a time of prevalent elitism and a
generalized lack of protection for the poor sectors. For as
a social, political and economic class, the upper segments
resisted the cultural evolution put in motion by Lencinism
and Bloquism, labeling them at times as simply "Communist"
inspired. Social equality did not convey the same meaning
for the upper and lower sectors, and dignity was a concept
reserved almost entirely for the well-to-do.^
'"This elitist frame of mind is well illustrated by
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Under such conditions, the emergence of the regional
popular movements provoked a social collision by
challenging the traditional dominant forces. Among the
symbolic expressions of class differentiation, few will
exemplify this point better than the role of clothing.
Its significance has been directly and indirectly stressed
throughout this study. Clothing was an indicator of
hierarchy for all the groups. Socio-economic status and
party identification were adscribed to an individual
according to the way that person dressed. The alpargata
was perhaps the best exponent of a definite political
affiliation, being an unmi stakeable sign of lower class.
As such, it became a symbol of pride to the humble sectors,
while the non-populist groups associated the alpargata
with the rabble who constituted the vertebral column of
Lencinism and Bloquism.
an editorial comment of La Prensa
, when Orfila's
government in Mendoza enacted the Sunday holiday and the
minimum wage for the domestic service. Heading its
comment as "Violent reforms," this paper believed that
the families with some status would be forced to experience
a period of discomfort when they did not have on their day
of leisure a cook to prepare their meals or maids to clean
up their houses. April 20, 1926,
2The Argentine Socialist leader Americo Ghioldi, in
truly Socialist fashion, has equated the alpargata with
the traditional vices of the comites of a bygone era, the
taba, the asado , and the wine, all of which had formerly
been used to buy votes on election day. Alparyatas ^ libros
en la historia argentina (Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 37.
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In view of the irreconcilable, viewpoints held by the
clashing political forces, it might be asked whether the
social reforms achieved in Mendoza and San Juan could had
been accomplished by less severe fiscal and political
procedures. Any answer would certainly be speculati^re. What
is certain, however, is that both Cuyano movements became
engaged, albeit to different degrees, in unjustifiable
practices that neither institutionally nor morally were
proper to impose upon an ideologically pluralist society.
For in spite of their public assertions, the Lencinas and
Cantonis were above all caudillos of a party rather than
rulers for all their comprovincianos
. In their efforts for
improving the daily life of the common man, which they
certainly did, their actions did not always respect
reasonable limitations to their power; their leaders many
times forced their will upon the provincial scene as if
instead of being the choices of a majority, they were the
absolute masters of their states.
The influential factor which greatly contributed to
the promotion of Lencinism and Bloquism outside Cuyo, was
the role they played within the anti-Personalist sectors
due to their implacable hatred for Yrigoyen. Ironically,
this represented a tremendous contradiction because
ideologically there was closer affinity between the
Lencinists and Cantonists and the Yrigoyenist Radicals,
than between the former and the so-called "galeritas, "
•
the Radical anti-Personalists who were more conservative-
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oriented.
In fact, the Cuyano leaders championed the cause of
reform in their regional sphere of influence to an extent
that the Yrigoyenist Radicals did not even attempt to
match at the national level. If Yrigoyen presumed to be a
reformer, Jose Nestor Lencinas was a pioneer in implementing
social reforms and Federico Cantoni even surpassed the
achievements of his Mendozan mentor. If Yrigoyen fought
strenuously for a fundamental political reform, the secret
ballot, Cantoni extended it to women. The country as a
whole had to wait almost a quarter of a century to enjoy
the same right.
But the intra-party differences, created to a large
extent by the independent leadership exerted by Jose Nestor
Lencinas in Mendoza and by Jones' assassination in San Juan
were crucial in provoking an irreparable breach between the
populist movements of Cuyo and the Yrigoyenist Radicals. As
old conflicts bred new ones, a significant incongruity
resulted in which Yrigoyenists on one side, and Lencinists
and Bloquists on the other, both groups in theory
representing advanced social movements, sided with
conservative political sectors or groups less progressive
than theirs, for the exclusive purpose of attacking and
destroying each other.
Writers with pro-Radical Yrigoyenist inclinations have
contended that the Cuyo movements were not in fact truly
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Radical. Certainly, although both stemmed from the same
trunk and shared some essential characteristics, Yrigoyen
was neither involved in the excesses which were part of
the actions of Lencinism and Cantonism, nor he was a
reformer of the caliber of Jose Nestor Lencinas or
Pederico Cantoni. Furthermore, after the 1930 revolution,
neither Lencinism nor Bloquism returned to be a part of
the Union Civica Radical.
Unlike Lencinism, the Union Civica Radical Bloquista
re-emerged in 1932 as the foremost political force in San
Juan.-^ But if in some respects this movement represented
in 1932 a continuation of the popular force it was in the
1920 's, it was besieged again by the fury of its local
adversaries. National politics had changed significantly
also. Argentina's president was now conservative General
Agustfn P. Justo, not Yrigoyen; hence, Bloquism more than
ever, found its influence confined to the provincial
sphere. In fact, from an ideological standpoint, Cantonism
became an anomaly in a country where the conservatives
were rigorously imposing their v/ill. Such was the weakness
besetting the third Bloquist government that in February
1934 it was violently ousted from power in a fashion
resembling nineteenth century caudillism, by the same
^Contrary to what Senator Diego Luis Kolinari had
predicted in 1929, in the provincial election held on
November 1931, Federico Cantoni was overwhelmingly elected
governor of San Juan for the second time.
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elements which fought against it in the 1920's/
Lencinism and Bloquism were rooted in the same
populist principles and followed a similar pattern of
authoritarian politics. Both were pioneers in placing in
the hands of the State the responsibility for altering the
inflexible social determinism imposed by the traditional
sectors, which an author has referred to with a sentence
which epitomizes the principle of the privilege: "we are
born either gentlemen or sans-culottes.
Nevertheless, Lencinism and Bloquism also presented
basic differences resulting from the disparities in the
personalities of their leaders. In general, Lencinism was
more austere and reform-minded under Jose Nestor Lencinas,
4
Vvhen Pederico Cantoni died in July 1956, he was no
longer regarded as a "dangerous Communist," for age and
moderation had softened his early implacable political
zeal. Nobody wanted to assassinate him any more, and he
even was on speaking terms with some of his former bitter
enemies. His brother Aldo had served as National Senator
again from 1932 to 1941, and died in September 1948.
Bloquism is still a strong provincial party, but today it
represents a political entity with a somewhat different
orientation from its original one.
^Ricardo Saenz Hayes, Ramon J. Carcano . En las
letras, el gobierno ^ la diplomacia , 166Q-194"6 TBuenos
Aires, I960'), p. 355. A Mendozan writer who was extremely
critical of Lencinas and Lencinism, stated that the
masses were not "un conjunto de hombres libres y
concientes. . . . " but "una entidad muerta, depresiva en su
laxitud, cobarde en su abandono. . .anulativa de todo
espiritu de virilidad." Severe P. del Castillo, "La
servidumbre y el servilisrao en las raasas populares y en
los empleados y funcionarios publicos," Revista Arpentina
de Ciencias Politicas, XXXIV, 1927, 483.
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but reached its peak of popularity under Carlos
Washington. Bloquism in the 1920 's presented a more
coherent line under the rule of Federico and Aldo Cantoni,
although Federico's role appears to have been the most
significant of the four caudillos. Moreover, besides
personal variances, the Bloquist performance seems to have
been more determined and effective. It successfully ended
the problem with the letras, maintained a firm position in
forcing the business groups to accept its social and
fiscal reforms, and used the provincial budget as a social
and economic leveler to an extent previously unknown in
Argentina. But although Bloquism appears to have been more
responsible than lencinism in handling the public purse,
in general the Sanjuanino movement ruled in a harsher
fashion than Lencinism.
Because of their special situation vis-a-vis Buenos
Aires, Lencinism and Bloquism also championed the cause of
federalism. It is somewhat difficult, however, to judge
the real dimension of their avowed federalism because
during the Yrigoyen's presidencies, Buenos Aires
represented a major center of opposition to them. Therefore,
for Lencinism and Bloquism their defense of federalism
meant their own survival. As a general rule those who
advocated the supremacy of the federalist principle were
those sectors who were in control of the provincial power.
The opposition continually demanded the assistance of
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Buenos Aires in redressing their grievances. Although the
provincianos are federalist at heart because of their
natural revulsion against the all-absorbing dominance of
Buenos Aires, in reality the social, economic, and
political structure of Argentina made them, almost in a
fatalistic way, heavily dependent on Buenos Aires.
^
Whether sincere, feigned or simply the result of political
circumstances, Lencinism and Bloquism thought of
themselves as truly defenders of federalism.
Eventually, the encroachment of partisan political
interests in the relationships between the central
government and the provinces of Mendoza and San Juan, made
their defense of the federalist principle seem a sham. For
during the Radical era, from 1916 to 1930, both provinces
were intervened five times each, which is a record even
for a period noticeable for the large number of federal
interventions. Referring to this natural weakness of the
provincial governments in relation to the federal
authorities, Federico Cantoni, in a 1925 letter to Carlos
Washington Lencinas, in which he rejected the overtures of
some Yrigoyenists to regain the support of Bloquism and
Writing in 1933, Ezequiel Martinez Estrada
referred to the biased and neglectful attitude of the man
from Buenos Aires: "for the inhabitant of Buenos Aires, to
look toward the interior is to look outside, abroad. Eor
him the interior is Europe.... The interior. .. signifies
work, illness, ignorance and oblivion. Nothing there
interests us." X-Ray of the Pampa (Austin, 1971), p. 232.
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Lencinism, wrote that the two Cuyano parties should be
united to avoid "playing the sad role of squeezed lemons;
they lose the juice and then they are discarded in the
garbage." But even such a special regional unwritten
alliance as the one constituted by Bloquists and
Lencinists, was rendered useless when confronting the
more powerful central government.
Furthermore, the National Congress in the 1920 's
conclusively proved the necessity that National Senators
should be elected by direct vote of the electorate, not by
the provincial legislators. This reform was achieved in
1949. But a reform still waiting to become a reality is
that the admission of congressional members be made
automatic, and thus, not be left subject to the potentially
dangerous procedure of leaving in the hands of a
politically-minded majority the pov/er to accept or reject
the credentials of the newly-elected representatives.
Because this type of manipulation prevailed in the 1920 's,
Mendoza and San Juan were denied the constitutional right
of proper representation in Congress. For years, Mendoza
had only one Senator instead of two, and there were none
for San Juan. Argentines had adopted many foreign
constitutional models, but as stated by Jose Nicolas
'^Letter dated May 18, 1925. Correspondence in the
hands of Antulio Lencinas.
Matienzo, "we make them work Creole style.
A comprehensive view of the goals, actions and symbols
of the Cuyano popular parties clearly reveals that they
were a harbinger of Peronism. Lencinism and Bloquism, of
course, were regional, semi-agrarian populist parties,
limited in scope, inorganic and unsophisticated, in contrast
with more modern and developed political expressions of what
Americo Ghioldi referred to as "industrial populism. "^ But
in addition to the logical variances resulting from the
changes produced by the technical and social evolution,
there is a historical continuity based on some essential
characteristics linking the provincial regimes of Mendoza
and San Juan in the 1920 's and the national Feronist
movement in the 1940 's and 1950' s.
These three movements were basically a product of the
mentality, social characteristics and political behavior
peculiar to the Argentines. "^^ In the history of this century
o
Jose Nicolas Matienzo, Nuevos temas politicos e
historicos (Buenos Aires, 1930), p. 17.
^Personal interview with Americo Ghioldi, July 22,
1972. Buenos Aires.
^^The ideological association between Yrigoyenist
Radicalism and Peronism has been stated by several authors.
Por example, two Argentine sociologists stated that the
distinctive feature of Peronism was its not having
absorbed "disposable masses," social and economically
marginal, migrating from the rural interior to the urban
centers, but having organized them, because the masses
had already expressed their longings for reform and social
justice. Thus, Peronism would represent "a continuation and
expansion of the characteristics already detected in
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strong similar facets can be detected both in the
idiosincracy and actions of many decades ago in the era of
the "politica criolla," and in the governments freely
elected by the people. Even in more recent times, some of
these traits appeared during the interludes of what can be
called the years of the "military-cracia.
"
These characteristics are openly manifested in the
populist goals of Lencinism, Bloquism, and Peronism. Their
highest aspirations were to achieve the social i*edemption
of the underdogs, to eliminate the preeminence of a social
and economic elite, and to make effective a better
distribution of wealth within the established economic order.
In the quest for these goals, they also shared the
personalist structure of their movements, the immanent
authoritarianism of their political leaders, the emotional
tone in which their ideological principles were vented, the
class inferences which to a large extent constituted the
basic intrinsic content of the populist movements, their
lack of tolerance or simply, their disdain for the rights
of the opposition, their tendency to manipulate the
Radicalism." Dario Canton and Jose Luis Moreno, "Bases
sociales del voto radical en la Argentina de 1928/30,"
Revista Latinoamericana de ^ociologia , VI (September and
December, 1970), 464.
Felix Luna extends the continuity of the popular
pattern to the nineteenth century, asserting that the
movements of the last fifty years, "radicales,
yrigoyenistas o peronistas," have "el mismo perlil as
those of the equestrian caudillos. Los caudillos
(Buenos Aires, 1971), p. 34.
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Judiciary, their partisan interference with the press and
other means of political communication with the people,
and the adoption of similar and effective socio-political
symbols, such as language, dress, cultural activities,
and an intense spiritual association with the vernacular.
•^-'There is a widely known grade school verse inArgentina which has been adapted through the years forpolitical purposes, and constitutes another examcle of thecontinuity of the popular symbols. The original strophes
En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo las espinas,
ly en el medio de mi pecho
la Republica Argentina:
Felix Luna (Yrigoyen , p. 419, and Olguin, "...y en
el medio de mi pecho...," p. 35) cited this version
referring to Carlos Washington Lencinas:
En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo las espinas,
iy en el medio de mi pecho
Carlos Washington Lencinas
1
Luna and Olguin do not provide the source, but the
author found a similar verse in La Palabra
,
April 16, 1925,
stating:
^ + n t •Las estrellas en el cielo
en el suelo las espinas
y en todas partes Lencinas
el primero de este suelo.
The association with Peronism appeared in 1944 when
President Pedro P. Ramirez lowered the rents in the city of
Buenos Aires. Then the adaptation read as follows:
En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo los claveles
y un jvival para Ramirez
que bajo los alquileres.
And a year later, at the time of the presidential
campaign the verse was changed to:
En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo el algodon,
y en el medio de mi pecho
el retrato de Peron.
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All these factors combined seem to explain to a
large extent why throughout several decades the popular
movements in Argentina—regi onal and national—have been
projecting themselves as an exclusive and conclusive
political solution. This rigid approach, a blessing or a
curse as the only alternatives, beclouded the proclaimed
altruism of their purposes with a dose of distortion and
dogmatism. This was illustrated by the Yrigoyenist
Radicals for whom the choice was strictly between the
"Causa" or the "Regimen"; for the Cantonists, with the
dilemma of deciding between "the Bloquists or the
bordalesas," and for the Peronists, simply the alternative
of selecting between "Peron or Braden.""^^
Lencinism and Bloquism in the early decades of the
century were mocked by their opponents as movements
reneging on Argentina's traditions. But they were, in fact,
a type of the caudillismo so rooted in Argentine life.
1 ?
Because Bloquism continued its political life
independently of Peronisra, these two movements have been
regarded as two different entities. This was not the case
with Lencinism, which after practically disappearing from
the political scene in 1930, years later appeared
historically linked v/ith Peronism. When in November 1951
homage was paid to Carlos Washington Lencinas on the
anniversary of his death, one orator stated that
"yesterday's chusma de alpargata are today's dencamisados
.
'
La Palabra , November 12, 1951. Likewise, popular poetry,
in true Lencinist tradition, also expressed the same view:
Fue precursor de la hora^[Carl03 V/ashington]
que hoy disfruta la nacion'
que el inclito Peron
engrandece cada dia
con honda sabiduria
de preclaro conductor.
Ibid.
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National Deputy lllatias Sanchez Sorondo was wrong when he
asserted that San Juan during the rule of Federico
Cantoni was "in the center of wildest Africa or in the
depths of the barbarian Polynesia. "^^ No, San Juan under
the Cantonis, as well as Mendoza under the Lencinas,
were in Argentina. And both movements, although at times
rough, violent and tainted with corruption, but always
authoritarian, paternalistic and committed to the
improvement of the needy sectors, did not represent an
isolated example in Argentine history in this century.
They attest to the historical continuity, both in
principles and procedures, of the popular movements in
that country in the last sixty years, regardless whether
the masses involved were called "chusma de alpargatas"
or "descamisados.
"
These movements generated and nurtured themselves
with emotional, class-oriented, popular fervor, endorsed
by an unquestionable support from the majority of the
citizens at the ballot boxes. However, their governments
can not be called democratic ones. Historical evidence
seems to indicate that in the basic framework of
Argentine politics since the enactment of the Saenz Pena
Law, even if the ruler represented the popular will, it
did not necessarily mean that democracy was a reality.
The central achievements of Lencinism and Eloquism
lies in having spearheaded the trend to social equality
'^See p. 361.
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by driving deep wedges into a traditional system which
understandably resisted change. However, the Cuyano
movements became self-entrapped by the methods they
applied to achieve their goals. But this predicament
did not only plague lencinism and Bloquism. It is a
quandary that in spite of the enactment of the Saenz
Pena Law still bedevils Argentine political life.
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PRIMARY SOURCES
Unpublished Materials
For the period covered in this work the Archivo
Historic© of Mendoza was only partially organized and it
was not as rich as could be expected. The explanation for
this seems to be mostly political, for not all the
pertinent documentation was properly channeled into the
official repository. The changes of governments and the
incurable bureaucracy seem to have affected the appropriate
gathering of the documentation. The Archivo Historico of
San Juan has scant material on the Cantoni era up to 1930.
The main reason given for this situation is the January
1944 earthquake which destroyed the city. But political and
bureaucratic considerations may also partially explain the
scarcity of documentation.
The Archive of the Legislature of Mendoza has valuable
items, though unfortunately some official reports are not
available. The Archive of the Legislature of San Juan, more
modest than Mendoza' s, is well kept but is not as complete
as one would desire.
Other manuscript sources for this study seem to be
more limited or less accessible. I was kindly allowed to
consult the personal correspondence held by Horacio Antulio
lencinas and Jorge Albarracin Godoy, in Mendoza, and the
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late Jose P. Barreiro in Buenos Aires. To fill the gap I
conducted interviews with a wide range of participants. In
addition to the interviews I was able to obtain responses
in writing from several others to a long general
questionnaire I submitted to them. I am very grateful for
their cooperation.
Interviews
Aguirre Molina, Raul (Mendozan, army officer).
Arroyo, Carlos Alberto (Mendozan, writer).
Barreiro Jose P. (Journalist, close collaborator of
Pederico and Aldo Cantoni).
Cantoni, Aldo Hermes (Son of Aldo Cantoni).
Cantoni, Graciela C. de (Federico Cantoni's wife).
Cantoni, Rosalina Plaza de (Aldo Cantoni's wife),
Carmona Rios, Indalecio (San Juan, Socialist leader).
Draghi Lucero, Juan (Mendozan, historian).
Ghioldi, Americo (Socialist leader).
Lanus, Adolfo (Ex-Governor of La Rioja Province,
1926-1928).
Lencinas, Horacio Antulio (Jose Nestor Lencinas' son).
Lencinas, Jose Hipolito (Jose Nestor Lencinas' son).
Lencinas, Rafael Nestor (Jose Nestor Lencinas' son).
Marianetti, Benito (Mendozan, Communist leader).
Maurln Navarro, Emilio (San Juan, historian).
Molina, Raul A. (Historian, legal representative of
the government of Mendoza in the Federal Capital,
1924).
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Moyano, Francisco J. (Metidozan, educator).
Palero Infante, Ruben (Mendozan, Radical leader).
Perkins, Manuel (Journalist in La Palabra, Mendoza,
in the 1920' s). *
Rodriguez, Eudoro (Close political friend of
Federico Cantoni).
Roveda, Alberto A. (Member of the Mosca intervention
to Mendoza in 1925)
.
Segura, Jorge I. (Mendozan, historian).
Trianes, Francisco J. (Lencinist leader).
Tudela, Ricardo (Writer and Lencinist leader).
Varese, Carmen Peffaloza de (San Juan, educator)
Videla, Horacio C. (San Juan, historian).
Questionnaires
Aguinaga, Carlos E. (Mendozan, National Senator, 1966).
Albarracfn Godoy, Jorge (Mendozan, Radical leader).
Correas, Edmundo (Mendozan, historian).
Gelardi, Santos (Mendozan, Lencinist leader).
Guevara, Juan Ramon (Mendozan, sociologist. Rector
of the National University of Cuyo, 1935-40).
Jofre, Emilio (Mendozan, Governor-elect, 1966).
Velasco Quiroga, Hilario (Mendozan, Radical leader).
Vicchi, Adolf 0 A. (Mendozan, Governor 1941-43; and
also Columbia University, Oral History Program.
Luis Alberto Romero, interview with Dr. Vicchi,
August 5, 1971).
Other Unpublished documents
Provincia de San Juan. Legislatura. Camara de
Diputados. Actas, 1923-1927.
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Camara de Senadores. Actas,
1923-1928. '
Asambleas legislativas. Actas
1923-1928.
Printed Documents
Laws and Decrees
Provincia de Mendoza. Boletin Oficial
, 1918-1924.
leyes usuales ^ sua decretos reglamentarios
hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1924 . Compiled by
Bernardo A. Benzoni and Basilic C. de Larrea.
2 vols. Buenos Aires, 1925.
Recopilaci on de leyes
, 1926-1937 * 2 vols.
Mendoza, 1938.
legislative Debates
Provincia de Mendoza. Honorable Convencion
Constituyente, 1915-1916. Diario de sesiones .
2 vols. Mendoza, 1917.
—— Legislatura. Camara de Diputados. Diario
de sesiones , 1922-1924.
—— Camara de Senadores. Diario de
sesiones , 1918-1919, 1922-1924.
Provincia de San Juan. Honorable ^convencion
reformadora de la constitucion. Diario de sesiones .
San Juan, 1927.
Republica Argentina. Congreso Nacional. Camara de
Diputados. Diario de sesiones , 1916-1930.
Camara de Senadores. Diario de
sesiones, 1916-1930.
Reports of Executive and Legislative Bodies
Republica Argentina. Ministerio de Agricultura. Direc-
cion General de Comercio e Industria. Censo ^
comercial e industrial de la republica . Boletin
No, 22 - Mendoza. Buenos Aires, 1915.
478
"T""" . Censo comercial eindustrial de la republica
. Boletin No. 24. ~
San Juan
. Buenos Aires, 1916.
~~ Memoria de la
Direccion General de Inmigraci on . Bueno3""Airea.
192^:
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria del Banco
de la Nacion Argentina
. 1918 . Buenos Aires, 1919.
1920.
1923.
1924.
1925.
1926.
1927.
1928.
1929.
Memoria.
.
.1919. Buenos Aires y
Memoria. .1922. Buenos Aires
^
Memoria. .1923. Buenos Aires
^
Memoria. .1924. Buenos Aires,
Memoria. .1925. Buenos Aires,
Memoria. .1926. Buenos Aires,
Memoria. .1927. Buenos Aires,
Memoria. .1928. Buenos Aires,
Las letras de tesoreria.
Denuncia de la Ca.ja de Conversion al Minis tro
de Hacienda, Eleodoro lobos . Buenos Aires, 1907.
Ministerio de Justicia e Instruccion Publica.
Consejo Nacional de Educacion. Educaci on comun en
la capital , provincias ^ territories nacionales .
1918. Buenos Aires, 1919.
Educacion . .
.
1919 .
Buenos Aires, 1920.
Educacion . . 1922 .
Buenos Aires, 1923.
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Educacion
. . .192^.
Bueaoa Aires, 1924.
~
Educacion.
. .1924.
Buenos Aires, 1925.
Educacion . . .1925
.
Buenos Aires, 1926. '
Educaci on . . .1926.
Buenos Aires, 1927.
Educacion
. . .1927.
Buenos Aires, 1928.
Educacion . .
.
1928 .
Buenos Aires, 1929.
Ministerio del Interior. Intervencion
nacional a la Provincia de San Juan. Buenos
Aires, 1921.
Intervencion nacional en
Mendoza ( 1917-191^ ). Buenos Aires, 1918.
Intervencion nacional en la
Provincia de San Juan
,
1923/26 . Informe
presentado por el General Eduardo Broquen .
Buenos Aires, 1926.
Memoria del Ministerio del
Interior , 1918-1919 . Buenos Aires, 1919.
Memoria . .
.
1919-1920 . Buenos
Aires, 1920.
Memoria. . .1920-1921 . Buenos
Aires, 1921.
Memoria . . 1921-1922 . Buenos
Aires, 1922.
Memoria . . 1922-1923 . Buenos
Aires, 1923.
Memoria. . .1923-1924 . Buenos
Aires, 1924.
Memoria . . .1924-1925 . Buenos
Aires, 1925.
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Aires, 1926.
Aires, 1927.
Aires, 1928,
Aires
,
1929.
Aires, 1930.
Memoria ... 1923-1926 . Buenos
Memoria
. . ,1926-1027. Buenos
Memoria
. .
«
1928-1929 » Buenos
Memoria , . .1929-1930 . Buenos
Tercer censo nacional. 12
vols. Buenos Aires, 1916-1916.
Provincia de Mendoza. Ministerio de Gobierno.
Legislacioa social de la Provincia de Mendoza
.
Mendoza, 1926.
-—~ El problema escolar en la
Provincia de Mendoza . Inf orme general del Ing .
Leopoldo Suarez sobre el estado de la
instruccion primaria ^ su organizacion ,
elevado al P.E. por el Comisionado Interventor
al iniciarse el e.iercicio de 1927 « Plan de
reformas ^ proyecto de presupuesto , sometido a
la aprobacion del Excmo . Gobierno . Decretos del
P.E. concordantes con esta gesti on . Buenos
Aires, 1927.
Direccion General de Escuelas.
Gesti on economica ^ financiera . La obra del Sr .
Enrique Julio al frente del gobierno escolar .
Mendoza, 1920.
— Direccion General de Estadistica.
Resumen general del censo comercial e industrial
levantado exi 1921. Mendoza, 1922.
Sintesis de la
Direccion General de Estadistica , 1930-1931 .
Mendoza, 1932.
Sumario estadistico
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Salario minimo
. Inf orme
presentado al Poder Ejecutivo Provincial
GBy Manuel A. Zuloaga^l. Mendoza, 1927.
Ministerio de Hacienda. El emprestito
norteamericano de 1927 . Ley 9lBT Antecedentes
de su contratacion
. Rea.juste del misrap en 1933.
Mendoza, 1934.
"
Banco de Mendoza. Informe
Bobre el estado financiero al 15_ de enero de
1929 . Mendoza, 1929.
Las letras de tesoreria ante
la constitucion ^ leyes de la nacion. Mendoza,
1909.
——— Ley de presupuesto de gastos
(1924). Mendoza, 1924.
Memoria del Credito Publico .
Ano 1930 . Mendoza, 1931.
Ministerio de Industrias y Obras Publicas.
Memoria presentada a la Honorable Legislatura
per el Ministro de Industrias ^ Obras Publi cas
Ing
.
Leopoldo Suarez
,
1922-23 . Buenos Aires,
1924.
Mensajes ^ proyectos de leyes .
Pension a la ve .j e
z
e^ invalidez . Mendoza, 1922.
—-
— El problema vinl cola . Memorial
de la intervencion nacional en Mendoza a la
Comision Asesora para la industria vi ti vini cola .
Mendoza, 1931*
Su vida , su trabaj_o, su progreso . Mendoza,
c. 1910. [^Special publication in homage to
Governor Emilio Civit].
Provincia de San Juan. Ministerio de Gobierno. Censo
agricola . Estadisticas _e inf ormaci ones de la
Provincia de San Juan . Buenos Aires, 1934.
Departamento del Trabajo,
Estadlstica y Archive. Las leyes de .jornada de
8 horas ^ salario minimo . San Juan, 1924.
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I^i^ro Blanco
. Documentos
oficiales de los hechos producidos en San Juan
y el procedimiento empleado por el GobernadoF"
Dr. Amable J ones . San Juan, IS^l' ~
Se^undo censo general de la
Provincia de San Juan
. Buenos Aires, 1910-1912.
Ministerio de Hacienda. Presupuesto
general para 1924. San Juan, 192^.
Other Printed Documents
Anastasi, Leonidas, and Jorge Albarracin Godoy.
Habeas Corpus interpuesto a favor del Senador
Nacional Electo Dr . Carlos Washington lencinas
^ querella criminal contra los autores de la
detenci5n
. liendoza, 1929.
Bialet Masse, Juan. El estado de las clases obreras
argentinas a comienzos de siglo
. C6rdoba« 1968.
Originally published in 1904. A report to
the Minister of the Interior Joaquin V.
Gonzalez, under Julio A. Roca's second
presidential term.
Castillo, Severe Gutierrez del. El Dr. Severe
Gutierrez del Castillo al pueblo culto de
Mendoza . Mendoza. 1922.
Corporacion de Tenedores de Titulos y Acciones.
Memoria del primer semestre del e.j ercicio de
1924-1923 . Buenos Aires, n.d.
Liga de Defensa de la Propiedad, la Industria y el
Comercio de San Juan. Memorial presentado al
poder E.jecutivo de la Nacion, 19 enero de
1924 . San Juan.
Municipalidad de la Capital QMendoza^]. Homena.je de
la Municipalidad de la Capital al Doctor
Jose Nestor Lencinas . Mendoza, 1928.
La Nueva Provincia Bahia Blanca . Homenaje de ' La
Nueva Provincia * al cincuentenari 0 de la
cludad de Bahia Blanca . Bahla Blanca, 1928.
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NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Newspapers
Diiring the Radical era (1916-1930) the press in
Argentina was free and newspapers could voice all
shades of political opinion. Both the General San
Martin's Library in Mendoza and the Franklin Library
in San Juan—the main public libraries in these
provinces—have excellent newspaper collections.
Naturally, it is richer in Mendoza, but both are very
well kept. An exception to this generalization concerns
Diario Nuevo
, a conservative daily of San Juan.
Although the Franklin Library has only a few volumes
of Diario Nuevo
, the full collection of this newspaper
is in private hands in the city of San Juan and was
made available to this researcher.
(a) Federal Capital
Critica
,
1918-1919; 1921-25; 1927-30.
La Epoca
,
1917-1930.
La Fronda, 1919, 1921-24, 1929.
La Nacion, 1917-30.
La Prensa , 1917-30.
La Razon, 1918-19, 1922-25, 1927-29.
La Van^uardia, 1918-19, 1921-24, 1927-29.
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(b) Mendoza
La Accion (General Alvear)
, 1927-28. Weekly,
Lencinist.
Los Andes
, 1917-30.
El Censor
, 1924. Weekly, conservative.
El Intransig:ente
, 1919-20. Radical, anti-
Lencinist.
El Latigo
, 1923. Weekly, Lencinist.
La Libertad, 1924-29. Conservative.
La Montana
, 1918-19. Lencinist.
La Opinion
, 1918-19, 1924. Voice of the
mercantile sectors, especially the
bodegueros
.
La Palabra, 1918-30. Lencinist.
Palanca, 1923-24. Weekly. Published by the
Provincial Federation of Teachers of
Mendoza.
Pensamiento Nuevo
,
1920. By-weekly, Anarchist.
El Regimen , 1917-18. Conservative.
El Socialista , 1918-29. Weekly, published by
the Mendozan Socialist Federation.
La Tarde , 1918-30. Conservative.
El Trabajo , 1925. Socialist.
La Voz Provincial , 1928-30. Yrigoyenist.
(c) San Juan
Debates , 1921-25. Independent, but anti-
Cantonist after 1923.
Jiario Nuevo , 1922-25. Anti-Cantonist.
La Reforma, 1923-30. Cantonist.
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Periodicals
The Review of the River Plate (Buenos Aires)
, 1928.
Pdginas de Columba (Buenos Aires), 1922-30. By-weekly.

